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CHAPTER I 
The t r a d i t i o n a l E n g l i s h p o l i t i c a l thought about freedom 
was predominantly " n e g a t i v e " u n t i l the second h a l f of the 19th 
century when the " p o s i t i v e " sense was p o p u l a r i z e d . The former i d e a , 
was a s s o c i a t e d before the 19th century w i t h Hobbes, Locke, and 
Adam Smith; w h i l s t i n t h a t century i t s e l f , i t became l i n k e d w i t h 
the C l a s s i c a l Economists, the U t i l i t a r i a n l i b e r a l s l i k e Bentham, 
James M i l l , John S t u a r t M i l l and Herbert Spencer. Whereas the l a t t e r 
was connected w i t h T.H.Green. According to the notion of "negative 
freedom", a person i s s a i d to be f r e e , to the extent t h a t he i s not 
i n t e r f e r e d w i t h or coerced by anything o u t s i d e h i m s e l f . The " p o s i t i v e " 
view i d e n t i f i e s l i b e r t y w i t h a man's power or c a p a c i t y to l i v e 
a c c o r d i n g to the b e s t of h i m s e l f . 
Hobbes was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the E n g l i s h t r a d i t i o n i n 
d e f i n i n g l i b e r t y as absence of e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t . T h i s t r a d i t i o n a l 
i d e a can be best i n t e r p r e t e d as the c o n d i t i o n of our being 
o u r s e l v e s . I n h i s words : "By l i b e r t y , i s understood, according to 
the proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n of the word, the absence of e x t e r n a l l 
impediments.: which impediments may o f t take away the man's power to 
do what hee would ; but cannot hinder him from u s i n g the power l e f t 
him according as h i s judgement and reason s h a l l d i c t a t e him".* 
Hobbes's m a t e r i a l i s m l e d him to observe t h a t "whatsoever i s so tyed^., 
or environed, as i t cannot move, but w i t h i n a c e r t a i n space, which 
space i s determined by the o p p o s i t i o n of some e x t e r n a l l • b o d y , we say 
i t hath not l i b e r t y to go f u r t h e r . And so of l i v i n g c r e a t u r e s , 
w h i l e s t they are imprisoned, or r e s t r a i n e d , w i t h w a l l s , or chayns; 
.... we use to say ; they are not a t l i b e r t y , to move i n such manner, 
2 
as without those e x t e r n a l l impediments they would." 
I t f o l l o w s then, t h a t according to the a p p r o p r i a t e 
meaning of the word - freedom, "a f r e e man, i s he, t h a t i n those 
t h i n g s , which by h i s s t r e n g t h and w i l l he i s able to do, i s not 
3 
hindred to doe what he has a w i l l t o . " I f t h i s were the 
- 2 -
t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a , could i t not be surmised t h a t J . S . M i l l and Herbert 
Spencer maintained the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of "negative freedom" ? 
M i l l f o r example, co n s i d e r e d l i b e r t y as a process by which men . 
pursued t h e i r own good i n t h e i r own way, so long as t h e i r a c t i o n s 
d i d not attempt to de p r i v e others of the same p r i v i l e g e or to 
4 
impede t h e i r e f f o r t s to o b t a i n i t . Spencer as w e l l argued t h a t 
according to the concept of l i b e r t y , a person ought to be f r e e to do 
whatever h i s d e s i r e s d i c t a t e only w i t h i n the p r e s c r i b e d l i m i t s - th a t 
5 
each i s f r e e . 
An attempt has been made so f a r , to show what freedom 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y i m p l i e s . But, there i s another aspect of i t which 
r e q u i r e s e l u c i d a t i n g . I f l i b e r t y means pursuing our own good i n our 
own way and accor d i n g to our means without hindrance from other 
people, w i t h what j u s t i f i c a t i o n do people c l a i m such p r i v i l e g e ? 
Before the emergence of Benthamites, the conventional wisdom was 
that l i b e r t y was a n a t u r a l r i g h t c o n f e r r e d upon men by God, or 
Nature i n v i r t u e of t h e i r s p e c i a l s t a t u s . Hence not only Hobbes but 
a l s o Locke i n s i s t e d t h a t freedom belonged to people as a n a t u r a l 
r i g h t . I n order to e s t a b l i s h t h a t i d e a , both men had to co n s i d e r 
the n a t u r a l s t a t e man was o r i g i n a l l y i n ( s t a t e of na t u r e ) before 
j o i n i n g w i t h others to form a p o l i t i c a l or c i v i l s o c i e t y . Signs of 
t h i s i m p l i c i t b e l i e f i n the o r i g i n a l s t a t e of t h i n g s could a l s o be 
seen i n Adam Smith's w r i t i n g s . 
On examining the c o n d i t i o n i n which men were placed by 
nature, Hobbes affi r m e d t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s were not only equal, 
s e l f - s e e k i n g and f r e e , but a l s o t h e r e was always a tendency f o r 
them to hurt each other. Accordingly, i f the r e were no 
" common power to keep them a l l i n awe, they are i n th a t 
c o n d i t i o n which i s c a l l e d warre; and such a warre, a s , i s of every 
Q 
man a g a i n s t every man." Human l i f e , he conceived, was r a t h e r too 
com p e t i t i v e and seldom e n t i r e l y f r e e of the s t r u g g l e f o r symbols 
of s t a t u s , t h a t the s o l u t i o n to p e a c e f u l l i v i n g was only to c r e a t e 
a u n i f i e d and s i n g l e a u t h o r i t y w i t h power to compress an anarchy of 
- 3 -
w i l l s . Although such a c r e a t i o n i n v o l v e d l i m i t i n g i n d i v i d u a l 
l i b e r t y , i t was n e v e r t h e l e s s n e c e s s a r y to avoid " t h a t c o n d i t i o n 
which i s c a l l e d warre." 
What causes t h i s d e s i r e to hurt ? One cause i s t h a t 
goods are s c a r c e . " t h e r e f o r e i f any two men d e s i r e the same 
t h i n g , which n e v e r t h e l e s s they cannot both enjoy, they become 
7 
enemies, and endeavour to destroy or subdue one another." 
The man who g a i n s the goods cannot c l a i m f u l l ownership because the 
o t h e r man can u n i t e w i t h o t h e r s and d i s - p o s s e s s him of the goods. 
Another cause i s l a c k of t r u s t among people. People always regard 
themselves as t h r e a t s to each o t h e r ' s l i f e and l i b e r t y . A person 
cannot w i t h c e r t a i n t y t e l l how h i s neighbour or f r i e n d s f e e l about 
him, and as such cannot confide much i n them. S i m i l a r l y h i s 
neighbours t h i n k the same way about him. The d i f f i c u l t y i s not t h a t 
they l a c k reason : i t i s r a t h e r the f a c t of being r a t i o n a l and 
a n t i c i p a t i n g danger which makes everyone a p o t e n t i a l enemy of another. 
I n other words, i f any man i s i n doubt about h i s neighbours 
i n t e n t i o n s , he ought to s t r i k e f i r s t . But, a t the same time, i t i s 
a l s o r a t i o n a l f o r h i s neighbour to s t r i k e at him f i r s t f o r both 
c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t to each other. F i n a l l y , competition f o r honour 
and d i g n i t y to which men are exposed can l e a d to t h e i r i n j u r i n g 
themselves. 
B e s i d e s the d e s i r e to hurt caused by these f a c t o r s , t h e r e 
was another f e a t u r e of the s t a t e of nature which i f pursued. 
unckecked was capable of making*social l i f e a' j u n g l e or-a w i l d e r n e s s . 
T h i s f e a t u r e was what Hobbes termed the r i g h t of nature and " .... i s 
the l i b e r t y each man hath to use h i s own power, as he w i l l h i m s e l f , 
f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of h i s nature ; t h a t i s to say o f " h i s own l i f e , 
and consequently of doing anything, which i n h i s own judgement and 
„8 
Reason, hee s h a l l conceive to be the a p t e s t means thereunto. 
But because i t was v a i n f o r an i n d i v i d u a l to have a r i g h t to the end 
( s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ) i f the r i g h t to the n e c e s s a r y means was denied 
him, i t followed, t h a t s i n c e every man had a r i g h t to p r e s e r v e 
h i m s e l f , he must a l s o be allowed a r i g h t to use a l l the means and to 
- 4 -
do a l l the a c t i o n s , without which he could not p r e s e r v e h i m s e l f . 1 
because the c o n d i t i o n of man i s a c o n d i t i o n of warre 
of every one a g a i n s t everyone ; i n which case everyone i s 
governed by h i s own Reason; and t h e r e i s nothing he can make use 
of, t h a t may not be a help unto him ; i n p r e s e r v i n g h i s l i f e 
a g a i n s t h i s enemies; i t f o l l o w e t h t h a t i n such a c o n d i t i o n , every 
9 
man has a Right to every thing; even to one another's body." 
I t was l e s s b e n e f i c i a l f o r people to l i v e i n a s t a t e 
of p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and e x e r c i s e e q u a l l y the r i g h t to e v e r y t h i n g . 
The e f f e c t s of t h i s r i g h t were the same almost, as i f there had 
been no r i g h t at a l l . Reason thus, suggested to them c o n d i t i o n s 
of s o c i e t y or peace, which t h e i r f e a r of v i o l e n t death, or t h e i r 
d e s i r e f o r a "commodious l i v i n g " , might l e a d them to accept. 
These "convenient a r t i c l e s of peace upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement" are according to Hobbes the p r i n c i p l e s which are 
g e n e r a l l y c a l l e d the laws of nature. These laws of nature were 
f u r t h e r d e s c r i b e d as "a precept, or g e n e r a l l r u l e , found out by 
Reason, by which a man i s forbidden to do, t h a t which i s d e s t r u c t i v e 
of h i s l i f e , or t a k e t h away the means of p r e s e r v i n g the same, and 
..10 
to omit, t h a t , by which he t h i n k e t h i t may be best p r e s e r v e d . 
They demanded " t h a t a man be w i l l i n g , when othe r s are 
so, too, as f a r r e - f o r t h , as f o r peace, and defence of h i m s e l f e he 
s h a l l t h i n k i t n e c e s s a r y , to l a y down t h i s r i g h t to a l l t h i n g s , and 
be contended w i t h so much l i b e r t y a g a i n s t other men as he would 
allow other men a g a i n s t h i m s e l f e . T h e motive of s u r r e n d e r i n g 
these r i g h t s " i s nothing e l s e but the s e c u r i t y of a man's 
person, i n h i s l i f e , and i n the means of so p r e s e r v i n g l i f e as not 
12 
to be weary of i t . " 
Although a person surrendered h i s r i g h t s , he never gave 
a l l up. There were some ne c e s s a r y f o r h i s e x i s t e n c e which he 
r e t a i n e d . "As i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r a l l men t h a t seek peace, to l a y 
down c e r t a i n r i g h t s of Nature; t h a t i s to say, not to have l i b e r t i e 
- 5 -
to do a l l they l i s t : so i s i t n e c e s s a r i e f o r man's l i f e , to 
r e t a i n e some, as r i g h t to governe t h e i r bodies, enjoy a i r e , water, 
motion, waies to go from p l a c e to p l a c e ; and a l l t h i n g s e l s e 
,.13 
without which a man cannot l i v e or not l i v e w e l l . 
I t might be u s e f u l to remark that when a person, i n an 
endeavour to secure peace, surrendered h i s freedom, t h a t such a 
t r a n s f e r d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y imply a diminution of h i s l i b e r t y or 
an i n c r e a s e f o r the r e c i p i e n t , but could be considered as a process 
by which he i n c r e a s e d the means by which he could e x e r c i s e h i s 
l i b e r t y . "To l a y downe a man's Right to anything, i s to d i v e s t 
h i m s e l f e of the l i b e r t y , of h i n d r i n g another of the b e n e f i t of 
h i s own Right to the same. For he t h a t renounceth, or p a s s e t h away 
h i s Right, g i v e t h not to any other man a Right which he had not 
before , because there i s nothing to which every man had not Right 
by Nature, but onely standeth out of h i s way, t h a t he may enjoy 
h i s own o r i g i n a l Right, without hinderance from him; not without 
hindrance from another. So t h a t the e f f e c t which redoundeth to one 
man by another man's d e f e c t of Right, i s but so much diminution of 
14 
impediments to use of h i s own Right o r i g i n a l l . " 
A l l i n a l l , though the s t a t e of nature was one of 
i n s e c u r i t y , i t was one of e q u a l i t y and freedom. But to a t t a i n peace 
and s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , i t was d e s i r a b l e f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to 
surrender p a r t of h i s freedom. T h i s t r a n s f e r was n e c e s s a r y to ensure 
t h a t he had scope to enjoy the l i b e r t y which he r e t a i n e d . As th e r e 
was no human a u t h o r i t y to r e g u l a t e the r e s p e c t i v e a c t i o n s of 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h a t s t a t e , every person had to depend on h i s 
p r i v a t e c o nscience. A c c o r d i n g l y , no person could complain about 
another's conduct as being u n j u s t , because every person acted as 
reason d i c t a t e d to him. These laws of naturewere always o b l i g a t o r y 
i n a person's conscience but i n some circumstances, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the realm of e x t e r n a l a c t i o n , they o b l i g e d the i n d i v i d u a l to a c t 
accord i n g to t h e i r d i c t a t e s only where th e r e was s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y . 
Freedom could be s a i d i n t h i s s t a t e to c o n s i s t i n obeying the 
- 6 -
d i c t a t e s of reason. 
Because of i n s e c u r i t y i n the s t a t e of nature, there i s 
c r a v i n g f o r a c i v i l s o c i e t y with a human a u t h o r i t y with power 
c o n f e r r e d on him by h i s s u b j e c t s to c o n t r o l t h e i r a c t i o n s . How can 
t h i s d e s i r e f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y be e x p l a i n e d ? I t can be done 
w i t h r e f e r e n c e to Hobbes's hedonism. Hobbes i d e n t i f i e d good w i t h 
" a p p e t i t e or d e s i r e " , v i r t u e - what b r i n g s p l e a s u r e to a person, 
and e v i l w i t h a v e r s i o n , v i c e - what i s unpleasant to an i n d i v i d u a l . 
From h i s study of human nature, he observed t h a t there are two 
types of motion. One i s v i t a l and the other v o l u n t a r y . V i t a l motions 
are those v i t a l p r o c e s s e s i n the animal organism which takes p l a c e 
without any d e l i b e r a t e or conscious e f f o r t on the p a r t of the 
animal. Voluntary a c t i o n s are the r e v e r s e . The endeavour, d i r e c t e d 
towards something which caused the v o l u n t a r y motion i s c a l l e d 
" a p p e t i t e or d e s i r e " . When i t i s d i r e c t e d away from something, i t i s 
c a l l e d a v e r s i o n . The fundamental forms of endeavour are thus 
" a p p e t i t e or d e s i r e " and a v e r s i o n , both being motions. 
On t h i s b a s i s , "good and e v i l l are names th a t s i g n i f i e 
.,15 
our a p p e t i t e s and a v e r s i o n s . The consensus of opinion among 
mankind i s t h a t not only peace i s good but a l s o the means of 
s e c u r i n g i t . I n other words, peace as an end and the means of 
a t t a i n i n g i t are good, v i r t u o u s , r i g h t , w h i l e war and causes 
g e n e r a t i n g i t are e v i l , v i c i o u s and wrong. I t i s because peace i s 
good and b r i n g s p l e a s u r e t h a t men are l e d to i n t r o d u c i n g r e s t r a i n t s 
upon themselves ; to e s t a b l i s h i n g a s o v e r e i g n and to i n v e s t i n g t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e powers i n him "by covenant only, which i s a r t i f i c i a l l . " 
The only process by which t h i s common power i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the people 11 .... i s to c o n f e r r e a l l t h e i r power and 
s t r e n g t h upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, t h a t may reduce 
a l l t h e i r W i l l s , by p l u r a l i t y of v o i c e s , unto one W i l l : which i s as 
much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare 
t h e i r Persons; and every one to owne, and acknowledge h i m s e l f e to be 
- 7 -
Author of whatsoever he th a t so beareth t h e i r Person, s h a l l Act, or 
cause to be Acted , " i n those t h i n g s which concerne the Common Peace 
and S a f e t i e ; and h e r e i n to submit t h e i r W i l l s , everyone to h i s W i l l , 
and t h e i r Judgements, to h i s Judgement i t i s a r e c a l l U n i t i e 
of them a l l , i n one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every 
man w i t h every man i n such manner, as i f every man should say to 
every man, I Au t h o r i s e and give up my Right of Governing myselfe, to 
t h i s Man, or to t h i s Assembly of men, on t h i s c o n d i t i o n , t h a t thou 
g i v e up thy Right to him, and Aut h o r i s e a l l h i s A c t i o n s i n l i k e 
manner. T h i s done, the Multitude so u n i t e d i n one Person, i s c a l l e d 
..16 
a Common-Wealth, i n L a t i n e C i v i t a s . 
A c i v i l s o c i e t y can e i t h e r be developed by i n s t i t u t i o n 
or a c q u i s i t i o n . The only d i f f e r e n c e between them i s t h a t i n one 
i n d i v i d u a l s choose t h e i r sovereign because of the f e a r they hold 
f o r one another, w h i l s t w i t h the other, they s u b j e c t themselves to 
the a u t h o r i t y they are a f r a i d of. On the whole, the motive urging 
men to form a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i s the f e a r of p a i n or une a s i n e s s 
they w i l l s u f f e r i f there i s none. 
As a c i v i l s o c i e t y i s c r e a t e d , men do a l s o make 
" A r t i f i c i a l c h a i n s c a l l e d c i v i l lawes, which they themselves, 
by mutuall covenants have f a s t n e d a t one end, to the l i p s of th a t 
Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the sover e i g n Power; and 
at the other end to t h e i r own E a r s . These bonds i n t h e i r nature but 
weak, may n e v e r t h e l e s s be made to hold, by the danger, though not 
17 
by the d i f f i c u l t y of breaking them." T h i s pact, being an 
a r t i f i c i a l t h i n g , can e a s i l y be broken by people, but f o r the 
consequences which may fo l l o w , i t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t to pr e s e r v e 
i t . 
C i v i l laws we are t o l d , " i s to every s u b j e c t , those r u l e s , 
which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, W r i t i n g , or 
oth e r s u f f i c i e n t Sign of the W i l l , to make use of, f o r the 
D i s t i n c t i o n of Righ t , and Wrong; t h a t i s to say, of what i s c o n t r a r y , 
..18 
and what i s not c o n t r a r y to the Rule. I n the s t a t e of nature, 
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man had no p o s i t i v e law to r e f e r to b e s i d e s reason or conscience i n 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g r i g h t from wrong. But i n the c i v i l s o c i e t y , there are 
c i v i l laws b u i l t f o r h i s guidance. The motive of making p o s i t i v e 
laws i s to e s t a b l i s h r e s t r a i n t s , without which there cannot be any 
peace, law was brought i n t o the world f o r nothing e l s e , but 
to l i m i t the n a t u r a l l i b e r t y of p a r t i c u l a r men, i n such a manner 
as they might not hurt but a s s i s t one another, and joyn together 
..19 
a g a i n s t a common Enemy. Was i t not the same view M i l l was 
r e p e a t i n g when he a f f i r m e d t h a t the only c o n d i t i o n i n which an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom could be j u s t i f i a b l y l i m i t e d wasto prevent harm 
20 
to o thers ? 
F u r t h e r to the r e l a t i o n between n a t u r a l l i b e r t y and 
p o s i t i v e laws, Hobbes observed t h a t " .... Right i s l i b e r t y , namely 
t h a t l i b e r t y which the c i v i l law l e a v e s us. But c i v i l law i s an 
o b l i g a t i o n ; and takes from us the l i b e r t y which the Law of Nature 
21 
gave u s . " Though c i v i l codes are infringements of i n d i v i d u a l 
n a t u r a l freedom, they do not a f f e c t a l l a s p e c t s of a person's l i f e . 
A c c o r d i ngly, Hobbes would allow a person " .... i n a l l c a s e s where 
the Sovereign has p r e s c r i b e d no r u l e , the l i b e r t y to do, or 
22 
f o r b e a r e , according to h i s own d i s c r e t i o n . " 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , i t could be s a i d t h a t i n Hobbes's 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy, the e x i s t e n c e of the s t a t e (hence c i v i l laws) 
was n e c e s s a r y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom and 
s e c u r i t y . T h i s view was not only shared by the u t i l i t a r i a n s but i t 
served a l s o to l i n k them w i t h Hobbes. He had argued t h a t p o s i t i v e 
codes enacted by the s o v e r e i g n or s t a t e ensure t h a t each man 
pursued h i s own end unmolested by o t h e r s . I n the same f a s h i o n , 
23 
Bentham pointed out t h a t the main f u n c t i o n of government was to 
p r o t e c t people from s u f f e r i n g s . The s t a t e f u l f i l l e d t h i s t a s k by 
c r e a t i n g r i g h t s which i t confered on them. Amongst these r i g h t s , 
were those of p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y . How does the s t a t e s e c u r e these 
r i g h t s ? 
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Bentham had t h i s answer to g i v e " The law does 
not say to a man, 'work and I w i l l reward you' but i t says to him, 
'work, and by stopping the hand t h a t would take them from you, I 
w i l l ensure to you the f r u i t s of your labour, i t s n a t u r a l and 
s u f f i c i e n t reward, which without me, you could not p r e s e r v e ' . I f 
i n d u s t r y c r e a t e s , i t i s the law which p r e s e r v e s : I f at the f i r s t 
moment we owe e v e r y t h i n g to labour, at the second, and every 
24 
succeeding moment, we owe e v e r y t h i n g to the law." 
Freedom would then c o n s i s t i n a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h 
the precepts of p o s i t i v e codes enacted by the s t a t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n those a s p e c t s of people's l i f e which were c o n t r o l l e d by such laws. 
I t was on t h i s b a s i s , Hobbes d e s c r i b e d what he c a l l e d the t r u e 
l i b e r t y of an i n d i v i d u a l , or i n other words - " the t h i n g s , 
which though commanded by the sovereign, he /the i n d i v i d u a l / , may 
25 • 
n e v e r t h e l e s s e , without i n j u s t i c e , r e f u s e to do; " 
Locke i n s i s t e d , as Hobbes d i d , t h a t f o r the f u l l 
r e a l i z a t i o n of l i b e r t y i n a c i v i l s o c i e t y i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t laws 
should e x i s t . Convinced t h a t l i b e r t y belonged to man as a n a t u r a l 
r i g h t , he proceeded to t r a c e i t from the p r i m i t i v e s t a t e man was i n 
before forming a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . He contended t h a t the s t a t e of 
nature was one " .... of p e r f e c t freedom /{where individuals.^fjS&jf^ 
p e r f e c t l y fre§7 to other t h e i r a c t i o n s , and dispose of t h e i r 
p o s s e s s i o n s and persons as they t h i n k f i t , w i t h i n the bounds of the 
law of Nature, without a s k i n g l e a v e or depending upon the w i l l of 
any other man. ,/Itwas alsq7 a s t a t e .... of e q u a l i t y , where i n a l l 
the power and j u r i s d i c t i o n i s r e c i p r o c a l , no one having more than 
another, ^and f o r evidence, he c a l l e d on the d i v i n e idea of c r e a t i o n ^ 
t h e r e being nothing more evident than t h a t c r e a t u r e s of the same 
s p e c i e s and rank promiscously born to a l l the same advantages of 
nature, and the use of the same f a c u l t i e s , should a l s o be equal one 
amongst another, without s u b o r d i n a t i o n or s u b j e c t i o n , u n l e s s the l o r d 
and master of them a l l should by any manifest d e c l a r a t i o n , of h i s 
w i l l , s e t one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and 
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c l e a r appointment, an undoubted r i g h t to dominion and s o v e r e i g n t y . " 
Though i t was a s t a t e of p e r f e c t freedom and e q u a l i t y , 
i t had i t s own laws to govern i t . These laws " which o b l i g e 
every one, and reason which i s th a t law, teaches a l l mankind who 
w i l l c o n s u l t i t , t h a t being a l l equal and independent, no one ought 
27 
to harm another i n h i s l i f e , wealth, l i b e r t y or p o s s e s s i o n s . " The 
e x i s t e n c e of t h i s law reminds us t h a t the s t a t e of p e r f e c t freedom 
and e q u a l i t y p r e v a i l i n g i n the s t a t e of nature was not one of 
l i c e n c e . "But though t h i s be a s t a t e of l i b e r t y , y e t i t i s not a 
s t a t e of l i c e n c e , though man i n t h a t s t a t e have an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e 
l i b e r t y to dispose of h i s person or p o s s e s s i o n s , y e t he has not 
l i b e r t y to des t r o y h i m s e l f , or so much as any c r e a t u r e i n h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n , but where some nobler use than i t s b a s i c p r e s e r v a t i o n 
28 
c a l l s f o r i t . " B e sides having t h e i r freedom and e q u a l i t y , i n d i v i d u a l 
had c e r t a i n other r i g h t s , f o r example, the r i g h t to punish anyone 
who overstepped the l i m i t s of f r e e a c t i o n or broke the law of 
natu r e . 
Locke p o s t u l a t e d as Hobbes d i d , t h a t i n t h i s s t a t e of 
nature, there was no s u p e r i o r human a u t h o r i t y , people depended on 
reason to c o n t r o l t h e i r a c t i o n . Freedom r e s i d e d i n obeying the 
d i c t a t e s of the laws of nature. 
I n Locke's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i d e a s , the s o l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e to the s t a t e of nature was the s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l 
s o c i e t y . Although a person could a c t f r e e l y i n the former, h i s 
freedom was "...very u n c e r t a i n and c o n s t a n t l y exposed to the 
i n v a s i o n of ot h e r s ; f o r being kings as much as he, every man h i s 
equa l , and the g r e a t e r p a r t no s t r i c t o b servers of e q u i t y and 
j u s t i c e , the enjoyment of the property he has i n t h i s s t a t e i s very 
.,29 
unsafe, very i n s e c u r e . 
Apart from i n s e c u r i t y , the s t a t e of nature l a c k e d three 
e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r s f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the l i v e s , property and 
l i b e r t y of mankind. These f a c t o r s were - l a c k of "an e s t a b l i s h e d 
s e t t l e d , known law, r e c e i v e d and allowed by common consent to be the 
standard of r i g h t and wrong, and the common measure to decide a l l 
- 11 -
c o n t r o v e r s i e s between them Secondly, .... i n d i f f e r e n t judge, 
w i t h a u t h o r i t y to determine a l l d i f f e r e n c e s according to the 
e s t a b l i s h e d law T h i r d l y , power to back and support the 
„30 
sentence when r i g h t to g i v e i t due e x e c u t i o n . Because of these 
inconveniences, men w i l l i n g l y gave up the powers which were r i g h t l y 
t h e i r s , of judging and punishing i n the s t a t e of nature, to form a 
p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y and to e n t r u s t c i v i l r u l e r s w i t h power over them. 
Locke grant/ed.7 t h a t c i v i l government i s the proper 
remedy f o r the inconveniences of the s t a t e of Nature, which must 
c e r t a i n l y be great when men may be judges i n t h e i r own case, s i n c e 
i t i s easy to be imagined t h a t he who was so u n j u s t as to do h i s 
brother an i n j u r y w i l l be s c a r c e be so j u s t as to condemn h i m s e l f 
31 
f o r i t . " Not only g r a n t i n g t h i s , he a l s o s t r e s s e d t h a t no 
p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y can be nor s u b s i s t , without having i n i t s e l f , the 
power to p r e s e r v e property / " i . e . l i f e , e s t a t e , freedom7, and i n 
order thereunto punish the o f f e n c e s of a l l those of that s o c i e t y 
„32 
These disadvantages which people s u f f e r i n the s t a t e of 
nature and which are h e l d as c o n t r i b u t o r y causes of men l e a v i n g i t , 
d e s p i t e i t s atmosphere of freedom and e q u a l i t y e x p l a i n some 
h e d o n i s t i c elements i n Locke. He a s s e r t e d t h a t by p l e a s u r e and p a i n , 
he " would be understood to s i g n i f y whatsoever d e l i g h t s or 
molests us; whether i t a r i s e s from the thoughts of our minds, or 
anything o p e r a t i n g on our bodies. For whether we c a l l i t 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , d e l i g h t , p l e a s u r e , happiness on the one s i d e , or 
u n e a s i n e s s , t r o u b l e , pain, torment, anguish, misery on the 
other, they are s t i l l but d i f f e r e n t degrees of the same t h i n g , and 
33 
belong to the idea of p l e a s u r e and p a i n , d e l i g h t or u n e a s i n e s s . " 
As p l e a s u r e and p a i n are produced i n us by the o p e r a t i o n 
of c e r t a i n o b j e c t s , e i t h e r on our minds or on our bodies, and i n 
d i f f e r e n t degrees, "what has an aptness to produce p l e a s u r e i n us 
i s what we c a l l good, and what i s apt to produce pain i n us we c a l l 
e v i l ; f o r no other reason but f o r i t s aptness to produce p l e a s u r e 
34 
and p a i n i n us, wherein c o n s i s t s our happiness and misery." 
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What generates the w i l l w i t h regard to a person's 
a c t i o n ? Locke p e r c e i v e d t h a t i t was not n e c e s s a r i l y caused 
by the " g r e a t e r good" the person had i n view but by the u n e a s i n e s s 
he was under. I t was t h i s uneasiness which determined the w i l l , and 
thus made the person a c t i n one way or the other. T h i s u n e a s i n e s s 
Locke d e s c r i b e d as d e s i r e , "which i s an uneasiness of the mind f o r 
want of some absent good." Experience shows a l s o t h a t a person 
"under any u n e a s i n e s s " cannot f e e l happy. Consequently, what 
"....determines the choice of our w i l l to the next a c t i o n , w i l l 
always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any l e f t , as the 
35 
f i r s t and n e c e s s a r y s t e p towards happiness." 
I t could then be deduced t h a t when people l e f t the s t a t e 
of nature to form a c i v i l s o c i e t y , they were moved by the d e s i r e to 
a t t a i n happiness, p l e a s u r e . Although the s t a t e of nature was one of 
p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and freedom, t h e r e were some inconveniences i n i t 
which made people f e e l d i s c o n t e n t e d . When men are d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h 
a s i t u a t i o n u n e a s i n e s s f o l l o w s , and t h i s tends to produce p a i n . But 
nobody wants to s u f f e r p a i n , Hence, people regard a c i v i l s o c i e t y 
as something good because they f e e l t h a t i t i s capable of y i e l d i n g 
p l e a s u r e i n the way of p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r property. T h i s property we 
were t o l d c o n s i s t s of " l i v e s , l i b e r t i e s and e s t a t e s " . 
Thus man entered i n t o a solemn compact w i t h o t h e r s , out 
of f e a r of i n s e c u r i t y and f o r the good of a l l , whereby they found a 
c i v i l s t a t e . They v e s t e d i n the s t a t e those powers of judgement and 
punishment which they forsook w h i l e l e a v i n g the s t a t e of nature. The 
a c t of judgement and punishment becomes now the duty of the s t a t e to 
perform. Locke h e l d t h a t "Whenever any number of men so u n i t e 
i n t o one s o c i e t y as to q u i t every one h i s e x e c u t i v e power of the law 
of Nature, and to r e s i g n i t to the p u b l i c , there and t h e r e only i s 
a p o l i t i c a l or c i v i l s o c i e t y . And t h i s i s done whenever any number 
of men, i n the s t a t e of Nature, e n t e r i n t o s o c i e t y to make one 
people one body p o l i t i c under one supreme government: or e l s e when 
any one j o i n s h i m s e l f to, and i n c o r p o r a t e s w i t h any government 
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a l r e a d y made. For hereby he a u t h o r i s e s the s o c i e t y , or which i s a l l 
one, the l e g i s l a t i v e t h e r e o f , to make laws f o r him as the p u b l i c 
good of the s o c i e t y s h a l l r e q u i r e , to the execution whereof h i s own 
36 
a s s i s t a n c e ( a s to h i s own d e c r e e s ) i s due." So f a r , i t has been 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the d e s i r e to p r e s e r v e h i s property urges man to 
surr e n d e r h i s freedom of doing whatever he l i k e s i n the s t a t e of 
nature i n order to j o i n the c i v i l s o c i e t y and be r e g u l a t e d by i t s 
p o s i t i v e codes. These laws c o n f i n e h i s n a t u r a l l i b e r t y . 
Although c i v i l laws are i n f r a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l n a t u r a l 
freedom, they are n e c e s s a r y not only f o r i t s maintenance but a l s o 
f o r i t s p r o t e c t i o n . No person w i l l l i k e h i s freedom r e s t r a i n e d by 
law, but f o r the ge n e r a l good of the s o c i e t y , i t i s important to 
e s t a b l i s h laws to ensure every person of h i s l i b e r t y . I n an i d e a l 
s o c i e t y made up of r a t i o n a l human beings, there may not be the need 
to e s t a b l i s h c i v i l laws, but i n a s o c i e t y which c o n t a i n s r a t i o n a l 
as w e l l as i r r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s , i t i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l to 
develop laws which should determine the scope of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . 
I n order to enact laws, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to choose a r e g u l a t i n g 
apparatus whose s o l e f u n c t i o n i t becomes. 
Laws a re e s s e n t i a l though a t times they may i n f r i n g e 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom. For those who t h i n k t h a t laws are i n i m i c a l to 
freedom, or obsessed a t t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , Locke had t h i s to 
say: law, i n i t s t r u e notion, i s not so much the l i m i t a t i o n -
as the d i r e c t i o n of a f r e e and i n t e l l i g e n t agent to h i s proper 
i n t e r e s t , and p r e s c r i b e s no f a r t h e r than i s f o r the g e n e r a l good of 
those under law so t h a t however i t may be mistaken, the end 
of law i s not to a b o l i s h or r e s t r a i n , but to pr e s e r v e and en l a r g e 
freedom. F o r i n a l l the s t a t e s of c r e a t e d beings, capable of laws, 
no 
where t h e r e i s no law the r e is^freedom. For l i b e r t y i s t o be f r e e 
from r e s t r a i n t and v i o l e n c e from o t h e r s , which cannot be where th e r e 
„37 
i s no law 
The s o c i e t y , hence the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , having been 
e s t a b l i s h e d , the l a t t e r e x i s t s as an umpire to p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l 
r i g h t s . Man having decided to j o i n w i t h o t h e r s to form a c i v i l 
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s o c i e t y and be c o n t r o l l e d by i t s r u l e s should remember 
t h a t " by consenting w i t h o t h e r s to make one body p o l i t i c 
under one government, puts h i m s e l f under an o b l i g a t i o n to 
everyone of t h a t s o c i e t y to submit to the determination of the 
m a j o r i t y , and to be concluded by i t , or e l s e t h i s o r i g i n a l compact 
whereby he w i t h others i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o one s o c i e t y , would 
s i g n i f y nothing, and be no compact i f he be l e f t and under no 
38 
t i e s t h a t he was i n before the s t a t e of Nature." The p o l i t i c a l 
a u t h o r i t y c r e a t e d by general consent, a c q u i r e s i t s power from 
the members of the s o c i e t y , and t h i s power should be used f o r the 
p u b l i c good of the s o c i e t y . 
The i d e a of consent p l a y s a dual r o l e i n Locke's 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy. F i r s t l y , Locke used i t to s e t t l e a 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e of h i s p e r i o d - namely, whether r u l e r s or 
kings d e r i v e d t h e i r r o y a l a u t h o r i t y from God, or r e s t e d on the 
consent of the people. King James and other S t u a r t s b e l i e v e d t h a t 
t h e i r r o y a l power o r i g i n a t e d from God. Hobbes a t t a c k e d t h i s 
39 
d o c t r i n e , and as has been shown e a r l x e r , he argued t h a t r u l e r s 
r e c e i v e d t h e i r a u t h o r i t y from the people. Locke, though d i f f e r i n g 
to some extent from him w i t h regard to the degree of power the 
r u l e r had, put the case more c l e a r l y , and i n f a c t , he i s h e l d as 
the t h e o r i s t who overthrew the b e l i e f i n the D i v i n e r i g h t of kings 
Secondly, t h i s n o t i o n of consent demonstrates t h a t 
freedom belongs to people as a n a t u r a l r i g h t . No a u t h o r i t y can 
r i g h t l y l i m i t people's l i b e r t y without t h e i r consent. Hence, Locke 
pointed out t h a t "every man being, as has been showed n a t u r a l l y 
f r e e , and nothing being a b l e to put him i n t o s u b j e c t i o n to any 
40 
e a r t h l y power, but only h i s own consent " Neither, can any 
c i v i l law be r e s p e c t e d i f i t i s not made by a l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
a u t h o r i t y - an a u t h o r i t y chosen by the consent of the people. Thus 
he i n s i s t e d that f o r the p o s i t i v e enactments of the l e g i s l a t u r e 
to be considered laws by the people, they must have " t h a t 
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which i s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y to . ,../lheir_7 being /Laws7, 
the consent of the s o c i e t y , over whom nobody can have a power to 
make laws but by t h e i r own consent and by a u t h o r i t y r e c e i v e d 
41 
from them." 
What does freedom e n t a i l i n a c i v i l s o c i e t y ? Locke 
a f f i r m e d t h a t "the l i b e r t y of man i n s o c i e t y i s to be under no 
o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e power but t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d by consent i n the 
common-wealth, nor under the dominion of any w i l l , or r e s t r a i n t 
of any law, but what th a t l e g i s l a t i v e s h a l l enact according to 
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the t r u s t put i n i t . " 
I t has been shown so f a r t h a t l i b e r t y does not imply 
absence of laws but obedience to them. As long as the i n d i v i d u a l 
obeys the law, he i s f r e e i n s p i t e of some r e s t r a i n t to which he 
.iniay. be s u b j e c t e d . But as c i v i l laws do not touch every p a r t of 
a person's l i f e , Locke would allow the d i c t a t e s of reason to 
guide the i n d i v i d u a l i n those p a r t s of h i s l i f e u n a f f e c t e d by 
them. Thus, he a s s e r t e d t h a t a person has "a l i b e r t y to f o l l o w .... 
/TiisJ^ own w i l l i n a l l t h i n g s where t h a t r u l e p r e s c r i b e s not, not 
to be s u b j e c t to the i n c o n s i s t e n t , u n c e r t a i n unknown a r b i t r a r y 
w i l l of another man, as freedom of nature i s to be under no other 
..43 
r e s t r a i n t but the law of n a t u r e . 
The p o l i t i c a l legacy which Locke l e f t f o r h i s 
s u c c e s s o r s can be summarized thus - t h a t though law c u r t a i l s 
freedom, i t i s not i n i m i c a l to i t , and t h a t the s t a t e should e x i s t 
f o r i t s development. I n d i v i d u a l s are obliged to obey these laws 
because of t h e i r i n t e r e s t . F a i l u r e to do so, w i l l f r u s t r a t e the 
end f o r which the s o c i e t y i s formed. I n the s t a t e of nature, the 
n o t i o n of r i g h t and wrong depends to a l a r g e extent oh the 
judgement of the p r i v a t e conscience of the i n d i v i d u a l . I n the 
c i v i l s o c i e t y , i t depends on the p u b l i c c o n s c i e n c e i . e . on the 
p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and where c i v i l laws do not p r e v a i l , men 
depend on t h e i r p r i v a t e c o n s c i e n c e . The power of p o l i t i c a l 
a u t h o r i t y i n s t i t u t e d , i s not a b s o l u t e but s u b j e c t to the w i l l of 
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the people. T h i s a u t h o r i t y can only i n t e r f e r e w i t h the freedom of 
a person i f h i s other regarding a c t i o n s w i l l cause d i s p l e a s u r e to 
o t h e r s , or reduce the general good of the s o c i e t y . 
I t i s d e s i r a b l e to mention c e r t a i n p o i n t s which l i n k 
Hobbes and Locke w i t h the U t i l i t a r i a n s . F i r s t l y , a l l agreed t h a t 
law was e s s e n t i a l f o r s e c u r i t y though i t could always be c r e a t e d 
at the expense of L i b e r t y . Bentham a f f i r m e d i n t h i s connection 
t h a t "without law t h e r e i s no s e c u r i t y , consequently no abundance, 
nor even c e r t a i n s u b s i s t e n c e . And the only e q u a l i t y which can e x i s t 
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i n such a c o n d i t i o n , i s the e q u a l i t y of misery." I n s h o r t , 
the s o c i a l u t i l i t y of law was the s e c u r i t y i t o f f e r e d to people. 
Secondly, the h e d o n i s t i c p o s i t i o n s of both Hobbes and 
Locke s e r v e as another connection between them and the U t i l i t a r i a n s . 
Locke f o r example, sometimes i d e n t i f i e d good and e v i l immediately 
w i t h p l e a s u r e and p a i n ; and o f t e n he a p p l i e d the terms to the 
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o b j e c t s which produce p l e a s u r e s and p a i n s i n people. Bentham 
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h e l d a s i m i l a r view. As i t w i l l be shown l a t e r , Bentham defined 
the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y as t h a t p r i n c i p l e which approved or 
disapproved of every a c t i o n i r r e s p e c t i v e of what i t was, according 
to the tendency which i t seemed to have e i t h e r to i n c r e a s e or 
decrease a person's happiness. U t i l i t y he a f f i r m e d was t h a t 
property i n any o b j e c t , whereby i t tended to y i e l d " b e n e f i t , 
advantage, p l e a s u r e , good, or happiness or to prevent 
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the happening of m i s c h i e f , p a i n , e v i l , or unhappiness" to a 
person. "A t h i n g i s s a i d to promote the i n t e r e s t , or to be f o r 
the i n t e r e s t of an i n d i v i d u a l , when i t tends to add to the sum 
t o t a l of h i s p l e a s u r e s ; or what comes to the same t h i n g , to 
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d i m i n i s h the sum of h i s p a i n s . 
Though Bentham r e j e c t e d the notion of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , 
he a t t r i b u t e d the f o r c e working f o r s o c i a l union to the p r i n c i p l e 
of u t i l i t y . He i n s i s t e d t h a t people obeyed the s t a t e hence c i v i l 
codes because " the probable m i s c h i e f s of obedience are l e s s 
..49 
than the probable m i s c h i e f s of r e s i s t e n c e . T h i s view can be 
taken to mean t h a t people obey t h e i r government because obedience 
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a s s u r e s g r e a t e r p l e a s u r e than p a i n . I n other words, i t i s f o r 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t to obey c i v i l laws because such a behaviour tends 
to add to the sura t o t a l of t h e i r happiness. Accordingly, as 
i n d i v i d u a l s always d e s i r e p l e a s u r e r a t h e r than p a i n , i t w i l l be 
to t h e i r advantage to obey the s t a t e . What then i s the l i n k 
between Bentham and h i s d i s c i p l e s on one hand, and Hobbes and 
Locke on the other ? 
50 
As i t was pointed out before, Hobbes and Locke h e l d 
t h a t a c i v i l s o c i e t y was good because i t was capable of producing 
p l e a s u r e (peace) i n the way of p r e s e r v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom and 
l i f e . Because of t h i s end, men were drawn by t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s 
i n t o e s t a b l i s h i n g a s o c i a l pact by which a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y was 
formed. As such i t would be to t h e i r advantage to observe or obey 
the c i v i l laws of the s o c i e t y as f a i l u r e to do so would f r u s t r a t e 
the end f o r which the pact was made. 
Bentham r e j e c t e d the i d e a t h a t people had n a t u r a l r i g h t s 
On the c o n t r a r y , what he maintained was t h a t the r i g h t s which they 
had were those given them by the l e g i s l a t o r . I n support of t h i s 
view, he a s s e r t e d t h a t the s t a t e d i d i t s duty of p r o t e c t i o n 
"....by c r e a t i n g r i g h t s which i t c o n f e r s upon i n d i v i d u a l s : r i g h t s 
of p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y , r i g h t s of p r o t e c t i o n f o r honour, r i g h t s of 
property; r i g h t s of r e c e i v i n g a s s i s t a n c e i n case of need i t 
can n e i t h e r command nor p r o h i b i t without r e s t r a i n i n g the l i b e r t y 
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of i n d i v i d u a l s . " For any person to a c q u i r e c e r t a i n r i g h t s , he 
must n e c e s s a r i l y s a c r i f i c e p a r t of h i s freedom. The i n d i v i d u a l 
could not enjoy the advantages of h i s r i g h t s without s a c r i f i c i n g 
p a r t of h i s l i b e r t y . Bentham a f f i r m e d " t h a t these c u r t a i l m e n t s of 
l i b e r t y are i n e v i t a b l e . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e to c r e a t e r i g h t s , to 
impose o b l i g a t i o n s , to p r o t e c t l i b e r t y i t s e l f , but a t the 
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expense of l i b e r t y . 
As regards the scope of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, Bentham 
e s t a b l i s h e d a p r i n c i p l e which would determine i t . T h i s p r i n c i p l e 
was u t i l i t y . I t i s designed as a guide to the s t a t e i n i t s 
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i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . I t i s d e s c r i b e d as " . . . . t h a t 
p r i n c i p l e which approves or disapproves of every a c t i o n whatsoever 
according to the tendency which i t appears to have to augment or 
d i m i n i s h the happiness of the p a r t y whose i n t e r e s t i s i n question 
or what i s the same t h i n g i n other words to promote or to oppose 
t h a t happiness By u t i l i t y i s meant t h a t property i n any 
o b j e c t , whereby i t tends to produce b e n e f i t , advantage, p l e a s u r e , 
good or happiness, or to prevent the happening of m i s c h i e f , pain, 
e v i l or unhappiness to the p a r t y whose i n t e r e s t i s considered. I f 
t h a t p a r t y be the community i n g e n e r a l , then the happiness of the 
community; i f a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l , the happiness of t h a t 
..53 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
T h i s d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y had a great impact on John 
S t u a r t M i l l . He admitted i n h i s autobiography t h a t "the p r i n c i p l e 
of u t i l i t y understood as Bentham understood i t , and a p p l i e d i n the 
manner i n which he a p p l i e d i t f e l l e x a c t l y i n t o i t s p l a c e 
as the keystone which h e l d together the detached and fragmentary 
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component p a r t s of £hlsj knowledge and b e l i e f s . " 
Bentham endeavoured not only to a n a l y s e man's n a t u r a l 
response to any a c t i o n but a l s o a t the same time to b u i l d up h i s 
s c i e n c e of m o r a l i t y on i t . He claimed t h a t "nature has p l a c e d 
mankind under the governance of two s o v e r e i g n masters, pain and 
p l e a s u r e . I t i s f o r them alone to point out what we ought to do, 
as w e l l as to determine what we s h a l l do. On one hand, the 
standard of r i g h t and wrong, on the other, the.chain of causes 
and e f f e c t s are f a s t e n e d to t h e i r throne. They govern us i n a l l 
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we do, i n a l l we say, i n a l l we t h i n k .... I f by nature, peopl 
are c o n t r o l l e d or responded to any a c t i o n according to the amount 
of p l e a s u r e or p a i n they r e c e i v e from i t , r a t i o n a l people being 
what they a r e , w i l l always seek p l e a s u r e r a t h e r than p a i n . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , under c o n d i t i o n s of p e r f e c t freedom, every r a t i o n a l 
person tends to d i r e c t h i s a c t i o n towards a t t a i n i n g h i s own 
g r e a t e s t happiness. 
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While Bentham on one h a n d , i n s i s t e d t h a t people were 
without r i g h t s except those given them by the s t a t e , Paine, on 
the other hand, argued t h a t people p o s s e s s , by r i g h t of t h e i r 
e x i s t e n c e , a c e r t a i n number of r i g h t s . These r i g h t s i n c l u d e 
i n t e l l e c t u a l r i g h t s , or r i g h t s of the mind, and the v a r i o u s 
r i g h t s possessed by every person of a c t i n g with a view to 
s e c u r i n g h i s comfort, and happiness, i n so f a r as the e x e r c i s e 
of these r i g h t s d i d not t h r e a t e n the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of other 
people. T h i s t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a of n a t u r a l r i g h t s which was handed 
down by Locke was pursued i n the 19th century by Herbert Spencer. 
His i d e a of n a t u r a l r i g h t s was n e i t h e r those which were assured 
by metaphysical e t h i c s nor those a r t i f i c i a l r i g h t s conferred by 
a government agent. They were those i n d i s p e n s a b l e r i g h t s which 
must be guaranteed to an i n d i v i d u a l so t h a t s o c i e t y might e x i s t 
and f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y . He was q u i t e prepared to show th a t they 
were found by ages of experience to be n e c e s s a r y f o r any normal 
and continuous s o c i a l l i f e . These a p a r t , he pointed out t h a t 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s were not only of d i v i n e but a l s o of b i o l o g i c a l 
o r i g i n . 
Paine c l a s s i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l n a t u r a l r i g h t s i n t o two. 
One s e t of r i g h t s , man r e t a i n s when j o i n i n g the c i v i l s o c i e t y 
w i t h h i s f e l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s , and the other he has an i n t e r e s t i n 
r e s i g n i n g to the s o c i e t y . The former r i g h t s i n c l u d e freedom "of 
t h i n k i n g , of speaking, of forming and e x p r e s s i n g o p i n i o n s . " The 
i n d i v i d u a l r e t a i n s these r i g h t s i n v i r t u e of h i s e x i s t e n c e , f o r 
they are "....those i n which the power to execute .... i s as 
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p e r f e c t i n the i n d i v i d u a l as the r i g h t . i t s e l f . The l a t t e r 
r i g h t s which the i n d i v i d u a l r e s i g n s to the s o c i e t y are the r i g h t s 
to p r o t e c t i o n and to the a c q u i s i t i o n and p o s s e s s i o n of property. 
These r i g h t s are p e r f e c t l y the i n d i v i d u a l ' s but the a b i l i t y to 
use them i s imperfect without the s e c u r i t y given by the s o c i e t y . 
These l a t t e r r i g h t s are c i v i l r i g h t s . Though they are 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s which people have exchanged i n order t h a t they 
may f r e e l y enjoy o t h e r s , they are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from n a t u r a l 
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r i g h t s i n t h a t i n the e x e r c i s e of c i v i l r i g h t s , people are a c t i n g 
under the guarantee of s o c i e t y . For example, Paine argued t h a t 
"a man, by n a t u r a l r i g h t , has a r i g h t to judge i n h i s own cause, 
and so f a r as the r i g h t of mind i s concerned, he never s u r r e n d e r s 
i t . But what a v a i l e t h i t him to judge, i f he has not power to 
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r e d r e s s . " Man, a c c o r d i n g l y , borrows "the arm of s o c i e t y " of 
which he i s a member, i n p r e f e r e n c e to and over and above h i s 
own. There i s now a need t h a t the s o c i e t y should become a government 
and should employ r e s t r a i n t s to impose on people to r e s p e c t t h e i r 
neighbours r i g h t s . The i n d i v i d u a l has "deposited i n the common 
st o c k " a c e r t a i n p a r t of h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t s ; s o c i e t y t h e r e f o r e 
"grants him nothing." Every i n d i v i d u a l i s the owner of the 
s o c i a l c a p i t a l , and has the r i g h t to draw from i t under c e r t a i n 
s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s . 
Concluding, i t could be s a i d t h a t the u t i l i t a r i a n 
p h i l o s o p h e r s admitted t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom was v a l u a b l e 
but d i f f e r e d from the n a t u r a l law school of thought i n t h a t they 
argued t h a t i t was a r t i f i c i a l l y c r e a t e d . Both schools of thought 
agreed t h a t laws were e s s e n t i a l but not i n i m i c a l to freedom. Having 
examined the concept of freedom i n t r a d i t i o n a l E n g l i s h p o l i t i c a l 
thought t i l l the e a r l y p a r t of the 19th century, i t i s a l s o 
d e s i r a b l e to extend t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n to the economic f i e l d . 
L i b e r t y i n the economic sphere:- I n the economic sphere, man 
engages h i m s e l f i n any a c t i v i t y out of pure s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The 
motive which induces a person to work or save i s s e l f - l o v e - the 
need to procure a l i v i n g . As Adam Smith observed w i t h regards to 
s a v i n g , " the p r i n c i p l e which prompts ^ i n d i v i d u a ^ to save, i s 
the d e s i r e of b e t t e r i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n a d e s i r e which, though 
g e n e r a l l y calm and d i s p a s s i o n a t e , comes w i t h us from the womb, 
and never l e a v e s us t i l l we go i n t o the grave. I n the whole 
i n t e r v a l which s e p a r a t e s those two moments, the r e i s s c a r c e perhaps 
a s i n g l e i n s t a n t i n which any man i s so p e r f e c t l y and completely 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s s i t u a t i o n , as to be without any w i s h of 
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59 a l t e r a t i o n or improvement of any k i n d . " 
I f s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s the motivating f a c t o r which c o n t r o l s 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' conduct, how can t h e i r v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s be d i r e c t e d 
towards a common good ? I s i t by l e a v i n g them f r e e l y to pursue 
t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t or by a system of r e s t r a i n t s ? Adam Smith had 
two p r o p o s i t i o n s to make. F i r s t l y , he i n s i s t e d t h a t the common 
good was a t t a i n a b l e n a t u r a l l y . A system of economic freedom i n 
which people were l e f t alone to pursue t h e i r economic i n t e r e s t s 
a ccording to t h e i r means wi t h the l e a s t amount of i n t e r f e r e n c e 
from any e x t e r n a l body. Secondly, he af f i r m e d t h a t i t could a l s o 
be secured by f e e l i n g s of sympathy. I n n e i t h e r case, was government 
i n t e r f e r e n c e encouraged because he was convinced t h a t the harmony 
of i n t e r e s t or the general good could be spontaneously achieved. 
Not only Adam Smith, but a l s o Bentham and Herbert Spence 
admitted t h a t sympathy could induce the i n d i v i d u a l to take i n t e r e s t 
i n the happiness of another. Bentham had r e f e r r e d to the p l e a s u r e s 
of sympathy, which he termed benevolence or goodwill, and r e a d i l y 
admitted t h a t sympathy as w e l l as i n t e r e s t could a t t a c h one 
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i n d i v i d u a l to another. Herbert Spencer a s s e r t e d t h a t the i n s t i n c t 
of p e r s o n a l r i g h t s , which he d e s c r i b e d as a p u r e l y s e l f i s h i n s t i n c t 
c ould be c o n t r o l l e d by sympathy. He regarded i t as a f a c u l t y i n 
the i n d i v i d u a l which awakened a l i k e s t a t e of sentiment f o r ot h e r s , 
and a c c o r d i n g l y , the i n d i v i d u a l could i d e n t i f y h i s i n t e r e s t w i t h 
o t h e r s by means of sympathy without any e x t e r n a l c o e r c i o n . 
I n d i v i d u a l s were considered to be the best judges of 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , a view shared by J . S . M i l l , and on the b a s i s 
of which he would oppose any s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n 
a s p e c t s of i n d i v i d u a l freedom. I f they are l e f t to a c t f r e e l y , they 
w i l l always seek those i n t e r e s t s most advantageous to them, 
u l t i m a t e l y b e n e f i t i n g the s o c i e t y . Adam Smith pointed out that 
"every i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n t i n u a l l y e x e r t i n g h i m s e l f to f i n d out 
the most advantageous employment f o r whatever c a p i t a l he can 
command. I t i s h i s own advantage, indeed, and not tha t of the 
s o c i e t y , which he has i n view. But the study of h i s own advantage 
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n a t u r a l l y , or r a t h e r n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d s him to p r e f e r t h a t 
..61 
employment which i s most advantageous to the s o c i e t y . 
S i m i l a r l y , Ricardo a f f i r m e d t h a t " w h i l s t every man 
i s f r e e to employ h i s c a p i t a l where he p l e a s e s , he w i l l n a t u r a l l y 
seek f o r i t th a t employment which i s most advantageous; he w i l l 
n a t u r a l l y be d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h a p r o f i t of 10 per cent; i f by 
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removing h i s c a p i t a l he can obtain a p r o f i t of 15 per cent. 
As i t w i l l be shown below, J . S . M i l l tended to accept t h i s view and 
would oppose the s t a t e d i s o r g a n i z i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade by a r t i f i c i a l 
r e s t r a i n t s . As a supporter of f r e e t r a d e , he was a g a i n s t the i d e a of 
p r o t e c t i o n i s m . He maintained t h a t c a p i t a l l e f t to i t s e l f would tend 
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to seek by p r e f e r e n c e the most advantageous market. 
Adam Smith's e x p l a n a t i o n of how the p r i n c i p l e of 
n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e tends to harmonize i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s towards 
the common good r e s t s on the fundamental theory - the d i v i s i o n of 
labour. He saw i n t h i s theory a proof of the noti o n of the n a t u r a l 
i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t , and regarded i t a l s o as an e f f e c t of exchange. 
These a p a r t , i t e x h i b i t e d a l i n k w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y . 
He t r i e d to t i e t h i s theory to the concept of reason. 
T h i s i d e a of reason was what the n a t u r a l law school of thought 
co n s i d e r e d capable to harmonize i n d i v i d u a l s i n the absence of 
c i v i l laws, provided t h a t they were w i l l i n g to obey i t s d i c t a t e s . 
The d i v i s i o n of labour and the many advantages which were d e r i v e d 
from i t were not the e f f e c t of a c a l c u l a t i o n on the p a r t of "human 
wisdom". They were "....the n e c e s s a r y , though very slow and 
gradual, consequence of a c e r t a i n p r o p e n s i t y i n human nature which 
has i n view no such e x t e n s i v e u t i l i t y ; the pro p e n s i t y to t r u c k , 
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b a r t e r , and exchange one t h i n g f o r another." T h i s p r o p e n s i t y 
could i t s e l f be considered e i t h e r as p r i m i t i v e or more l i k e l y as 
"the n e c e s s a r y consequence of the f a c u l t i e s of reason and speech." 
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I t was a propensity "....common to a l l men, and to be found i n 
no other r a c e of animals, which seem to know n e i t h e r t h i s nor 
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any other s p e c i e s of c o n t r a c t s , and i t brought about the 
immediate r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of general and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . 
He was convinced t h a t i n so f a r as men agreed to 
accomplish t h e i r own p a r t according to the p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n 
of labour, t h e r e was a constant harmony between p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s 
and the general i n t e r e s t . So long as i n d i v i d u a l s f u l f i l l e d t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t d u t i e s according to th a t p r i n c i p l e , each one i n d i v i d u a l l y 
f o r h i s own i n t e r e s t , the i d e n t i t y of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t was 
abs o l u t e without much i n t e r f e r e n c e from the s t a t e . Hence, " i t i s 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, 
t h a t we expect our dinner, but from t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . We address 
o u r s e l v e s , not to t h e i r humanity but to t h e i r s e l f - l o v e , and 
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never t a l k to them of our own n e c e s s i t i e s but of t h e i r advantages." 
A c c o r d i n g l y , exchange i s the cause of the harmony of egoisms. I t 
i s c o n s t a n t l y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the t a s k s of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s 
c o n s i d e r e d as producers, and c o n s t a n l t y e q u a l i z i n g the i n t e r e s t s of 
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a l l i n d i v i d u a l s c o nsidered as consumers. T h i s exchange, Halevy 
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and Plamenatz observed was e s s e n t i a l l y the endurance of present 
p a i n i n the hope of f u t u r e p l e a s u r e to be got by s a t i s f y i n g our• 
needs. 
S t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e was not n e c e s s a r y because the d i v i s i o n 
of labour and the market ensured t h a t the labour of an i n d i v i d u a l 
r e c e i v e d an expected remuneration. What i s t h i s expected 
remuneration ? Adam Smith a f f i r m e d t h a t i t was the n a t u r a l p r i c e . 
A p r i c e which he de f i n e d as the t o t a l value of the labour which 
must be expanded i n producing and b r i n g i n g a commodity to the 
market. T h i s was the j u s t p r i c e labour could o b t a i n i n a f r e e market 
I f l e s s were r e c e i v e d , t h e r e was a tendency f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to 
stop production. On the other hand, i f i t were a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
remunerated, the i n d i v i d u a l would continue production. I n which case 
the market p r i c e was i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the n a t u r a l p r i c e , 
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which was i n t u r n the same as the r e a l p r i c e . 
I n other words, through the process of exchange, the 
i n d i v i d u a l should have obtained, i n the products of the labour 
of someone e l s e , the same value t h a t he should have obtained i f 
he has h i m s e l f laboured i n producing the commodity i n s t e a d of him. 
Hence w i t h out i n t e r f e r e n c e , the labour he has put i n producing 
the good can be considered equal to the labour which t h i s commodity 
can command or buy on the market. T h i s conforms to the nature of 
t h i n g s . Hence, he maintained t h a t " i t i s n a t u r a l t h a t what i s 
u s u a l l y the produce of two days or two hours labour should be worth 
double of what i s u s u a l l y the produce of one day's or one hour's 
labour. 
Whatever impedes the d i v i s i o n of labour and the f r e e 
mechanism of the market i s t h e r e f o r e i n j u r i o u s . I t i s then 
unnecessary f o r government to i n t e r f e r e i f labour should r e c e i v e 
i t s due reward. "The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the d i f f e r e n t employments of labour and s t o c k must, i n the same 
neighbourhood, be e i t h e r p e r f e c t l y equal or c o n t i n u a l l y tending to 
e q u a l i t y . I f i n the same neighbourhood, t h e r e was any employment 
e v i d e n t l y e i t h e r more or l e s s advantageous than the r e s t , so many 
people would crowd i n t o i t i n the one case, and so many would 
d e s e r t i t i n the other, t h a t i t s advantages would soon r e t u r n to 
the l e v e l of other employments. T h i s at l e a s t would be the case i n 
a s o c i e t y where thi n g s were l e f t to f o l l o w t h e i r n a t u r a l course, 
where t h e r e was p e r f e c t l i b e r t y , and where everyone was p e r f e c t l y 
f r e e both to chuse what occupation he thought proper, and to 
change i t as o f t e n as he thought proper. Every man's i n t e r e s t would 
prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous 
employment. 
Adam Smith has been able so f a r to e s t a b l i s h t h a t an 
i n d i v i d u a l has not only an i n t e r e s t , but can be considered as the 
b e s t judge of h i s i n t e r e s t . He was prepared to show f u r t h e r on t h i s 
b a s i s , t h a t without s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e , the i n t e r e s t s of producers 
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and consumers could equate supply to e f f e c t i v e demand. T h i s was 
how he put i t - "the q u a n t i t y of every commodity brought to the 
market n a t u r a l l y s u i t s i t s e l f to the e f f e c t u a l demand. I t i s the 
i n t e r e s t of a l l those who employ t h e i r land, labour, or stock, i n 
b r i n g i n g any commodity to market, t h a t the q u a n t i t y never should 
exceed the e f f e c t u a l demand, and i t i s the i n t e r e s t of a l l other 
people t h a t i t never should f a l l s h o r t of th a t demand 
The whole q u a n t i t y of i n d u s t r y a n n u a l l y employed i n order to b r i n g 
any commodity to market n a t u r a l l y s u i t s i t s e l f i n t h i s manner to 
the e f f e c t u a l demand. I t n a t u r a l l y aims a t b r i n g i n g always t h a t 
p r e c i s e q u a n t i t y t h i t h e r which may be s u f f i c i e n t to supply and 
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no more than supply, t h a t demand." 
Though Adam Smith upheld the no t i o n of d i v i s i o n of 
labour as a f o r c e capable of s e c u r i n g a n a t u r a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
i n t e r e s t s , Halevy observed t h a t " i t appears from other passages 
/of the Wealth of n a t i o n s ^ , however, t h a t the d i v i s i o n of labour 
i s not adequate to i d e n t i f y i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t , i n c e r t a i n c a s e s , 
a divergence of i n t e r e s t s occurs between the c a p i t a l i s t s , the 
landed p r o p r i e t o r s , and the l a b o u r e r s . But even when they s t a r t 
from c o n t r a d i c t o r y premises, Adam Smith's arguments a r r i v e a t a 
common c o n c l u s i o n - economic l i b e r a l i s m , the almost i n d e f i n i t e 
r e d u c t i o n of the f u n c t i o n s arrogated to themselves by governments 
i n these m a t t e r s . Adam Smith never admits t h a t the government 
should i n t e r v e n e to p r o t e c t one c l a s s a g a i n s t another, even when 
h i s p r i n c i p l e s seem to j u s t i f y t h i s 'conclusion: he upholds i n d u s t r i a l 
as w e l l as commercial l i b e r t y . S i n c e human s o c i e t y e x i s t s and 
s u b s i s t s , i t must be t h a t the p r i n c i p l e which i d e n t i f i e s i n d i v i d u a l 
i n t e r e s t s i s more powerful than the p r i n c i p l e which s e v e r s them; 
and reason, which c r i t i c i s e s s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s , has l i t t l e 
s t r e n g t h to remedy them, as compared w i t h the i n s t i n c t i v e power of 
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nature. 
Adam Smith appeared so wedded to the p r i n c i p l e of 
n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e , and economic l i b e r a l i s m t h a t i n d e f i n i n g the 
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f u n c t i o n s of the s t a t e , he a l l o t t e d n e g a t i v e d u t i e s to i t . He 
b e l i e v e d t h a t "according to the system of n a t u r a l l i b e r t y the 
s o v e r e i g n has only three d u t i e s to attend to; t h r e e d u t i e s of 
great importance, indeed, but p l a i n and i n t e l l i g i b l e to common 
understanding. F i r s t , the duty of p r o t e c t i n g the s o c i e t y from 
the v i o l e n c e and i n v a s i o n of other independent s o c i e t i e s ; 
secondly the duty of p r o t e c t i n g , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , every member 
of the s o c i e t y from the i n j u s t i c e or oppression of every other 
member of i t , or the duty of e s t a b l i s h i n g an exact a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of j u s t i c e ; and t h i r d l y , the duty of e r e c t i n g and maintaining 
c e r t a i n p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , which i t can never be f o r the i n t e r e s t 
of any i n d i v i d u a l , or s m a l l number of i n d i v i d u a l s , to e r e c t and 
maintain; because the p r o f i t could never repay the expence to any 
i n d i v i d u a l or s m a l l number of i n d i v i d u a l s , though i t may 
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f r e q u e n t l y do much more than repay i t to a g r e a t s o c i e t y . " 
Bentham was no l e s s o p t i m i s t i c i n the p u r s u i t of 
economic l i b e r a l i s m . He had t o l d the members of the French n a t i o n a l 
Convention t h a t the n a t u r a l p r i c e of a commodity was secured by 
a l l o w i n g producers to compete f r e e l y . I n h i s address - e n t i t l e d -
Emancipate your C o l o n i e s - d e l i v e r e d before the convention, Bentham 
i n s i s t e d t h a t no amount of monopoly ex e r t e d over the t r a d e of 
t h e i r C o l o n i e s would make the p r i c e of t h e i r goods f a l l below i t s 
n a t u r a l p r i c e . But holding t h i s view d i d not absolve him from the 
i d e a of u t i l i t y i n the economic sphere. 
The end the s t a t e should seek f o r i n the economic sphere 
according to Bentham was the attainment of the g r e a t e s t happiness, 
i n so f a r as i t was enhanced by the production of the maximum 
n a t i o n a l wealth and population. T h i s end was b e t t e r achieved by 
l e s s s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . "The motto, or watchword, ought to be -
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Be q u i e t " i n the economic f i e l d . Bentham's reasons f o r supporting 
" q u i e t i s m " were f i r s t , l i k e Adam Smith, he maintained t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l s knew t h e i r i n t e r e s t s b e t t e r than government could. 
Secondly, people operated more s k i l l f u l l y i n p u r s u i t of t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t s than the s t a t e could or would operate on t h e i r b e h a l f , 
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and t h i r d l y , s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e meant c o e r c i o n e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y through t a x a t i o n . Coercion i n v o l v e d pain and t h e r e f o r e 
was bad. 
T h i s view d i d not imply a detached recommendation not 
to i n t e r f e r e at a l l . There were th r e e r e q u i s i t e s - Power, knowledge 
or i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n c l i n a t i o n - which Bentham argued should e x i s t 
i n p e r f e c t i o n i n an i n d i v i d u a l to produce the d e s i r a b l e e f f e c t of 
i n c r e a s i n g the n a t i o n a l wealth. When they were p e r f e c t , n a t i o n a l 
wealth could be i n c r e a s e d without any s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . But when 
any of these r e q u i s i t e s was d i f f i d e n t , government c o n t r o l might be 
v a l u a b l e and i t s i n t e r f e r e n c e should be determined" ....according 
as the inconveniences attached to the measures i n which the 
i n t e r p o s i t i o n of government c o n s i s t s , preponderate or f a i l of 
preponderating over the advantage a t t a c h e d to the e f f e c t which i t 
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i s proposed should be produced. 
The need f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e was made l e s s because 
w i t h regard to i n c l i n a t i o n , t h e r e was always.the d e s i r e among 
i n d i v i d u a l s to i n c r e a s e t h e i r own wealth and hence the n a t i o n ' s . 
The s t a t e could improve the other r e q u i s i t e s . I n t e l l i g e n c e could 
be advanced by way of g r a n t i n g reward to people who merited i t , 
and power was enhanced by g i v i n g freedom to i n d i v i d u a l s . F o r 
example, Bentham i n support of h i s view argued t h a t p r o v i d i n g 
c a p i t a l was supply i n g power. I t could be r a i s e d by g i v i n g people 
the freedom to form p a r t n e r s h i p . A l l t h a t people r e q u i r e i n the 
economic f i e l d were " s e c u r i t y and freedom". "The request which 
a g r i c u l t u r e , manufacturers and commerce present to government, i s 
modest and reasonable as t h a t which Diogenes made to Alexander : 
'stand out of my sunshine' we have no need of favour we r e q u i r e 
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only a secure and open path. 
Paine, f o l l o w i n g the f o o t - s t e p s of Adam Smith 
p o s t u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e was a n a t u r a l s o c i e t y , which was p r i o r to the 
formation of government and which would continue to e x i s t i f forms 
of government were a b o l i s h e d . T h i s s o c i e t y was b u i l t on the 
p r i n c i p l e of exchange. I n other words, a s o c i e t y where the 
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i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n t e r e s t could be harmonized through the mechanism 
of exchange. He admitted t h a t t h i s s o c i e t y r e s t e d p a r t l y on a 
system of s o c i a l a f f e c t i o n s and above a l l on the s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s 
of man. An i n d i v i d u a l by nature had some s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s but 
" i n a l l c a s e s / n a t u r e ^ ....made h i s n a t u r a l wants g r e a t e r than h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l powers. No one man i s capable without the a i d of s o c i e t y , 
of s u p p l y i n g h i s own wants; and those wants a c t i n g upon every 
i n d i v i d u a l impel the whole of them i n t o s o c i e t y , as n a t u r a l l y as 
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g r a v i t a t i o n a c t s to a c e n t r e . " T h i s view coupled w i t h the 
Newtonian metaphor l i n k s Paine d i r e c t l y w i t h Adam Smith; he appears 
to share the same p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n s of labour and exchange 
which Adam Smith had made the foundation of h i s d o c t r i n e . 
Paine h e l d economic co-operation as a s o c i a l bond of 
u n i t y among people. I n h i s words: "the mutual dependence and 
r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r e s t which man has upon man and a l l the p a r t s of a 
c i v i l i s e d community upon each other, c r e a t e t h a t g reat c h a i n of 
connection which holds i t together. The landholder, the farmer, the 
manufacturer, the merchant, the tradesman, and every occupation, 
prospers by the a i d which each r e c e i v e s from the other, and from 
the whole. Common i n t e r e s t r e g u l a t e s t h e i r concerns, and forms t h e i r 
law; and the laws which common usage ord a i n s have a g r e a t e r 
i n f l u e n c e than the laws of government. I n time, s o c i e t y performs 
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f o r i t s e l f almost e v e r y t h i n g which i s a s c r i b e d to government." 
Government i n t e r f e r e n c e i s not n e c e s s a r y , f o r as soon as men, by 
i n s t i n c t and r e c i p r o c i t y of i n t e r e s t , have become accustomed to 
s o c i a l and c i v i l i s e d l i f e , s o c i a l p r i n c i p l e s are a c t i v e enough to 
take the p l a c e of government r e g u l a t i o n s . 
A l l g r e a t s o c i a l laws can be d e s c r i b e d as n a t u r a l laws, 
laws of mutual and r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r e s t . People conform to them and 
obey them because i t i s to t h e i r advantage to do so, and not 
through r e s p e c t f o r laws which the s t a t e b u i l d s . Paine, i n s h o r t , 
was t r y i n g to e x p l a i n t h a t s o c i e t y was capable of performing f o r 
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i t s e l f almost a l l the f u n c t i o n s which were o r d i n a r i l y a l l o t t e d to 
the s t a t e , "and i n s t a n c e s are not wanting to show, t h a t e v e r y t h i n g 
which government can u s e f u l l y add t h e r e t o , has been performed by 
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the common consent of s o c i e t y , without government." 
C o n s i d e r i n g Paine's i d e a s , i t i s . observed t h a t he h e l d 
two opposing views though r e c o n c i l i a b l e i f p o l i t i c a l and economic 
spheres a r e t r e a t e d as two d i s t i n c t worlds. I n the p o l i t i c a l 
sphere, nature c o n f e r r e d on man more r i g h t s than he can maintain 
and f o r s e c u r i t y reasons he r e s i g n e d some r i g h t s to a r e g u l a t i n g 
f o r c e f o r p r o t e c t i o n which he e s t a b l i s h e d . Accordingly, government 
i s considered a n e c e s s i t y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 
freedom. 
On the other hand, i n the economic sphere, nature g i v e s 
the i n d i v i d u a l more n a t u r a l wants than power w i t h which to s a t i s f y 
them; but i n exchange i n d i v i d u a l s develop means wi t h which to 
s a t i s f y t h e i r n a t u r a l needs without r e s o r t i n g to any c o n s t r a i n t 
and without any s a c r i f i c e of i n t e r e s t . There are two l i k e l y 
e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s confusion. E i t h e r Paine was t r e a t i n g p o l i t i c a l 
and economic spheres as two d i s t i n c t f i e l d s or was j u s t adopting 
the general i d e a about l i b e r t y shared by most w r i t e r s of h i s time. 
J u s t as Paine a s s e r t e d , t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s needs were 
always g r e a t e r than h i s power to s a t i s f y them, Malthus i n a 
s i m i l a r f a s h i o n observed t h a t s o c i e t y was threatened by 
overpopulation and poverty. Malthus, by h i s theory'Of population, 
introduced a d i s t i n c t break from the e g o i s t i c p r e - s u p p o s i t i o n of 
the n a t u r a l law school of thought. He inaugurated the b i o l o g i c a l 
p o i n t of view, and emphasized the f a c t t h a t a l l human s t r u c t u r e s 
a rose from an animal b a s i s . The f a c t s he exposed heralded the 
c o m p e t i t i v e " s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t " aspect of n a t u r a l l i b e r t y . 
C l o s e l i n k s can be seen between h i m s e l f and Spencer. Most 
p u r i t a n i c a l views which Spencer h e l d i n s o c i a l a f f a i r s - f o r 
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example h i s o p p o s i t i o n to s t a t e r e l i e f of the poor - can be s a i d 
80 
to be based on Malthusian d o c t r i n e . L e s l i e Stephen pointed out 
as w e l l t h a t J . S . M i l l was i n f l u e n c e d to a c e r t a i n extent by i t . 
He maintained t h a t the d o c t r i n e had been the foundation of M i l l ' s 
e n t i r e s o c i a l philosophy. M i l l h i m s e l f admitted t h a t i t was 
through the impact of the d o c t r i n e t h a t he could argue t h a t f u l l 
employment at high wages can be maintained only i f the working 
8 
c l a s s e s could r e s t r i c t v o l u n t a r i l y any i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r numbers. 
Through h i s theory of population, Maithus observed that 
"the power of population i s i n d e f i n i t e l y g r e a t e r than the power 
1 82 i n the e a r t h to produce s u b s i s t e n c e f o r man." Consequently, he 
argued t h a t i f population i n c r e a s e d without check the means of 
s u b s i s t e n c e would not be s u f f i c i e n t to feed the i n c r e a s i n g 
population. The d i f f i c u l t y caused by t h i s phenomenon would tend 
to f a l l on the lower c l a s s e s r a t h e r than the upper. To a v e r t t h i s , 
he advocated i n c r e a s i n g production, and applying r e s t r a i n t s on the 
i n c r e a s e of population. U n t i l population tended to e q u a l i t y w i t h 
s u b s i s t e n c e , there was always the i n c l i n a t i o n among people to 
compete f o r the s c a r c e means of l i f e . These views gained ground 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as they were s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the r a p i d i n c r e a s e of 
population which took p l a c e during the e a r l y y e a r s of the 19th 
century. 
Having given an account of the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a s about 
l i b e r t y which would have formed the background from which M i l l 
and Spencer developed t h e i r thoughts, i t i s d e s i r a b l e to c o n s i d e r 
the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n of the period a l s o . I t has been e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h a t c i v i l enactments (hence the s t a t e ) are not n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n i m i c a l to i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom. I t i s one t h i n g to admit t h a t 
the e x i s t e n c e of government i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of 
l i b e r t y . I t i s another, to c r e a t e a s t a t e which i n s t e a d of 
p r o t e c t i n g people's freedom, tends to become t y r a n n i c a l to i t . 
The purpose of examining the trend of s o c i a l a f f a i r s i n the e r a 
before M i l l and Spencer wrote i s to determine the extent to which 
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the l i b e r t y of the masses was r e s t r i c t e d by the s t a t e . 
S o c i a l Background. 
The s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n of the period before M i l l and 
Spencer wrote was one i n which most of i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
not only dominated by one c l a s s but a l s o were permeated by 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s . These p r a c t i c e s were encouraged to 
p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the c l a s s concerned. S i m i l a r l y , the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s e i t h e r a t c e n t r a l or l o c a l l e v e l were c o n t r o l l e d 
by the a r i s t o c r a c y . 
Admittedly, there was a pa r l i a m e n t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
system of government which should g i v e i n d i v i d u a l s freedom to 
choose t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . But, u n t i l the reform b i l l of 1832, 
the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r a vote favoured the wealthy c l a s s . The 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s v a r i e d from one borough to another. Some 
boroughs r e q u i r e d from a vote r a r e s i d e n c e of at l e a s t s i x 
months, the payment of poor r a t e or church r a t e ; i n o t h e r s , 
the only c o n d i t i o n was th a t the voter had not been a charge on 
the poor r a t e . Some i n s i s t e d on a vote r proving that he was an 
i n h a b i t a n t i n the borough, had a f a m i l y and " b o i l e d a pot t h e r e " . 
I n o t h e r s , the r i g h t to vote attached e x c l u s i v e l y to the 
p o s s e s s i o n of "burgage property". With some, t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s 
waived t h e i r r i g h t of e l e c t i o n , and delegated i t to 
c o r p o r a t i o n s . These were e s t a b l i s h e d by c h a r t e r s and i t was not 
uncommon f o r the landed a r i s t o c r a c y to extend t h e i r wave of 
i n f l u e n c e to them. I n some extreme c a s e s , f r a n c h i s e which ought 
to be l e f t f r e e l y to people of the boroughs were o f t e n l i m i t e d 
to members of a trade g u i l d , M a l p r a c t i c e s i n par l i a m e n t a r y 
p r o c e s s e s were common. To sec u r e a s e a t i n parliament had a high 
value and as votes commanded money, the co r p o r a t i o n s had every 
inducement to keep down the number of v o t e r s . Besides these, 
t h e r e was a general tendency to s e l l the freedom of the borough 
to n o n - r e s i d e n t s . A c c o r d i n g l y people who wanted votes, or to 
become members, could always buy, and those favoured were the 
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a r i s t o c r a t s . A l l i n a l l , the a r i s t o c r a c y became a favoured 
c l a s s because they met w i t h the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r 
enfranchisement. As a consequence, the heat of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e 
could be f e l t by the mass not only through s t a t e a c t i o n s but 
a l s o through the p r e v a i l i n g opinion and f e e l i n g i n the s o c i e t y . 
A c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power reposed on t h i s b a s i s would 
have appeared reasonably complete, but the a r i s t o c r a c y took 
f u r t h e r s t e p s to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s monopoly. I n 1710, by an a c t 
of parliament, they t r i e d to q u a l i f y members who were i n the 
House of Commons to exclude a l l people who had not a c e r t a i n 
e s t a t e of land, worth i n the case of k n i g h t s of the s h i r e £500 
and i n the case of burgesses £300. Though t h i s a c t was evaded 
by one way and another, i t g r e a t l y l i m i t e d the freedom of those 
who should normally have obtained a s e a t . 
The g e n e r a l e f f e c t s of t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r were 
f i r s t l y , the mass were d i s i n h e r i t e d , and a l l government and 
power vested i n a s m a l l body of a r i s t o c r a t s . The populace were 
not allowed a share i n p u b l i c l i f e or government. Besides t h i s 
d e n i a l of l i b e r t y , p a r l i a m e n t a r y government was no longer a 
system of government but t h a t of property. As i t was property 
which mattered, these landed a r i s t o c r a c i e s endeavoured to 
p r e s e r v e t h e i r powers and p r i v i l e g e s by e s t a b l i s h i n g a system 
of e n t a i l which gave to each s u c c e s s i v e g eneration merely a l i f e 
i n t e r e s t i n the e s t a t e s , and kept the e s t a t e s themselves as the 
permanent p o s s e s s i o n of the f a m i l y . Secondly, t h i s was 
inconvenient f o r the new masters of machines ushered i n by 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . 
At l o c a l government l e v e l , e v e r y t h i n g d r i f t e d i n t o the 
hands of the J u s t i c e of the peace. O r i g i n a l l y they were c r e a t e d 
to keep peace i n the c o u n t i e s i n which they served, but l a t e r 
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they developed an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power which drew to i t s e l f 
almost the f u n c t i o n s and p r o p e r t i e s of government. For example, 
i t was the J u s t i c e of the peace who was appointed to a d m i n i s t e r 
laws by which the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s e s sought to l i m i t the 
freedom of the working c l a s s e s . Under the E l i z a b e t h a n Poor Law, 
i t was the J u s t i c e of the Peace who appointed the p a r i s h 
o v e r s e e r s , and approved t h e i r poor r a t e . I t was he who h e l d i n 
h i s hand the meshes of the law of set t l e m e n t . 
From the trend of a f f a i r s i t could be p r o p e r l y 
concluded t h a t the landed a r i s t o c r a t s were omnipotent. I n 
parliament, they had the o v e r a l l power and c o n t r o l l e d the a f f a i r s 
of the s o c i e t y . At l o c a l government l e v e l , t h e i r i n f l u e n c e was 
f e l t through the J u s t i c e of the peace. They c o n t r o l l e d academic 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , the church, law and a l l the sp r i n g s of l i f e and 
d i s c u s s i o n . T h e i r a u t h o r i t y was c o n s o l i d a t e d by the strong s o c i a l 
d i s c i p l i n e embodied i n the system of e n t a i l . 
I n order to meet the i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r food 
n e c c e s s i t a t e d by growth of population and i r r e g u l a r f o r e i g n 
s u p p l i e s caused by constant wars t h a t the country was engaged i n , 
a g r i c u l t u r e tended to become c a p i t a l i s t i c , i n v o l v i n g a system of 
e n c l o s u r e s . T h e i r expense was a burden too great f o r some c l a s s e s 
engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y . These c l a s s e s were those most 
a f f e c t e d by e n c l o s u r e s . They were : the s m a l l farmers, the 
co t t a g e r and the s q u a t t e r . Somesmall farmers had no other 
a l t e r n a t i v e than e i t h e r to emigrate to America or to an 
i n d u s t r i a l town or to become i day labourers. A f t e r the en c l o s u r e , 
the c o t t a g e r was turned to a labourer without la n d . The economic 
b a s i s of h i s independence was destroyed. He l o s t a great many 
r i g h t s f o r which he r e c e i v e d no compensation. Among the r i g h t s l o s t 
was the p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t of keeping a cow, and the p r i v i l e g e of 
c u t t i n g f u r z e and t u r f on the common land. S i m i l a r l y , the Sq u a t t e r s 
l o s t t h e i r a c c e s s to the common and waste l a n d s . 
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83 According to Hammonds, the c o n d i t i o n of the 
labou r e r was one " w i t h no corporate r i g h t s to defend, no 
corporate power to invoke, no property to c h e r i s h , no ambition 
to pursue, bent beneath the f e a r of h i s masters, and the weight 
of a f u t u r e without hope. No c l a s s i n the world has so beaten 
and crouching a h i s t o r y , and i f the b l a z i n g r i c k s i n 1830 once 
threatened h i s r u l e r s w i t h the anguish of h i s d e s p a i r e , "the 
p a r i s h i s a law w i t h i t s S q u i r e . " F or the p a r i s h was no longer 
the community t h a t o f f e r e d the labourer f r i e n d s h i p and s h e l t e r e d 
h i s freedom: i t was merely the shadow of h i s poverty, h i s 
h e l p l e s s n e s s , and h i s shame. 
I n the f a c e of t h i s d i s t r e s s , coupled w i t h i n c r e a s e s 
i n p r i c e s , a l a b o u r e r was not f r e e to roam about England, and t r y 
h i s l u c k i n some d i s t a n t v i l l a g e or town when h i s circumstances 
became desperate a t home. The law which l i m i t e d h i s n a t u r a l 
l i b e r t y of movement was the o l d law of s e t t l e m e n t . The 
d e s t r u c t i o n of the commons by e n c l o s u r e s had deprived him of any 
c a r e e r w i t h i n h i s own v i l l a g e , and the settlement laws had 
i n c r e a s e d h i s c a l a m i t y by b a r r i n g h i s escape from i t . D e s p i t e 
v a r i o u s concessions made by subsequent laws, the labourer s t i l l 
found h i s freedom c o n t r o l l e d by the p a r i s h o f f i c e r s . I w i l l not 
go i n t o d e t a i l s of these laws but w i l l r a t h e r quote a r e a c t i o n a r y 
statement about the impact of such a body of laws on the l i b e r t y 
of the poor. T h i s was given by Adam Smith whose f e e l i n g s 
p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t so raw and b r u t a l an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l 
freedom. 
I n h i s words: "To remove a man who has not committed no 
misdemeanor from a p a r i s h where he chuses to r e s i d e , i s an 
evide n t v i o l a t i o n of n a t u r a l l i b e r t y and j u s t i c e . The common people 
of England, however, so j e a l o u s of t h e i r l i b e r t y , but l i k e the 
common people of most other c o u n t r i e s never r i g h t l y understanding 
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wherein i t c o n s i s t s , have now f o r more than a century together 
s u f f e r e d themselves to be exposed to t h i s oppression without a 
remedy. Though men of r e f l e c t i o n too have sometimes complained 
of the law of s e t t l e m e n t s as a p u b l i c g r i e v a n c e ; yet i t has 
never been the o b j e c t of any general popular clamour, such as 
t h a t a g a i n s t g e n e r a l warrants, an abusive p r a c t i c e undoubtedly 
but such a one as was not l i k e l y to o c c a s i o n any general 
oppression. There i s s c a r c e a poor man i n England of f o r t y y e ars 
of age, I w i l l venture to say, who has not i n some p a r t of h i s 
l i f e f e l t h i m s e l f most c r u e l l y oppressed by t h i s i l l - c o n t r i v e d 
„84 
law of s e t t l e m e n t s . 
There were v a r i o u s views about these laws and how f a r 
they i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the l i b e r t y of the poor. A l l i n a l l , i t 
could be s a f e l y surmised t h a t they were a v i o l a t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . Though they might not have stopped the flow 
of labour, they tended to r e g u l a t e i t i n the i n t e r e s t of the 
employing c l a s s . 
C a p i t a l i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n d i d not stop at 
a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y but a l s o extended to manufacture and 
mining. New f a c t o r y system was d i s p l a c i n g the o l d domestic method 
of production. I n d u s t r i a l towns were developing, and labour was 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g around the f a c t o r y a r e a . Most cottage workers had to 
seek jobs i n the f a c t o r y . Some were r e l u c t a n t to leave the 
community they were used to f o r anywhere e l s e . The i n d u s t r i a l 
d i s c i p l i n e of the f a c t o r y system was new, r e a l and hard. Many 
could not stand the s t r a i n a t the o u t s e t and would p r e f e r to stand 
by a f a l l i n g system even i f working c o n d i t i o n s were bad. 
With such d i s t r e s s c o n f r o n t i n g the working c l a s s e s , 
t h e i r c o n d i t i o n might have been soothed by an attempt to i n c r e a s e 
t h e i r wages. There were two ways i n which the wages of the 
l a b o u r e r s might have been r a i s e d . One way, the way of combination 
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was forbidden by law. The d o c t r i n e of L a i s s e z f a i r e was at t h i s 
p e r i o d w i d e l y accepted by the lower c l a s s e s , and i n f a c t induced 
a more p o s i t i v e , a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i r employers. T h e i r a c t i o n met 
w i t h a s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e not only from the law but a l s o from 
t h e i r employers. ..The l a t t e r were the new c a p i t a l i s t masters 
ushered i n by i n d u s t r i a l i s m . They were s m a l l i n number and having 
a b e t t e r opportunity of knowing each other could take a more 
concerted a c t i o n i n opposing the demands of t h e i r employees. There 
were marks of absolute d i v o r c e and t h e r e f o r e enmity between 
c a p i t a l and labour. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between some employers and 
t h e i r employees was r a t h e r tense, and i n some ca s e s l e d to 
out b u r s t s of v i o l e n c e by the l a t t e r . 
B e s i d e s , the French r e v o l u t i o n was producing some 
r e a c t i o n s on E n g l i s h thought. Paine had pu b l i s h e d The Ri g h t s of Man 
which was a p l e a f o r democracy, e q u a l i t y and f r a t e r n i t y between 
man and man. T h i s aroused a c r y f o r reform among the working 
c l a s s e s . Consequently, the government was becoming more v i g i l a n t 
and adopting s t r i c t e r measures to prevent a s i m i l a r r e v o l u t i o n 
i n the country. The r e s u l t was th a t by the Corresponding S o c i e t i e s 
Act of 1799, a l l n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h corresponding r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h l o c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s were d e c l a r e d i l l e g a l , and i n 1800 
combination a c t s were passed s u p p r e s s i n g a l l forms of t r a d e s 
unionism by law. . These s t e p s were a f u r t h e r l i m i t a t i o n of .the 
l i b e r t y of the people, though combinations p e r s i s t e d i n s e c r e t 
u n t i l the r e p e a l of 1824. 
The other way of r a i s i n g the wages of the l a b o u r e r s was 
by g i v i n g them the freedom to bargain w i t h t h e i r employers. -7vyhat 
the r a t e of t h e i r wages should be. The populace were deprived of 
t h i s l i b e r t y . I n s t e a d , there was a l e g a l f i x i n g of maximum wage 
i n r e l a t i o n to the p r i c e of food. The r e g u l a t i o n of wages by law 
was a venerable E n g l i s h i n s t i t u t i o n , as o l d as the s t a t u t e of 
Edward I I I . During t h i s p e r i o d , the laws on the same s u b j e c t were 
an a c t of E l i z a b e t h , an a c t of James I , and an a c t of 1747. The 
f i r s t a c t , provided t h a t the J u s t i c e s of the peace should meet 
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a n n u a l l y and a s s e s s the wages of farm l a b o u r e r s and c e r t a i n ' other 
workmen. P e n a l t i e s were imposed on a l l who gave or took a wage 
i n excess of t h i s assessment. The second a c t provided p e n a l t i e s 
f o r those who gave a wage below the wage f i x e d by the m a g i s t r a t e s . 
I n s h o r t , w h i l e the f i r s t a c t aimed a t f i x i n g a maximum wage, the 
second t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h a minimum. F i n a l l y , the a c t of 1747 
maintained t h a t d i s p u t e s between masters and workmen should be 
r e f e r r e d to the m a g i s t r a t e s . Without much d i s p u t e , i t could be 
c l e a r l y seen t h a t the i n t e n t i o n was to use l e g i s l a t i o n to keep 
wages down. T h i s was made evident by the f a i l u r e which marked 
Whitbread's attempt to secure a r e p e a l of the a c t of E l i z a b e t h 
which would have i m p l i e d an adoption of a p o l i c y of minimum wage. 
Whitbread was opposed by a m a j o r i t y of the House, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
P i t t . E n t e r t a i n i n g the p o l i c y of maximum wage gave employers the 
opportunity of e x p l o i t i n g . o r manipulating the wages of t h e i r 
workmen to t h e i r own advantage. 
M e r c a n t i l i s m which o r i g i n a t e d w i t h the Tudors, was 
s t i l l a p r e v a i l i n g economic thought. T h i s concept r u l e d i n d u s t r i a l 
and commercial p o l i c y during the 19th and through the g r e a t e r 
p a r t of the 18th century. I t r e c e i v e d e x p r e s s i o n i n the corn laws, 
the p r o t e c t i o n of home i n d u s t r i e s , the n a v i g a t i o n laws, and the 
c o l o n i a l system. I n an attempt to p r o t e c t home i n d u s t r i e s trade was 
considered of advantage to a n a t i o n when i t imported raw m a t e r i a l s 
which i t d i d not produce, or produced i n i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s , 
to be worked up a t home. The imp o r t a t i o n of l u x u r i e s , and of 
a r t i c l e s which supplanted the home manufacturers, was s e v e r e l y 
condemned. The p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of t h i s d o c t r i n e was t h a t c e r t a i n 
branches of i n d u s t r y were encouraged e i t h e r by bounties, or f i s c a l 
immunities, and othe r s were r e s t r i c t e d by t a r i f f s and 
p r o h i b i t i o n . The most important example of p r o t e c t i o n granted to 
the manufactured a r t i c l e was the case of woollen c l o t h . 
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Though t h i s was an attempt to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t 
of manufacturers, i t g r e a t l y reduced the freedom of the populace 
to buy from whichever market they d e s i r e d . The c u r t a i l m e n t of 
l i b e r t y was f u r t h e r accentuated by another method of p r o t e c t i n g 
i n d u s t r y . T h i s was by the p r o h i b i t i o n of the emigration of 
s k i l l e d a r t i s a n s . During there-ligious p e r s e c u t i o n s of C h a r l e s I , 
and during the c i v i l wars, many s k i l l e d t e x t i l e workers i n E a s t 
A n g l i a migrated to the c o n t i n e n t . Besides t h i s , some s k i l l e d 
workers i n many t r a d e s were a t t r a c t e d abroad by o f f e r s of high 
r a t e s of pay and other inducements. I n the supposed i n t e r e s t s of 
i n d u s t r y , a law was enacted i n 1719, making i t i l l e g a l f o r s k i l l e d 
a r t i s a n s to emigrate. However t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n was j u s t i f i e d j i t 
l i m i t e d the freedom of movement of labour to p l a c e s where i t 
could be b e t t e r p a i d . 
S i m i l a r l y , the n a v i g a t i o n laws which provided t h a t goods 
from and to A s i a , A f r i c a and America could only be c a r r i e d i n 
E n g l i s h s h i p s , w h i l e goods from and to any European port could be 
brought e i t h e r i n the s h i p s of t h i s country or of the country 
a c t u a l l y producing the goods, i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the l i b e r t y of choice 
of shipment of i n d i v i d u a l s or country importing or ex p o r t i n g 
commodities. I f freedom meant minimum government i n t e r f e r e n c e , 
people or a country should be given the freedom to choose any s h i p 
which should c a r r y t h e i r exports or imports i n s t e a d of being 
l e g a l l y bound to the s h i p s of a power. 
Corn laws had been long i n e x i s t e n c e . I n 1815, a corn 
law was passed which p r a c t i c a l l y p r o h i b i t e d corn imports except i n 
famine y e a r s . According to the terms of the law, import of c e r e a l s 
u n t i l the p r i c e i n the E n g l i s h market had r i s e n to 80/- per q u a r t e r 
of wheat, 40/- f o r b a r l e y ; 26/- f o r oats and 53/- f o r r y e , was 
p r o h i b i t e d . Various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were given to t h i s law. Some 
h e l d t h a t i t was passed to p r o t e c t the landed i n t e r e s t , and to 
* These p r i c e s were given by Briggs and Jordan. 
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enable i t to m a i n t a i n a high standard of l i v i n g by i n e f f i c i e n t 
methods. Others argued t h a t the main o b j e c t i v e was to remove 
sharp f l u c t u a t i o n s from the p r i c e of corn. But whatever the 
motive, i t appeared to have been assumed t h a t i n the y e a r s of 
p l e n t y , the e f f e c t of the law would be to prevent a sharp f a l l i n 
corn p r i c e s by e x c l u d i n g f o r e i g n imports, and c o n v e r s e l y , i n the 
y e a r s of bad h a r v e s t s , the import of f o r e i g n corn would prevent 
p r i c e s r i s i n g to famine h e i g h t s . The freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l to 
buy i n a f r e e market was s t i l l i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . Obviously, no 
importer would import corn i n t o the country, i f i t were not to h i s 
advantage to do so. Accordingly, u s i n g l e g i s l a t i v e measures to 
exclude f o r e i g n corn i n order to maintain s t a b l e p r i c e s d i d not 
only put the mass a t a disadvantage of buying corn cheaply i n the 
y e a r s of p l e n t y but a l s o l i m i t e d the freedom of the e x p o r t e r . 
From the b r i e f s o c i a l h i s t o r y of the p e r i o d , i t i s 
observed t h a t the freedom of the people was r e g u l a r l y i n t e r f e r e d 
w i t h by the s t a t e . They were d i s i n h e r i t e d of t h e i r l i b e r t y to 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i t i c a l process by which they were r u l e d . 
T h e i r freedom of movement was r e g u l a t e d ; the wages which they 
r e c e i v e d from the e f f o r t of t h e i r labours was f i x e d by law, and 
worst of a l l the p r i c e which they p a i d f o r the food they a t e was 
a l s o r e g u l a t e d by a p o s i t i v e law. 
I n t h i s chapter an attempt has been made to d i s c u s s 
the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a s about: l i b e r t y which were handed to M i l l 
and Spencer on one hand, and on the other to show how these i d e a s 
tend to r e l a t e to t h e i r s , ( M i l l ' s and S p e n c e r ' s ) . I n a d d i t i o n , 
a b r i e f account i s a l s o given of the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n of the 
masses a t the p e r i o d when both men wrote. I n the f o l l o w i n g 
c h a p t e r s , an a n a l y s i s of M i l l ' s and Spencer's views about l i b e r t y 
w i l l be made. 
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CHAPTER__2--. 
As I showed i n the l a s t Chapter,"*" M i l l ' s p redecessors 
maintained t h a t economic freedom d i d hot n e c e s s a r i l y imply complete 
absence of government i n t e r f e r e n c e . The consensus of opinion was 
t h a t l e a v i n g people to pursue t h e i r economic i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r 
own way and according to t h e i r means was b e t t e r than c o n t r o l l i n g 
them. Adam Smith admitted t h a t s e l f - l o v e or s e l f - i n t e r e s t was the 
p r i n c i p a l cause urging an i n d i v i d u a l to take up an economic f u n c t i o n . 
He was convinced t h a t the harmony of i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s could 
be b e t t e r secured u l t i m a t e l y by l e a v i n g people alone to f o l l o w 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . His reason was t h a t people would only engage 
themselves i n those f u n c t i o n s which were advantageous to them, and 
through every person doing those t h i n g s which were expedient, 
s o c i e t y would tend to b e n e f i t . T h i s view i s supplemented by h i s 
p r i n c i p l e of "sympathy". He argued t h a t harmony of i n t e r e s t s could 
not only be secured i n the above manner but a l s o by the theory of 
"sympathy". He would allow the s t a t e to i n t e r f e r e i n the economic 
sphere p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those g i g a n t i c p r o j e c t s which are of no 
advantage f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to undertake. 
Bentham stood f o r the p r i n c i p l e of " q u i e t i s m " but 
t h i s does not mean t h a t he d e v i a t e d from the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y 
to j o i n the n a t u r a l law school of thought. He was a u t i l i t a r i a n i n 
h i s economic i d e a s , and i n f a c t would only allow s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
w i t h i n d i v i d u a l economic freedom i f i t w e r e - j u s t i f i e d by the 
d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y . He made h i s stand c l e a r by a t t a c k i n g those 
who opposed t a x a t i o n on the grounds t h a t i t i n v o l v e d a burden on 
those who pay i t . According to him, " i t would be a gross 
e r r o r , and an extremely mischevious one, to r e f e r to the d e f a l c a t i o n 
thus r e s u l t i n g from the mass of l i b e r t y or f r e e agency, as 
a f f o r d i n g a c o n c l u s i v e o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t the i n t e r p o s i t i o n of the 
law f o r t h i s or any other purpose. Every law which does not c o n s i s t 
i n the r e p e a l , t o t a l or p a r t i a l , of a c o e r c i v e law, i s i t s e l f a 
c o e r c i v e law. To reprobate as a m i s c h i e f r e s u l t i n g from t h i s or 
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t h a t law, a property which i s of the very essence of a l l law, i s to 
betray ..... - a t o t a l unaquaintance w i t h what may be c a l l e d the 
..2 
l o g i c of the laws. 
3 
Paine was no l e s s a supporter of the d o c t r i n e of 
" L a i s s e z - f a i r e " . Using Adam Smith's theory of d i v i s i o n of labour, 
he envisaged an economic s o c i e t y b u i l t on a system of exchange. He 
/ 
contended t h a t without any a r t i f i c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e , the harmony of 
4 
i n t e r e s t could be secured n a t u r a l l y . Malthus was w o r r i e d about 
i n c r e a s e i n population outrunning the means of s u b s i s t e n c e . Though 
he h e l d t h i s view, he would not encourage a w e l f a r e s t a t e a s s i s t i n g 
the poor. 
5 
Nassau S e n i o r , M i l l s contemporary was not 
completely h o s t i l e to S t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the economic freedom 
of i n d i v i d u a l s . He opposed the i d e a of l i m i t i n g s t a t e f u n c t i o n to 
the r i n g - f e n c e of p r o v i d i n g i t s s u b j e c t s w i t h p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
f o r e i g n e r s by war or by n e g o t i a t i o n , and a g a i n s t one another by the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c i v i l and c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e . T h i s a p a r t , he 
disapproved of the use of the word " o p t i o n a l " as a p p l i e d to the 
f u n c t i o n s of government, on the grounds t h a t i t appeared to imply 
th a t t h e r e might be u s e f u l measures which the government of a 
country might at i t s d i s c r e t i o n adopt or r e j e c t . 
He argued t h a t "the only r a t i o n a l foundation of a 
r i g h t to govern and of a c o r r e l a t i v e duty to obey i s expediency -
the g e n e r a l b e n e f i t of the community. I t i s the duty of a 
government to do whatever i s conducive to the w e l f a r e of the 
governed. The only l i m i t to t h i s duty i s i t s power. And as the 
supreme government of an independent s t a t e i s n e c e s s a r i l y absolute,' 
the only l i m i t to i t s power i s p h y s i c a l or moral i n a b i l i t y . And 
whatever i t i s i t s duty to do, i t must n e c e s s a r i l y have a r i g h t to 
5 
do." I t can be concluded t h a t S enior j u s t l i k e h i s contemporary 
John S t u a r t M i l l held to u t i l i t a r i a n views i n the economic spheres. 
M i l l d i d not depart from the general i d e a s of h i s 
predecessors about economic l i b e r t y , though he tended more towards 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . " L a i s s e z - f a i r e " ought to be the general 
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p r i n c i p l e but the s t a t e could i n t e r f e r e when i t s a c t i o n was 
j u s t i f i e d by the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y . The point M i l l was 
s t r e s s i n g was, t h a t " under whatever p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
we l i v e , t h e r e i s a c i r c l e around every i n d i v i d u a l human being 
which no government, be i t t h a t of one, of a few, or of the many, 
ought to be permitted to overstep: t h e r e i s a p a r t of the l i f e of 
every person who has come to y e a r s of d i s c r e t i o n , w i t h i n which 
the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of t h a t person ought to r e i g n u n c o n t r o l l e d 
e i t h e r by any other i n d i v i d u a l or by the p u b l i c c o l l e c t i v e l y . That 
t h e r e i s , or ought to be, some space i n human e x i s t e n c e thus 
entrenched around, and s a c r e d from a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t r u s i o n , no one 
who p r o f e s s e s the s m a l l e s t regard to human freedom or d i g n i t y w i l l 
c a l l i n question; the point to be determined i s where the l i m i t 
should be placed; how l a r g e a province of human l i f e t h i s r e s e r v e d 
t e r r i t o r y should i n c l u d e . I ^ M i l l 7 apprehend t h a t i t ought to 
i n c l u d e a l l t h a t p a r t which concerns only the l i f e , whether inward 
or outward, of the i n d i v i d u a l , and does not a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t s of 
o t h e r s , or a f f e c t s them only through the moral i n f l u e n c e of 
example. 
M i l l approved of l i m i t i n g government i n t e r v e n t i o n both 
f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic reasons. P o l i t i c a l l y , as the f u n c t i o n s 
of the s t a t e i n c r e a s e , i t ' s power i n c r e a s e s as w e l l , both i n the 
7 
form of a u t h o r i t y , and i n the i n d i r e c t form of i n f l u e n c e . Bentham 
regarded u n f a i r d i s t r i b u t i o n of power as an e v i l . He a f f i r m e d t h a t 
the g r e a t e r the q u a n t i t y of power th a t an i n d i v i d u a l or a group of 
i n d i v i d u a l s may p o s s e s s , the g r e a t e r the f a c i l i t y of and the 
incitement to i t s abuse. M i l l saw t h a t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n meant an 
i n c r e a s e i n the number of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . From the h i s t o r i c a l 
experience of the country, he f e a r e d t h a t more p u b l i c employment 
would mean more abuse of patronage by the government. As the power 
of the s t a t e i n c r e a s e d , i n d i v i d u a l freedom diminished at an i n v e r s e 
r a t i o . T h i s would make the power of the s t a t e d e s p o t i c beyond 
c e r t a i n l i m i t s . Such a tendency, threatened i n d i v i d u a l freedom, and 
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"hence i t i s no l e s s important i n a democratic than i n any other 
government, t h a t a l l tendency on the p a r t of p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s to 
s t r e t c h t h e i r i n t e r f e r e n c e and assume a power of any s o r t which 
can e a s i l y be dispensed w i t h should be regarded w i t h u n r e m i t t i n g 
j e a l o u s y . 
Economically, on the b a s i s of the p r i n c i p l e of the 
d i v i s i o n of labour, the government had s u f f i c i e n t d u t i e s to perform. 
Every i n c r e a s e of f u n c t i o n which the s t a t e undertook meant 
overworking i t s organs. I n e f f i c i e n c y i n e v i t a b l y followed as a r e s u l t 
B e s i d e s i n e f f i c i e n c y , s t a t e o f f i c i a l s would be so very much 
occupied t h a t they would have no time or thought to c o n t r i b u t e 
towards s o c i a l improvement. 
Why i s i n d i v i d u a l economic freedom v a l u a b l e ? F i r s t l y , 
i t provides a b i g scope f o r educating i n d i v i d u a l s i n "the bus i n e s s 
of l i f e " . "The bu s i n e s s of l i f e i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the 
p r a c t i c a l education of a people; without which book and school 
i n s t r u c t i o n , though most n e c e s s a r y and s a l u t a r y , does not s u f f i c e 
to q u a l i f y them f o r conduct, and f o r the adaptation of means to ends 
Education of a vigorous e x e r c i s e of the a c t i v e e n e r g i e s , which 
i n c l u d e labour, c o n t r i v a n c e , judgement, and s e l f - c o n t r o l . As these 
e n e r g i e s can d i m i n i s h i n e f f i c i e n c y , i f they are not f r e e l y 
e x e r c i s e d , i t becomes incumbent on the s t a t e to allow the 
i n d i v i d u a l the freedom to e x e r c i s e them with the u l t i m a t e prospect 
of producing a l a r g e group w i t h a d i v e r s i f i e d education. "A people 
among whom there i s no h a b i t of spontaneous a c t i o n f o r a 
c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t - who look h a b i t u a l l y to t h e i r government to 
command or prompt them i n a l l matters of j o i n t concern - who 
expect to have e v e r y t h i n g done f o r them, except what can be made 
an a f f a i r of mere h a b i t and r o u t i n e - have t h e i r f a c u l t i e s only 
h a l f developed, t h e i r education i s d e f e c t i v e i n one of i t s most 
..10 
important branches. 
Government by a few i n a s o c i e t y cramped by ignorance 
i s a k i n to despotism and i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the concept of 
freedom, and "the only s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l s l a v e r y i s the 
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check maintained over governors by the d i f f u s i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
a c t i v i t y and p u b l i c s p i r i t among the governed." 1' 1' The ideas about 
despotism a t t h i s p e r i o d were very unfavourable. Ricardo observed 
t h a t "The most e f f i c i e n t causes of d e p r e s s i o n are despotism, 
oppression and ignorance; the most e f f i c i e n t causes of e l e v a t i o n 
a r e , c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y and education. Of the causes which 
tend to generate p r u d e n t i a l h a b i t s , the most e s s e n t i a l i s c i v i l 
l i b e r t y , and to the maihtainance of c i v i l l i b e r t y , p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y 
..12 
i s g e n e r a l l y n e c e s s a r y . 
Hence, M i l l would p r e f e r a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e form of 
government as the i d e a l because every i n d i v i d u a l has the freedom 
not only to take p a r t i n i t , but a l s o has a v o i c e i n the e x e r c i s e 
of the s o v e r e i g n power. I n h i s views, " the i d e a l l y b e s t form 
of government i s t h a t i n which the s o v e r e i g n t y , or supreme 
c o n t r o l l i n g power i n the l a s t r e s o r t , i s r e s t e d i n the e n t i r e aggregat 
of the community; every c i t i z e n not only having a v o i c e i n the 
e x e r c i s e of t h a t u l t i m a t e s o v e r e i g n t y , but being, a t l e a s t 
o c c a s i o n a l l y , c a l l e d on to take an a c t u a l p a r t i n the government, 
by the p e r s o n a l d i s c h a r g e of some p u b l i c f u n c t i o n , l o c a l or 
13 
g e n e r a l . " I t s s u p e r i o r i t y as a form of government r e s t s on two 
p r i n c i p l e s of " u n i v e r s a l t r u t h and a p p l i c a b i l i t y . " F i r s t l y , 
"....human beings are only s e c u r e from e v i l a t the hands of others 
i n p r o p o r t i o n as they have the power of being, and a r e , s e l f -
p r o t e c t i n g ; /secondly^ ....they only achieve a high degree of 
s u c c e s s i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e w i t h Nature i n p r o p o r t i o n as they are 
self-dependent, r e l y i n g on what they themselves can do, e i t h e r 
..14 
s e p a r a t e l y or i n c o n c e r t , r a t h e r than on what oth e r s do f o r them." 
The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e which o r i g i n a t e s from the g e n e r a l 
i d e a t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l i s the only s a f e guardian of h i s own r i g h t s 
and i n t e r e s t regarded by some people as a d o c t r i n e of u n i v e r s a l 
s e l f i s h n e s s , M i l l defended as a s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t overlooking c e r t a i n 
i n t e r e s t s i n the s o c i e t y . T h i s was h i s defence - "For my own p a r t , 
not b e l i e v i n g i n u n i v e r s a l s e l f i s h n e s s , I have no d i f f i c u l t y i n 
a d m i t t i n g t h a t communism would even now be p r a c t i c a b l e among the 
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e l i t e of mankind, and may become so among the r e s t . But as t h i s 
o pinion i s anything but popular w i t h those defenders of e x i s t i n g 
i n s t i t u t i o n s who f i n d f a u l t with the d o c t r i n e of the ge n e r a l 
predominance of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , I am i n c l i n e d to t h i n k they do i n 
r e a l i t y b e l i e v e t h a t most men co n s i d e r themselves before other 
people. I t i s not, however, n e c e s s a r y to a f f i r m even thus much i n 
order to support the c l a i m of a l l to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the sove r e i g n 
power. We need not suppose t h a t when power r e s i d e s i n an e x c l u s i v e 
c l a s s , that c l a s s w i l l knowingly and d e l i b e r a t e l y s a c r i f i c e the 
other c l a s s e s to themselves; i t s u f f i c e s t h a t , i n the absence of i t 
n a t u r a l defenders, the i n t e r e s t of the excluded i s always i n danger 
of being overlooked, and, when looked a t , i s seen w i t h very 
d i f f e r e n t eyes from those of the persons whom i t d i r e c t l y concerns. 
The second p r i n c i p l e s t i m u l a t e s s o c i a l p r o g r e s s , and encourages 
competition among people. 
He c l e a r l y exposed the importance of educating people 
i n the management of t h e i r own government w i t h these words - "A 
democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n , not supported by democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n d e t a i l , but confined to the c e n t r a l government, not only i s not 
p o l i t i c a l freedom, but o f t e n c r e a t e s a s p i r i t p r e c i s e l y the 
r e v e r s e , c a r r y i n g down to the lowest grade i n s o c i e t y the d e s i r e 
and ambition of p o l i t i c a l domination .... I n proportion as the 
people a r e accustomed to manage t h e i r a f f a i r s by t h e i r own a c t i v e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , i n s t e a d of l e a v i n g them to the government, t h e i r 
d e s i r e s w i l l t u r n to r e p e l l i n g tyranny, r a t h e r than to t y r a n n i z i n g ; 
w h i l e i n proportion as a l l r e a l i n i t i a t i v e and d i r e c t i o n r e s i d e s 
i n the government, and i n d i v i d u a l s h a b i t u a l l y f e e l and a c t as 
u n d e r i i t s p e r p e t u a l t u t e l a g e , popular i n s t i t u t i o n s develop i n them 
not the d e s i r e of freedom, but an unmeasured a p p e t i t e f o r p l a c e 
and power, d i v e r t i n g the i n t e l l i g e n c e and a c t i v i t y of the country 
from i t s p r i n c i p a l b u s i n e s s to a wretched competition f o r the 
16 
s e l f i s h p r i z e s and the p e t t y v a n i t i e s of o f f i c e . " 
Not only the importance of educating people to manage 
t h e i r government appealed to him: he a l s o a p p r e c i a t e d the 
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e d u c a t i o n a l v a l u e s of economic freedom, and i n f a c t , f e l t t h a t 
education was the main avenue to improving the c o n d i t i o n of the 
working c l a s s e s and reducing the i n e q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n g i n s o c i e t y . 
Hence, he encouraged the formation of a c o - o p e r a t i v e movement 
among the working c l a s s e s . The s u c c e s s of a s s o c i a t i o n s s i m i l a r to 
c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s i s " a course of education i n those 
moral and a c t i v e q u a l i t i e s by which alone s u c c e s s can be e i t h e r 
17 
deserved or a t t a i n e d . " The power to co-operate, he remarked, i s 
18 
an a c c u r a t e t e s t of the progress of c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
Secondly, competition f l o u r i s h e d b e t t e r i n an 
atmosphere of economic freedom than i n one of economic r e s t r a i n t s . 
M i l l would have given h i s e n t i r e support to s o c i a l i s m , but f a i l e d 
because of s o c i a l i s t "declamations a g a i n s t competition." There were 
some o l d i d e a s p r e v a l e n t among s o c i a l i s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those i d e a s 
which a t t r i b u t e d a l l economic e v i l s to competition, which he 
conceived as r e p u l s i v e . I t was h i s aim to show them th a t competition 
brought l e s s e v i l than the s o c i a l i s t s thought. The opposite of 
monopoly i s competition, and he regarded monopoly as a t a x a t i o n 
l e v i e d on the i n d u s t r i o u s to support the i n d o l e n t . Economic 
freedom and hence competition, would prevent such a t a x a t i o n . 
Competition works f o r the b e n e f i t of the working c l a s s e s by 
cheapening the a r t i c l e s they consume, and by p r o v i d i n g a source 
of high wages wherever the demand f o r labour exceeds the supply. 
Although competition was d e s i r a b l e , i t could not be a c q u i t t e d 
e n t i r e l y of c a u s i n g c e r t a i n inconveniences i n the economic sphere. 
19 
"But i f competition has i t s e v i l s , i t prevents g r e a t e r e v i l s . " 
I t was considered as the best c o n c e i v a b l e s t i m u l u s to improvement 
i n the economic spheres. Thus, i f the s o c i e t y were to operate on 
the assumption t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s were competent judges of improvement 
i n t h i s f i e l d , i t would be e a s i e r to i n t r o d u c e new methods of 
production i n i n d u s t r i e s under a c o m p e t i t i v e atmosphere than under 
a m o n o p o l i s t i c one. 
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As I pointed out above, M i l l ' s i d e a of economic 
20 
freedom d i d not mean t o t a l absence of s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
Sometimes, he j u s t i f i e d government i n t e r v e n t i o n , though i t meant 
a d e n i a l of freedom. One of the s o c i a l a f f a i r s i n which s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e was j u s t i f i e d was education. I f people were the best 
judges of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , why should they not be allowed a b s o l u t e 
freedom i n e d u c a t i o n a l matters ? F i r s t l y , M i l l pointed out t h a t 
education as a commodity, " c h i e f l y u s e f u l as tending to r a i s e the 
21 
c h a r a c t e r of human beings," was d i f f e r e n t from other m a t e r i a l 
goods which people r e q u i r e d f o r t h e i r p h y s i c a l needs or f o r the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of some t a s t e o:ir~ i n c l i n a t i o n . A c c o r dingly, n e i t h e r 
the knowledge of the i n d i v i d u a l (where he i s not educated) nor the 
demand of the market was s u f f i c i e n t guarantee f o r the goodness of 
22 
the commodity. 
The point M i l l i s making here i s of some s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
Take the case of a student f o r example reading f o r a degree a t 
U n i v e r s i t y . Obviously, the things which he r e q u i r e s f o r h i s course 
of s t u d i e s a r e d i f f e r e n t from those he needs f o r h i s p h y s i c a l want 
or f o r the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of h i s t a s t e s or i n c l i n a t i o n s . The 
student w i l l not regard h i s l e c t u r e r ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e i n matters 
r e l a t i n g to the purchase of text-books as i n h i b i t o r y to h i s freedom 
of c h o i c e . But w i l l do so, i f the l e c t u r e r i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h i n g s 
which he r e q u i r e s f o r h i s p e r s o n a l want; he w i l l l i k e h i s freedom 
of c h o i c e to p r e v a i l undisturbed i n buying h i s shoes, s h i r t s , 
c i g a r e t t e s or other things which appeal to him. I n most c a s e s , i n 
making h i s d e c i s i o n s he i s i n f l u e n c e d by the p o p u l a r i t y , cheapness 
or dearness of the goods i n the market; or the amount of 
advertisement given to the commodity. But w i t h regards to the t e x t -
books or other n e c e s s a r i e s , he r e q u i r e s f o r h i s academic work, he 
w i l l allow any measure of i n t e r f e r e n c e h i s l e c t u r e r may be disposed 
t o make. 
Secondly, the s o c i a l h i s t o r y of t h a t p e r i o d (19th 
Century) shows t h a t the m a j o r i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s were uneducated. 
I f the masses were uneducated, i t i s c l e a r t h a t they could not be 
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competent judges of l e a r n i n g . M i l l moreover observed t h a t "those 
who most need to be made w i s e r and b e t t e r u s u a l l y d e s i r e i t l e a s t , 
and i f they d e s i r e d i t , would be i n c a p a b l e of f i n d i n g the way to 
23 
i t by t h e i r own l i g h t s . " Without a measure of compulsion and 
s y s t e m a t i c o r g a n i s a t i o n by the s t a t e , "....the end not being 
24 
d e s i r e d , the means w i l l not be provided at a l l " 
With regards to elementary education, he admitted t h a t parents were 
under o b l i g a t i o n to provide such "primary elements and means of 
,.25 
knowledge to t h e i r c h i l d r e n . But as there might be a tendency 
f o r some parents to n e g l e c t t h i s duty, i t was n e c e s s a r y on the p a r t 
of the s t a t e "to impose on parents the l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n of g i v i n g 
elementary i n s t r u c t i o n to / ' t h e i r J c h i l d r e n . T h i s , however, cannot 
f a i r l y be done, without t a k i n g measures to i n s u r e t h a t such 
i n s t r u c t i o n s h a l l be always a c c e s s i b l e to them, e i t h e r g r a t u i t o u s l y 
..25 
or a t a t r i f l i n g expense. 
M i l l had warned t h a t "the primary and p e r e n n i a l 
..26 
so u r c e s of a l l s o c i a l e v i l a r e ignorance and want of c u l t u r e . 
These could not be e l i m i n a t e d from s o c i e t y "by the best c o n t r i v e d 
system of p o l i t i c a l checks, n e c e s s a r y as such checks are /"designed^ 
27 
f o r other purposes." I f " p o l i t i c a l checks" were not good enough 
to remove the e v i l s , on what could mankind depend ? "Mainly, on 
the u n r e m i t t i n g e x e r t i o n s of the more i n s t r u c t e d and c u l t i v a t e d , 
whether i n the p o s i t i o n of the government or i n a p r i v a t e s t a t i o n , 
to awaken i n t h e i r minds a consciousness of t h i s want, and to 
27 
f a c i l i t a t e to them the means of supplying i t . " 
Why d i d M i l l e n t r u s t matters of education mainly to 
the s t a t e ?/Apart from the reasons which have been d i s c u s s e d , he 
h e l d t h a t "....any w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d and t o l e r a b l y c i v i l i z e d 
government ought to possess a degree of c u l t i v a t i o n above the 
average of the community which i t r u l e s , and i t should 
t h e r e f o r e be capable of o f f e r i n g b e t t e r education and b e t t e r 
i n s t r u c t i o n to the people, than the g r e a t e r number of them would 
28 
spontaneously demand." Accordingly, education ought to be 
regarded as one of those t h i n g s the s t a t e should provide f o r the 
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people. 
Although s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d i n 
e d u c a t i o n a l f i e l d s , monopoly p r a c t i c e s should not be encouraged 
i n them. I n d i v i d u a l s should not only be given the freedom to 
choose t h e i r i n s t r u c t o r s but should be allowed to b u i l d 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , i f they can a f f o r d them. " I t i s not endurable t h a t a 
government should e i t h e r de j u r e , or defacto, have a complete c o n t r o l 
over the education of the people. To possess such a c o n t r o l , and 
a c t u a l l y e x e r t i t , i s to be d e s p o t i c . A government which can mould 
the opinions and sentiments of the people from t h e i r youth upwards 
can do w i t h them whatever i t p l e a s e s . Though a government t h e r e f o r e , 
may, and i n many cases ought to, e s t a b l i s h s c h o o l s and c o l l e g e s , 
i t must n e i t h e r compel nor b r i b e any person to come to them, nor 
ought the power of i n d i v i d u a l s to s e t up r i v a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s to 
depend i n any degree upon i t s a u t h o r i z a t i o n . I t would be j u s t i f i e d 
i n r e q u i r i n g from a l l the people t h a t they s h a l l possess i n s t r u c t i o n 
i n c e r t a i n t h i n g s , but not i n p r e s c r i b i n g to them how or from whom 
29 
they s h a l l o b t a i n i t . " M i l l maintained the g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of 
support given to s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n e d u c a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 
Adam Smith pointed out t h a t the education of the 
common people r a t h e r than t h a t of the r i c h r e q u i r e d i n any modern 
s o c i e t y the a t t e n t i o n of the s t a t e . The wealthy at an e a r l y age 
have a p r o f e s s i o n a l education to f o l l o w which the poor d i d not have. 
"They ^ h e poor/ have l i t t l e time to spare f o r education. T h e i r 
p a r e n t s can s c a r c e a f f o r d to maintain them even i n i n f a n c y . As soon 
as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade by which 
they can earn t h e i r s u b s i s t e n c e . That trade too i s g e n e r a l l y so 
simple and uniform as to g i v e l i t t l e e x e r c i s e to the understanding; 
w h i l e , a t the same time, t h e i r labour i s both so constant and so 
s e v e r e , t h a t i t l e a v e s them l i t t l e l e i s u r e and l e s s i n c l i n a t i o n to 
30 
apply to, or even to t h i n k of anything e l s e . " He suggested t h a t 
" f o r a very s m a l l expense the p u b l i c can f a c i l i t a t e , can encourage, 
and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the 
n e c e s s i t y of a c q u i r i n g those most e s s e n t i a l p a r t s of education. The 
p u b l i c can f a c i l i t a t e t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n by e s t a b l i s h i n g i n every 
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p a r i s h or d i s t r i c t a l i t t l e s c h o o l , where c h i l d r e n may be taught 
f o r a reward so moderate, t h a t even a common labo u r e r may a f f o r d 
31 
i t ; " Though the s t a t e d e r i v e s no advantage from educating 
the poor, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t they should not be l e f t i g n o r a n t . 
"The more they are i n s t r u c t e d , the l e s s l i a b l e they are to the 
d e l u s i o n s of enthusiasm and s u p e r s t i t i o n , which, among ignorant 
32 
n a t i o n s , f r e q u e n t l y o c c a s i o n the most d r e a d f u l d i s o r d e r . " 
33 
Nassau Senior argued t h a t i t wasnecessary t h a t the 
s t a t e should not only provide but a l s o c o n t r o l the system of 
education f o r the l a b o u r i n g c l a s s . J u s t l i k e M i l l , he a f f i r m e d t h a t 
the means, the i n t e l l i g e n c e and c o n s c i e n t i o u s n e s s of the working 
c l a s s which would enable and induce them to g i v e t h e i r c h i l d r e n a 
good education were not enough. Asking them to provide t h e i r 
c h i l d r e n w i t h education would e n t a i l t h e i r s a c r i f i c i n g much i n t h a t 
cause. 
S i m i l a r l y , as M i l l d i d not f e e l t h a t the u n c u l t i v a t e d 
could ever make good judges of the c u l t i v a t e d , S e nior would not 
t r u s t the management of the education of the poor w i t h them. He 
argued, " . . . . t h a t i n order to p r o f i t by experience men must s t a r t 
w i t h much more education than i s possessed by the lower c l a s s e s of 
the E n g l i s h . For f i f t y y e a r s , they have been managing t h e i r own 
b e n e f i t s o c i e t i e s . Almost a l l of them are founded on p r i n c i p l e s 
l e a d i n g to i n e v i t a b l e i n s o l v e n c y . For f i f t y y e a r s , they have been 
managing t h e i r own t r a d e unions. There i s not one which i s not 
based on f o l l y , tyranny and i n j u s t i c e which would d i s a g r e e w i t h the 
r u d e s t savages. They s a c r i f i c e t h e i r wives, t h e i r c h i l d r e n ' s and 
33 
t h e i r own h e a l t h and s t r e n g t h to the lowest s e n s u a l i t y . " S e n i o r 
was perhaps unduly s e v e r e i n h i s assessment of the working c l a s s 
and i n f a c t would not g i v e them the freedom to co-operate f o r 
improvement as M i l l should have. 
Another sphere i n which s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e was 
j u s t i f i e d was i n s t a t e r e l i e f of the poor. According to him, 
i n d i v i d u a l s should, i n g e n e r a l , be given the freedom to do 
whatever was considered reasonable f o r them to do. But when i t was 
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not a q u e s t i o n of l e a v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s to themselves, but i n 
t r u s t i n g them to the a s s i s t a n c e of o t h e r s , "....the q u e s t i o n /then/ 
a r i s e s whether i t i s b e t t e r t h a t they should r e c e i v e t h i s h e l p 
e x c l u s i v e l y from i n d i v i d u a l s , and t h e r e f o r e u n c e r t a i n l y and c a s u a l l y , 
or by s y s t e m a t i c arrangements, i n which s o c i e t y a c t s through i t s 
..34 
organ, the s t a t e . Why was s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the problem of 
the poor j u s t i f i e d ? 
F i r s t l y , M i l l a f f i r m e d t h a t i f poor r e l i e f were l e f t 
to v o l u n t a r y c h a r i t y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t to achieve a f a i r 
d i s t r i b u t i o n to needy i n d i v i d u a l s . Secondly, s i n c e the s t a t e could 
provide f o r the c r i m i n a l poor, i t could a l s o provide f o r the 
innocent poor or i t s a c t i o n might be regarded as encouraging crime. 
35 
F i n a l l y , "a v a s t amount of mendencity i s i n e v i t a b l e , " i f the poor 
were t r u s t e d to vo l u n t a r y c h a r i t y . Consequently, M i l l thought the 
w e l f a r e of the poor r e q u i r e d a s y s t e m a t i c arrangement, and t h i s 
arrangement would be best c a r r i e d out by the s t a t e . Although s t a t e 
r e l i e f i s v a l u a b l e , yet i t should be planned i n such a way as not 
to induce i n d i v i d u a l s to dispense w i t h s e l f - h e l p nor to make the 
c o n d i t i o n of a r e c e i v e r b e t t e r than an i n d i v i d u a l who gained h i s 
l i v i n g by s e l f - e x e r t i o n - a view shared by Se n i o r . 
C o l o n i z a t i o n i s another s o c i a l a f f a i r which c a l l s f o r 
government i n t e r v e n t i o n . I t should be a s t a t e undertaking because 
the b e n e f i t a c c r u i n g from i t a f f e c t s not only the economic i n t e r e s t 
of one country but t h a t of the world a t l a r g e . B e s i d e s the b e n e f i t 
the expenses of c o l o n i z a t i o n can be more l i g h t l y borne by the s t a t e 
than by the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Admittedly, freedom i s l i m i t e d by c o l o n i z a t i o n but 
would be more l i m i t e d i f i t were l e f t f r e e l y i n p r i v a t e hands. 
* 
The i d e a expressed here i s the p r i n c i p l e t h a t l i b e r t y to r e c e i v e 
s t a t e a s s i s t a n c e should not. exceed the extent which would make a 
person dispense w i t h s e l f - e x e r t i o n . 
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Wakefield's p l a n f o r r a i s i n g funds f o r the support of c o l o n i z a t i o n , 
though a good one, provides a good example of the extent to which 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom can be l i m i t e d i f c o l o n i z a t i o n i s f r e e l y l e f t i n 
p r i v a t e funds. The plan i n v o l v e d not only p u t t i n g a p r i c e on a l l 
unoccupied land and devoting the proceeds to emigration, but making 
i t a r u l e t h a t a l l emigrants whose passage was p a i d f o r out of 
these proceeds should earn a c o n s i d e r a b l e sum before they could 
become landed p r o p r i e t o r s . The e f f e c t s of t h i s p l a n on the emigrant 
were f i r s t l y t h a t r e s t r a i n t was put upon h i s freedom to adopt the 
t a s t e s and type of l i f e he wished.to l e a d . Secondly, h i s freedom of 
movement was r e s t r i c t e d to c e r t a i n l i m i t s . T h i r d l y , h i s n a t u r a l 
i n s t i n c t of a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s was kept under c o n t r o l . He could not 
f r e e l y own any land or i n c r e a s e h i s e s t a t e because of the c o s t of 
the l a n d . Thus, i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l 
freedom s u f f e r e d more under p r i v a t e hands c a r r y i n g out c o l o n i z i n g 
p r o j e c t s than under the government. 
A f t e r i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s 
p r e s e r v e d by a s t a t e undertaking M i l l went on f u r t h e r to examine 
whether c o l o n i z a t i o n was j u s t i f i a b l e , by the s t a t e i n t e r f e r i n g i n 
the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of another community. He a f f i r m e d t h a t "there 
are few q u e s t i o n s which more r e q u i r e to be taken i n hand by 
e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , w i t h a view to e s t a b l i s h i n g some 
r u l e or c r i t e r i o n whereby the j u s t i f i a b l e n e s s of i n t e r v e n i n g i n 
the a f f a i r s of other c o u n t r i e s , and ^what i s sometimes f u l l y as 
questionable^ 7 the j u s t i f i a b l e n e s s of r e f r a i n i n g from i n t e r v e n t i o n , 
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may be brought to a d e f i n i t e and r a t i o n a l t e s t . T h i s i s an 
important i s s u e which he t r i e d to c o n s i d e r . The c r i t e r i o n which he 
e s t a b l i s h e d s t r e s s e d t h a t the s t a t e of c i v i l i z a t i o n of the people 
would determine whether i n t e r f e r e n c e was j u s t i f i a b l e or not. I f a 
community i s made up of b a r b a r i a n s , any i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e i r , 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s by a neighbouring c i v i l i s e d s t a t e i s approved of. 
Though "a v i o l a t i o n of g r e a t p r i n c i p l e s of m o r a l i t y i t may e a s i l y 
be; but b a r b a r i a n s have no r i g h t s as a n a t i o n , except a r i g h t to 
such treatment as may, a t the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e p e r i o d , f i t them 
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f o r becoming one. The only moral laws f o r the r e l a t i o n between 
a c i v i l i z e d and a barbarous government, are the u n i v e r s a l r u l e s 
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of m o r a l i t y between man and man." 
The point M i l l was d r i v i n g a t , i s one which 
c o n s i d e r s the u n c i v i l i z e d s t a t e of a people s u f f i c i e n t excuse f o r 
d e p r i v i n g them of p a r t of t h e i r freedom. He i s regarding the s t a t e 
of b a r b a r i a n s s i m i l a r to t h a t of c h i l d r e n and i d i o t s whose 
c o n d i t i o n j u s t i f i e s r e g u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e by an e x t e r n a l power. 
Should a dependent colony be given the freedom to 
t r a d e w i t h any other country of i t s c h o i c e ? The p r o t e c t i o n i s t s 
a s s e r t e d t h a t the dependent colony should be compelled to t r a d e 
e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the dominant country. M i l l disapproved of the i d e a , 
because "a country which thus s e c u r e s to i t s e l f an e x t r a f o r e i g n 
demand f o r i t s commoditie's undoubtedly g i v e s i t s e l f some advantage 
i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the g e n e r a l gains of the commercial 
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world. B e s i d e s the commercial advantage, such compulsion i m p l i e s 
r e s t r a i n i n g the choice of a s o c i e t y at l a r g e which i s f a r more 
seve r e than imposing trade r e s t r i c t i o n i n the form of t a r i f f s on 
the, country. 
Having reviewed c e r t a i n f i e l d s i n which s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d , I s h a l l now c o n s i d e r the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
property w i t h r e f e r e n c e to r i g h t s of bequest and i n h e r i t a n c e . M i l l 
observed t h a t "the laws and c o n d i t i o n s of the production of wealth 
p a r t a k e of the c h a r a c t e r of p h y s i c a l t r u t h s . There i s nothing 
o p t i o n a l or a r b i t r a r y i n them. Whatever mankind produce, must be 
produced i n the modes, and under the c o n d i t i o n s , imposed by the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of e x t e r n a l t h i n g s , and by the i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s of 
t h e i r own b o d i l y and mental s t r u c t u r e i t i s not so w i t h the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth. That i s a matter of human i n s t i t u t i o n 
s o l e l y . The t h i n g s once t h e r e , mankind, i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y , 
can do w i t h them as they l i k e . They can p l a c e them a l l a t the 
d i s p o s a l of whomsoever they p l e a s e , and on whatever terms ..... The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth, t h e r e f o r e , depends on the laws and customs 
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of s o c i e t y . " 
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A f t e r a c a r e f u l examination of systems of d i s t r i b u t i n g 
n a t i o n a l wealth, M i l l a s s e r t e d t h a t the b e s t system i s the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of p r i v a t e property. T h i s he argued s e c u r e s every 
person, an e q u i t a b l e share of h i s labour. What does the i n s t i t u t i o n 
of p r i v a t e property mean ? "The i n s t i t u t i o n of property when 
l i m i t e d to i t s e s s e n t i a l elements, c o n s i s t s i n the r e c o g n i t i o n , i n 
each person, of a r i g h t to the e x c l u s i v e d i s p o s a l of what he or she 
has produced by t h e i r own e x e r t i o n s , or r e c e i v e d e i t h e r by g i f t or 
by f a i r agreement, without f o r c e or fraud, from those who produced 
i t . The foundation of the whole i s the r i g h t of producers to what 
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they themselves have produced. Right of property, then, i m p l i e s 
the r i g h t every i n d i v i d u a l has to h i s own f a c u l t i e s , to what he can 
produce by them, and to whatever he can get f o r them i n a f a i r 
market. T h i s i n c l u d e s the freedom of a c q u i r i n g property by c o n t r a c t -
t h a t i s , the r i g h t an i n d i v i d u a l has to g i v e h i s property to another 
person, and the r i g h t the l a t t e r has to r e c e i v e from the former. 
On t h i s b a s i s , M i l l deduced t h a t the r i g h t of bequest 
was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i d e a of p r i v a t e property but r i g h t of 
i n h e r i t a n c e was not. Though the r i g h t of bequest was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
the concept of p r i v a t e property, system of e n t a i l s and 
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p e r p e t u i t i e s was not. Thxs system was shown i n the l a s t chapter, 
as one of the ways by which the landed c l a s s endeavoured to p r o t e c t 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t . M i l l ' s c o n t e n t i o n was t h a t when any property was 
bequeathed, i t should be done once and once only. I t i s wrong f o r 
example f o r a t e s t a t o r to bequeath a property to A and then 
p r e s c r i b e t h a t on A's death, i t s h a l l pass on to h i s e l d e s t son, 
and son's son and so on ad i n f i n i t u m . 
Although M i l l ' s motive f o r opposing e n t a i l s was an 
attempt to bridge the economic i n e q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n g i n s o c i e t y , 
he appeared to have s t r e s s e d h i s l e v e l l i n g p r o p o s i t i o n on 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . I f the i n s t i t u t i o n of p r i v a t e property allowed 
every person the freedom to d i s p o s e e x c l u s i v e l y of what he or she 
has produced by h i s or her own e x e r t i o n , on what grounds was M i l l 
opposing e n t a i l s and p e r p e t u i t i e s ? His argument tended to r e v o l v e 
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around the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t s o c i e t y gains more by imposing 
r e s t r a i n t on the mode of bequest than a l l o w i n g e n t a i l s . 
Assuming th a t he had j u s t i f i e d h i s views on 
u t i l i t a r i a n grounds, what i s the guarantee t h a t the gain of u t i l i t y 
would be g r e a t e r i f a posthumous r e s t r a i n t were imposed on the use 
of bequeathed wealth ? Would such a r e s t r a i n t not cause a diminished 
inducement to produce and pre s e r v e wealth ? 
I t could be argued t h a t men i n gen e r a l would r e c e i v e 
a g r e a t e r s a t i s f a c t i o n out of t h e i r wealth f o r themselves, i f they 
were allowed to choose f r e e l y the way of spending i t . But on one 
hand, i t does not i n any manner fo l l o w that they would render i t 
most pr o d u c t i v e of u t i l i t y f o r those who are to come a f t e r them i f 
they were allowed to bequeath i t under any c o n d i t i o n which they 
chose. On the other hand, i t i s not im p o s s i b l e t h a t the i n s t i n c t 
of a c q u i s i t i o n could be impaired i f they r e a l i s e d t h a t i f a f t e r 
e x e r t i n g themselves to a c q u i r e and pr e s e r v e wealth, t h e i r freedom 
to d i s p o s e of i t the way they d e s i r e d would be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . 
Amassing property would then be l e s s u s e f u l which, i f i n d i v i d u a l s 
were l e f t f r e e l y to do as they wish w i t h t h e i r wealth, would not be 
the c a s e . The f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s no l e g a l or p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n t on 
i t s d i s p o s a l w i l l be an inducement to ac q u i r e and p r e s e r v e i t . 
C o n t r a c t s should be enforced by the s t a t e . S t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i s nec e s s a r y to ensure t h a t p a r t n e r s to a c o n t r a c t 
f u l f i l t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s . When i n d i v i d u a l s f r e e l y e n t e r i n t o a 
c o n t r a c t , i t becomes binding on them to f u l f i l but i n most c a s e s , 
some i n d i v i d u a l s who f a i l to c a r r y out t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s do so out 
of n egligence or w i t h an i n t e n t to cheat, " . . . . e n f o r c i n g c o n t r a c t s 
i s not r e g u l a t i n g the a f f a i r s of i n d i v i d u a l s a t the p l e a s u r e of 
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government, but g i v i n g e f f e c t to t h e i r own expressed d e s i r e . " 
B esides e n f o r c i n g c o n t r a c t s , the s t a t e a l s o determines what c o n t r a c t s 
are f i t to be enforced. 
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F o r example, a c o n t r a c t an i n d i v i d u a l s i g n s to s e l l h i m s e l f as a 
s l a v e i s not a good c o n t r a c t f i t to be enforced, considered both 
from the point of i n t e r e s t of the i n d i v i d u a l , and t h a t of the 
s o c i e t y . The i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r i n g such a c o n t r a c t misuses h i s 
freedom f o r l i c e n c e . Hence the government i s j u s t i f i e d to 
i n t e r f e r e , because by s e l l i n g h i m s e l f , the i n d i v i d u a l renounces h i s 
freedom. 
The idea of p r o t e c t i o n i s m has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
l i m i t i n g an i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom to buy from a f o r e i g n market when 
i t i s the cheapest, because h i s a c t i o n i s c a l c u l a t e d to be 
c o n t r a r y to p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . M i l l , b a s i c a l l y a d i s c i p l e of 
L a i s s e z - f a i r e p r i n c i p l e , t r i e d to examine how f a r the s t a t e was 
j u s t i f i e d i n l i m i t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom to buy from the 
market of h i s c h o i c e . 
Importation of f o r e i g n goods never takes p l a c e 
except when i t i s f o r the good of s o c i e t y as i t enables the same 
amount of goods to be obtained a t a s m a l l e r c o s t of labour and 
c a p i t a l to the country. P r o h i b i t i n g t h i s importation a f f e c t s not 
only the i n t e r e s t of the i n d i v i d u a l as a consumer, but the s o c i e t y 
a t l a r g e . I t a f f e c t s the i n t e r e s t of the s o c i e t y by re n d e r i n g 
" the labour and c a p i t a l of the country l e s s e f f i c i e n t i n 
production than they would otherwise be; and compel a waste of the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the labour and c a p i t a l n e c e s s a r y f o r the home 
production of the commodity and t h a t which i s r e q u i r e d f o r 
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producing the th i n g s w i t h which i t can be purchased from abroad." 
The i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom as a consumer i s very much l i m i t e d as 
h i s choice of goods i s enclosed w i t h i n the r i n g - f e n c e of goods 
produced at home. Whereas, i f t h e r e ,±s no p r o h i b i t i o n , h i s c hoice 
of goods i s g r e a t e r and hence h i s freedom to buy from any market 
g r e a t e r . 
Note: I n h i s ess a y on L i b e r t y , M i l l t r i e d to s e p a r a t e 
p o l i t i c a l from economic freedom. 
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Nations are no more exempted from a moral code based on 
a l t r u i s m than are i n d i v i d u a l s . I n a case of s c a r c i t y of food, no 
i n d i v i d u a l nor a n a t i o n w i l l be reproached f o r e x h i b i t i n g t h a t 
a l t r u i s t i c f e e l i n g by s t a r v i n g h i m s e l f or i t s e l f i n order to feed 
o t h e r s , " . . . i f the g r e a t e s t amount of good to mankind on the whole 
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were the end aimed at i n the maxims of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conduct," 
the r i c h should consume l e s s food i n order t h a t the poorer c l a s s e s 
have some; no country should stop exporting food however s c a r c e 
food i s . Any s t a t e which t r i e d to r e g u l a t e the p r i c e of food because 
of s c a r c i t y should be condemned. 
The r e g u l a t i o n of the p r i c e of food i s a sphere of a c t i o n 
a l l o t t e d to the i n d i v i d u a l . There, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom should 
r e i g n undisturbed. The average p r i c e of food i s g e n e r a l l y accepted to 
be equal to the c o s t of production p l u s p r o f i t . As such, the producer 
w i l l continue production as long as he r e c e i v e s t h i s p r i c e . But i f he 
f a i l s , he w i l l , stop production u n l e s s f o r c e d to do so by law. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s o b j e c t e d to, because i t d i s r u p t s 
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the n a t u r a l p r i c e of commodities. As f a r as t h i s moral code i s 
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concerned, " . . . f r e e e x p o r t a t i o n i s d e s i r e d . " 
The concept of p r o t e c t i o n i s m was u n p a l a t a b l e to M i l l ' s t a s t e s , 
and consequently, he d i d not support the s t a t e d i s o r g a n i z i n g 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e by a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r a i n t s . His n o t i o n of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m i n the economic world was one i n which exports and 
imports should be allowed to pass the f r o n t i e r s of every n a t i o n f r e e l y ; 
every n a t i o n r e c e i v i n g i t s p r o p o r t i o n a l gain of world produce 
according to i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n . He b e l i e v e d t h a t "...a country which 
d e s t r o y s or prevents a l t o g e t h e r c e r t a i n branches of f o r e i g n t r a d e , 
thereby a n n i h i l a t i n g a g e n e r a l gain to the world, which would be shared 
i n some proportion between i t s e l f and other c o u n t r i e s - does, i n some 
circ u m s t a n c e s , draw to i t s e l f , a t the expense of f o r e i g n e r s , a l a r g e r 
share than would e l s e belong to i t of the g a i n a r i s i n g from t h a t p o r t i o n 
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of i t s f o r e i g n t r a d e which i t s u f f e r s to s u b s i s t . " Even t h i s l a r g e r 
s h a r e which can be gained i s only p o s s i b l e i f f o r e i g n e r s do not 
m a i n t a i n s i m i l a r t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s : . T h i s course of a c t i o n on the 
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p a r t of the country i s u n j u s t i f i e d by the p r i n c i p l e of freedom. 
He a s s e r t e d t h a t without r e s t r i c t i o n s , c a p i t a l tended to seek by 
p r e f e r e n c e a market where i t can y i e l d the g r e a t e s t p r o f i t . 
The g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e of Adam Smith towards imposing 
a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r a i n t s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e was unfavourable. His 
i d e a s gave f u l l support to f r e e t rade among v a r i o u s n a t i o n s . He 
was convinced t h a t the productive powers of a s o c i e t y could never 
exceed i t s n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l . As such, no r e g u l a t i o n of t r a d e can 
i n c r e a s e the output of an i n d u s t r y beyond what i t s c a p i t a l can 
m a i n t a i n . A l l r e g u l a t i o n can do i s to d i r e c t p a r t of i t i n t o 
channels where i t may not otherwise have gone, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to say whether t h i s a r t i f i c i a l d i r e c t i o n w i l l be more advantageous 
to the s o c i e t y than i f i t i s l e f t f r e e l y to seek i t s own b e s t 
end. He argued t h a t without a r t i f i c i a l b a r r i e r s on t r a d e , producers 
would always tend t o i n v e s t t h e i r c a p i t a l a t home provided t h a t i t was 
b e n e f i c i a l to them. Accordingly, f r e e t rade promotes n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t 
more than trade r e s t r i c t i o n . The exporting and importing of goods can 
never be c a r r i e d on i f they are not conducive to the i n t e r e s t of the 
people concerned. To s e c u r e a monopoly f o r a home producer by means of 
r e g u l a t i o n i m p l i e s d i r e c t i n g p r i v a t e concerns to employ t h e i r c a p i t a l 
i n a l e s s advantageous manner. 
I have a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d M i l l ' s a t t i t u d e towards monopoly 
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p r a c t i c e s i n s o c i e t y . I n f a c t , he regarded monopoly as the 
instrument by which the s t a t e c r e a t e d a r t i f i c i a l dearness of goods. 
I t i s thus wrong f o r the s t a t e to confer monopoly on a producer, or 
a group of producers, when they are not too many to combine as i t 
i m p l i e s g i v i n g such a producer, "...the power of l e v y i n g any amount 
of t a x a t i o n on the p u b l i c f o r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i t , which w i l l 
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not make the p u b l i c forego the use of the commodity." He pleaded 
t h a t every aspect of production i n the economy should be kept f r e e f o r 
i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n . 
One of the exceptions to M i l l ' s condemnation of 
monopoly p r a c t i c e s i s p a t e n t s . An i n v e n t o r granted the monopoly of 
u s i n g h i s i n v e n t i o n should only enjoy i t f o r a l i m i t e d p e r i o d . 
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Applying the above p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l property r i g h t , M i l l 
must have been convinced t h a t an i n v e n t o r has an e x c l u s i v e c l a i m 
to h i s i n v e n t i o n because he had produced i t by h i s own e x e r t i o n . 
B e s i d e s the e x c l u s i v e c l a i m , the i n v e n t o r i s e n t i t l e d a l s o to a 
reward f o r any p u b l i c use of h i s i n v e n t i o n . No other person has the 
freedom to use i t without h i s consent. " T h i s i s not making the 
commodity dear f o r h i s b e n e f i t , but merely postponing a p a r t of the 
i n c r e a s e d cheapness which the p u b l i c owe to the i n v e n t o r i n order 
i.50 
to compensate and reward him. 
How can the i n v e n t o r be rewarded ? Two a l t e r n a t i v e 
ways present themselves. E i t h e r p a tents are i s s u e d to the i n v e n t o r , 
or the s t a t e r a i s e s some funds f o r him out of temporary t a x a t i o n . 
Of these two a l t e r n a t i v e s , the former i s b e t t e r , and t h a t i s why 
p a t e n t s are exempted from the condemnation of monopoly p r a c t i c e s . 
T h i s was one of the spheres i n which i n d i v i d u a l i t y should p r e v a i l 
undisturbed by law f o r a p r e s c r i b e d p e r i o d . Consequently, he 
d e c l a r e d t h a t " . . . . i t would be a gross immorality i n the law to s e t 
everybody f r e e to use a person's work without h i s consent, and 
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without g i v i n g him an e q u i v a l e n t . 
So f a r , v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of the economic sphere i n 
which s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e was e i t h e r j u s t i f i e d or not j u s t i f i e d by 
M i l l have been examined. There i s another important f e a t u r e which 
r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s i s trade unionism. How f a r was 
government i n t e r f e r e n c e i n trade union movement j u s t i f i e d ? 
M i l l argued t h a t i t was u n j u s t i f i e d . I n h i s views, 
"such laws e x h i b i t the i n f e r n a l s p i r i t of the s l a v e master, when to 
r e t a i n the working c l a s s e s i n avowed s l a v e r y has ceased to be 
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p r a c t i c a b l e . Though he had h i s doubts whether combination of 
working c l a s s e s would succeed i n r a i s i n g wages as t h e i r numbers 
were g r e a t and s c a t t e r e d , the a b i l i t y of doing so should be 
welcomed and r e j o i c e d a t . I n other words, the freedom of forming 
trade unions should not be denied them. Combinations might succeed 
i n reducing the hours of labour, and e a r n i n g the same wages f o r l e s s 
work and i t might be p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n an i n c r e a s e of g e n e r a l 
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wages at the expense of p r o f i t s . But the l i m i t to which t h i s could 
be done was very narrow and i f i t w e r e o v e r - s t r a i n e d , i t would l e a d 
to unemployment. 
He went on to demonstrate the Wages Fund Theory i n 
support of t h i s view, and a s s e r t e d t h a t the best way of i n c r e a s i n g 
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wageswa-s by r e s t r a i n i n g the supply of labour to the demand. 
Combination to improve wages can be s u c c e s s f u l i n t r a d e s where the 
workers are not only few i n number but a l s o concentrated i n an 
a r e a . However, i t can s t i l l be p o s s i b l e where t h e i r numbers are 
g r e a t but any i n c r e a s e thus secured r a i s e s the value and p r i c e of 
the p a r t i c u l a r commodity and u l t i m a t e l y f a l l s on the consumer. The 
e n t r e p r e n e u r -' i s only a f f e c t e d i n so f a r as the high p r i c e 
narrows the market. A l l i n a l l , the impact on him i s not as g r e a t as 
on h i s employees as t h e i r numbers w i l l be reduced. The concomitant 
e f f e c t of t h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l be .tocreate an a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r a i n t 
a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l s s e e k i n g employment. 
On the other hand, i f high wages do not cause fewer 
workers to secure employment i n a t r a d e , i t may l e a d to i n v e s t i n g 
more c a p i t a l i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t r a d e . The g e n e r a l e f f e c t s t i l l 
f a l l s on the workers because f i r s t l y ; " i t throws an 
a d d i t i o n a l number of l a b o u r e r s on the g e n e r a l market; .... /secondlyj? 
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i t withdraws from t h a t market a p o r t i o n of demand " T h i s , 
M i l l claimed was a short-term e f f e c t of a s u c c e s s f u l trade union 
movement i n a p a r t i c u l a r t r a d e a f t e r i t s formation. I n the long run, 
what a c t u a l l y determined the wage r a t e of the working c l a s s was the 
standard of l i v i n g . T h i s might change but w h i l e i t remained the 
same, wages d i d not f a l l below t h i s standard, and d i d not long 
remain above i t . 
I f a p o r t i o n of trade unions ( f o r example, the 
s k i l l e d workers) could succeed i n keeping up t h e i r wages above the 
market r a t e , i t would be a matter of s a t i s f a c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
M i l l would have p r e f e r e d to see a general i n c r e a s e a f f e c t i n g both 
s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d workers. I n order to achieve t h i s , i t was 
important that both s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d workers j o i n f o r c e s f o r 
a common end. Thus, " when the e l e v a t i o n of the c h a r a c t e r and 
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c o n d i t i o n of the e n t i r e body has a t l a s t become a t h i n g not beyond 
the reach of r a t i o n a l e f f o r t , i t i s time t h a t the b e t t e r paid 
c l a s s e s of s k i l l e d a r t i s a n s should seek t h e i r own advantage i n 
55 common w i t h , and not by the e x c l u s i o n of t h e i r f e l l o w - l a b o u r e r s . " 
But i f the s k i l l e d workers d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t u n s k i l l e d ones, by 
not a l l o w i n g the l a t t e r t o j o i n f r e e l y t h e i r unions, every s u c c e s s 
which the former a t t a i n s , w i l l h inder the emancipation of the 
l a t t e r . 
Although combinations to improve wages are seldom 
e f f e c t i v e and when e f f e c t i v e have some i n h i b i t i n g r e s u l t s , y et the 
freedom to make the attempt a t combining should not be denied 
i n d i v i d u a l s . Freedom should a l s o be given to workers f o r t a k i n g 
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n the form of s t r i k e s . . Why i s such l i b e r t y 
n e c e s s a r y ? Assuming t h a t s t r i k e a c t i o n w i l l f a i l any time i t t r i e s 
to r a i s e wages above the r a t e f i x e d by supply and demand; supply and 
demand cannot f i x the r a t e s e i t h e r without the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
workers. The market r a t e cannot be f i x e d by some s e l f - a c t i n g 
instrument, but by g i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s the freedom to ba r g a i n 
between themselves. T h i s process was what Adam Smith d e s c r i b e d as 
the h i g g l i n g of the market, and i s i n f a c t regarded as an important 
f a c t o r i n wage n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
M i l l saw tr a d e unions as important means by which 
workers could p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t those of the c a p t a i n s 
of i n d u s t r y . Hence, he d i d not h e s i t a t e to say " . . . . t h a t 
a s s o c i a t i o n s of l a b o u r e r s , of a nature s i m i l a r to trade unions, d^ar 
from being a hindrance to a f r e e market f o r labour, a r e the 
n e c e s s a r y i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of th a t f r e e market; the i n d i s p e n s a b l e means 
of e n a b l i n g the s e l l e r s of labour to take due ca r e of t h e i r own 
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i n t e r e s t s under a system of competition. 1 1 
M i l l exhorted trade union o r g a n i z a t i o n s to make t h e i r 
unions v o l u n t a r y . B e s i d e s making them v o l u n t a r y , "No s e v e r i t y , 
n e c e s s a r y to the purpose, i s too great to be employed a g a i n s t attempts 
to compel workmen to j o i n a union, or take p a r t i n a s t r i k e by 
t h r e a t s or v i o l e n c e . Mere moral compulsion, by the e x p r e s s i o n of 
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opinion, the law ought hot to interfere with; i t belongs to more 
enlightened opinion to r e s t r a i n i t , by r e c t i f y i n g the moral 
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sentiments of the people. He deplored the policy of some trade 
unions which was to demand abrogation of task work, equal wages 
irres p e c t i v e of s k i l l , a scale of wages which no individual was 
allowed to exceed and the abolition of piece work as being 
mischievous. I t was not only mischievous but also involved a 
denial of individual freedom to the labourer to gain the reward of 
his labour. 
Though"Mill to a certain extent was representative 
of a l i b e r a l economic thought, there were some l i b e r a l s who did not 
give complete support to trade unionism as he did. Adam Smith did 
not appear to postulate a de f i n i t e idea encouraging or 
discouraging trade union movement. An inference could only be made 
from his views p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to labour and wages. 
He admitted the existence of combinations both of 
employers and employees during his time, but observed that the 
int e r e s t s of these combinations differed. Those of employees make 
them "....desire to get as much, /while those of employers^ to 
give as l i t t l e ^wages7 as p o s s i b l e . T h e s e employers generally 
tend to r e s i s t the demand of thei r employees. I n most cases the 
l a t t e r have recourse to violence and outrage. "The masters upon 
these occasions , never cease to c a l l aloud for the assistance 
of the c i v i l magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws 
which have been "eiia^.cted with so much severity against the 
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combination of servants, labourers and journeymen /iemployees_7" 
Though i n disputes between employers and employees 
about wages, the former generally had an advantage, Adam Smith made 
certain observations as regard the rate of wages. F i r s t l y , he 
perceived that " there i s however a certain rate below which i t 
seems impossible to reduce, for any considerable time,, the ordinary 
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wages even of the lowest species of labour." Secondly, the standard 
of wages would depend not only on the national wealth but also on 
the supply and demand for labour. He was convinced that the rate of 
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wages in the country when he was writing was above the lowest rate. 
Nevertheless, high wages would be advantageous for society i f 
attained. 
Hence he argued that whatever serves to improve 
the conditions of the mass of people in a society should not be 
regarded as an inconvenience but as an advantage. In his view, 
"servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the 
far greater part of every great p o l i t i c a l society. But what 
improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded 
as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be 
flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members 
are poor and miserable. I t i s but equity, besides, that they who 
feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have 
such a share of the produce of the i r own labour as to be themselves 
/ 61 tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged." 
The primary aim of 19th century trade unionism was 
not only to improve thei r condition of l i f e but also to secure 
better wages. As far as t h i s objective goes, i t could be 
surmised that Adam Smith would favour the trade union movement 
(provided that the demand for higher wages was proportionate to the 
national c a p i t a l ) i 
On the other hand, there was another aspect of trade 
unionism i n that century which he would have opposed - namely that i t 
obstructed free c i r c u l a t i o n of labour, impeded free competition 
among workers, and encouraged segregation i n the labour movement. As 
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w i l l be shown l a t e r , Nassau Senior opposed trade unionism on t h i s 
b a sis. M i l l encouraged combination of workers irrespective of s k i l l . 
Adam Smith saw the i l l - e f f e c t s of medieval regulations on the slowly 
progressive l i f e of his period and therefore b i t t e r l y attacked them. 
He opposed the statute of apprenticeship not only because i t 
obstructed the free c i r c u l a t i o n of labour from one trade or 
employment to another, even i n the same place but also 11 /Ihey 
w«re7 a manifest encroachment upon the j u s t l i b e r t y both of the 
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workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As 
/they hinder^ the one from working at what he thinks proper, so ... 
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/they hinder^ the others from employing whom they think proper." 
Similarly, he attacked corporations and corporation 
laws because they encouraged monopolies instead of competition, and 
the privileges of the former obstructed the free movement of labour 
from one place to another. He argued that what obstructed the 
c i r c u l a t i o n of labour also impeded that of stock. Some 19th century 
trade union organizations confined t h e i r membership to possessors of 
a certain s k i l l . This was a general phenomenon of the early part of 
the century and such practice was similar to what the statute 
fostered. I f he would oppose the statute on the above grounds, 
apparently, he would also r e j e c t the segregative attitude of the 
unions. 
Nassau Senior had l i t t l e l i k i n g for trade unionism, 
i n fact he opposed such a movement. His antagonism was based on the 
effect of i t s (the trade union's) r e s t r i c t i v e policy on mobility 
and freedom of labour. He asserted that the duty of the state i n 
th i s connection was to protect the right of the labourer to dispose 
of h i s labour as he l i k e d . From the trend of his argument, i t can be 
deduced that t h i s protection i s given by li m i t i n g trade union 
a c t i v i t i e s . His views are quite acceptable because he expressed 
concern about the suffering imposed on the unskilled workers by the 
s t r i k e actions of the s k i l l e d . I t i s th i s suffering M i l l t r i e d to 
prevent. Hence his demand that unskilled workers should be allowed 
to j o i n f r e e l y the unions of the s k i l l e d . 
Sabine argued that "the s i g n i f i c a n t feature of Mi l l ' s 
economics was that he substantially abandoned the conception of 
natural economic laws and i n consequence the dogma of a self-regulating 
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competitive economic system. This view i s fa r from being the case 
i n so far as i t r e l a t e s to M i l l . I f M i l l actually abandoned the 
conception of natural economic laws, why should he have preferred 
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leaving workers to s e t t l e t h e i r wages with the i r employers i n an 
atmosphere of perfect freedom rather than i n one of r e s t r a i n t . 
S i m i l a r l y he opposed state regulation of prices of commodities 
because, l i k e Adam Smith, he was convinced that supply would tend 
to equate i t s e l f to eff e c t i v e demand. I t was with matters r e l a t i n g 
to the poor that his views were contrary to some of his 
predecessors. On the whole he maintained the t r a d i t i o n a l concept of 
economic freedom. His predecessors were ready to welcome state 
intervention when i t was advantageous to the society and M i l l i n a 
sim i l a r mood, was quite w i l l i n g to accept state interference 
provided i t was j u s t i f i e d by expediency. Cowling, one of Mi l l ' s modern 
c r i t i c s , added t h i s notion to his c r e d i t . 
" L a i s s e z - f a i r e ^ne affirmed? i s the right p r i n c i p l e 
to follow, partly because whatever the government does could almost 
always be done better by private agency, partly because participation-
i n economic a c t i v i t y was a necessary element i n the education of 
people. For th i s reason an important economic duty of government i s 
to maintain the operation of the laws, and challenge, of the market 
economy; land, inheritance and insolvency laws, for example, which 
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hamper free exchange of property should be altered. 
Before bringing t h i s chapter to a close, i t i s desirable 
to show an important variation observed between the f i r s t and t h i r d 
editions of M i l l ' s P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l Economy. The question M i l l 
t r i e d to answer was whether the right to form association should come 
within the legal bounds of constitutional freedom or not. 
* 
He stands for M.Cowling. 
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He was not very sure about the answer to t h i s question 
when he wrote the f i r s t edition of the P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l 
Economy; he only made up his mind i n the t h i r d edition. In the f i r s t 
edition, he averred that "every society which exacts from i t s 
members obedience to rules of t h i s description, and endeavours to 
enforce compliance with them on the part of employers by ref u s a l to 
work, i s a public nuisance. Whether the law would be warranted i n 
making the formation of such associations i l l e g a l and punishable 
depends upon the d i f f i c u l t question of the legitimate bounds of 
constitutional l i b e r t y . What are the proper l i m i t s to the right of 
associations ? To associate for the purpose of v i o l a t i n g the law, 
could not, of course, be tolerated under any government. But among 
the numerous acts which, although mischievous i n themselves, the law 
ought not to prohibit from being done by individuals, are there not 
some which are rendered so much more mischievous when people combine 
to do them, that the l e g i s l a t u r e ought to prohibit the combination, 
though not the act i t s e l f . When these questions have been 
philosophically answered, which belongs to a different branch of 
s o c i a l philosophy from the present, i t may be determined whether the 
kind of associations here treated can be a proper subject of any 
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other than merely moral repression." I n the th i r d edition, these 
were h i s views :- ''It does not, however, follow as a consequence 
that the law would be warranted in making the formation of such 
associations i l l e g a l and punishable. Independently of a l l 
considerations of constitutional l i b e r t y , the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
human race imperatively require that a l l economical experiments, 
voluntarily undertaken, should have the f u l l e s t l i c e n s e , and that 
force and fraud should be the only means of attempting to benefit 
themselves, which are interdicted to the l e s s fortunate classes of 
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the community. 
In the former quotation, M i l l was not quite sure 
whether the freedom to associate or combine should come within the 
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legitimate bounds of constitutional l i b e r t y but i n the l a t t e r , he 
e x p l i c i t l y stated that a l l economical experiments l i k e trade 
associations or combinations voluntarily undertaken for the 
improvement of mankind should be given the f u l l e s t freedom. Such 
t 
freedom can be limited i f the association i s not genuine enough. 
I t can be concluded that the t r a d i t i o n a l idea of 
economic freedom which M i l l inherited from his predecessors does 
hot imply t o t a l absence of regulation. A l l they st r i v e d to 
est a b l i s h was a l i b e r a l economic society i n which control was to be 
by competition and the market, and not by the state and i n which 
each man, l e f t to his own means, labours e f f e c t i v e l y for the 
enrichment of the society. M i l l maintained t h i s notion to a certain 
extent but to a considerable degree refined i t - c l a r i f i e d i t i n 
the sense that state interference i s encouraged provided i t i s 
j u s t i f i e d by expediency. 
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CHAPTER__3. 
I t was pointed out i n the f i r s t chapter,''' that the 
existence of laws, hence the state, was e s s e n t i a l for the protection 
of individuals' l i b e r t y . M i l l accepted t h i s view but as he saw 
from the trend of s o c i a l a f f a i r s during the period he was writing, 
not only the state appeared to be i n t e r f e r i n g too much but also 
society. His essay on Liberty was an endeavour to develop a principle 
which would determine the extent to which both bodies ought to 
in t e r f e r e with individuals' freedom. 
M i l l began the essay by distinguishing between Social and 
P o l i t i c a l freedom. Social l i b e r t y s p e c i f i e s "the nature and l i m i t s 
of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
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indivi d u a l . On the other hand, constitutional history teaches 
that there has been not only c o n f l i c t between "Liberty and 
Authority" but also antagonism between r u l e r s and the i r subjects. 
These c o n f l i c t s and antagonisms led to the demand that a l i m i t 
should be put "to the power which the r u l e r should be suffered to 
exercise over the community; and t h i s l i m i t a t i o n was what they 
3 
meant by / p o l i t i c a l / l i b e r t y . " 
Bentham, l i k e James M i l l and his u t i l i t a r i a n friends, had 
looked upon democracy as a certain remedy for a l l p o l i t i c a l e v i l s . 
I n t h e i r days, a close study of democracy had not been carried out, 
4 
Plamenatz observed. But when John Stuart M i l l wrote his essay on 
l i b e r t y , there were signs that t h i s form of government was not 
without i t s e v i l s . Consequently, he undertook to warn people of 
democracy's attendant danger. This e v i l , he affirmed, would take 
the form of tyranny of the majority over the minority, which, i f 
l e f t unchecked, would be more formidable both p o l i t i c a l l y and 
s p i r i t u a l l y than that of r u l e r s . I n order to safeguard individuals 
against t h i s danger, "Protection, , against the tyranny of 
the magistrate i s not enough: there needs protection also against 
the tendency of society to impose by other means than c i v i l 
- 69 -
penalties, i t s own ideas and practices as r u l e r s of conduct on 
those who dissent from them; to fe t t e r the development, and i f 
possible, prevent the formation, of any in d i v i d u a l i t y not i n 
harmony with i t s ways, and compels a l l characters to fashion 
..5 
themselves upon the model of i t s own. 
In fact M i l l asserted i n his essay on representative 
government that "....the dangers incident to a representative 
democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence 
i n the representative body, and i n the popular opinion which controls 
i t , and danger of c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n on the part of the numerical 
majority, these being a l l composed of the same c l a s s . /Accordingly, 
he considered^ ....how far i t i s possible to organise the democracy 
as, without i n t e r f e r i n g materially with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c benefits 
of democratic government, to do away with these two great e v i l s , or 
at l e a s t to abate them, i n the utmost degree attainable by human 
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contrivance. The cure for the second e v i l , which i s the topic 
under discussion, and which every lover of freedom w i l l l i k e to see 
implemented, i s to ensure that minorities should be adequately 
represented. In his views, nothing but a " f a l s e show of democracy" 
can operate without i t . 
Another condition necessary for counteracting the impact 
of the tyranny i s that the individual should not be made a mere 
puppet of s o c i a l pressure. There should be a " l i m i t to the 
legitimate interference of c o l l e c t i v e opinion with individual 
independence to find that l i m i t , and maintain i t against 
encroachment, i s as indispensable to a good condition of human 
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a f f a i r s , as protection against p o l i t i c a l despotism." This i s 
desirable but to determine the l i m i t of s o c i a l interference with an 
individual's freedom i s admittedly a task. 
In order to prevent individuals from destroying one 
another, and making s o c i a l l i f e a jungle or a wilderness, M i l l , l i k e 
Hobbes and Locke, admitted that r e s t r a i n t s must be put on thei r g actions. The control can be enforced f i r s t l y by physical r e s t r a i n t 
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i n the form of law, and then by moral coercion i n the form of 
public opinion, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those spheres of individual's 
conduct "which are not f i t subjects for the operation of the law." 
How f a r these methods can protect a person's freedom without any 
guiding p r i n c i p l e i s very doubtful. This tendency was exposed by 
the state of s o c i a l a f f a i r s in the country at that time. For 
example, as M i l l remarked, " i n England, from the peculiar 
circumstances of p o l i t i c a l history, though the yoke of 
opinion i s perhaps heavier, that of law i s l i g h t e r , than i n most 
other countries of Europe; and there i s considerable jealousy of 
dir e c t interference, by the l e g i s l a t i v e or the executive power, with 
private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the 
independence of the individual, as from the s t i l l subsisting habit 
of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest 
to the public There i s , i n fact , no recognised princ i p l e by 
which the propriety or impropriety of government interference i s 
customarily tested. People decide according to t h e i r personal 
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preferences. As such, i t i s necessary to assert a princ i p l e which 
w i l l control the dealings of the society with the individual, whether 
the methods used in enforcing the r e s t r a i n t s are by physical or moral 
force i n the forms of law or public opinion respectively. 
This principle demands "that the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted, individually or c o l l e c t i v e l y , in i n t e r f e r i n g with the 
l i b e r t y of action of any of t h e i r number, i s self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be r i g h t f u l l y exercised over 
any member of a c i v i l i s e d community, against his w i l l , i s to prevent 
..10 
harm to others. M i l l contended, l i k e Hobbes and Locke, that 
individuals should have t h e i r freedom but t h i s state of freedom 
should not be confused with the state of licence. 1" 1" An individual 
has the l i b e r t y to do what he wants but has no right to injure 
others, and in order to prevent t h i s action, the state has the right 
12 
to i n t e r f e r e . This principle leads to two important maxims. 
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F i r s t l y , "that the individual i s not accountable to society 
'for his actions, in so far as these concern the i n t e r e s t s of no 
person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance 
by other people i f thought necessary by them for t h e i r own good, are 
the only measures by which society can j u s t i f i a b l y express i t s 
d i s l i k e or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such 
actions as are p r e j u d i c i a l to the i n t e r e s t s of others, the 
individual i s accountable, and may be subjected either to s o c i a l or 
to legal punishment, i f society i s of opinion that the one or the 
„13 
other i s requisite for i t s protection. The former maxim i s 
generally described as self-regarding action and the l a t t e r , 
other-regarding. Their v a l i d i t y has not only been contested by some 
modern p o l i t i c a l thinkers but the maxims themselves have also been 
the subject of various interpretations and misgivings. For example, 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of human action has been widely c r i t i c i z e d on 
the grounds that i t i s impossible to sustain. Professor J.C.Rees 
argued that the views held by M i l l ' s c r i t i c s were f a l s e and that 
they derived from a f a i l u r e to observe the form of words which 
M i l l often employed in the text and to take at i t s f u l l value his 
firm assertion that actions regarded as self-regarding type could 
14 
frequently affect, even harmfully, persons other than the agent. 
These apart, he endeavoured to show that there i s an important 
difference between saying on the one hand, that an action affects 
another person, and on the other, that i t affects h i s i n t e r e s t . 
Professor Rees was convinced that a person might be affected 
by another's behaviour without his interest being affected. For 
example, an individual's i n t e r e s t in l i t e r a t u r e can undergo a 
r a d i c a l change without anything l i k e business, professional or 
jpaxjpe»it5§K interests being affected to the s l i g h t e s t extent. In 
elucidating the difference between interests and e f f e c t s , Rees 
concluded that interests depended for their existence on s o c i a l 
recognition and were closely connected with prevailing standards 
about the sort of behaviour a man could legitimately expect from 
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others. On the other hand, an individual could be affected by the 
action of another person merely because he was very s e n s i t i v e and 
had no claim to have others respect; t h i s nature would be 
recognised as amounting to an in t e r e s t , So far, i t i s true that what 
an individual i s , or does, affects other people, but deciding 
whether interests are affected i s another matter, and Rees stressed 
that a princip l e which sought to l i m i t s o c i a l interference to 
spheres where int e r e s t s were involved, could not be attacked because 
i t f a i l e d to recognise the fact that individuals are inter-related 
i n society. 
Rees ci t e d a few examples to show not only that M i l l was 
aware of the d i f f i c u l t y of separating self-regarding from 
other-regarding actions, but also his attempts to demarcate the 
area of conduct for which individuals were to be made responsible 
to society. On the strength of these examples, Rees claimed that i t 
was " i n t e r e s t s " , rather than "ef f e c t s " , with which M i l l was 
concerned. He further pointed out that to M i l l , interest and rights 
(constituted r i g h t s ) had a sim i l a r connotation. Thus, by linking 
i n t e r e s t s to rights, M i l l exposed the d i s t i n c t i o n between int e r e s t s 
and e f f e c t s . A l l i n a l l , he maintained that M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e of 
self-protection was based on a di v i s i o n of conduct into actions 
which either did or did not affect the interest of other persons -
rather than into conduct having or not having effects on others. 
15 
R.Wollheim rejected Rees's suggestion on two counts. 
F i r s t l y , he pointed out that Rees's views made Mill' s p r i n c i p l e 
both " p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c and conservative" i n practice. He argued 
that i f the notion of int e r e s t were bound up to some degree or 
other with s o c i a l recognition, then i t implied that the proper sphere 
of individual l i b e r t y would not only vary markedly from one 
society to another but would also be possessed of considerable 
s t a b i l i t y over time. Secondly, Wollheim affirmed that M i l l ' s 
p r i n c i p l e as interpreted by Rees was neither derivable from nor even 
consistent with the pri n c i p l e of u t i l i t y . He was not convinced that 
M i l l would deviate from that principle i n which he was brought up, 
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and to which he had constantly declared h i s adherence. 
According to the notion of interest held by Rees, an 
action could be p r e j u d i c i a l to a man, yet:- not affect his 
interests and wouid only affect his i n t e r e s t i f the way i n which 
i t affected him was one s o c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d by the society. He then 
deduced, that an action A committed by X against Y would resu l t in 
a net decrease in the pleasure pain coefficient i n society by not 
merely causing pain to Y but by causing more pain to Y than pleasure 
to Xi and yet not affect the interest of Y at a l l . In such a case, 
Wollheim concluded that the principle of l i b e r t y on Rees's 
interpretation would c l e a r l y place the action outside the sphere of 
the state. But on the other hand, the princip l e of u t i l i t y would 
place i t inside. 
Wollheim suggested a different interpretation. He affirmed 
that the actions which M i l l wished to exclude from state interference 
were not " l i t e r a l l y self-regarding action" i . e . actions which i n 
no way affected other people, but they were actions which i f they 
affected other people and affected them p r e j u d i c i a l l y , did so 
because of certain b e l i e f s which the people held implying that 
self-regarding actions are actions which affect either only the 
agent or other people solely i n so far as they believe such actions 
to be wrong. 
Wollheim's interpretation of Mill' s s e l f and other 
regarding actions i s more cogent than that of Rees. The actions 
which M i l l regarded as self-regarding were those which affected only 
the agent or other people because they believe such actions to be 
wrong. A greater support i s given to t h i s view when i t i s considered 
that Mill himself pointed out i n the Principles of P o l i t i c a l Economy 
that i t i s desirable to carve out a space in human a f f a i r s which 
should be kept sacred from authoritative interference. This latitude 
he i n s i s t e d , should include a l l that part of a person's l i f e which 
concerns himself and did not affect the in t e r e s t s of others, or 
affected them only through the moral influence of example. Wollheim 
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asserted that Rees's interpretation made Mi l l ' s p r i n c i p l e both 
" p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c and conservative" i n practice. Rees was wrong 
because M i l l proclaimed in his autobiography that he was a Radical 
16 
and Democrat. I f M i l l had styled himself a Radical, i t i s very 
doubtful i f he could suddenly change his r a d i c a l views for 
conservative ones. 
Having aired a few interpretations given to M i l l ' s 
p r i n c i p l e of self-protection, i t i s desirable to proceed with the 
idea of freedom. Although freedom of action should be the ideal 
condition in the society, so long as an agent's action does not 
affe c t the i n t e r e s t s of others, yet there i s nothing l i k e abstract 
r i g h t . The amount of freedom the individual enjoys, depends on the 
u t i l i t y of his action. M i l l was prepared "....to forego any 
advantage which could be derived to ...../hi§7 argument from the 
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of u t i l i t y . . . . . fi\ej 
regard/ed7 u t i l i t y as the ultimate appeal on a l l e t h i c a l questions, 
but i t must be u t i l i t y i n the largest sense, grounded on the 
permanent int e r e s t s of a man as a progressive being. Those i n t e r e s t s , 
/HQ7 contend/ed/ authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity 
to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which 
17 
concern the i n t e r e s t of other people." 
Plamenatz pointed out one defect which i s debatable i n 
t h i s connection about Mill ' s attitude towards u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . 
According to him, M i l l did not show any good reason on u t i l i t a r i a n 
grounds for non-interference which he advocated but proceeded to 
determine the l i m i t s of the interference which he regarded as 
18 
permissible. This i s not a f a i r and general remark to make about 
M i l l . In most cases, he gave good reasons on u t i l i t a r i a n grounds 
19 
for non-interference. What Plamenatz should have asked was -
Had M i l l the idea of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n his mind or the doctrine of 
the greatest happiness ? His trend of argument showed that at 
times he was prepared to suppress the individual for the greatest 
happiness of the society. For i t can be observed that i n some cases 
when in d i v i d u a l i t y comes in c o n f l i c t with the iCanon of greatest 
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happiness, the former gives way. 
I w i l l stop a while to examine M i l l ' s attitude towards 
the concept of l i b e r t y and the doctrine of u t i l i t y or happiness. 
Recent views tend to argue that M i l l ' s doctrine did not preach 
l i b e r t y but u t i l i t y as the proper end of a l l s o c i a l action. Cowling, 
for example, i n M i l l and Liberalism, after c a r e f u l l y analyzing the 
text, concluded that M i l l did indeed make u t i l i t y rather than l i b e r t y 
the end of a l l s o c i a l action. Accordingly, M i l l ' s idea of freedom 
i s not an end i n i t s e l f , but j u s t instrumental, a means to promoting 
mental c u l t i v a t i o n and an e s s e n t i a l condition for attaining the truth, 
As the topic under discussion only deals with the f i r s t part of 
Cowling's views, I s h a l l confine my discussion to a study of that 
part. 
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, 
u t i l i t y or the Greatest Happiness Pri n c i p l e , holds that actions are 
right i n proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness i s intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain and the 
.,20 , privation of pleasure. This was M i l l s d e f i n i t i o n of the idea of 
happiness. He did not stop there, but proceeded to qualify t h i s 
notion. 
He asserted that " i t i s quite compatible with the p r i n c i p l e 
of u t i l i t y to recognise the fac t , that some kinds of pleasure are 
more desirable and more valuable than others. I t would be absurd 
that while, i n estimating a l l other things, quality i s considered as 
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to 
21 
depend on quantity alone." I f the idea of happiness should be 
taken as he pointed out - i . e . - that there are various kinds of 
pleasure, some quantitatively superior to others, he i s g u i l t y of a 
wide breach i n h i s father's and Bentham's system. Bentham had 
assumed that pleasure was the same for every individual. 
I f happiness and hence pleasure should be as M i l l 
maintained, the ultimate end of human action, freedom, ought to be 
considered as a means of attaining i t . Alternatively, l i b e r t y may as 
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well be an end i n i t s e l f - M i l l sometimes seems to imply t h i s . In 
rel a t i o n to the notion of freedom, he promulgated a princip l e 
which would guide the state i n i t s interference with individual 
2 l i b e r t y . According to th i s principle which has already been stated, 
the only purpose for which the state can j u s t i f i a b l y interfere with 
an individual's freedom i s to prevent harm to others. The 
individual's good, either physical or moral, i s not a s u f f i c i e n t 
warrant. "..../He/ regard/ed7 u t i l i t y as the ultimate appeal on 
a l l e t h i c a l questions; but i t must be u t i l i t y i n the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent int e r e s t s of a man as a progressive being. 
Those i n t e r e s t s , /he7 contend/edy, authorise the subjection 
of individual spontaneity to external control, only i n respect to 
„23 
those actions of each which concern the int e r e s t of other people. 
A l l forms of r e s t r a i n t , M i l l affirmed were e v i l . Probably 
because they cause pain or because i t i s always better to leave 
people to pursue the i r own ends freely than to control them. But 
whatever cause makes r e s t r a i n t bad, M i l l tended to hold the idea 
that i t was j u s t i f i a b l e to r e s t r i c t individual l i b e r t y for the 
general good of the community. Does i t imply, that he was prepared 
to subject i n d i v i d u a l i t y to the concept of general good ? Can i t 
be regarded as a mere confusion on his side ? 
For example, a town council wants to build an arts 
museum in a town, and in order to do so, has to r a i s e the funds by 
imposing a tax on the people l i v i n g i n the town. Admittedly, 
admiring the beauty of arts creates pleasure, and as such i s a 
good i n i t s e l f . On the grounds of u t i l i t y , building an arts museum 
i s j u s t i f i a b l e because i t adds to the pleasure of the community. 
On the other hand, taxing the people for that purpose causes pain 
as i t r e s t r i c t s t h e i r freedom of spending. Some people w i l l prefer 
to spend the i r money on pints of beer, or backing horses or on any 
int e r e s t other than paying towards the building of an arts museum. 
The point one has to determine i s whether the quantity of pleasure 
the people gain by watching the beauty of arts i s greater than the 
pain they suffer by having t h e i r spending power r e s t r i c t e d , or 
greater than the pleasure horse racing or beer drinking or pursuing 
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any other i n t e r e s t -may y i e l d them. This w i l l be rather d i f f i c u l t 
to say as i t w i l l depend on the subjective judgement of the 
individual. I f i t i s accepted that i t i s always better to leave 
people to pursue the i r i n t e r e s t s rather than to control them, one 
w i l l surmise that people may prefer to spend the i r money fr e e l y the 
way they l i k e rather than being controlled. Accordingly, i f the 
quantity only of pleasure an individual can obtain by f r e e l y spending . 
his money on two alternatives, namely, beer drinking and a 
municipal art gallery i s considered, r e s t r i c t i n g individual l i b e r t y 
of spending for the purpose of building an art's gallery, which the 
town council f e e l s w i l l add to the general good of the town, may 
give way to the idea of freedom. 
Again i f quality of pleasure i s taken into consideration, 
the argument w i l l tend towards supporting to an extent the town 
council in building the a r t - g a l l e r y . M i l l affirmed that i n examining 
differences of quality i n pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more 
valuable than another, two things count - f i r s t l y , the pleasure 
derived from one object being greater than another and secondly, 
24 
preference derivable from the knowledge of the two pleasures. 
Under a system of paternalism, the state or in t h i s case the town 
council w i l l be j u s t i f i e d i n building an a r t - g a l l e r y because the 
council f e e l s that the people w i l l derive a greater amount of 
pleasure from i t than beer drinking. On the other hand, i f people 
ought to be free to pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in t h e i r own way, and the 
people concerned are capable of knowing their i n t e r e s t , the 
council's action i s questionable. Secondly, Mill had stressed the 
importance of education as a way of improving mankind. Though the 
majority of people w i l l prefer beer drinking, he would j u s t i f y the 
town council building an a r t - g a l l e r y because i t would be more 
preferable as a means of employing "the higher f a c u l t i e s " of the 
people. In his views, " . . . . i t i s an unquestionable fact that those 
who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating 
and enjoying, both, /pleasures derivable from art-g a l l e r y and beer 
drinking7 do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence 
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25 which employs t h e i r higher f a c u l t i e s . " 
How are the people who have the knowledge of the- p l e a s u r e s 
to be chosen ? - I n other words, who are competent to judge the 
* 
q u a l i t y of two p l e a s u r e s ? M i l l had t h i s answer to o f f e r - "On a 
q u e s t i o n which i s the best worth having of two p l e a s u r e s , or which 
of two modes of e x i s t e n c e i s the most g r a t e f u l to the f e e l i n g s , 
a p a r t from i t s moral a t t r i b u t e s and from i t s consequences, 
the judgement of those who are q u a l i f i e d by knowledge of both, 
..26 
must be admitted as f i n a l . I t i s c l e a r t h a t i n a town 
where a m a j o r i t y of the people w i l l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t being taxed by 
a town c o u n c i l i n order to b u i l d an a r t - g a l l e r y , which w i l l imply 
a r e d u c t i o n on t h e i r spending on beer, one w i l l not h e s i t a t e to 
conclude t h a t those people a r e not a r t - l o v e r s . Accordingly, 
knowledge of two p l e a s u r e s d e r i v a b l e from b e e r - d r i n k i n g and a r t w i l l 
be confined to the former. T h i s d i s q u a l i f i e s them as competent 
judges and g i v e s a g r e a t e r support f o r the c o u n c i l s action,; 
Concluding, i t can be s t a t e d t h a t i n the i l l u s t r a t i o n 
j u s t given, two ends can be reached. On the grounds of q u a n t i t y of 
p l e a s u r e only, the town c o u n c i l w i l l be a c t i n g u n j u s t l y i n 
r e s t r i c t i n g the freedom of the people to spend t h e i r money on what 
i n t e r e s t s them. On the other hand, i f the q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of 
p l e a s u r e are considered, the town c o u n c i l ' s a c t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d . 
M i l l regarded t r a d e as a s o c i a l a c t . His reasons were -
"whoever undertook .... to s e l l any d e s c r i p t i o n of goods to the 
p u b l i c , does what a f f e c t s the i n t e r e s t of other persons, and of 
s o c i e t y i n g e n e r a l , and thus h i s conduct i n p r i n c i p l e comes w i t h i n 
27 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of s o c i e t y " Although he h e l d t h i s view, he 
opposed r e s t r i c t i o n imposed on trade p a r t i c u l a r l y when such a 
r e s t r a i n t made i t i m p o s s i b l e or d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
commodity. His o b j e c t i o n s were s o l e l y based on the r e s t r i c t i o n of 
28 
the l i b e r t y of the buyer. With the s a l e of poisons, f o r example, 
.* T h i s s e c t i o n of the argument i s based on the assumption t h a t the 
town c o u n c i l i s composed of beer and a r t l o v e r s . 
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M i l l advocated the s t a t e u s i n g p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures to ensure 
proper use of them r a t h e r than imposing r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e i r 
s a l e . Was M i l l c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s matter on the p r i n c i p l e s of l i b e r t y 
or u t i l i t y ? I t could be s a i d t h a t he t r i e d to p r e s e r v e i n d i v i d u a l 
l i b e r t y on the grounds of u t i l i t y . Admittedly poisonous drugs are 
dangerous to mankind, and t h e i r improper use causes death or p a i n . 
I f the s a l e of drugs i s considered s o l e l y on u t i l i t a r i a n grounds, 
M i l l might have supported complete r e s t r i c t i o n because they could 
cause harm i f improperly used. But as drugs were more w i d e l y used 
29 
f o r good purposes than bad, he was ready to p r e s e r v e the buyer's 
freedom. Hence he would p r e f e r the s t a t e u s i n g p r e c a u t i o n a r y 
measures i n s t e a d of imposing complete ban. 
At times M i l l regarded l i b e r t y as an end i n i t s e l f . Take 
f o r example, the case of s l a v e r y , he opposed i t because i t i n f r i n g e d 
the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , "....an engagement by which a 
person should s e l l h i m s e l f or allow h i m s e l f to be s o l d , as a s l a v e , 
would be n u l l and void; n e i t h e r enforced by law nor by opinion. 
The ground f o r thus l i m i t i n g h i s power of v o l u n t a r y d i s p o s i n g of 
h i s own l o t i n l i f e , i s apparent, and i s very c l e a r l y seen i n t h i s 
extreme case. The reason f o r not i n t e r f e r i n g , u n l e s s f o r the sake of 
o t h e r s , w i t h a person's v o l u n t a r y a c t s , i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r h i s 
l i b e r t y . His v o l u n t a r y c h o i c e i s evidence t h a t what he so chooses i s 
d e s i r a b l e , or at l e a s t endurable, to him, and h i s good i s on the 
whole b e s t provided f o r by a l l o w i n g him to take h i s own means of 
pursuing i t . But by s e l l i n g h i m s e l f f o r a s l a v e , he a b d i c a t e s h i s 
l i b e r t y ; he foregoes any f u t u r e use of i t beyond t h a t s i n g l e a c t . 
He t h e r e f o r e d e f e a t s , i n h i s own case, the very purpose which i s 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a l l o w i n g him to dispose of h i m s e l f . He i s no 
longer f r e e ; The p r i n c i p l e of freedom cannot r e q u i r e t h a t he 
„30 
should be f r e e not to be f r e e . 
From the pracediing. examples, i t could be s a i d t h a t M i l l a t 
times considered u t i l i t y as an end, and supported r e s t r i c t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom f o r the g e n e r a l good. At other times, he regarded 
l i b e r t y as an end i n i t s e l f . 
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. 31 Again, i f one considered P r o f e s s o r Rees s reminder t h a t 
" M i l l s p e c i f i c a l l y affirm / e d 7 t h a t h i s argument f o r l i b e r t y 
i s not to be regarded as an appeal to a b s t r a c t r i g h t but d e r i v e d 
from / u t i l i t y i n the l a r g e s t sense grounded i n the permanent 
32 
i n t e r e s t s of a man as p r o g r e s s i v e being7" , i t would appear as i f 
M i l l d i d not regard freedom as a means and u t i l i t y as an end and 
v i c e v e r s a , but was only r e f e r r i n g to u t i l i t y as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r being f r e e , j u s t as Herbert Spencer would r e f e r to n a t u r a l 
s c i e n t i f i c laws ( p a r t i c u l a r l y b i o l o g i c a l laws) or d i v i n e laws as 
important j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r a l l o w i n g a person h i s freedom, or 
Locke would demand l i b e r t y f o r ah i n d i v i d u a l as a n a t u r a l r i g h t . 
Having examined M i l l ' s stand, I w i l l t r y to c o n s i d e r what the 
p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e a l l o w s . 
M i l l p o s t u l a t e d an exception to h i s p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h people's freedom. As i n d i v i d u a l s are always 
competing w i t h one another f o r the l i m i t e d supply of the n e c e s s i t i e s 
of l i f e , p o s s i b i l i t y of c a u s i n g harm i s i n e v i t a b l e . Consequently, 
" , i t must by no means be supposed, because damage or 
p r o b a b i l i t y of damage, to the i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s , can alone j u s t i f y 
the i n t e r f e r e n c e of s o c i e t y , t h a t t h e r e f o r e i t always does j u s t i f y 
such i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n many c a s e s , an i n d i v i d u a l i n pursuing a 
l e g i t i m a t e o b j e c t , n e c e s s a r i l y and t h e r e f o r e l e g i t i m a t e l y causes 
p a i n or l o s s to o t h e r s , or i n t e r c e p t s a good which they had a 
reasonable hope of o b t a i n i n g . Such op p o s i t i o n s of i n t e r e s t between 
i n d i v i d u a l s o f t e n a r i s e from bad s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but are 
unavoidable w h i l e those i n s t i t u t i o n s l a s t ; and some would be 
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unavoidable under any i n s t i t u t i o n . " 
The demand he i s making here i s f o r s o c i e t y or the s t a t e 
to use i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e c i d i n g c a s e s on t h e i r m e r i t s even when 
p a i n has been caused, before l i m i t i n g a person's freedom of a c t i o n . 
The advantages and disadvantages of s o c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e should be 
weighed on each o c c a s i o n before any c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
"....the q u e s t i o n whether the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e w i l l or w i l l not be 
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promoted by i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h i t , becomes open to d i s c u s s i o n . 
- 81 -
The i l l u s t r a t i o n which he used to e x p l a i n h i s views was the 
u n s u c c e s s f u l candidate i n a comp e t i t i v e examination. Others gained 
a t the u n s u c c e s s f u l candidate's expense, but the r e was nothing the 
s t a t e could do as the examination was co m p e t i t i v e . A r e c e n t 
example r e l a t e d to the same t o p i c i s the p u b l i c i t y given to the 
c o r r e l a t i o n which has been d i s c o v e r e d between c i g a r e t t e smoking 
and lung cancer. Before any a u t h o r i t y w i l l decide whether to l i m i t 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom of smoking or not, i t w i l l be a d v i s a b l e 
to c o n s i d e r not only the e f f e c t of any r e s t r a i n t on the i n d i v i d u a l 
smoker but a l s o the economic impact on tobacco f i r m s . 
What should then be "the appropriate r e g i o n of human 
l i b e r t y " ? I t comprises f i r s t l y of, "the inward domain of 
consciousness; demanding l i b e r t y of conscience i n the most 
comprehensive sense; l i b e r t y of thought and f e e l i n g ; a bsolute freedom 
of o p i n i o n and sentiment on a l l s u b j e c t s , Secondly, the 
p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s l i b e r t y of t a s t e s and p u r s u i t s ; of framing the 
plan of our l i f e t o s u i t our own c h a r a c t e r ; of doing as we l i k e , 
s u b j e c t to such consequences as may f o l l o w without impediment from 
our f e l l o w - c r e a t u r e s , so long as what we do does not harm them, 
even though they should t h i n k our conduct f o o l i s h , p e r v e r s e , or 
wrong. T h i r d l y , from t h i s l i b e r t y of each i n d i v i d u a l , f o l l o w s the 
l i b e r t y , w i t h i n the same l i m i t s , of combination among i n d i v i d u a l s ; 
freedom to u n i t e , f o r any purpose not i n v o l v i n g harm to o t h e r s : the 
persons combining being supposed to be of f u l l age, and not f o r c e d 
35 
or d e c e i v e d . " I n whatever s o c i e t y these forms of l i b e r t y do not 
e x i s t , i r r e s p e c t i v e of the type of government, can not be 
considered as being f r e e . I n s h o r t , what i s r e c o g n i z a b l e as 
i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y i s the g r a n t i n g of freedom to an i n d i v i d u a l to 
pursue h i s own i n t e r e s t i n h i s own way, so long as h i s a c t i o n does 
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not prevent o t h e r s from g a i n i n g s i m i l a r freedom. 
"Human nature i s not a machine, to be b u i l t a f t e r a 
model, and s e t to do e x a c t l y the work p r e s c r i b e d f o r i t , but a t r e e , 
which r e q u i r e s to grow and develop i t s e l f on a l l s i d e s , according 
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to the tendency of the inward f o r c e s which make i t a l i v i n g 
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t h i n g . " Hence, custom and t r a d i t i o n , should g i v e way to freedom: 
L i b e r t y enables people to a t t a i n such growth and development. 
T h i s was a notion shared a l s o by most members of n a t u r a l law school 
of thought. Spencer h e l d the same view and i n f a c t a t t r i b u t e d a l l 
e v i l s e x i s t i n g i n the s o c i e t y to the ignorance of l e g i s l a t o r s who 
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misconceived s o c i e t y as a manufacture i n s t e a d of a growth. Custom 
and t r a d i t i o n a r e i n h i b i t o r y and consequently l e s s d e s i r a b l e because 
they l e a v e l e s s room f o r development. Under such a c o n d i t i o n , people 
do not have enough space to develop themselves or a c t on t h e i r own. 
They do t h i n g s because ot h e r s do them. Such a p e - l i k e i m i t a t i o n does; 
not add to p r o g r e s s . 
Though freedom i s d e s i r a b l e , "as much compression as i s 
n e c e s s a r y to prevent the s t r o n g e r specimens of human nature from 
encroaching on the r i g h t s of others cannot be dispensed w i t h ; but 
f o r t h i s t h e r e i s ample compensation even i n the point of view of 
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human development." The compensation takes the form of making 
i n d i v i d u a l s a l t r u i s t i c , and i s expressed i n the f o l l o w i n g quotation. 
"The means which the i n d i v i d u a l l o s e s by being prevented from 
g r a t i f y i n g h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s to the i n j u r y of o t h e r s , are c h i e f l y 
obtained a t the expense of the development of other people. And even 
to h i m s e l f there i s a f u l l e q u i v a l e n t i n the b e t t e r development of 
the s o c i a l p a r t of h i s nature, rendered p o s s i b l e by the r e s t r a i n t 
put upon the s e l f i s h p a r t . To be h e l d to r i g i d r u l e s of j u s t i c e f o r 
the sake of o t h e r s , develops the f e e l i n g s and c a p a c i t i e s which have 
40 
the good of o t h e r s f o r t h e i r o b j e c t . " 
I n d i v i d u a l s have d i f f e r e n t t a s t e s and r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t • 
modes of l i f e f o r t h e i r w e l f a r e . What an i n d i v i d u a l r e q u i r e s f o r a 
l i v i n g , or what he l i k e s , w i l l not i n a l l c a s e s s u i t another 
i n d i v i d u a l . Some people can s u r v i v e i n slums w h i l e o t h e r s cannot. 
As such, i t w i l l be wrong to s u b j e c t them to the same t a s t e and 
mode of l i f e . A c c o r d ingly, d i v e r s i t y i s considered as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e 
f o r the attainment of happiness and f o r the growth of t h e i r "mental, 
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moral and a e s t h e t i c s t a t u r e of which t h e i r nature i s capable. 
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Bosanquet a f f i r m e d t h a t "....what we have to observe i s 
merely t h a t the demarcation between i n d i v i d u a l i t y and s o c i e t y , 
c o n t r i v e d i n defence of the former, has p r e t t y n e a r l y a n n i h i l a t e d 
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i t . " T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t M i l l d i d not l e a v e any space f o r the 
development of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n h i s attempt to draw l i m i t s to 
spheres of f r e e a c t i o n of the s t a t e and the i n d i v i d u a l . Plamenatz 
on the other hand, opposed t h i s view. I n h i s words - "As f o r the 
c r i t i c i s m t h a t M i l l ' s c r i t e r i o n l e a v e s no l i b e r t y to the i n d i v i d u a l , 
i t i s not w e l l founded; f o r though any kind of a c t i o n may sometimes 
i n j u r e other people n e a r l y as much as or more than i t i n j u r e s the 
agent, i t does not f o l l o w t h a t the a c t i o n s which i n j u r e them not a t 
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a l l , or so l i t t l e as not to be worth regarding, are few. 
Plamenatz's views are more r e l e v a n t than the former. M i l l 
had a s s e r t e d t h a t "the most remarkable of those consequences of 
advancing c i v i l i z a t i o n , which the s t a t e of the world i s now f o r c i n g 
upon the a t t e n t i o n of t h i n k i n g minds, i s t h i s : t h a t power passes 
more and more from i n d i v i d u a l s , and s m a l l knots of i n d i v i d u a l s , to 
masses: t h a t the importance of the masses becomes c o n s t a n t l y g r e a t e r , 
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t h a t of i n d i v i d u a l s l e s s . " He had a l s o expressed h i s f e a r of the 
tyranny of the masses over the few. I f he had been moved by these 
f a c t o r s to save the i n d i v i d u a l from being overcome by the mass, 
whatever or however l a r g e the sphere of f r e e action, he a l l o t t e d to 
the s o c i e t y , he would s t i l l r e s e r v e some f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s 
r e a l l y a d i f f i c u l t t a s k to draw a s t r a i g h t and f i x e d l i n e of 
demarcation i n matters r e l a t i n g to human behaviour whether an 
i n d i v i d u a l or a group of i n d i v i d u a l s are i n v o l v e d . So, i n essence, 
j u s t as M i l l had done, the l i n e of demarcation should be wavy. 
As I pointed out above, freedom of e x p r e s s i o n was regarded 
as one of the r i g h t s which s o c i e t y should guarantee to the 
45 
i n d i v i d u a l . "....the p e c u l i a r e v i l of s i l e n c i n g the e x p r e s s i o n of 
an opinion i s , t h a t i t i s robbing the human r a c e ; p o s t e r i t y as 
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w e l l as the e x i s t i n g generation; those who d i s s e n t from the opinion, 
s t i l l more than those who hold i t . I f the opinion i s r i g h t , they are 
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging e r r o r f o r t r u t h . I f wrong, 
they l o s e , what i s almost as g r e a t a b e n e f i t , the c l e a r e r p e r c e p t i o n 
and l i v e l i e r impression of t r u t h , produced by i t s c o l l i s i o n w i t h 
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e r r o r . 
Having a s s e r t e d the e v i l of denying i n d i v i d u a l s the 
freedom to express t h e i r opinion, M i l l went on to c o n s i d e r two 
important hypotheses which he deduced from the t r u t h f u l n e s s or 
f a l s i t y of an opinion. F i r s t l y , he considered a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
an a u t h o r i t y t r i e s to s i l e n c e an opinion which i s accepted to be 
t r u e . To deny i n d i v i d u a l s the opportunity of d i s c u s s i n g such an 
opinion i s "an assumption of i n f a l l i b i l i t y . " H i s t o r y of opinion 
shows t h a t opinion changes w i t h y e a r s . An opinion h e l d i n one p e r i o d 
to be c o r r e c t can i n the f u t u r e be proved f a l s e . By open d i s c u s s i o n 
of opinions which can e i t h e r be t r u e or f a l s e , i n d i v i d u a l s can 
a d j u s t t h e i r views about a s u b j e c t to the changing p a t t e r n of l i f e . 
As i n d i v i d u a l s ' a c t i o n s and opinions are i n t e r - r e l a t e d ( t h a t i s , one 
generates the o t h e r ) , i t i s w i s e to have t h e i r views debated before 
a c t i n g on them. "Complete l i b e r t y of c o n t r a d i c t i n g and d i s p r o v i n g 
our opinion i s the very c o n d i t i o n which j u s t i f i e s us i n assuming i t s 
t r u t h f o r purposes of a c t i o n , and on no other terms can a being w i t h 
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human f a c u l t i e s have any r a t i o n a l assurance of being r i g h t . " 
Secondly, M i l l considered a s i t u a t i o n where the opinion 
s i l e n c e d was wrong but could c o n t a i n a p o r t i o n of t r u t h . By 
d i s c u s s i n g the opinion f r e e l y , the remainder of the t r u t h can be 
d i s c o v e r e d . I f people are to hold an opinion, i t w i l l be w i s e t h a t 
such an opinion should be f u l l y d i s c u s s e d and l e a r n t by them. T h i s 
l e a r n i n g j u s t i f i e s them i n t h e i r c h a l l e n g e of any c r i t i c . But, a t 
times, d i f f e r e n c e of opinion can a r i s e about a s u b j e c t . I n such a 
case, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t the t r u t h be developed between the two 
shades of opinion. F o r example, a school of thought i n s i s t s t h a t the 
economy of a country grows f a s t e r i f i t i s immune from s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e , w h i l e another s c h o o l m a i n t a i n s t h a t the economy shows 
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b e t t e r improvements when c o n t r o l l e d by the s t a t e than when l e f t 
f r e e . They should be given freedom to a i r t h e i r views because " 
the t r u t h depends on a balance to be s t r u c k between two s e t s of 
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co n f r o n t i n g reasons. 
So f a r , i t could be a s s e r t e d t h a t M i l l gave a g r e a t e r 
sphere of freedom to i n d i v i d u a l opinion than a c t i o n . Could h i s 
endorsement f o r t h i s g r e a t e r freedom be a t t r i b u t e d , as Plamenatz 
a f f i r m e d , to the f a c t t h a t i t i s e a s i e r to c o n t r o l a c t i o n s than 
o p i n i o n s , and a l s o t h a t i t i s e a s i e r to show th a t they have p e r n i c i o u s 
consequences ? 'If t h i s view were accepted, would i t mean t h a t M i l l 
s l i g h t e d the i d e a t h a t most people's a c t i o n s s p r i n g from t h e i r 
opinions ? I f a c t i o n s and opinions were i n t e r - r e l a t e d , why should an 
attempt be made to draw a l i m i t to the f i e l d s of a c t i o n s of 
i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i e t i e s without doing the same w i t h opinions ? I t 
i s d e s i r a b l e at t h i s p o i n t to argue t h a t both have p e r n i c i o u s e f f e c t s 
and t h a t i f i n d i v i d u a l i t y should have i t s proper sphere of f r e e 
a c t i o n , t h i s space should be carved out not only i n matters a f f e c t i n g 
a c t i o n s but a l s o those r e l a t e d to o p i n i o n s . 
I n order to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h , M i l l maintained t h a t we must 
have the freedom to express and d i s c u s s o p i n i o n s . As Cowling 
remarked, " M i l l was a d d i c t e d to the r h e t o r i c of Freedom as much as 
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to the r h e t o r i c of T r u t h : " Allowing t h i s view to hold, d i d 
i t imply that M i l l would grant absolute freedom to a person i n as 
much as the person's opinion was used to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h ? 
Supposing t h a t t h i s s e a r c h i n v o l v e d a c t i o n , would he l i m i t the 
person's freedom ? 
Completely f r e e an i n d i v i d u a l should be i n e x p r e s s i n g h i s 
o p i n i o n s , but should t h e r e not be a l i m i t as to the manner i n which 
they a r e expressed ? ''Much might be s a i d on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
f i x i n g where these supposed bounds are to be p l a c e d , " but i f offence 
should be the c r i t e r i o n f o r imposing the l i m i t , "experience 
t e s t i f i e s t h a t t h i s o f f e n c e i s given whenever the a t t a c k i s t e l l i n g 
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and powerful...." I n other words, offence can not form a good 
c r i t e r i o n because the manner i n which an i n d i v i d u a l e x p r e s s e s an 
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opinion, even though i t be a t r u e one, can never f a i l to offend 
o t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when the i n d i v i d u a l holds a c o n t r a s t i n g 
opinion to o t h e r s . 
M i l l admitted t h a t a c t i o n s should not be as f r e e as 
op i n i o n . But, the freedom to express and d i s c u s s opinion should be 
l i m i t e d i f i t would l e a d to a p o s i t i v e i n s t i g a t i o n to some 
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mischievous a c t . F o r example, an opinion t h a t coloured immigrants 
were not welcome i n Birmingham should be "unmolested" when 
expressed i n the p r e s s , but would i n c u r l i m i t a t i o n , and where 
ne c e s s a r y punishment, when d e c l a r e d to an e x c i t e d a n t i - c o l o u r e d mob 
assembled i n d i s t r i c t s where these immigrants l i v e d . On t h i s b a s i s , 
he e s t a b l i s h e d one c o n d i t i o n f o r l i m i t i n g the l i b e r t y to d i s c u s s and 
express opinion - namely, "Acts, of whatever kind, which, without 
j u s t i f i a b l e cause, do harm to o t h e r s , may be, and i n the more 
important c a s e s a b s o l u t e l y r e q u i r e to be, c o n t r o l l e d by the 
unfavourable sentiments, and, when ne e d f u l , by the a c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
of mankind. The l i b e r t y of the i n d i v i d u a l must be thus f a r l i m i t e d ; 
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he must not make h i m s e l f a nuisance to other people. 
He d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t s o c i e t y was founded on c o n t r a c t 
but maintained t h a t as f a r as s o c i a l o b l i g a t i o n was concerned the 
f a c t t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l l i v e d i n a s o c i e t y rendered i t n e c e s s a r y 
t h a t he should be bound by some r u l e s of conduct towards the r e s t . 
" T h i s conduct c o n s i s t s , f i r s t , i n not i n j u r i n g the i n t e r e s t s of one 
another; or r a t h e r c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t s , which, e i t h e r by express l e g a l 
p r o v i s i o n or by t a c i t understanding, ought to be considered as 
r i g h t s ; and secondly, i n each person's be a r i n g h i s share .... of the 
labours and s a c r i f i c e s i n c u r r e d f o r defending the s o c i e t y or i t s 
members from i n j u r y and m o l e s t a t i o n . These c o n d i t i o n s s o c i e t y i s 
j u s t i f i e d i n e n f o r c i n g , at a l l c o s t s to those who endeavour to 
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w i t h h o l d f u l f i l m e n t . " Where h i s conduct f e l l s h o r t , the s o c i e t y 
( t h e p u b l i c ) had the r i g h t to punish him by opinion and by law. 
Good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s was an i d e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p which M i l l 
argued should e x i s t i n the s o c i e t y . I n d i v i d u a l s have the duty to 
a s s i s t each other "to d i s t i n g u i s h the b e t t e r from the worse, and 
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to choose the former and avoid the l a t t e r . They should be f o r ever 
s t i m u l a t i n g each other to i n c r e a s e d e x e r c i s e of t h e i r higher 
f a c u l t i e s , and i n c r e a s e d d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r f e e l i n g s and aims towards 
w i s e i n s t e a d of f o o l i s h e l e v a t i n g i n s t e a d of degrading, o b j e c t s and 
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contemplations. But i n a case where an i n d i v i d u a l i s i l l - b e h a v e d 
and r e f u s e s to a v a i l h i m s e l f of the a s s i s t a n c e or a d v i c e given by a 
f r i e n d to improve h i s behaviour, i t w i l l be wrong to i n c r e a s e h i s 
s u f f e r i n g i n the way of oppression. 
The course of treatment, the i n d i v i d u a l can be s u b j e c t e d to 
i s , f i r s t l y t h a t s o c i e t y has the freedom to avoid, though not o v e r t l y , 
the company of the i l l - b e h a v e d i n d i v i d u a l , but not to oppress h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Secondly, s o c i e t y has the freedom to warn the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s a s s o c i a t e s i f i t f e e l s t h a t h i s behaviour i s dangerous. 
T h i r d l y , i f the i n d i v i d u a l i s s e e k i n g employment, employers w i l l have 
the r i g h t to g i v e p r e f e r e n c e to other a p p l i c a t i o n s because of h i s 
behaviour. T h i s course of treatment, w i l l make the i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r 
a t the hands of the s o c i e t y f o r f a u l t s r e s u l t i n g from h i s 
s e l f - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s . "That the inconveniences which a r e s t r i c t l y 
i n s e p a r a b l e from the unfavourable judgement of o t h e r s , are the only 
ones to which a person should ever be s u b j e c t e d f o r t h a t p o r t i o n of 
h i s conduct and c h a r a c t e r which concerns h i s own good, but which 
does not a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t of o t h e r s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h . . ,.55 him. 
As an i n d i v i d u a l i s a s o c i a l being, the harm which the 
i n d i v i d u a l does to h i m s e l f w i l l s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t h i s r e l a t i o n s and i n 
a l e s s degree s o c i e t y a t l a r g e . When by conduct of t h i s nature, the 
i n d i v i d u a l n e g l e c t s h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to other i n d i v i d u a l s , h i s 
a c t i o n i s no longer regarded as s e l f - r e g a r d i n g but i s s u b j e c t to 
"moral d i s a p p r o b a t i o n . " For example, a married man who due to 
extravagance or v i c e , becomes unable to f u l f i l h i s o b l i g a t i o n to h i s 
f a m i l y can be s u b j e c t e d to r e p r o b a t i o n and i f p o s s i b l e punishment 
f o r committing a breach of duty to h i s f a m i l y . S i m i l a r l y , no 
i n d i v i d u a l could be punished f o r being drunk, but a bus conductor 
or d r i v e r should be punished f o r being drunk on duty. I n s h o r t , 
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"whenever , t h e r e i s a d e f i n i t e damage, or a d e f i n i t e r i s k of 
damage, e i t h e r to an i n d i v i d u a l or to the p u b l i c , the case i s taken 
out of the province of l i b e r t y , and p l a c e d i n t h a t of m o r a l i t y or 
law. 
There are cases of p e r s o n a l conduct which ought to be 
punished but which the p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y precludes the s o c i e t y 
from punishing or p r e v e n t i n g because they a r e s e l f - r e g a r d i n g . I f an 
i n d i v i d u a l has the freedom to perform those a c t s , have not other 
i n d i v i d u a l s the freedom to a d v i s e or to i n s t i g a t e him to do so ? "To 
g i v e a d v i c e or o f f e r inducements to anyone i s a s o c i a l a c t , and may, 
t h e r e f o r e , l i k e a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l which a f f e c t o t h e r s , be supposed 
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amenable to s o c i a l c o n t r o l . On second thoughts, M i l l a f f i r m e d 
t h a t the q u e s t i o n under d i s c u s s i o n though r e l a t e d to l i b e r t y was not 
s t r i c t l y w i t h i n the bounds of the d o c t r i n e of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the same p r i n c i p l e governing i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y 
a f f e c t e d i t . As such, i f people ought to be f r e e to a c t as they 
l i k e i n t h i n g s which concern them, they must be f r e e to seek a d v i c e 
or c o n s u l t anybody. 
But, "the q u e s t i o n i s doubtful only when the i n s t i g a t o r 
d e r i v e s a p e r s o n a l b e n e f i t from h i s a d v i c e ; when he makes i t h i s 
occupation, f o r s u b s i s t e n c e or pecuniary g a i n , to promote what 
s o c i e t y and the s t a t e c o n s i d e r to be an e v i l . Then, indeed, a new 
element of c o m p l i c a t i o n i s introduced; namely, the e x i s t e n c e of 
c l a s s e s of persons w i t h an i n t e r e s t opposed to what i s considered as 
the p u b l i c weal, and whose mode of l i v i n g i s grounded on the 
58 
c o u n t e r a c t i o n of i t . " Gambling f o r example should be t o l e r a t e d but 
should book-makers be allowed to run b e t t i n g shops. 
M i l l admitted t h a t i t was a border l i n e case between two 
p r i n c i p l e s and a c c o r d i n g l y argued both f o r and a g a i n s t g r a n t i n g t h i s 
freedom to a book-maker. The f a c t t h a t a book-maker f o l l o w s an 
occupation •:: i s not a good enough reason to i n c r i m i n a t e him when 
co n s i d e r e d on grounds of t o l e r a t i o n . A c c o r dingly, "...the a c t 
/gambling/ should e i t h e r be c o n s i s t e n t l y permitted or c o n s i s t e n t l y 
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p r o h i b i t e d ; . . . . i f the p r i n c i p l e s .... ^whiclj7 have ^feeen s t a t e d 7 . . . . 
a r e t r u e , s o c i e t y has no b u s i n e s s , as s o c i e t y to decide anything 
t o be wrong which concerns only the i n d i v i d u a l ; t h a t i t cannot go 
beyond d i s s u a s i o n , and t h a t one person should be as f r e e t o 
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persuade as another to di s s u a d e . Consequently, i f gambling i s 
allowed, book-makers have e q u a l l y the r i g h t to keep b e t t i n g shops. 
On the other hand, although the s t a t e or p u b l i c has no 
r i g h t t o decide what s e l f - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n i s good or bad, y e t i t 
i s j u s t i f i e d i n assuming t h a t an a c t i o n i s bad. The v a l i d i t y of such 
an assumption can be cha l l e n g e d i f the person concerned t h i n k s t h a t 
he i s being v i c t i m i z e d . On these grounds, the s t a t e w i l l be a c t i n g 
c o r r e c t l y i f i t l i m i t s the freedom of a book-maker who i s not honest 
to the p u b l i c - a book-maker whose aim i s to cheat the p u b l i c f o r h i s 
own p a r t i c u l a r end. For example, a book-maker who i s unable to pay a 
winning c l i e n t or indulges i n a l t e r i n g winning bets or i n ac c e p t i n g 
b e t s from people whom the s o c i e t y do not accept as i n d i v i d u a l s f i t 
to manager t h e i r own a f f a i r s , ought not to be allowed to p r a c t i c e 
h i s occupation. Concluding, M i l l s t r e s s e d t h a t what the s t a t e should 
do i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s of t h i s nature was to ensure a 
s i t u a t i o n i n which people " . . . . s h a l l make t h e i r e l e c t i o n , e i t h e r 
w i s e l y or f o o l i s h l y , on t h e i r own prompting, as f r e e as p o s s i b l e from 
the a r t s of persons who s t i m u l a t e t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n s f o r i n t e r e s t e d 
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purposes of t h e i r own." 
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Trade i s a type of s o c i a l a c t worth c o n s i d e r i n g . 
"Whoever undertakes to s e l l any d e s c r i p t i o n of goods to the p u b l i c , 
does what a f f e c t s the i n t e r e s t of other persons, and of s o c i e t y i n 
ge n e r a l ; and thus h i s conduct, i n p r i n c i p l e , comes w i t h i n t h e ' 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n of s o c i e t y . " A c c o rdingly, under the regime of 
pr o t e c t i o n i s m , v a r i o u s s t a t e s were very much i n f l u e n c e d by t h i s view 
t h a t i t was conceived as t h e i r duty to r e g u l a t e p r i c e s and production. 
R e s t r i c t i o n s whether on tr a d e or on production are s i m i l a r t o other 
r e s t r a i n t s , "and a l l r e s t r a i n t s , qua r e s t r a i n t , i s an e v i l : but the 
r e s t r a i n t i n que s t i o n a f f e c t s only t h a t p a r t of conduct which s o c i e t y 
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i s competent to r e s t r a i n , and are wrong s o l e l y because they do not 
r e a l l y produce the r e s u l t s which i t i s d e s i r e d to produce by 
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them." F o r example, i t w i l l be wrong to impose a ban on the s a l e of 
f o r e i g n whisky i f i n d i v i d u a l s can o b t a i n some by i l l i c i t means. I t i s 
e q u a l l y wrong to impose a ban which w i l l l i m i t the freedom of buyers 
to buy whisky from any market w h i l e home producers are given p e r f e c t 
freedom of production. Such a ban w i l l not o n l y c r e a t e a r t i f i c i a l 
monopoly f o r producers but w i l l a l s o prevent buyers from buying whisky 
from the cheapest market. A ban, when p r o p e r l y imposed, should a f f e c t 
both buyers and s e l l e r s . 
But when p r o t e c t i o n i s m was- r e p l a c e d by the regime of f r e e 
t r a d e , i t was r e a l i s e d t h a t both the good q u a l i t y and cheapness of 
commodities were secured by g r a n t i n g equal freedom to buyers and 
s e l l e r s . T h i s l e a d s to one of M i l l ' s most v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the 
concept of l i b e r t y , namely, the s u c c e s s f u l d i v o r c e of the notion of 
economic freedom from t h a t of p o l i t i c a l freedom. T h i s d i v o r c e was 
announced when he s t r e s s e d t h a t the " d o c t r i n e of F r e e Trade; . . . r e s t s 
on grounds d i f f e r e n t from, though e q u a l l y s o l i d w i t h , the p r i n c i p l e of 
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i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y a s s e r t e d i n the E s s a y . 
"As the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y i s not i n v o l v e d i n 
the d o c t r i n e of F r e e Trade, so n e i t h e r i s i t i n most of the q u e s t i o n 
which a r i s e r e s p e c t i n g the l i m i t s of t h a t d o c t r i n e : as f o r example, 
what amount of p u b l i c c o n t r o l i s a d m i s s i b l e f o r the p r e v e n t i o n of 
freedom by a d u l t e r a t i o n ; how f a r s a n i t a r y p r e c a u t i o n s , or arrangements 
t o p r o t e c t work people employed i n dangerous occupations, should be 
enforced on employers. Such qu e s t i o n s i n v o l v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of l i b e r t y , 
only i n so f a r as l e a v i n g people to themselves i s always b e t t e r , 
c a e t e r i s p a r i b u s , than c o n t r o l l i n g them; but t h a t they may be 
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l e g i t i m a t e l y c o n t r o l l e d f o r these ends i s i n p r i n c i p l e undeniable. 
On the other hand, the p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y was i n v o l v e d i n some 
c a s e s , f o r example, the r e s t r i c t i o n of the s a l e of poisons, where 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e was aimed at making a p a r t i c u l a r commodity 
d i f f i c u l t or i m p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n . Such i n t e r f e r e n c e was o b j e c t i o n a b l e 
* My own u n d e r l i n i n g . 
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because i t l i m i t e d the freedom of the buyer. 
65 
The s a l e of poisons r a x s e s the q u e s t i o n - How f a r can the 
s t a t e l i m i t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom of a c t i o n f o r the o b j e c t of 
p r e v e n t i n g crime or a c c i d e n t ? Admittedly, the s t a t e has the r i g h t 
to prevent a crime being committed, and i n a case where i t has been 
committed, i t i s the duty of the s t a t e to d e t e c t and punish i t . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , i f poisons a r e bought or used s o l e l y f o r commiting 
crimes, the s t a t e has the r i g h t to p r o h i b i t t h e i r production and 
s a l e . But, poisons are not only used f o r bad purposes but f o r 
u s e f u l ones as w e l l . Can i n d i v i d u a l s then, be given the freedom to 
use poisons f o r good purposes without s u b j e c t i n g t h a t l i b e r t y to 
abuse ? I t i s d i f f i c u l t to use t h i s freedom f o r good purposes only. 
" r e s t r i c t i o n s cannot be imposed i n the one case without 
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o p e r a t i n g i n the other. 
The s t a t e can not r i g h t l y l i m i t i n d i v i d u a l freedom w i t h the 
s o l e o b j e c t of preventing crime or a c c i d e n t . The i n d i v i d u a l can * * only be warned of the danger; not f o r c i b l y prevented from exposing ..67 
h i m s e l f to i t . How can t h i s warning be given, without i n d i v i d u a l 
freedom being v i o l a t e d ? Such warning, can take the form of 
l a b e l l i n g a l l b o t t l e s c o n t a i n i n g poison w i t h words which show t h a t 
they are dangerous. I t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n poison even f o r 
a l e g i t i m a t e purpose, i f the s a l e i s l i m i t e d to those who can 
o b t a i n a w r i t t e n a u t h o r i t y from a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r . The next 
method i s Behtham's "preappointed evidence". I t i n v o l v e s keeping a 
r e g i s t e r f o r buyers. Every person who s e l l s poisons keeps a 
r e g i s t e r i n which a buyer s i g n s anytime he purchases any poison. 
T h i s makes i t e a s i e r to t r a c e any i l l use which may take p l a c e . 
The p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y a l l o w s drunkeness so long as the 
agent does not, under the i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l , harm o t h e r s . But, 
such a conduct does not g e n e r a l l y promote the best i n t e r e s t of the 
agent. Should the s t a t e then, w h i l e i t permits drunkeness, 
My own u n d e r l i n i n g . 
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n e v e r t h e l e s s , l i m i t i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n d i r e c t l y i n t h a t sphere of 
a c t i o n by making a l c o h o l more c o s t l y , or by l i m i t i n g the number of 
" p u b l i c houses" i n order to make i t more d i f f i c u l t to get ? 
Every i n c r e a s e i n the p r i c e of beer i m p l i e s a decrease i n 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom of not only those who cannot a f f o r d to buy a 
p i n t of beer due to the i n c r e a s e but a l s o those who w i l l have to 
spend more i n order to buy one. I n d i v i d u a l s should be f r e e to choose 
t h e i r p l e a s u r e s and to spend t h e i r income the way t h a t s u i t s them 
68 
b e s t " a f t e r s a t i s f y i n g t h e i r l e g a l and moral o b l i g a t i o n s . " Oh 
the other hand, " t a x a t i o n f o r f i s c a l purposes i s a b s o l u t e l y 
i n e v i t a b l e ; t h a t i n most c o u n t r i e s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
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p a r t of t h a t t a x a t i o n should be i n d i r e c t . . . . Consequently, the 
s t a t e imposing tax on a l c o h o l i s d e s i r a b l e though i t i m p l i e s a 
r e d u c t i o n i n the degree of i n d i v i d u a l freedom. 
" P u b l i c houses" should be under the c o n t r o l of the p o l i c e 
because o f f e n c e s a g a i n s t s o c i e t y o f t e n o r i g i n a t e t h e r e . The s t a t e 
should t h e r e f o r e confine the s a l e of a l c o h o l to people of r e s p e c t a b l e 
c h a r a c t e r r a t h e r than l i m i t the number of p u b l i c houses f o r the s a l e 
purpose of making a l c o h o l more d i f f i c u l t to get. "The l i m i t a t i o n i n 
number, of beer and s p i r i t houses, f o r the express purpose of 
ren d e r i n g them more d i f f i c u l t of a c c e s s , and d i m i n i s h i n g the 
oc c a s i o n s of temptation, not only exposes a l l to an inconvenience 
because t h e r e a r e some by whom the f a c i l i t y would be abused, but 
i s s u i t e d only to a t a s t e of s o c i e t y i n which the l a b o u r i n g c l a s s e s 
are avowedly t r e a t e d as c h i l d r e n or savages, and pl a c e d under an 
education of r e s t r a i n t , to f i t them f o r f u t u r e admission to the 
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p r i v i l e g e s of freedom. 
Should the freedom of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s w h i l e a c t i n g i n 
t h e i r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t i e s be l i m i t e d ? The p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y 
demands t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l should be f r e e to pursue h i s own 
i n t e r e s t s the way which s u i t s him b e s t . I n h i s own concerns but 
a c t i n g f o r o t h e r s , he i s denied t h i s freedom. Consequently, the 
s t a t e has the r i g h t to c o n t r o l over the i n d i v i d u a l ' s e x e r c i s e of 
any power which i t allows him to possess over o t h e r s . 
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T h i s view l e a d s to another important i s s u e - s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h domestic r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the f a m i l y . MOne 
would almost t h i n k t h a t a man's c h i l d r e n were supposed to be 
l i t e r a l l y , and not m e t a p h o r i c a l l y , a p a r t of h i m s e l f , so j e a l o u s 
i s opinion of the s m a l l e s t i n t e r f e r e n c e of law w i t h h i s a b s o l u t e and 
e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l over them; more j e a l o u s than of almost any 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s own freedom of a c t i o n : so much l e s s do the 
.,70 
g e n e r a l i t y of mankind v a l u e l i b e r t y than power. I f these a r e the 
general r e a c t i o n s of mankind to s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e with domestic 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l , w i t h what j u s t i f i c a t i o n does the 
s t a t e demand t h a t every c h i l d i n a f a m i l y should be educated up to 
a c e r t a i n standard ? 
Admittedly, i t i s the duty of a f a t h e r to provide education 
f o r h i s c h i l d . But i n most c a s e s , f a t h e r s n e g l e c t t h i s duty and no 
one ever bothers to compel them to perform i t . To b r i n g a c h i l d i n t o 
the world and f a i l t o provide him "with i n s t r u c t i o n and t r a i n i n g f o r 
i t s mind, i s a moral crime both a g a i n s t the unfortunate o f f s p r i n g 
71 
and a g a i n s t s o c i e t y . " On the other hand, education i s one of those 
a c t i o n s which are c l a s s i f i e d under o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s and 
a c c o r d i n g l y comes under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t e . As such, i t 
becomes incumbent on the s t a t e to see the duty performed " a t the 
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charge, as f a r as p o s s i b l e , of the parent." 
Though the s t a t e i s j u s t i f i e d i n e n f o r c i n g education, i t 
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has no r i g h t to d i r e c t i t . Enforcement and d i r e c t i o n of education 
are two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . When the s t a t e undertakes the d i r e c t i o n of 
education, i t i n v o l v e s encroaching on the freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s to 
a c t on t h e i r own o p i n i o n s . I n d i v i d u a l i t y of c h a r a c t e r and d i v e r s i t y 
i n opinions and modes of conduct a r e l o s t due to l a c k of d i v e r s i t y 
i n e ducation. I n d i v i d u a l s ' c h a r a c t e r s are moulded to s u i t the 
i n t e r e s t of those i n power. These a p a r t , freedom should be given to 
p r i v a t e agencies who wish to b u i l d t h e i r own e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those modern c o u n t r i e s where t h e r e a r e q u a l i f i e d 
and educated people. 
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As i t i s a crime to b r i n g a c h i l d i n t o the world without 
adequate means f o r i t s w e l f a r e , i s the s t a t e j u s t i f i e d i n 
p r e v e n t i n g improvident marriages ? Laws passed to prevent such 
marriages are j u s t i f i e d not from the p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y but from 
t h e i r tendency to stop harmful a c t s . "The laws which, i n many 
c o u n t r i e s on the c o n t i n e n t , f o r b i d marriages u n l e s s the p a r t i e s 
can show t h a t they have the means of supporting a f a m i l y , do hot 
exceed the l e g i t i m a t e powers of the s t a t e ; and whether such laws 
be expedient or not .... they are not o b j e c t i o n a b l e as v i o l a t i o n s 
of l i b e r t y . Such laws are i n t e r f e r e n c e s of the s t a t e to p r o h i b i t 
a mischievous a c t - an a c t i n j u r i o u s to o t h e r s , which ought to be a 
s u b j e c t of r e p r o b a t i o n , and s o c i a l stigma, even when i t i s not 
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deemed expedient to superadd l e g a l punishment." Having thus 
s u r v e y e d . M i l l ' s views about i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s , 
1 s h a l l now examine why he advocated i t . 
F i r s t l y , no one i s so competent to conduct a b u s i n e s s , or 
to decide how a b u s i n e s s should be conducted as an i n d i v i d u a l who 
i s i n t e r e s t e d i n i t . As such, i n d i v i d u a l s should be given the 
freedom to pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s i n the way they l i k e b e s t . 
Secondly, g i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s the freedom to c a t e r f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
s e r v e s as a means of educating them, "....though i n d i v i d u a l s may not 
do the p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g so w e l l , on the average, as the o f f i c e r s of 
government, i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s d e s i r a b l e t h a t i t should be done by 
them, r a t h e r than by the government, as a means of t h e i r own mental 
education - a mode of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r a c t i v e f a c u l t i e s , 
e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r judgement and g i v i n g them a f a m i l i a r knowledge of 
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the s u b j e c t s w i t h which they are thus l e f t to d e a l . " T h i r d l y , 
every i n c r e a s e i n the f u n c t i o n of the government i m p l i e s an a d d i t i o n 
76 
not only to i t s powers but a l s o to i t s i n f l u e n c e . 
I n t h i s connection, M i l l followed Malthus i n t h i n k i n g t h a t over-
population must be checked by preventing imprudent marriages. 
S t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s l e g i t i m a t e and does not imply i n v a s i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' l i b e r t y . 
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A l l i n a l l , i t can be concluded t h a t M i l l f e a r e d the 
e v i l s of democracy and c i v i l i z a t i o n and loved i n d i v i d u a l i t y not 
only because i t would break up the e x i s t i n g r i g i d i t i e s i n the 
s o c i e t y but a l s o induce d i v e r s i t y . Consequently, he p r e s s e d f o r 
freedom i n order to enable i n d i v i d u a l s to a t t a i n t h i s end, and 
a l s o c o n t r i b u t e to the g r e a t e s t happiness of the g r e a t e s t number. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Herbert Spencer sprang from a f a m i l y who was " e s s e n t i a l l y 
d i s s e n t i n g " and as such opposed to a u t h o r i t y . T h i s t r a i t and the 
Nonconformist t r a i n i n g of h i s youth l e f t an abi d i n g mark i n h i s 
w r i t i n g s . The Nonconformists he d e s c r i b e d a s , " a p o l i t i c a l 
body, who p r o f e s s to a c t upon p r i n c i p l e and not upon expediency, 
and who avow t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to f o l l o w up sound d o c t r i n e whether i t 
may l e a d to odium or p o p u l a r i t y . . . " 1 At the age of twenty-two, he 
c o n t r i b u t e d a s e r i e s of l e t t e r s e x p r e s s i n g h i s p o l i t i c a l views about 
"The Proper Sphere of Government" to a Nonconformist newspaper. 
These views l a t e r formed the main d i s c o u r s e i n the S o c i a l S t a t i c s . 
I n f a c t , he admitted that without these c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h e i r 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n the Nonconformist newspaper, S o c i a l S t a t i c s would not 
even have been thought of. 
S o c i a l S t a t i c s was an a t t a c k not only on the d o c t r i n e of 
u t i l i t y and the expediency - p h i l o s o p h e r s ( t o employ Spencer's term 
f o r the U t i l i t a r i a n s ) but a l s o on t h e i r views about government. For 
Spencer, the s t a t e was not a n e c e s s a r y i n s t i t u t i o n i n the s o c i e t y . 
I t s e x i s t e n c e was only a c c i d e n t a l and temporary. Besides c i v i l laws 
th e r e were n a t u r a l laws (moral and b i o l o g i c a l laws) to govern the 
s o c i e t y . The s t a t e and i t s laws were not the only means of 
harmonizing p e o p l e s 1 i n t e r e s t s because by means of Sympathy, people 
would r e s p e c t the r i g h t s of o t h e r s , o r ^ r a t h e r tended- to be 
a l t r u i s t i c . He was not very much impressed by the u t i l i t a r i a n 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . Consequently, he condemned i t 
and t r i e d to develop h i s own p r i n c i p l e which on one hand would 
determine the degree to which the s t a t e ought to i n t e r f e r e and on 
the other, j u s t i f i e d the i d e a of freedom..While doing t h i s , he 
f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d to e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s e s and the law of 
a d a p t a t i o n . Having developed the p r i n c i p l e , he endeavoured to 
e s t a b l i s h c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s ; and urged t h a t the form of 
government which was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e was the only 
a c c e p t a b l e one. 
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The Expediency - philosophers ( t o use Spencer's term f o r 
the U t i l i t a r i a n s ) propagated the idea t h a t the end and j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
to s o c i a l a c t i o n was to a t t a i n the g r e a t e s t happiness of the 
g r e a t e s t number. Spencer accepted the view t h a t happiness ought to 
be the u l t i m a t e end but d i s a g r e e d w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n s as regards 
the means of reaching t h i s end - hence h i s a t t a c k . 
T h i s was how he s t a r t e d h i s onslaught on the theory of 
u t i l i t y : He pointed out t h a t f o r a r u l e , a p r i n c i p l e , or an axidn 
to s e r v e a s a t i s f a c t o r y purpose, i t must have a d e f i n i t e meaning. 
I n order to be u n i v e r s a l l y accepted, i t s meaning must be of 
u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n . These f e a t u r e s the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y 
l a c k e d . When the u t i l i t a r i a n s accepted the p r i n c i p l e of the g r e a t e s t 
happiness of the g r e a t e s t number, as the canon of s o c i a l m o r a l i t y , 
Spencer argued t h a t they d i d not r e a l i z e t h a t as human beings 
d i f f e r , so do they vary i n t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n of the g r e a t e s t 
happiness. I n other words, what forms the source of happiness f o r 
an i n d i v i d u a l does not i n a l l c a s e s provide happiness f o r another. 
F o r example, "to the wandering gipsy a home i s tiresome; w h i l s t a 
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Swiss i s mi s e r a b l e without one." Putt i n other words, a home i s a 
source of happiness to a Swiss but to a wandering g i p s y i t i s not. 
Happiness acc o r d i n g to Spencer c o n s i s t s i n a g r a t i f i e d 
s t a t e of a i l f a c u l t i e s . I n order to s a t i s f y a f a c u l t y , i t must be 
f r e e l y e x e r c i s e d , and the e x e r c i s e must be prop o r t i o n a t e to the 
power of the f a c u l t y . I f i t were done i n ex c e s s , w e a r i n e s s would be 
caused and i f i t were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y done, d i s c o n t e n t would a r i s e . 
The degree of g r e a t e s t happiness one d e r i v e d depended on the extent 
to which one could f r e e l y e x e r c i s e these f a c u l t i e s . No two 
i n d i v i d u a l s have a s i m i l a r combination of elements. T h e i r d e s i r e s 
d i f f e r and hence t h e i r methods of s a t i s f y i n g them. The c o n d i t i o n 
n e c e s s a r y f o r one to s e c u r e h i s happiness cannot i n a l l c a s e s be 
s u i t a b l e f o r another. Consequently, the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y must 
vary according to the d i s p o s i t i o n and c h a r a c t e r of people. I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o determine the degree to which a f a c u l t y can be 
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e x e r c i s e d to produce an expected happiness. When the content of 
happiness i s examined, i t i s not the same f o r two people. 
As "....an agreement, to the meaning of 'g r e a t e s t 
happiness' ^i§7 t h e o r e t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e , £andj i t i s a l s o 
m a n i f e s t , t h a t men are a t i s s u e upon a l l t o p i c s , which f o r t h e i r 
d e termination r e q u i r e defined notions of i t . So t h a t i n d i r e c t i n g 
us to t h i s ' g r e a t e s t happiness to the g r e a t e s t number,' as the 
o b j e c t towards which we should s t e e r , our p i l o t 'keeps the word of 
promise to our ear and breaks i t to our hope'."'* 
Even i f the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y has a d e f i n i t e meaning 
t h e r e s t i l l remains the qu e s t i o n - How can the g r e a t e s t happiness 
be achieved ? Spencer pointed out, t h a t as experience d a i l y 
proved, j u s t as the end to be a t t a i n e d was u n c e r t a i n , so a l s o was 
the r i g h t means of r e a c h i n g i t , even i f , when the end was supposed 
known. I n people's attempts to a t t a i n the components of the "grand 
4 
t o t a l " - the g r e a t e s t happiness, they had h a r d l y been s u c c e s s f u l , 
t h e i r most promising measures g e n e r a l l y turned out as f a i l u r e s . 
F or example, l e g i s l a t i v e measures taken to check improvident 
marriages i n B a v a r i a d i d not y i e l d the expected r e s u l t . I n s t e a d , 
i l l e g i t i m a t e b i r t h s i n c r e a s e d . "When i t was enacted i n B a v a r i a 
t h a t no marriage should be allowed between p a r t i e s without 
c a p i t a l , ( u n l e s s c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s could see a reasonable prospect 
of the p a r t i e s being able to provide f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n ) , i t was 
doubtless intended to advance the p u b l i c weal by checking 
improvident unions, and redundant population; a purpose most 
p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l c o n s i d e r praiseworthy, and a p r o v i s i o n which many 
w i l l t h i n k w e l l adapted to sec u r e i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s apparently 
sagacious measure has by no means answered i t s end, the f a c t being 
t h a t i n Munich, the c a p i t a l of the kingdom, h a l f the b i r t h s a r e 
5 
i l l e g i t i m a t e I " * 
Spencer, q u i t e u n l i k e M i l l d i d not accept Malthusian view t h a t 
over-population could be checked by the s t a t e . I t i s a show of 
h i s i d e a t h a t s o c i a l e v i l s could not be c o n t r o l l e d by a r t i f i c i a l 
means. Hence s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n a f f a i r s of t h i s nature i s 
not j u s t i f i e d . 
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Another f e a t u r e of expediency - philosophy which Spencer 
d i s a g r e e d w i t h was t h a t i t i m p l i e d the c o n t i n u a l e x i s t e n c e of 
government. He h e l d t h a t government was a temporary i n s t i t u t i o n i n 
s o c i e t y . "The i n s t i t u t i o n marks a c e r t a i n s t a g e of c i v i l i z a t i o n -
i s n a t u r a l to a p a r t i c u l a r phase of human development. I t i s not 
..6 
e s s e n t i a l but i n c i d e n t a l . He went on to support t h i s view w i t h 
h i s own p a r t i c u l a r conception of l i b e r t y which he i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
7 
l e s s government. I t can be deduced from h i s argument t h a t he 
thought the progress of s o c i e t y from a t r a d i t i o n a l form to a modern 
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type s a t i s f i e d h i s i d e a of freedom. Probably, he must have been 
l e d to t h i s c o n c l u s i o n by h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of the trend of s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s during h i s time when p a r a p o l i t i c a l systems 
were growing i n number and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s i n c r e a s i n g as w e l l . T h i s , 
he might have f e l t would r e s u l t i n l e s s government f u n c t i o n s . 
Spencer proceeded w i t h h i s attempt to e x p l a i n why the 
u t i l i t a r i a n s emphasized the n e c e s s i t y of government. F i r s t l y , they 
h e l d t h a t happiness as an end i n i t s e l f should be the main 
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j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a l l s t a t e a c t i o n . . I f "expediency" i m p l i e d the 
b e n e f i t of the masses and not of the i n d i v i d u a l , i t presupposed 
someone to judge what would be most conducive to t h a t b e n e f i t . The 
need f o r t h i s judge becomes c l e a r e r when i t i s considered t h a t the 
views people hold about any l e g i s l a t i v e measure or i t s u t i l i t y a r e 
so v a r i b u s . Secondly, i f every person should, independent of a 
s t a t e power, seek h i s own conception of the g r e a t e s t happiness of 
the g r e a t e s t number, s o c i e t y w i l l l a p s e i n t o chaos. " C l e a r l y , 
t h e r e f o r e a m o r a l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d upon a maxim of which the p r a c t i c a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s q u e s t i o n a b l e , i n v o l v e s the e x i s t e n c e of some 
a u t h o r i t y whose d e c i s i o n r e s p e c t i n g i t s h a l l be f i n a l - t h a t i s 
l e g i s l a t u r e . And without t h a t a u t h o r i t y , such a m o r a l i t y must ever 
remain i n o p e r a t i v e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the theory of u t i l i t y was designed by i t s 
founder as a code of c o r r e c t r u l e s f o r the c o n t r o l of human beings -
a p p l i c a b l e , f o r t h e i r guidance to p e r f e c t i o n . But government, Spencer 
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argued, o r i g i n a t e d from the i m p e r f e c t i o n of mankind. As mankind was 
imp e r f e c t , i t followed t h a t an i n s t i t u t i o n d e r i v e d from i t was 
im p e r f e c t . Not only the government but a l s o the notion of 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s i m p e r f e c t . Having argued t h a t the s t a t e was 
temporary and imperfect i n s o c i e t y , he proceeded to p o s t u l a t e t h a t 
without c i v i l laws, t h e r e were other forms of laws to govern men. 
Before going on to d i s c u s s t h i s a s p e c t , i t i s d e s i r a b l e to 
remark t h a t the trend of events during Spencer's l i f e t i m e 
c o n t r a d i c t e d h i s views about the temporary nature of government. 
Almost every day the power of government tended to i n t r u d e upon i n t o 
i n d i v i d u a l s sphere of a c t i o n . F or example, i n i n d u s t r y , the s t a t e 
had s t a r t e d to r e g u l a t e hours of labour; i n d i v i d u a l s were denied, 
to some ext e n t , the freedom to combine. I n e d u c a t i o n a l matters, t h e r e 
was a constant demand f o r a s t a t e a i d system f o r primary education. 
The s t a t e had undertaken to c o n t r o l p u b l i c h e a l t h matters. The 
l e g i s l a t u r e were p a s s i n g laws f o r the car e of the poor. With t h i s 
t i d a l move towards c o l l e c t i v i s m , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept the idea 
t h a t the s t a t e was designed to be s h o r t - l i v e d , as Spencer made out. 
There a r e some i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s i n a person which make 
him behave i n one way or the other. S i m i l a r l y , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
the i n d i v i d u a l e x h i b i t i n the way of s o c i a l union are n a t u r a l . 
Without t h i s i n h e r e n t property i n him to r u l e and to be r u l e d , 
government w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e . Most complex s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n s o c i e t y a r e made p o s s i b l e through the a i d of t h i s 
p r e - e x i s t i n g endowment. A person behaves i n one way or another, not 
because he i s compelled to do so by an e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y but 
because he i s moved by an i n t e r n a l f o r c e . These general f e a t u r e s of 
mankind suggest according to Spencer t h a t the moral law of s o c i e t y 
l i k e other laws of s o c i e t y , o r i g i n a t e s from some a t t r i b u t e of a 
human being. I t i s a l s o a reminder t h a t s o c i e t y cannot be understood, 
and s t u d i e d on one hand, and on the other e s t a b l i s h laws governing 
s o c i e t y without understanding and stu d y i n g the i n d i v i d u a l . 
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"Had we no other Inducement to eat than t h a t a r i s i n g from 
the prospect of c e r t a i n advantages to be thereby obtained, i t i s 
s c a r c e l y probable t h a t our bodies would be so w e l l cared f o r as now. 
One can q u i t e imagine, t h a t were we deprived of t h a t punctual 
monitor - a p p e t i t e , and l e f t to the guidance of some reasoned code 
of r u l e s , such r u l e s , were they never so p h i l o s o p h i c a l , and the 
b e n e f i t s of obeying them never so obvious, would form but a very 
i n e f f i c i e n t s u b s t i t u t e . " 1 1 He went on to argue t h a t j u s t as people 
have the d e s i r e to do c e r t a i n a c t i o n s ( f o r example, to e a t , to 
s l e e p ) t h e r e i s a l s o "....a l i k e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y employed i n 
i m p e l l i n g us /people^ to t h a t l i n e of conduct i n the due observance 
12 
of which c o n s i s t s what we c a l l m o r a l i t y . " T h i s " l i k e 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y " or ( i n h e r e n t property i n people) w i l l form an 
e f f i c i e n t s u b s t i t u t e f o r c i v i l laws i n guiding the i n d i v i d u a l to 
the l i n e of proper conduct. M o r a l i t y being a f e a t u r e of mankind, 
should not be imposed as the expediency p h i l o s o p h e r s advocated. 
As t h i s moral law e x i s t s independent of the s t a t e , i t i s 
u n d e s i r a b l e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s freedom should be l i m i t e d a r t i f i c i a l l y . 
13 
Green h e l d a s i m i l a r view. He maintained t h a t m o r a l i t y had i t s 
o r i g i n i n reason, i . e . i n the i d e a of a p o s s i b l e s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n to 
be a t t a i n e d by the moral agent. As such, the s t a t e could not 
p o s s i b l y enforce i t , though, i t could urge e x t e r n a l a c t i o n s 
( o b l i g a t i o n s ) . T h i s was h i s main reason f o r opposing p a t e r n a l 
government. 
S t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s f u r t h e r made unnecessary because, 
" e v e r y t h i n g i n nature has i t s laws. I n o r g a n i c matter has i t s 
dynamical p r o p e r t i e s , i t s chemical a f f i n i t i e s ; o r g a n i c matter, more 
complex, more e a s i l y destroyed, has a l s o i t s governing p r i n c i p l e s . 
As w i t h matter i n i t s i n t e g r a l form, so w i t h matter i n i t s 
aggregate; animate beings have t h e i r laws, as w e l l as the m a t e r i a l , 
from which they a r e d e r i v e d . Man, as an animate being, has f u n c t i o n s 
to perform, and has organs f o r performing those f u n c t i o n s ; he has 
i n s t i n c t s to be obeyed, and the means of obeying those i n s t i n c t s ; 
and, so long as he performs those f u n c t i o n s , as he obeys those 
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i n s t i n c t s as he bends to the laws of h i s nature, so long does he 
remain i n h e a l t h . A l l disobedience to these d i c t a t e s , a l l 
t r a n s g r e s s i o n , produces i t s own punishment. Nature w i l l be obeyed. 
As w i t h man p h y s i c a l l y , so w i t h man s p i r i t u a l l y . Mind has i t s laws 
as w e l l as matter. The mental f a c u l t i e s have t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l 
spheres of a c t i o n i n the great b u s i n e s s of l i f e ; and upon t h e i r 
proper development, and the due performance of t h e i r d u t i e s , depend 
the moral i n t e g r i t y , and the i n t e l l e c t u a l h e a l t h , of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . P s y c h i c a l laws must be obeyed as w e l l as p h y s i c a l ones; 
and disobedience as s u r e l y b r i n g s i t s punishment i n the one c a s e , 
as i n the other. As w i t h man i n d i v i d u a l l y , so w i t h man s o c i a l l y . 
S o c i e t y as c e r t a i n l y has i t s governing p r i n c i p l e s as man has. They 
may not be so e a s i l y t r a c e d , so r e a d i l y d e f i n e d . T h e i r a c t i o n may 
be more complicated, and i t may be more d i f f i c u l t to obey them, 
14 
but, n e v e r t h e l e s s analogy shows us t h a t they must e x i s t . " 
T h i s can be regarded as a r e v i v a l of the law of n ature. 
Spencer c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t every s p e c i e s i n the world had i t s 
15 
n a t u r a l law to c o n t r o l i t , and maintained l i k e Locke, t h a t t h i s 
n a t u r a l law should take precedence over a l l other laws. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
he introduced some confusion i n h i s i d e a s . He d e c l a r e d t h a t , "as 
w i t h man i n d i v i d u a l l y , so w i t h man s o c i a l l y . S o c i e t y as c e r t a i n l y 
has i t s governing p r i n c i p l e s as man has." I n h i s P r i n c i p l e s of 
16 
Sociology, he considered s o c i e t y as a f i c t i t i o u s e n t i t y , and 
a f f i r m e d t h a t what mattered were the i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s comprising i t . 
But i n the above quotation, he argued t h a t man had h i s p r i n c i p l e s 
t o guide him, and the s o c i e t y ( i n d i v i d u a l s i n aggregate) had i t s 
own. T h i s i s c l e a r l y a c o n f u s i o n f o r i f i t i s not, i t only i m p l i e s 
t h a t as people d i f f e r , they have v a r i o u s p r i n c i p l e s to c o n t r o l 
them. When people are c o n s i d e r e d i n aggregate, nothing but a 
m u l t i f a r i o u s system of p r i n c i p l e s w i l l be seen a t work i n the 
s o c i e t y and without one c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e to r e g u l a t e them, chaos 
w i l l u l t i m a t e l y f o l l o w . Another a l t e r n a t i v e a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h i s 
view i s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l has a g r e a t e r freedom when a c t i n g i n 
i s o l a t i o n which i s a u n i v e r s a l t r u t h but when he i s a s o c i a l being 
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h i s freedom i s c u r t a i l e d to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent because he i s 
s u b j e c t e d to two p r i n c i p l e s - f i r s t l y to a s e t of laws c o n t r o l l i n g 
him as a man, and secondly to another s e t of p r i n c i p l e s r e g u l a t i n g 
h i s conduct as a member of the s o c i e t y . 
Spencer h e l d t h a t the u t i l i t a r i a n p l e a s u r e - p a i n p r i n c i p l e 
was not a c o r r e c t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . P a i n i s something i n e v i t a b l e , i n the l i f e of 
a l l l i v i n g organisms. I t i s a normal phenomenon of l i f e or 
organisms i n t h e i r process of adaptation to c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r 
environment. I n d i v i d u a l s s u f f e r pain because t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
are not adapted to c o n d i t i o n s . The p a i n i s not only l i m i t e d to 
human beings but a l s o a f f e c t s any l i v i n g organism. But i t i s 
ephemeral i n nature, and tends to disappear when adaptation to 
c o n d i t i o n i s complete. The non-adaptation of an organism to i t s 
c o n d i t i o n s i s con t i n u o u s l y being s t r a i g h t e n e d . M o d i f i c a t i o n of the 
organism or both the organism and the c o n d i t i o n continues u n t i l 
the a d a p t a t i o n i s complete. "Whatever p o s s e s s e s v i t a l i t y from the 
elementary c e l l up to h i m s e l f , i n c l u s i v e , obeys t h i s law. We see 
i t i l l u s t r a t e d i n the a c c l i m a t i z a t i o n of p l a n t s , i n the a l t e r e d 
h a b i t s of domesticated animals, i n the v a r y i n g c h a r a c t i s t i c s of 
17 
our own r a c e Man e x h i b i t s j u s t the same a d a p t a b i l i t y . " 
I n the words of Bosanquet, Spencer r e s o r t s to " s t o r y - t e l l i n g " u s i n g 
e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s e s , r e g u l a t e d by law of adaptation to t r a c e 
the development of s o c i e t y from i t s simple and p r i m i t i v e nature to 
i t s complex and modern c o n d i t i o n , thereby i n c o r p o r a t i n g the i d e a 
of nature. 
What i s the purpose of adapting an i n d i v i d u a l to h i s 
c o n d i t i o n s ? The s o l e aim i s t« f i t him to the " S o c i a l S t a t e " . 
T h i s s t a t e i s one of p e r f e c t i o n . The i n d i v i d u a l i s not adapted to 
i t , because he has not completely given up the f e a t u r e s which 
adapted him to an "antecedent S t a t e " . His p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n 
r e q u i r e d t h a t i n the p u r s u i t of h i s w e l f a r e , he should encroach 
on other people's. Spencer, l i k e Hobbes, before him, regarded war 
as the U n i v e r s a l Condition of man i n the "antecedent s t a t e . " But the 
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s o c i a l s t a t e does not r e q u i r e t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . What then does the 
S o c i a l S t a t e r e q u i r e ? " I t r e q u i r e s t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l s h a l l have 
such d e s i r e s only, as may be f u l l y s a t i s f i e d without t r e n c h i n g upon 
the a b i l i t y of other i n d i v i d u a l s to o b t a i n l i k e s a t i s f a c t i o n . I f 
the d e s i r e s of each are not thus l i m i t e d , then e i t h e r a l l must have 
c e r t a i n of t h e i r d e s i r e s u n g r a t i f i e d , or some must get g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r them at the expense of o t h e r s . Both of which a l t e r n a t i v e 
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n e c e s s i t a t i n g p a i n , imply non-adaptation. 
I f p a i n i s u n d e s i r a b l e and f u r t h e r i m p l i e s non-adaptation, 
then i t means t h a t adaptation i s p a r a l l e l to p l e a s u r e , hence 
happiness. As man i s being adapted to the S o c i a l S t a t e , i t f o l l o w s 
t h a t the g r e a t e s t happiness i s h i s immediate aim. I t can then be 
deduced t h a t the concept of g r e a t e s t happiness i s analogous to the 
law. of a d a p t a t i o n . I f t h i s view i s accepted, i t remains to 
e s t a b l i s h c o n d i t i o n s by conforming to which t h i s g r e a t e s t happiness 
can be a t t a i n e d . 
The f i r s t c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e d by the s o c i a l s t a t e f o r 
the achievement of g r e a t e s t happiness i s the a b i l i t y on the p a r t of 
the i n d i v i d u a l to completely o b t a i n happiness w i t h i n h i s own sphere 
of a c t i v i t y without d i m i n i s h i n g the spheres of a c t i v i t y r e q u i r e d 
f o r the same a c q u i s i t i o n of happiness by o t h e r s . T h i s should be the 
proper course of a c t i o n as the sphere of a c t i v i t y of each i n d i v i d u a l 
i s l i m i t e d by the spheres of a c t i v i t y of other people. Any 
divergence from t h i s c o n d i t i o n e n t a i l s e i t h e r a decrease or i n c r e a s e 
of the degree of happiness of the i n d i v i d u a l or t h a t of o t h e r s . 
The f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s c a l l e d " j u s t i c e " . 
Without i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h each i n d i v i d u a l ' s sphere of 
a c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l s can y e t behave to one another i n such a way as 
to cause p a i n . I f any i n d i v i d u a l has f e e l i n g s which make him do 
t h i s , i t i s obvious t h a t the t o t a l amount of i n d i v i d u a l happiness 
i s reduced. Hence i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s should not cause 
unhappiness to other people e i t h e r i n d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t ways. 
Conformity to t h i s Supplementary C o n d i t i o n i s termed "Negative 
b e n e f i c i e n c e " . Another supplementary c o n d i t i o n i s one c a l l e d 
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" P o s i t i v e b e n e f i c i e n c e " . Through i t , an i n d i v i d u a l can r e c e i v e 
happiness from t h a t of o t h e r s . While r e g a r d f u l of the above 
l i m i t a t i o n s s e t out, i t i s ne c e s s a r y f o r each i n d i v i d u a l to do a l l 
he can to achieve h i s own p r i v a t e happiness. " G r e a t e s t happiness 
i s obtained only when conformity to them /the above c o n d i t i o n s ^ 
i s spontaneous, s e e i n g t h a t the r e s t r a i n t of d e s i r e s i n c i t i n g to 
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t r e s p a s s i m p l i e s p a i n , or deduction from g r e a t e s t happiness. 
Human happiness i s w i l l e d by God. How i s happiness 
generated ? I t i s produced when a d e s i r e i s s a t i s f i e d , and a d e s i r e 
can only be s a t i s f i e d by the f r e e e x e r c i s e of the r e l a t e d f a c u l t y . 
S i n c e happiness i s caused by the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the d e s i r e , i t 
fo l l o w s t h a t happiness c o n s i s t s i n the c o r r e c t s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l 
f a c u l t i e s . 
I t can then be argued t h a t i f i t i s the W i l l of God t h a t 
man should have happiness, and i t can only be done by the e x e r c i s e 
of the f a c u l t i e s , then i t f o l l o w s , t h a t i t i s His W i l l t h a t man 
should e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t y . I t becomes a duty to man to e x e r c i s e 
h i s f a c u l t y i n order to comply w i t h the W i l l of God. When an 
i n d i v i d u a l n e g l e c t s t h i s duty, he s u f f e r s punishment. But, as i t i s 
God's W i l l t h a t man should enjoy happiness, any l i n e of behaviour 
which produces unhappiness i s c o n t r a r y to His W i l l , and non-ex e r c i s e 
of the f a c u l t i e s i s a g a i n s t His W i l l . I n order to e x e r c i s e h i s 
f a c u l t i e s , the i n d i v i d u a l r e q u i r e s freedom of a c t i o n , because he 
20 
"....cannot e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s without c e r t a i n scope." As 
such, i t i m p l i e s then t h a t the r i g h t to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s i s a 
n a t u r a l r i g h t d e r i v e d from God. "God w i l l s men's happiness. Man's 
happiness could only be produced by the e x e r c i s e of h i s f a c u l t i e s . 
Then God w i l l s t h a t he should e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s . But to 
e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s he must have l i b e r t y to do a l l t h a t h i s 
f a c u l t i e s n a t u r a l l y impel him to do. Then God intends t h a t he should 
«21 
have t h a t l i b e r t y . T h e r e f o r e , he has a r i g h t to t h a t l i b e r t y . 
How can the term r i g h t be de f i n e d ? "....what we c a l l r i g h t s a r e 
merely a r b i t r a r y s u b d i v i s i o n s of the ge n e r a l l i b e r t y to e x e r c i s e 
the f a c u l t i e s ; - and t h a t only can be c a l l e d an infringement of r i g h t s 
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which a c t u a l l y d i m i n i s h e s t h i s l i b e r t y - cut s o f f a p r e v i o u s l y 
22 
e x i s t i n g power to pursue the o b j e c t s of d e s i r e . " 
T h i s r i g h t does not belong to any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l 
but i s common to a l l . A l l i n d i v i d u a l s possess f a c u l t i e s , and comply 
wi t h the W i l l of God by e x e r c i s i n g them. Accordingly, they must 
a l l have the freedom to e x e r c i s e t h e i r f a c u l t i e s . I n order to carve 
out a sphere of i n d i v i d u a l u n r e s t r a i n e d a c t i v i t y , " . . . . t h e r e 
n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e s a l i m i t a t i o n . F o r i f men have l i k e c l a i m s to 
that freedom which i s needful f o r the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r f a c u l t i e s , 
then must the freedom of each be bounded by the s i m i l a r freedom of 
a l l . When i n the p u r s u i t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e ends, two i n d i v i d u a l s 
c l a s h , the movements of the one remain f r e e only so f a r as they do 
not i n t e r f e r e w i t h the l i k e movements of the other. T h i s sphere of 
e x i s t e n c e i n t o which we are thrown not a f f o r d i n g room f o r the 
u n r e s t r a i n e d a c t i v i t y of a l l , and y e t a l l p o s s e s s i n g i n v i r t u e of 
t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s s i m i l a r c l a i m s to such u n r e s t r a i n e d a c t i v i t y , 
t h e r e i s no course but to apportion out the unavoidable r e s t r a i n t 
e q u a l l y . Wherefore, we a r r i v e a t the general p r o p o s i t i o n , t h a t 
every man may c l a i m the f u l l e s t l i b e r t y to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s 
compatible w i t h the p o s s e s s i o n of l i k e l i b e r t y by every other 
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man. 
Spencer turned to co n s i d e r two formulations of the law of 
equal freedom - f i r s t l y h i s own as s t a t e d a t the end of the 
preceding paragraph ( e v e r y man may c l a i m the f u l l e s t l i b e r t y to 
e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s compatible w i t h the p o s s e s s i o n of l i k e 
l i b e r t y by every other man). Secondly, the u t i l i t a r i a n s ' which 
a f f i r m e d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s could 
only be l i m i t e d "....by the p r o v i s o t h a t he s h a l l not hu r t anyone 
24 
e l s e - s h a l l not i n f l i c t p a i n on anyone e l s e . " His aim was to 
determine the more a c c e p t a b l e one. Admittedly, the p u r s u i t of 
happiness can h a r d l y take p l a c e without causing p a i n to people. 
" I t i s not, however, t h a t each avoids g i v i n g pain by r e f r a i n i n g 
from the f u l l e x e r c i s e of h i s f a c u l t i e s ; but i t i s t h a t the 
f a c u l t i e s of each a r e such t h a t the f u l l e x e r c i s e of them offends 
25 
no one." I n p r a c t i c e , the p a i n i n d i v i d u a l s s u f f e r under the l a t t e r 
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p r i n c i p l e i s caused by two f a c t o r s . E i t h e r an a b n o r m a l l y - c o n s t i t u t e d 
person causes p a i n to normally c o n s t i t u t e d people by h i s 
misbehaviour, i n which r e s p e c t , h i s a c t i o n i s wrong; or the 
behaviour of a normally c o n s t i t u t e d i n d i v i d u a l h u r t s the abnormal 
f e e l i n g s on h i s neighbours, i n which c a s e , i t i s not the i n d i v i d u a l 
but the neighbours c h a r a c t e r which i s wrong. I n any of these c a s e s , 
the e x e r c i s e of the f a c u l t i e s i s c o r r e c t though i t causes p a i n . 
F o r example, A, an honest man has a f r i e n d B, who i s a 
rogue. A i s q u i t e convinced t h a t roguery i s repugnant, and l e d 
by h i s c o n v i c t i o n , he s e v e r s connection w i t h B. His a c t i o n w i l l 
d e f i n i t e l y cause p a i n to B, but i t does not f o l l o w t h a t he has 
t r a n s g r e s s e d the law. The p a i n B s u f f e r s cannot be a t t r i b u t e d to 
A's a c t i o n but to h i s , B's immorality. Hence, i n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e 
t h i s , to l i m i t A's freedom of a c t i o n i n order to prevent p a i n being 
i n f l i c t e d on B, w i l l be t o stop A's e x e r c i s i n g h i s f a c u l t i e s , f o r 
the purpose of a l l o w i n g improper e x e r c i s e of B's f a c u l t i e s . Oh the 
other hand, i f A l i m i t s h i s freedom i n order to allow B to e x e r c i s e 
h i s f a c u l t i e s , he does so at the expense of s u f f e r i n g p a i n h i m s e l f . 
According to the u n i v e r s a l law of l i f e , "....the e x e r c i s e 
of g r a t i f i c a t i o n of f a c u l t i e s strengthens them; w h i l s t , on the 
c o n t r a r y , the curbing or i n f l i c t i n g p a i n upon them, e n t a i l s a 
diminution of t h e i r power. And hence i t f o l l o w s t h a t when the 
a c t i o n of a normal f a c u l t y i s checked, to prevent p a i n being g i v e n 
to the abnormal f a c u l t i e s of o t h e r s , those abnormal f a c u l t i e s 
remain as a c t i v e as they were, and the normal one becomes weaker or 
abnormal. Whereas under converse circumstances the normal ones 
remain s t r o n g , and the abnormal ones are weakened, or made more 
normal. I n the one case, the p a i n i s d e t r i m e n t a l , because i t r e t a r d s 
the approximation to t h a t form of human nature under which the 
f a c u l t i e s of each may be f u l l y e x e r c i s e d without d i s p l e a s u r e to the 
l i k e f a c u l t i e s of a l l . I n the other c a s e the p a i n i s b e n e f i c i a l , 
26 
because i t a i d s the approximation to t h a t form." R e f e r r i n g to the 
above examples, A and B a r e f r i e n d s , and each w i l l s u f f e r p a i n f o r 
l o s i n g each other's company*. But the p a i n A s u f f e r s i s b e n e f i c i a l by 
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f r e e l y c u t t i n g h i m s e l f away from B because of h i s bad behaviour 
and t h a t which B s u f f e r s i s d e t r i m e n t a l . Accordingly, the l a t t e r 
p r i n c i p l e " L i m i t i n g the l i b e r t y of each by the l i k e l i b e r t y of 
a l l " i s the more a c c e p t a b l e one. 
An i n d i v i d u a l can cause pain to o t h e r s by e x e r c i s i n g h i s 
f a c u l t i e s i n c e r t a i n ways without t r a n s g r e s s i n g the law of equal 
freedom. For example, the i n d i v i d u a l can behave not only i n an 
u n f r i e n d l y manner, but can a l s o use h a r s h language to o t h e r s ; and i n 
so doing d i m i n i s h the happiness of those people. I f the former 
p r i n c i p l e which demands t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s f r e e to e x e r c i s e h i s 
f a c u l t i e s so long as he does not i n f l i c t p a i n on others i s a p p l i e d , 
the above a c t i o n s of the i n d i v i d u a l a re forbidden. But w i t h the 
l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e , they are not, because "....he who e x e r c i s e s h i s 
f a c u l t i e s i n t h i s way does not hinder o t h e r s from e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r s 
27 
i n the same way, and to the same e x t e n t . " 
But i f the law of equal freedom i s d i r e c t e d towards the 
attainment of the g r e a t e s t happiness, which of the two e x p r e s s i o n s 
i s more acc e p t a b l e ? I t i s the l a t t e r . " L i m i t i n g the l i b e r t y of 
each by the l i k e l i b e r t y of a l l , excludes a wide range of improper 
a c t i o n s , but does not exclude c e r t a i n other improper ones. L i m i t i n g 
the l i b e r t y of each by the n e c e s s i t y of not g i v i n g p a i n to the r e s t , 
excludes the whole of these improper a c t i o n s , but excludes along 
w i t h them many othe r s t h a t are proper. The one does not cut o f f 
enough; the other c u t s o f f too much. The one i s n e g a t i v e l y erroneous 
and the other i s p o s i t i v e l y so. E v i d e n t l y then, we must adopt the 
n e g a t i v e l y erroneous one, s e e i n g t h a t i t s shortcomings may be made 
28 
good by a supplementary law." 
29 
I s t h i s s t a t e of freedom, a s t a t e . o f l i c e n c e ? Spencer 
i n s i s t e d l i k e ILocke and M i l l t h a t i t was not. I f an i n d i v i d u a l 
i s f r e e to do a l l t h a t he w i l l s , provided he does not encroach upon 
c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d c l a i m s of o t h e r s , has he the freedom, "then. 
to do t h i n g s t h a t are i n j u r i o u s to h i m s e l f i s /hej 7 f r e e to get 
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drunk, or to commit s u i c i d e " ? Though the p r i n c i p l e f o r b i d s 
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c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of a c t i o n s as immoral, i t does not recognize a l l 
kinds of immorality. The r e s t r i c t i o n which the p r i n c i p l e puts on 
the f r e e e x e r c i s e of the f a c u l t i e s i s not the only one and so i t 
can e q u a l l y be a p p l i e d to f u r t h e r ones. There i s a d i f f i c u l t y 
a t t a c h e d to t h e s e supplementary r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
F i r s t l y , they are i n f e r i o r to the o r i g i n a l law - i . e . 
" l i m i t i n g l i b e r t y of each by the l i k e l i b e r t y of a l l . " Moreover, 
the o r i g i n a l law can be s u b j e c t e d to mathematical deduction. Spencer 
intr o d u c e d s c i e n t i f i c n o t i o n to h i s p r i n c i p l e s s i m i l a r l y as Bentham 
d i d w i t h the development of f e l i c i t y c a l c u l u s . T h i s was the g e n e r a l 
p a t t e r n of thought i n the 17th, 18th and 19th c e n t u r i e s among 
ph i l o s o p h e r s ever s i n c e Newton e s t a b l i s h e d the p h y s i c a l laws of 
g r a v i t a t i o n . The l i m i t put to each i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom by the l i k e 
freedom of every other man, can "....almost" /hej p o s s i b l e of exact 
ascertainment; f o r l e t the c o n d i t i o n of t h i n g s be what i t may, the 
r e s p e c t i v e amounts of freedom men assume can be compared, and the 
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e q u a l i t y or i n e q u a l i t y of those amounts be r e c o g n i s e d . " But the 
supplementary r e s t r i c t i o n s cannot, though they can only be 
s t r a i g h t e n e d i n t o s u p e r i o r forms of expediency. When one t r i e s to 
draw p r a c t i c a l deductions from what a man i s f r e e to do and what 
he i s not f r e e to do, he f i n d s h i m s e l f entangled i n a complicated 
estim a t e of p l e a s u r e and p a i n s , w i t h no d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n . I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to i n f e r from one's a c t i o n whether i t s r e s u l t i s good 
or bad, or whether the good outweighs the bad, or v i c e v e r s a . One 
can n e i t h e r say i f the f a c u l t i e s on which p a i n w i l l be i n f l i c t e d 
a r e i n normal or abnormal s t a t e s . 
F o r example, undoubtedly i t i s very patent t h a t drunkeness 
i s an i n j u r i o u s e x e r c i s e of the f a c u l t y , because i t causes more 
p a i n than p l e a s u r e . Though the e f f e c t of drunkeness can be r e a d i l y 
seen, n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine the degree of 
work which i s good f o r the i n d i v i d u a l and t h a t which i s bad. I t i s 
a l s o d i f f i c u l t to draw a l i n e between due and undue i n t e l l e c t u a l 
a c t i v i t y . I t i s as w e l l a t a s k to determine the amount of advantage 
which w i l l j u s t i f y an i n d i v i d u a l to migrate from a t r o p i c a l to a 
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temperate country, " and yet i n each of these cases happiness 
i s at s t a k e , and the wrong course i s wrong f o r the same reason t h a t 
drunkeness i s so W h i l s t we a r e as yet i m p e r f e c t l y adapted to 
our c o n d i t i o n s , p a i n must i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e from the r e p r e s s i o n of 
f a c u l t i e s t h a t are too a c t i v e , and from the o v e r t a s k i n g of those 
t h a t a r e not equal to t h e i r d u t i e s ; and, as being needful to the 
development of the u l t i m a t e man, such p a i n cannot be h e l d 
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damnatory of the a c t i o n s c a u s ing i t . " As the s o c i e t y i s tending 
towards p e r f e c t i o n and so s t i l l l a c k s an i d e a l man, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to f i x r i g i d l i m i t a t i o n s t o i n d i v i d u a l s freedom of a c t i o n . The 
g r e a t e s t happiness i s what i n d i v i d u a l s r e q u i r e . The c o n d i t i o n s 
n e c e s s a r y to i t s achievement are f i x e d and before they can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d • t h e human c o n s t i t u t i o n , "bodily and mental" must be 
p e r f e c t l y known. T h i s knowledge i s l a c k i n g and hence the d i f f i c u l t y 
about the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s . S i n c e such i s the ease 
" our course i s to r e g a r d the law of equal freedom as s e t t i n g 
up the only r e c o g n i s a b l e l i m i t to the e x e r c i s e of f a c u l t i e s , 
knowing t h a t the other l i m i t s w i l l i n e v i t a b l y make themselves f e l t , 
and t h a t i n v i r t u e of the law of adaptation, there must e v e n t u a l l y 
a r i s e a complete conformity to them. That on t h i s course being 
pursued, t h e r e w i l l happen a gradual c e s s a t i o n of the d e t r i m e n t a l l y 
p a i n f u l a c t i o n s , w h i l s t the b e n e f i c i a l l y p a i n f u l ones w i l l be 
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continued u n t i l they have ceased to be p a i n f u l " When complete 
ada p t a t i o n between C o n s t i t u t i o n and Condition has been achieved, a 
complete c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n s i n t o e s s e n t i a l l y i n j u r i o u s and 
e s s e n t i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l w i l l be a t t a i n e d as w e l l . 
As shown above, man p o s s e s s e s moral sense by the a i d of 
which he can d i s t i n g u i s h between the r i g h t and wrong e x e r c i s e of the 
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f a c u l t i e s . T h i s moral sense i s analogous to what can be 
d e s c r i b e d as an " i n s t i n c t of p e r s o n a l r i g h t s . " With i t s a s s i s t a n c e 
an i n d i v i d u a l not only c l a i m s as g r e a t a s h a r e of n a t u r a l r i g h t s as 
i s claimed by o t h e r s but a l s o r e s i s t s any i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s 
"sphere of o r i g i n a l freedom". But t h e r e i s a s e t of u t i l i t a r i a n s who 
s l i g h t the i d e a of n a t u r a l r i g h t s . They r e j e c t the i d e a and y e t they 
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t a l k about j u s t i c e , draw the same l i n e of d i s t i n c t i o n between law and 
eq u i t y as upholders of n a t u r a l r i g h t s do. They tend to propagate 
t h e i r d o c t r i n e from the same plat f o r m as the n a t u r a l r i g h t school 
of thought. " T h i s so s o l i d - l o o k i n g p r i n c i p l e of the g r e a t e s t 
happiness to the g r e a t e s t number, needs but to have a l i g h t brought 
near i t , and l o '. i t explodes i n t o the astounding a s s e r t i o n t h a t 
..35 
a l l men have equal r i g h t s to happiness As the i n s t i n c t of 
per s o n a l r i g h t s i s a s e l f i s h one, inducing an i n d i v i d u a l to a s s e r t 
and defend h i s own freedom of a c t i o n , how does an i n d i v i d u a l 
r e c o g n i s e the r i g h t s of other s ? T h i s i s done by means of sympathy. 
Sympathy was d e s c r i b e d by Adam Smith i n h i s "Theory of Moral 
Sentiment" as t h a t f a c u l t y which e x c i t e d a f e l l o w - f e e l i n g f o r the 
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p a s s i o n of o t h e r s . When the sympathetic f e e l i n g s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l a r e aroused, h i s i n s t i n c t of pe r s o n a l r i g h t s can be 
reasonably reduced. I n s h o r t , i n d i v i d u a l s become a l t r u i s t i c because 
of sympathy. T h i s had been a constant c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e between the 
n a t u r a l law and u t i l i t a r i a n s school of thought. 
Under the impression t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the concept 
of happiness i s important, the U t i l i t a r i a n s maintained t h a t such 
p r e s e r v a t i o n ever r e q u i r e d the adoption of m a j o r i t y r u l e . The 
que s t i o n then a r i s e s - does t h i s n o t i o n of m a j o r i t y r u l e 
n e c e s s a r i l y imply omnipotence of the m a j o r i t y ? I n Spencer's view i t 
does not. There i s a l i m i t to t h e i r power. T h i s view can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d w i t h a few examples. Supposing t h a t people are wo r r i e d 
about over-population, and so the l e g i s l a t u r e enacts a law t h a t 
every newborn baby d e l i v e r e d w i t h i n a per i o d should be k i l l e d . 
O bviously such an enactment should not be e n t e r t a i n e d . I f i t i s not 
supported, i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a l i m i t to the power of the 
m a j o r i t y . Supposing t h a t f o r a u s t e r i t y measures, Mr.H.Wilson (The 
Prime M i n i s t e r ) announces t h a t no s a l a r y i n B r i t a i n should exceed 
£1000 a ye a r . Any excess above t h a t amount should be appropriated 
f o r p u b l i c purposes. Can t h a t r e s o l u t i o n be j u s t i f i e d ? I f not, 
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i t shows t h a t there i s a l i m i t to the power of the m a j o r i t y , and 
t h e r e i s a law above the popular v o i c e of the people. "What then 
i s t h a t law, i f not the law of pure e q u i t y - the law of equal 
freedom ? These r e s t r a i n t s , which a l l would put to the w i l l of the 
m a j o r i t y , are e x a c t l y the r e s t r a i n t s s e t up by t h a t law. . . . . . . i f 
the w i l l of the many cannot supersede the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of 
m o r a l i t y i n these (above) c a s e s , n e i t h e r can i t i n any. So t h a t , 
however i n s i g n i f i c a n t the m i n o r i t y , and however t r i f l i n g the 
proposed t r e s p a s s a g a i n s t t h e i r r i g h t s , no such t r e s p a s s i s 
p e r m i s s x b l e . 
The e x i s t e n c e of m a j o r i t i e s and m i n o r i t i e s d e p i c t s the 
immoral s t a t e of the s o c i e t y . The moral s t a t e of the s o c i e t y demands 
th a t i n d i v i d u a l s should o b t a i n complete happiness without 
d i m i n i s h i n g the happiness of t h e i r neighbours. "But the enactment 
of p u b l i c arrangements by vote i m p l i e s a s o c i e t y c o n s i s t i n g of men 
o therwise c o n s t i t u t e d - i m p l i e s t h a t the d e s i r e s of some cannot be 
s a t i s f i e d without s a c r i f i c i n g the d e s i r e s of o t h e r s - i m p l i e s t h a t 
i n the p u r s u i t of t h e i r happiness, the m a j o r i t y i n f l i c t a c e r t a i n 
amount of unhappiness on the m i n o r i t y - i m p l i e s t h e r e f o r e , o r g a n i c 
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i mmorality." S i m i l a r to M i l l and Bagehot, Spencer was not very 
s u r e t h a t democracy would s e c u r e equal freedom to i n d i v i d u a l s . 
I n d i r e c t l y he maintained l i k e M i l l t h a t the power of the m a j o r i t y 
could be t y r a n n i c a l . The only d i f f e r e n c e between them was t h a t M i l l 
looked upon tyranny as an e v i l attendant on democracy, w h i l e 
Spencer a t t r i b u t e d i t to immorality of the s t a t e . 
From the preceding arguments, i t can r i g h t l y be concluded 
t h a t the law of r i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the s o c i e t y should be -
Every man has the freedom to do a l l t h a t he w i l l s , p r o v ided t h a t he 
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i n f r i n g e s not the equal freedom of any other man. Spencer pointed 
out t h a t c r i t i c s would o b j e c t to the above law on the grounds t h a t 
as i t was "an axiomatic t r u t h " , i t should be recognised by a l l , but 
i t i s not so r e c o g n i s e d . I f men have not equal r i g h t s , i t ,only 
i n d i c a t e s two a l t e r n a t i v e s . E i t h e r , t h a t men have no r i g h t s a t a l l 
or t h a t they have unequal r i g h t s . The f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s untenable 
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because i t has a l r e a d y been shown t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s * r i g h t s are 
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d e r i v e d from God. As regards the second, i f people have unequal 
r i g h t s , no con c e i v a b l e motive can be a t t r i b u t e d to i t but a d e s i r e 
to ensure the supremacy of the b e s t . Supremacy should not be 
a r t i f i c i a l l y aided. I n d i v i d u a l s who f e e l t h a t they a r e s u p e r i o r 
should e x e r t t h a t s u p e r i o r i t y without a r t i f i c i a l a i d . I f thin g s 
a r e l e f t t o take t h e i r n a t u r a l course, people w i t h the a b i l i t y can 
d i s p l a y t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y to t h e i r i n f e r i o r s i n proportion to t h e i r 
marked a b i l i t y . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h a y a r d - s t i c k f o r measuring 
the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , and to develop a uniform 
sta n d a r d f o r t e s t i n g the r e s p e c t i v e v a l u e s of v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l 
a b i l i t i e s , i f freedom of a c t i o n i s to be apportioned to 
i n d i v i d u a l s according to t h e i r m e r i t s . P u b l i c opinion i s not a 
good c r i t e r i o n e i t h e r , because i t i s not uniform i n the country, 
I t i s a t a s k to f i n d e f f i c i e n t judges over human a b i l i t y , and to 
b u i l d a s c a l e f o r marking o f f the q u a n t i t y \ o f freedom proper f o r 
each i n d i v i d u a l . 
The only form of government c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of 
equal freedom i s the " f r e e s t form of government". Democracy and 
O l i g r a c h y are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r i n c i p l e because they i n v o l v e 
the tyranny of the m a j o r i t y over the m i n o r i t y and the tyranny of the 
m i n o r i t y over the m a j o r i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y . Both forms of government 
imply f o r c e and infringement of r i g h t s . But comparably, democracy 
i s b e t t e r than O l i g a r c h y because i t t r e s p a s s e s a g a i n s t the r i g h t s 
of the s m a l l e s t number. Moreover, i f according to the concept of 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom, every i n d i v i d u a l has the freedom to do whatever 
he l i k e s provided he does not i n f r i n g e the equal freedom of any 
other man, i t then i n d i c a t e s t h a t each has the r i g h t to e x e r c i s e 
the same a u t h o r i t y i n l e g i s l a t i o n as h i s neighbours. 
Consequently, " a p u r e l y democratic government i s the only one 
which i s morally a d m i s s i b l e - i s the only one t h a t i s not 
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i n t r i n s i c a l l y c r i m i n a l . " 
What does t r u e democracy mean ? A democracy can be 
d e s c r i b e d as a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n arranged i n accordance w i t h 
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the law of equal freedom. From t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , one observes t h a t 
most forms of government i n c l u d i n g those of a n c i e n t Greece and 
Rome are not democracies. Admittedly, v a r i o u s governments have 
t r i e d to a t t a i n such form of o r g a n i z a t i o n though without s u c c e s s . 
But the f a c t t h a t they have f a i l e d , does not show t h a t the path 
they took was i n c o r r e c t . An e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r one has to c o n s i d e r 
i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of such an i n s t i t u t i o n i s " t h a t a high 
form of government i s rendered p r a c t i c a b l e only by a high type 
of c h a r a c t e r - t h a t freedom can i n c r e a s e o n l y as f a s t as c o n t r o l 
becomes needless - t h a t the p e r f e c t man aitone can r e a l i z e the 
p e r f e c t s t a t e . A democracy t h e r e f o r e , being the h i g h e s t form t h a t 
a government can assume - i n d i c a t i v e , i f not of the u l t i m a t e 
phase of c i v i l i z a t i o n , s t i l l of the penultimate one - must of 
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n e c e s s i t y f a i l i n the hands of barbarous and semi-barbarous men." 
I n order to r e a l i z e a complete democratic s t a t e , the 
moral sense of the people has a l a r g e p a r t to p l a y . A popular 
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government i s one which puts l e s s r e s t r a i n t on i n d i v i d u a l s freedom. 
When the terms c i v i l l i b e r t y , f r e e i n s t i t u t i o n , s e l f government 
are used, they r e f e r to freedom. But e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t can only 
be reduced a t the same r a t e as the i n c r e a s e i n i n t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t . 
Conduct can not be l e f t f r e e , i t has to be r e g u l a t e d e i t h e r from 
without or from w i t h i n . I f the moral sense of the people i s not 
s u f f i c i e n t . ^ t h e r e must e x i s t a supplementary r u l e from without. 
I f , on the other hand, a l l men are p r o p e r l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e i r 
moral sense, government becomes n e e d l e s s , and a l l men are p e r f e c t l y 
f r e e . As the c h i e f f a c t o r of s e l f - r u l e i s the moral sense, the 
degree of freedom a l l o t t e d by i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the s o c i e t y to every 
i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the amount of moral sense 
d i f f u s e d among them. I t i s only when the i n f l u e n c e of moral sense i s 
w i d e l y f e l t can democracy be i n s t a l l e d . I t s supremacy i s not only 
n e c e s s a r y f o r the s t a b i l i t y of democracy, but a l s o important to 
make i n d i v i d u a l s w a t c h f u l of any encroachment on t h e i r r i g h t s w i t h 
a determination to r e s i s t i t and to make those i n power r e s p e c t 
the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s . 
- 115 -
As equal freedom i s the p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r normal l i f e i n 
s o c i e t y , should women have l e s s freedom than men because of t h e i r 
sex ? Or should both sexes have equal freedom ? The law of equal 
freedom knows no d i f f e r e n c e i n sex. I t a p p l i e s to both male and 
female. S e v e r a l r i g h t s claimed by men should e q u a l l y be claimed 
by women. I f t h i s view i s not accepted, two p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e open. 
E i t h e r t h a t women have no r i g h t s a t a l l or t h a t t h e i r r i g h t s a r e 
l e s s than men's. 
The f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n i s r e v o l t i n g because such a 
sugge s t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t the Cre a t o r r e l e g a t e d women to an i n f e r i o r 
p o s i t i o n to men and doomed them to remain a t t h e i r mercy. As regards 
the second p r o p o s i t i o n , i t i s r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h a 
s c a l e f o r a l l o t t i n g v a r y i n g degrees of r i g h t s to men and women 
acc o r d i n g as t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y and i n f e r i o r i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
i 
I f these p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e untenable, there i s no other a l t e r n a t i v e 
than to accept the view t h a t the r i g h t s of women are equal to those 
of men. 
"The d e s i r e to command i s e s s e n t i a l l y a barbarous d e s i r e . . . . 
Command cannot be otherwise than savage, f o r i t i m p l i e s an appeal 
to f o r c e , should f o r c e be n e e d f u l . . . . . . Command i s the growl of 
c o e r c i o n crouching i n ambush Command i s the foe of peace, f o r 
i t breeds war of word and f e e l i n g s - sometime of deeds. I t i s 
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i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the f i r s t law of m o r a l i t y . I t i s r a d i c a l l y wrong." 
Command and obedience are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h despotism and s l a v e r y . 
When command i s used on an i n d i v i d u a l , he i s fo r c e d to bend h i s w i l l 
to the f u l f i l m e n t of another person's w i l l . F or example, a w i f e who 
a c t s a c c o r d i n g to the i n s t r u c t i o n or command of her husband, bends 
her w i l l to the f u l f i l m e n t of her husband's w i l l . Then, " i f every . 
man has freedom to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s w i t h i n s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s ; 
and i f , s l a v e r y i s wrong because i t t r a n s g r e s s e s t h a t freedom, 
and makes one man use h i s powers, to s a t i s f y not h i s own wants, but 
the wants of another; whatsoever i n v o l v e s command, or whatsoever 
i m p l i e s obedience, i s wrong a l s o ; s e e i n g t h a i i t too, n e c e s s i t a t e s 
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the s u b s e r v i e n c y of one man's a c t i o n s to the g r a t i f i c a t i o n s of 
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another. Accordingly, as the g r e a t e s t happiness i s the d e s i r e 
of both men and women, and the law of equal freedom i s designed 
f o r i t s achievement, i n d i v i d u a l s should have equal r i g h t s 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r sex. 
Having a s s e r t e d the view t h a t women should have equal 
r i g h t s w i t h men, should the same p r i n c i p l e apply to c h i l d r e n ? J u s t 
as the a d u l t ' s happiness i s w i l l e d by God, so a l s o i s t h a t of the 
c h i l d . T h i s a p a r t , he has f a c u l t i e s t o be e x e r c i s e d l i k e the 
a d u l t , and consequently, r e q u i r e s freedom f o r such e x e r c i s e . Hence, 
h i s c l a i m s to freedom a r e co - e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h a t of the a d u l t . 
Any o b j e c t i o n to t h i s view i m p l i e s t h a t the law of equal freedom 
only a p p l i e s to man. T h i s means th a t before a man a t t a i n s the age 
of manhood, he has no r i g h t s . I f the c h i l d has no r i g h t s , i t then 
f o l l o w s , " th e r e i s nothing wrong i n i n f a n t i c i d e . ; . . . , robbery 
i s j u s t i f i a b l e , provided the pa r t y robbed be under age a 
c h i l d may e q u i t a b l y be ensl a v e d . For, murder, t h e f t , and the 
holding of o t h e r s i n bondage are wrong, simple because they a r e 
v i o l a t i o n s of human r i g h t s ; and i f c h i l d r e n have no r i g h t s , they 
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cannot become the s u b j e c t s of these crimes. On the other hand, 
i f c h i l d r e n have r i g h t s , t h e i r r i g h t s can not be l i m i t e d to the 
above primary ones. 
People who i n d i c a t e t h a t c h i l d r e n have no r i g h t s are wrong; 
those who maintain t h a t they have r i g h t s but unequal to those of 
a d u l t s , should draw the l i n e , to e x p l a i n or to d e f i n e . "They must 
say what r i g h t s a r e common to c h i l d r e n and a d u l t s , and why. They 
must say where the r i g h t s of a d u l t s exceed those of c h i l d r e n , and 
why. And t h e i r answers to these q u e r i e s must be drawn, not from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of expediency, but from the o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
47 
t h i n g s . " Hence,children should enjoy s i m i l a r freedom to a d u l t s . 
I s C o e r c i v e education good f o r c h i l d r e n ? I t i s not. 
Education i s r e q u i r e d f o r the formation of c h a r a c t e r . C h a r a c t e r 
formation i s not best achieved by c o e r c i v e means. I n f a c t , i t r e t a r d s 
the formation and i t i s only s u i t a b l e as a form of r e s t r a i n t . I n 
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e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , freedom i s more d e s i r a b l e than f o r c e , 
and t h a t i s one of the reasons why c o e r c i v e education i s becoming 
unpopular. Those who conceive t h a t the use of f o r c e i s the best means 
of educating c h i l d r e n w i l l change t h e i r views when they v i s i t 
c e r t a i n mental h o s p i t a l s . "Hanwell Asylum f o r the i n s a n e " according 
to Spencer, provides a good example of an i n s t i t u t i o n where 
l u n a t i c s a re cared f o r without the use of f o r c e . The r a t e of recovery 
i s i n c r e a s i n g and the management has changed from " s t r a i t - j a c k e t 
regime" to a more moderate one. I f s u a s i o n w i l l r e p l a c e c o e r c i o n 
i n the treatment of mentally i l l , why should c h i l d r e n not enjoy 
s i m i l a r treatment ? A non-coercive treatment i s favourable to, and 
n e c e s s i t a t e s constant appeals to the higher f e e l i n g s . By f r e e l y 
e x e r c i s i n g those f e e l i n g s , the c h a r a c t e r i s improved^ and the 
c h i l d i s accustomed to the c o n d i t i o n of freedom i n which h i s manhood 
should be spent. 
The law of equal freedom permits an i n v e n t o r to keep 
-his i n v e n t i o n f o r h i s own e x c l u s i v e use or as h i s p r i v a t e property. 
The same p r i n c i p l e which j u s t i f i e s t h e . r i g h t of property warrants 
the r i g h t of property i n i d e a s as w e l l . An i n v e n t o r has equal c l a i m 
over h i s i n v e n t i o n j u s t as a . C a p i t a l i s t has over h i s c a p i t a l . Laws 
l i k e patent .laws, law of c o p y r i g h t a r e passed "...not so much i n 
obedience to the d i c t a t e s of j u s t i c e , a s i n deference to the 
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suggestions to trade p o l i c y . Some people w i l l i n s i s t t h a t such lawi 
are passed f o r economic reasons and not merely f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of j u s t i c e . To n u r t u r e such a b e l i e f shows moral c a l l o u s n e s s . I t i s 
wrong to t h i n k t h a t the p r o f i t s a s p e c u l a t o r makes from sh a r e s should 
be r e c o g n i s e d as h i s property but the r i g h t of an i n v e n t o r over h i s 
i n v e n t i o n which has taken him y e a r s of hard work to develop should 
not be acknowledged. As such, one w i l l deduce t h a t j u s t i c e has 
s i m i l a r b e a r i n g on such laws as economic i n t e r e s t . 
I t i s important to remark a t t h i s s tage t h a t w i t h the 
i n s i s t e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e to normal l i f e , 
t h a t government and freedom must be i n i n v e r s e proportion to one 
another.As the s o c i e t y tends towards i t s s t a t e of p e r f e c t i o n , 
i n d i v i d u a l 
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freedom i n c r e a s e s and the sphere of s t a t e a c t i v i t y d e c r e a s e s . "The 
once u n i v e r s a l despotism was but a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the extreme 
n e c e s s i t y of r e s t r a i n t ... The progress from ... /thi§7 i s i n a l l 
c a s e s the same - l e s s government. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l forms mean t h i s . 
P o l i t i c a l freedom means t h i s . Democracy means t h i s . I n s o c i e t i e s , 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , j o i n t s tock companies, we have now agencies 
occupying f i e l d s f i l l e d i n l e s s advanced times and c o u n t r i e s by the 
s t a t e . . . . the l e g i s l a t u r e i s dwarfed by newer and g r e a t e r powers -
i s no longer master but s l a v e . . . . Thus as c i v i l i z a t i o n advances, 
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does government decay." 
As the power of the s t a t e i s so l i m i t e d , what should be 
i t s proper d u t i e s ? The moral law cannot s p e c i f y what the s t a t e 
ought to do but can only a s s e r t what i t ought not to do. Moreover, 
i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s t a t e and the i n d i v i d u a l i s 
c o n t r a c t u a l - t e s t i f i e d by the r i g h t i n d i v i d u a l s have to secede 
from i t - t h e r e i s nothing to d i s t i n g u i s h i t i n the a b s t r a c t from 
any other i n c o r p o r a t e d s o c i e t y . There i s nothing to determine i t s 
s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n . I t becomes then incumbent on i n d i v i d u a l members 
to a l l o t the s t a t e i t s d u t i e s provided those d u t i e s do not break the 
moral law. "The question i s no longer one of pure e t h i c s , and i s 
t h e r e f o r e i n c a p a b l e of s o l u t i o n by any exact methods; Approximate 
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ones only are a v a i l a b l e . " They demand t h a t the s t a t e should 
"not.... r e g u l a t e commerce; not.... educate the people; not.... 
t e a c h r e l i g i o n ; n o t . . . . a d m i n i s t e r c h a r i t y ; not.... make roads and 
r a i l w a y s ; but simply defend the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of men..k. p r o t e c t 
person and property .... prevent the aggressions of the powerful 
upon the weak.... i n a word.... a d m i n i s t e r j u s t i c e . T h i s i s the 
n a t u r a l , the o r i g i n a l , o f f i c e of a government. I t was not intended 
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to do l e s s ; i t ought not to be allowed to do more. I n c a r r y i n g 
out t h i s f u n c t i o n , the s t a t e should only tender i t s s e r v i c e s ; i t 
should not f o r c e i n d i v i d u a l s i n t o a c c e p t i n g them. I f i t does, i t 
v i o l a t e s t h a t very freedom which i t proposes to f o s t e r . His views 
here a r e extreme compared w i t h those put forward by other members 
of n a t u r a l law school of thought. They were q u i t e ready to t o l e r a t e 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e b e s i d e s i t s p o l i c e d u t i e s provided t h a t i t was 
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advantageous to the s o c i e t y . 
I n s e t t i n g out what the s t a t e should do, and what i t should 
not do, Spencer has betrayed h i m s e l f i n t o an e r r o r . He forgot t h a t 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s a s c i e n c e of tendency and so cannot work w i t h 
p e r f e c t data as any of the e n g i n e e r i n g s c i e n c e s . He should have 
remembered t h a t every s o c i e t y c o n t a i n s member c i t i z e n s of v a r y i n g 
degrees of c h a r a c t e r , physique and s t a t u s . No two of the c i t i z e n s 
have the same a t t r i b u t e s . While mechanical or geometrical s c i e n c e s 
can work w i t h s t r a i g h t l i n e s , these v a r y i n g a t t r i b u t e s of mankind 
can not form s t r a i g h t l i n e s f o r s o c i a l s c i e n c e . I t w i l l have 
l o g i c a l l y been p o s s i b l e , i f every person has the same f e a t u r e s but 
i s i m p o s s i b l e when the s o c i e t y i s comprised of s t r a i g h t and crooked 
i n d i v i d u a l s . 
S i n c e t h e r e i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y e q u i t a b l e means of a s s e r t i n g 
the r i g h t of property c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the law of equal freedom, 
Spencer allowed the s t a t e to assume the duty of a l a n d l e s s o r , w h i l e 
i t s i n d i v i d u a l members became l e s s e e s . An i n d i v i d u a l can f r e e l y 
l e a s e from the s o c i e t y without any infringement of the law of equal 
freedom, a given s u r f a c e of land, by agreeing to pay i n r e t u r n a 
s t a t e d amount of the produce he o b t a i n s from t h a t land, " . . . . i n doing 
t h i s , he does no more than what every other man i s e q u a l l y f r e e 
w i t h h i m s e l f to do - that each has the same power w i t h h i m s e l f to 
become the tenant - and t h a t the r e n t he pays accrues a l i k e to 
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a l l . " Having l e a s e d a p i e c e of land and c u l t i v a t e d i t w i t h the 
consent of the s o c i e t y , the i n d i v i d u a l can r i g h t l y a p p r o priate to 
h i m s e l f t h a t p a r t of the produce of the land l e f t a f t e r paying h i s 
r e n t . I n p l a y i n g the p a r t of a l e s s o r , j u s t i c e i s administered by 
the s t a t e i n e n s u r i n g t h a t every i n d i v i d u a l has a f r e e a c c e s s to the 
use of the l a n d . 
Obtaining the consent of the s o c i e t y as Spencer urged i n 
t h i s connection i s d e s t r u c t i v e of h i s whole theory of n a t u r a l r i g h t s 
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and law of l i f e . As Barker maintained, i f a r i g h t so elementary as 
t h a t of property i n v o l v e s s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how r i g h t s can i n t h e i r nature be independent of s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n . 
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The s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s the more s e r i o u s , as Spencer d e f i n i t e l y 
a s s e r t e d t h a t the d e s i r e to a c q u i r e property was one of the 
elements of human na t u r e . I f the law of n a ture demanded t h a t a 
person r e q u i r e s freedom to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s - a c o n d i t i o n he 
has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to - why should he o b t a i n the consent of the 
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s o c i e t y before e n j o y i n g the b e n e f i t s of t h a t c o n d i t i o n ? 
S t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of l a n d w i l l imply employing more 
e x e c u t i v e s to c o n t r o l i t . Already, Spencer had complained t h a t the 
s t a t e was making steady inroads i n t o the freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s . By 
a l l o w i n g the s t a t e to assume the r o l e of a land l e s s o r , was he not 
encouraging f u r t h e r government i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l freedom 
l e a d i n g to an u l t i m a t e d e f e a t of the end he (Spencer) was f i g h t i n g 
f o r ? 
One observes from the above l i s t s of d u t i e s immune from 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e , t h a t the s t a t e should not r e g u l a t e t r a d e . When 
the s t a t e r e g u l a t e s t r a d e i n the way of imposing r e s t r i c t i o n on 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n between two c o u n t r i e s , i t encroaches upon 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom of a c t i o n . I t has been s t r e s s e d t h a t the duty 
of the s t a t e c o n s i s t s of s e c u r i n g f o r every i n d i v i d u a l the f u l l e s t 
freedom to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s , compatible w i t h the l i k e 
freedom of a l l o t h e r s . Trade p r o h i b i t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s deny 
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i n d i v i d u a l s t h i s freedom. I n e n f o r c i n g them the s t a t e exchanges i t s 
duty as a "maintainer of r i g h t s " f o r a " v i o l a t o r of r i g h t s " . 
On the other hand, supposing f r e e t r a d e i s allowed, can a 
farmer complain t h a t h i s r i g h t s are i n f r i n g e d by a l l o w i n g consumers 
to buy food where i t s p r i c e i s lower -2 Can- he urge t h a t the s t a t e 
i s u n j u s t to him by not f o r c i n g the manufacturer to pay a high p r i c e 
f o r a commodity which he can buy at a lower p r i c e somewhere e l s e ? 
The answer to the above qu e s t i o n i s n e g a t i v e , f o r j u s t i c e w i l l not 
demand such i n t e r f e r e n c e . I f the s t a t e r e c o g n i s e s i t s duty as the 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r of j u s t i c e , t h e r e w i l l be nothing l i k e r e s t r i c t i o n s 
being put on t r a d e . F r e e t r a d e should then be the i d e a l c o n d i t i o n . 
A s i m i l a r view was put forward by the c l a s s i c a l economists. They 
agreed t h a t f r e e t r a d e was b e n e f i c i a l to the society.. 
A government cannot undertake to a d m i n i s t e r the a f f a i r s of 
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a colony without i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of the parent s o c i e t y . Any 
expenditure f o r the above purpose i n v o l v e s a breach of s t a t e duty. 
To take from i n d i v i d u a l s property beyond what i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the 
b e t t e r s e c u r i n g of t h e i r r i g h t s , i s to encroach on t h e i r r i g h t s . 
" C o l o n i a l expenditure cannot be met without property being so 
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taken. C o l o n i a l expenditure i s t h e r e f o r e u n j u s t i f i a b l e . " 
As regards the emigrant, custom demands t h a t he has a 
c l a i m to p r o t e c t i o n from the mother country but reason says no. As 
i t i s the duty of the s t a t e to a d m i n i s t e r the law of equal freedom, 
i t can not, without r e v e r s i n g i t s f u n c t i o n , tax i n d i v i d u a l s i n the 
parent country a t a higher r a t e than i s needful to p r o t e c t them, i n 
order to g i v e p r o t e c t i o n to the emigrant. The extent of p r o t e c t i o n 
the mother country should extend to each of i t s members, i s l i m i t e d 
by c o n d i t i o n s . "Viewed p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , a community i s a body of 
men a s s o c i a t e d together f o r mutual defence. The members of t h a t 
community are supposed to occupy a c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r y , and i t may be 
f a i r l y assumed t h a t the p r i v i l e g e s c o n f e r r e d are only enjoyed by 
those r e s i d i n g w i t h i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y . The n a t i o n cannot be expected 
to extend p r o t e c t i o n to i t s members wherever they may chance to 
wander.... The n a t u r a l i n f e r e n c e i s t h a t when a man l e a v e s such a 
community he l o s e s h i s membership, he f o r f e i t s h i s p r i v i l e g e s , and 
he foregoes a l l c l a i m to c i v i l a s s i s t a n c e . I t i s presumed th a t he 
duly c o n s i d e r s , on the one hand, the b e n e f i t s to be d e r i v e d by h i s 
contemplated emigration, and, on the other, the e v i l s attendant on 
the l o s s of c i t i z e n s h i p , and t h a t the p r o s p e c t i v e advantages of 
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exchange have the preponderance. 
C o l o n i a l government can not be c a r r i e d on without 
i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of the c o l o n i s t s . I f the c o l o n i s t s a re r u l e d 
by a u t h o r i t i e s sent out from the parent country, then the law of 
;-equal freedom w i l l be broken i n t h e i r persons. I f the c o l o n i s t s are 
permitted to c o n t r o l t h e i r own a f f a i r s , the parent s t a t e r e t a i n i n g 
only a veto power, th e r e w i l l s t i l l be i n j u s t i c e i n the assumption 
of g r e a t e r freedom by.the members of the mother country than i s 
allowed.by the colony. 
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C olonies are a burden to the mother country. The l a t t e r 
not only expend so much to gain so l i t t l e , but a l s o i n some c a s e s , 
i t expends so much f o r nothing, and i n f a c t a c hieve a l o s s . For 
example, the United S t a t e s of America was a burden to the mother 
country, but when she became independent, i t was a source of g a i n . 
Canada was a l s o a burden. Her commercial advantages d i d not pay the 
c o s t of her management. N e i t h e r d i d the E a s t I n d i a Company's 
statement of accounts show t h a t the balance i s i n favour of the 
mother country. 
The idea t h a t by monopolizing her c o l o n i a l t r a d e , the 
mother country o b t a i n s a more extended market f o r her goods i s 
wrong. I t i s p o s s i b l e to monopolize her t r a d e from one of two 
c a u s e s . E i t h e r the goods s o l d by the mother country are s o l d a t a 
lower r a t e , or the c o l o n i s t s are o b l i g e d to buy from the mother 
country. I f the mother country could u n d e r s e l l , she could do so 
even i f the colonies;;, were f r e e . I f she could not, i t would mean 
t h a t f o r any goods s o l d , an e q u i v a l e n t amount would be p a i d to the 
colony f o r raw m a t e r i a l s . As such, the mother country i s i n d i r e c t l y 
c a u s i n g h e r s e l f harm by monopolizing her c o l o n i e s t r a d e . Hence, 
c o l o n i e s would do f a r b e t t e r i f they were s e t f r e e of the 
government and p r o t e c t i o n of the mother country than i f they were 
c o n t r o l l e d . 
I t i s important to add t h a t apart from l o o k i n g a t the 
law of equal freedom as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e to the r e a l i z a t i o n of the 
D i v i n e W i l l , i t can a l s o be seen as a d i r e c t deduction from the 
n e c e s s i t i e s of e x i s t e n c e . E v i d e n t l y , l i f e depends on the performance 
of c e r t a i n a c t i o n s . I f i n d i v i d u a l s are deprived of t h e i r l i b e r t y 
to e x e r c i s e t h e i r f a c u l t i e s , two r e s u l t s w i l l be l i k e l y to f o l l o w . 
E i t h e r they w i l l d i e or s u f f e r p a i n , "....as t h e r e must be l i f e 
before there can be s o c i e t y , t h i s f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of l i f e must take 
precedence of the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of s o c i e t y - must f i x or govern i t . 
....as l i b e r t y to e x e r c i s e the f a c u l t i e s i s the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , the l i b e r t y of each, l i m i t e d only by the l i k e 
l i b e r t y of a l l , must be the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n of s o c i a l l i f e . D erived, 
t h e r e f o r e , as i t i s , d i r e c t l y from the D i v i n e W i l l , and u n d e r l y i n g as 
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i t does, the r i g h t o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y , the law of equal 
freedom i s of higher a u t h o r i t y than a l l other laws. The c r e a t i v e 
purpose demands t h a t e v e r y t h i n g s h a l l be subordinate to i t . 
....as s u r e l y then as the i n c i d e n t a l must bow before the n e c e s s a r y , 
so s u r e l y must a l l conventional arrangements be s u b j e c t to the 
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a b s o l u t e moral law." The idea of m o r a l i t y " i s e s s e n t i a l l y one w i t h 
a p h y s i c a l t r u t h - i s i n f a c t , a s p e c i e s of t r a n s e n d e n t i a l 
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physiology. The whole c r e a t i o n i s moving towards a f i n a l s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s ordered by the law of equal freedom. I t i s a s t a t e where the 
i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s of every one can be manifested without l i m i t , except 
the l i k e of i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s of o t h e r s . T h i s f i n a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s 
i s one of p e r f e c t i o n . Changes which are observed i n mankind w h i l e on 
i t s p ilgrimage to p e r f e c t i o n s t i l l tend towards a g r e a t e r 
development of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and can be d e s c r i b e d as "a tendency to 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n . " 
"....when the change at present going on i s complete - when 
each p o s s e s s e s an a c t i v e i n s t i n c t of freedom, together w i t h an a c t i v e 
sympathy - then w i l l a l l the s t i l l e x i s t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s to 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , be they governmental r e s t r a i n t s , or be they the 
a g g r e s s i o n s of men on one another, cease. Then, none w i l l be hindered 
from duly u n f o l d i n g t h e i r n a t u r e s ; f o r w h i l s t every one maintains h i s 
own c l a i m s , he w i l l r e s p e c t the l i k e c l a i m s of o t h e r s . Then, t h e r e 
w i l l ho longer be l e g i s l a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s and l e g i s l a t i v e burden; 
f o r by the same process these w i l l have become both n e e d l e s s and 
i m p o s s i b l e . Then f o r the f i r s t time «in the h i s t o r y of the world, 
w i l l t h e r e e x i s t beings whose i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s can be expanded to the 
f u l l i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s . And thus, i n the u l t i m a t e man p e r f e c t 
m o r a l i t y , p e r f e c t i n d i v i d u a t i o n , and p e r f e c t l i f e w i l l be 
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s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e a l i z e d . T h i s should be the c o r r e c t p i c t u r e of 
the f u t u r e s t a t e of the s o c i e t y . 
T h i s view i s c o n t r a r y to the Maithusian concept of the 
p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of s o c i e t y . Malthus argued t h a t the s o c i e t y could 
not a t t a i n p e r f e c t i b i l i t y due to i n e q u a l i t y between population and 
s u b s i s t e n c e ; the constant e f f o r t by the law of nature to e q u a l i s e 
them. He r e s o r t e d to the p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of a p l a n t to i l l u s t r a t e 
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h i s views. According to him, "the r e a l p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of man may 
be i l l u s t r a t e d by the p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of a p l a n t . The o b j e c t of 
the e n t e r p r i s i n g f l o r i s t , i s , as I conceive, to u n i t e s i z e , 
symmetry, and beauty of c o l o u r . I t would s u r e l y be presumptuous 
i n the most s u c c e s s f u l improver to a f f i r m t h a t he possessed a 
c a r n a t i o n i n which these q u a l i t i e s e x i s t e d i n the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e 
s t a t e of p e r f e c t i o n . However b e a u t i f u l h i s flower may be, other 
c a r e , other s o i l , or other suns, might produce one s t i l l more 
b e a u t i f u l . Yet, although he may be aware of the a b s u r d i t y of 
supposing t h a t he has reached p e r f e c t i o n ; and though he may know 
by what means he a t t a i n e d t h a t degree of beauty i n the flower which 
he at p r e s e n t p o s s e s s e s , yet he cannot be s u r e t h a t by pursuing 
s i m i l a r means, r a t h e r i n c r e a s e d i n s t r e n g t h , he w i l l o b t a i n a more 
b e a u t i f u l blossom. 
By endeavouring to improve one q u a l i t y , he may impair the 
beauty of another. The r i c h e r mould which he would employ to 
i n c r e a s e the s i z e of h i s p l a n t , would probably b u r s t the c a l y x , 
and d e s t r o y at once i t s symmetry. I n a s i m i l a r manner, the f o r c i n g 
manure used to b r i n g about the French r e v o l u t i o n , and to g i v e a 
g r e a t e r freedom and energy to the human mind, has b u r s t the c a l y x 
of humanity, the r e s t r a i n i n g bond of a l l s o c i e t y ; and however l a r g e 
the s e p a r a t e p e t a l s have grown; however s t r o n g l y or even b e a u t i f u l l y 
a few of them have been marked; the whole i s a t present a l o o s e , 
deformed, d i s j o i n t e d mass, without union, symmetry, or harmony of 
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c o l o u r i n g . 
Spencer's views can b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as merely Utopian. 
From the events of our own time, t h e r e are no s i g n s of a t t a i n i n g 
p e r f e c t i o n y e t . I f he should conceive metamorphosis as a s o c i a l 
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phenomena, i t i s s u r p r i s i n g to f i n d him h o l d i n g to the notion 
t h a t a s t a t e of p e r f e c t i o n would e v e n t u a l l y be reached and thence, 
l e s s government. The growth of s o c i e t i e s w i l l ever continue, and 
every such i n c r e a s e has i t s own problem to be met by the s o c i e t y . 
As t h i s change goes on, no man w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s p o s i t i o n . 
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E v e r y person w i l l always be f i g h t i n g to improve h i m s e l f w i t h the 
r e s u l t t h a t no one observes when t h i s s t a t e of p e r f e c t i o n i s reached. 
The matter i s made more d i f f i c u l t by l a c k of a proper, d e f i n i t i o n of 
the term p e r f e c t i o n , and how to measure i t . I t i s seen t h a t as y e a r s 
go p a s t , so do s t a t e powers i n c r e a s e . I n s t e a d of having l e s s 
government, we tend to have more, and ever s i n c e , Spencer wrote, 
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t h e r e has not been any decrease i n governmental f u n c t i o n . 
Before summing up the chapter, i t i s d e s i r a b l e to c o n s i d e r 
an i s s u e on which most modern w r i t e r s hold v a r y i n g views. The 
q u e s t i o n i s - was Spencer a u t i l i t a r i a n i n h i s p o l i t i c s ? 
Barker f o r example, argued t h a t " i t i s t r u e , .... t h a t w h i l e he 
/SpencerJ? a t t a c k e d what he c a l l e d the /expediency philosophy^ of 
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Bentham, he was a u t i l i t a r i a n i n h i s p o l i t i c s . Sabine maintained 
t h a t " . . . . a l l of Spencer's important e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l i d e a s 
were d e r i v e d from u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and had no c l o s e l o g i c a l 
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dependence on e i t h e r biology or e v o l u t i o n . Bowie, on the other 
hand pointed out t h a t "....he wrote i n the Benthamite j a r g o n which 
seldom l e f t him, though he was never Behtham s d i s c i p l e 
Spencer could be considered a u t i l i t a r i a n though he d i s a g r e e d w i t h 
Bentham and most u t i l i t a r i a n s on the method which they taught by 
which the u l t i m a t e end - happiness - could be a t t a i n e d . I n f a c t , 
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he o b j e c t e d to being considered an a n t i . ^ u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . He 
regarded happiness as the u l t i m a t e end of m o r a l i t y and s t r e s s e d 
t h a t the end i s p a r t i a l l y a t t a i n a b l e by e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s 
from the observed r e s u l t s of .conduct, and completely a t t a i n a b l e by 
deducing ".....from the laws of l i f e and the c o n d i t i o n s of 
e x i s t e n c e , what kinds of a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y tend to produce 
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happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness." 
T h i s was what he had to say i n a p r i v a t e l e t t e r to 
^•SvWi'-ll.". • • I have never regarded myself as an a n t i - u t i l i t a r i a n . 
My d i s s e n t from the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y as commonly understood, 
concerns not the o b j e c t to be reached by man, but the method of 
r e a c h i n g i t . Wihile I admit t h a t happiness i s the u l t i m a t e end to be 
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contemplated, I do not admit t h a t i t should be the proximate end. 
The expediency - Philosophy having concluded t h a t happiness i s the 
t h i n g to be achieved, assumes t h a t m o r a l i t y has no other b u s i n e s s 
than e m p i r i c a l l y to g e n e r a l i z e the r e s u l t s of conduct, and to 
supply f o r the guidance of conduct nothing more than i t s e m p i r i c a l 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . 
But the view f o r which I contend i s , t h a t m o r a l i t y 
p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d - t h e s c i e n c e of r i g h t conduct - has f o r i t s 
o b j e c t s to determine how and why c e r t a i n modes of conduct a r e 
d e t r i m e n t a l , and c e r t a i n other modes b e n e f i c i a l . These good and 
bad r e s u l t s cannot be a c c i d e n t a l , but must be n e c e s s a r y 
consequences of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i n g s ; and I conceive i t to 
be the b u s i n e s s of moral s c i e n c e to deduce, from the laws of l i f e 
and the co n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e , what kinds of a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y 
tend .to1 produce happiness and what kinds to unhappiness. Having 
done t h i s , i t s deductions a r e to be recognized as laws of conduct; 
and a r e to be conformed to i r r e s p e c t i v e of a d i r e c t e s t i m a t i o n 
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of happiness or misery. Spencer could be s a i d to be a 
U t i l i t a r i a n i n the sense t h a t he accepted happiness as the u l t i m a t e 
end of human endeavour. 
A l l i n a l l , Spencer has expressed two important a s p e c t s of 
19th century thought; f i r s t l y , non-conformist r a d i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m 
and the p r i m i t i v e s c i e n c e of the i d e a of e v o l u t i o n . With a 
combination of ide a s about biology, the concept of e v o l u t i o n and 
the notion of n a t u r a l r i g h t s , he had fought to safeguard the 
l a r g e s t p o s s i b l e sphere of i n d i v i d u a l freedom w h i l s t d e - l i m i t i n g 
t h a t of the s t a t e . 
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CHAPTER 5. 
The d o c t r i n e of s o c i a l organism, the kingpost of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s permeates Spencer's P r i n c i p l e s of Sociology. 
T h i s work can be regarded as an attempt to r e v i v e the o r g a n i c 
theory of the s t a t e . What does the term s o c i e t y mean ? Spencer 
provided a d e f i n i t i o n but d i d not stop t h e r e . To him, i t was 
analogous to an organism. Thus convinced, he proceeded to compare 
and c o n t r a s t animal organism w i t h s o c i e t y . T h i s analogy was 
followed by an examination of the e v o l u t i o n of s o c i e t y , 
i n c u l c a t i n g the.degree of l i b e r t y , people enjoy a t any p a r t i c u l a r 
s t a g e . 
S o c i e t y can be def i n e d as a c o l l e c t i v e name f o r a number 
of i n d i v i d u a l s , and can be regarded as an e n t i t y formed of 
d i s c r e t e units.' 1' I f s o c i e t y i s an e n t i t y , w i t h what can i t be 
c l o s e l y compared ? "Between a s o c i e t y and anything e l s e , the only 
c o n c e i v a b l e resemblance must be one due to p a r a l l e l i s m of p r i n c i p l e 
i n the arrangement of components. There a re two g r e a t c l a s s e s of 
aggregates w i t h which the s o c i a l aggregate may be compared - the 
2 
i n o r g a n i c and the o r g a n i c . " S o c i e t y and i n o r g a n i c aggregate a re 
incompatible because the l a t t e r i s l i f e l e s s . As such, s o c i e t y can 
only be compared w i t h the o r g a n i c aggregate, and i s d e s c r i b e d as 
3 
being marked by a growth. T h i s t r a i t i s common w i t h o r g a n i c 
aggregates, but i s l a c k i n g w i t h inanimate bodies. "Many organisms 
grow throughout t h e i r l i v e s ; and the r e s t grow throughout 
c o n s i d e r a b l e ' p a r t s of t h e i r l i v e s . S o c i a l growth u s u a l l y continues 
e i t h e r up to times when the s o c i e t i e s d i v i d e , or up to times when 
4 
they a r e overwhelmed." 
I n order to j u s t i f y h i s comparison between an^animal and 
s o c i a l organism, Spencer went on to c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y the analogy 
drawn between a l i v i n g body and body p o l i t i c by other o r g a n i c 
p h i l o s o p h e r s , p o i n t i n g out where they went wrong. P l a t o a s s e r t e d 
t h a t - the s t a t e s a r e as men a r e ; they grow out of human c h a r a c t e r s 
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T h i s p l a t o n i c view about the s t a t e i s s i m i l a r to Spencer's but 
d i f f e r s i n the sense t h a t P l a t o nurtured "....the b e l i e f t h a t 
these s t a t e s , w i t h c h a r a c t e r s thus determined, can ye t determine 
„5 
the c h a r a c t e r s of t h e i r c i t i z e n s . P l a t o f u r t h e r d i f f e r e d by an 
erroneous analogy drawn between the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e . He 
compared the i n d i v i d u a l ' s reason, p a s s i o n and d e s i r e on one hand 
w i t h the s t a t e ' s c o u n s e l l o r s , a u x i l i a r i e s , and t r a d e r s on the other. 
Spencer's observed t h a t the e r r o r was the comparison drawn 
between the co-operating p a r t s of the mind and the mutually 
dependent p a r t s of the p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
Hobbes, " l i k e P l a t o . . . . regards s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n not 
as n a t u r a l but as f a c t i t i o u s ; propounding the no t i o n of a s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t as o r i g i n a t i n g governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s , and as endowing 
..6 
the s o v e r e i g n power w i t h i r r e v o c a b l e a u t h o r i t y . The analogy 
drawn between man and the s t a t e was expressed i n these words by 
Hobbes - For by a r t i s c r e a t e d t h a t g r e a t LEVIATHAN c a l l e d a 
COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, i n L a t i n CTVITAS, which i s but an 
a r t i f i c i a l man; though of g r e a t e r s t a t u r e and s t r e n g t h than the 
n a t u r a l , f o r whose p r o t e c t i o n and defence i t was intended; and i n 
which the so v e r e i g n t y i s an a r t i f i c i a l s o u l , as g i v i n g l i f e and1 
motion to the whole body; the m a g i s t r a t e s , and other o f f i c e r s of 
j u d i c a t u r e , a r t i f i c i a l j o i n t s ; reward and punishment, by which 
fa s t e n e d to the s e a t of the sov e r e i g n t y every j o i n t and member i s 
moved to perform h i s duty, a r e the nerves, t h a t do the same i n the 
7 
body n a t u r a l -. The e r r o r as Spencer saw i t , was the comparison 
between the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a human being and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of 
a s o c i e t y . 
Because of these erroneous a n a l o g i e s , Spencer i n s i s t e d 
t h a t i t was important to poi n t out t h a t no analogy e x i s t e d between 
the l i v i n g body and the body p o l i t i c b e s i d e s t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e d by 
th a t mutual dependence of p a r t s which they e x h i b i t e d i n common. A l l 
l i v i n g kinds of animals are s i m i l a r i n so f a r as each i n d i c a t e s 
co-operation among i t s components f o r the b e n e f i t of the whole. 
T h i s t r a i t common to animals, i s a l s o common to communities. The 
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degree of t h i s co-operation measures the degree of e v o l u t i o n both 
i n i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l organisms. 
8 
I t was pointed out above t h a t l i f e depended upon the 
performance of c e r t a i n a c t i o n s . I f man were deprived e n t i r e l y of 
the freedom to e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s , death would r e s u l t ; and 
9 
i f deprived p a r t i a l l y , he would s u f f e r p a i n or p a r t i a l death. 
S o c i e t y was d e f i n e d on the other hand as a c o l l e c t i v e name f o r a 
number of i n d i v i d u a l s , and shared one common t r a i t - growth -
10 
w i t h other l i v i n g bodies. As freedom i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e to l i f e , 
so i s i t w i t h growth. Moreover, i t was deduced t h a t the s i m i l a r i t y 
e x i s t i n g between the l i v i n g body and the body p o l i t i c was tha t 
n e c e s s i t a t e d by t h a t mutual dependence of p a r t s which they 
e x h i b i t e d i n common. D i v i s i o n of labour i s a phenomenon s u b s i s t i n g 
both i n the s o c i e t y and i n other l i v i n g bodies, and through i t s 
p r o c e s s e s , the s o c i e t y or the l i v i n g body can be made a l i v i n g 
whole. T h i s co-operation can not be c a r r i e d out f o r the sustenance 
of l i f e without g i v i n g freedom to the v a r i o u s p a r t s of the s o c i e t y 
of the l i v i n g body performing t h e i r s p e c i a l i s e d f u n c t i o n . The 
importance of t h i s freedom i s c l e a r l y shown i n the f o l l o w i n g 
q u o t a t i o n : 
" we see t h a t i n a mammal, a r r e s t i n g the lungs q u i c k l y 
b r i n g s the h e a r t to a stand; i f the stomach f a i l s a b s o l u t e l y i n 
i t s o f f i c e a l l other p a r t s by-and-by cease to a c t ; p a r a l y s i s 
of i t s limbs e n t a i l s on the body a t l a r g e death from want of food 
or i n a b i l i t y to escape; l o s s of even such s m a l l organs as the 
eyes, dep r i v e s the r e s t of a s e r v i c e e s s e n t i a l to t h e i r 
p r e s e r v a t i o n ; i n a s o c i e t y , we see t h a t the workers i n i r o n 
stop i f the miners do not supply m a t e r i a l s ; makers of c l o t h e s 
cannot c a r r y on t h e i r b u s i n e s s i n the absence of those who s p i n 
and weave t e x t i l e s f a b r i c s ; the manufacturing community w i l l 
cease to a c t u n l e s s the food-producing and f o o d - d i s t r i b u t i n g 
agencies are a c t i n g ; the c o n t r o l l i n g powers, governments, 
bureaux, j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s , p o l i c e , must f a i l to keep order when 
the n e c e s s a r i e s of l i f e a r e not s u p p l i e d to keep them by the p a r t s 
kept i n order; " 1 1 T h i s example shows how e s s e n t i a l freedom i s 
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both to i n d i v i d u a l s and other l i v i n g organism. Can i t not be 
concluded t h a t Spencer's i d e a of l i b e r t y i s no more than t h a t 
enjoyed by l i v i n g organism ? 
I t i s d e s i r a b l e to add t h a t Spencer i s g u i l t y of u s i n g 
the i d e a of freedom i n a very odd sense here. C a r r y i n g h i s views 
a b i t f u r t h e r , i t can be shown t h a t freedom can have the same 
r e s u l t as non-freedom. For i l l u s t r a t i o n purposes, I w i l l use 
iron-miners and iron-workers. I t can be argued t h a t i f the former 
ar e f r e e to work, s u r e l y they must a l s o be f r e e not to work -
i . e . to s t r i k e . I f they go on s t r i k e , they w i l l e v e n t u a l l y stop 
the iron-workers working f o r want of raw m a t e r i a l . C l e a r l y , the 
e f f e c t w i l l be s i m i l a r to a s i t u a t i o n i n which armed f o r c e s 
s e i z e the mines and p r e v e n t i n g miners from e n t e r i n g . I r o n workers 
w i l l s t i l l stop working because of l a c k of raw m a t e r i a l . 
S i m i l a r l y , t h i s example can be used to show the importance of 
c o n t r o l r a t h e r than l i b e r t y . As c o a l must be mined to keep 
iron-workers busy, c o a l miners must not have the freedom to s t r i k e 
but must work under c o n t r o l to ensure t h a t iron-workers have t h e i r 
raw m a t e r i a l s f o r production. 
12 
I t was a s s e r t e d above t h a t the degree of co-operation 
measured the degree of e v o l u t i o n both i n i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l 
organisms. There are t h r e e types of e v o l u t i o n s - i n o r g a n i c , o r g a n i c 
and s u p e r - o r g a n i c . As the s o c i a l organism i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
s u p e r - o r g a n i c e v o l u t i o n , I w i l l only l i m i t my c o n s i d e r a t i o n to 
i t , examining a l s o the e x t e n t of co-operation among human beings 
at t h i s s tage of e v o l u t i o n . 
Super-organic e v o l u t i o n i s s a i d to commence " only 
when t h e r e a r i s e s something more than the combined e f f o r t s of 
p a r e n t s . There can of course be no absolute s e p a r a t i o n . I f t h e r e 
has been e v o l u t i o n , t h a t form of i t here d i s t i n g u i s h e d as 
s u p e r - o r g a n i c must have a r i s e n by i n s e n s i b l e s t e p s out of the 
o r g a n i c . But we may c o n v e n i e n t l y mark i t o f f as i n c l u d i n g a l l 
those p r o c e s s e s and products which imply the co-ordinated a c t i o n s 
of many which achieve r e s u l t s exceeding i n extent and complexity 
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..13 those a c h i e v a b l e by i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . The f o l l o w i n g f e a t u r e s 
can be s a i d t o mark super-organic e v o l u t i o n . I t i s a form of 
e v o l u t i o n marked not only by g r e a t e r i n d i v i d u a l freedom but a l s o 
a tendency to complete i n d i v i d u a t i o n . I t i s a s t a t e of e q u a l i t y 
w i t h an absence of a s u p e r i o r a u t h o r i t y , and any i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i v i t y c a r r i e d out i s performed by vo l u n t a r y co-operation, w i t h 
every man performing a s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n . The r e l a t i o n e x i s t i n g 
among men before t h i s stage i s a d j u s t e d to s u i t the g r e a t e r tendency 
towards complete i n d i v i d u a t i o n and a c t i v i t i e s . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
demonstrate;;? the degree of co-operation among i n d i v i d u a l s i n an 
i d e a l s o c i a l s t a t e . 
" I t s c a r c e l y needs to p a r t i c u l a r i z e t h e s e t r u t h s , as shown 
us by bees and wasps. A l l know t h a t these form communities -
communities such t h a t the u n i t s and the aggregates stand i n very 
d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s . Between the i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the 
hive-bee and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the hi v e as an o r d e r l y aggregate 
of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a regularly-formed h a b i t a t i o n , t h e r e e x i s t s 
a f i x e d connexion. J u s t as the germ of a wasp ev o l v e s i n t o a 
complete i n d i v i d u a l , so does the a d u l t queen-wasp, the germ of a 
wasp-society, evolve i n t o a multitude of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h 
..14 
d e f i n i t e l y - a d j u s t e d arrangements and a c t i v i t i e s . 
What a re the s i m i l a r i t i e s between a l i v i n g and s o c i a l 
organism ? Mutual dependence of. p a r t s i s an e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
common to both organisms. Another common f e a t u r e i s shown by the 
r e l a t i o n between the l i f e of the u n i t s and the l i f e of the 
aggregate. A b i g ca t a s t r o p h e may destroy the l i f e of the aggregate 
without immediately d e s t r o y i n g the l i f e of a l l the u n i t s . But i f 
nothing occurs to des t r o y the l i f e of the aggregate, i t tends to 
o u t - l i v e the i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s . Both organisms show c e r t a i n 
fundamental t r a i t s of e v o l u t i o n . They s t a r t t h e i r l i v e s as germs 
and by pro c e s s e s of i n t e g r a t i o n , a t t a i n a s i z e bigger than the 
o r i g i n a l one. There i s an i n c r e a s i n g tendency towards coherence. 
The growth i n aggregates of d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s a r e extremely 
v a r i o u s . I n c r e a s e i n mass i s followed by i n c r e a s e of s t r u c t u r e i n 
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both organisms. Along w i t h i n t e g r a t i o n , both organisms show 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s followed by h e t e r o g e n e i t y . 
15 
Contrary to h i s views i n S o c i a l S t a t i c s , Spencer 
now r e a l i s e s t h a t the f i r s t s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a r u l i n g agency. I n the S o c i a l S t a t i c s , he 
r e j e c t e d or s l i g h t e d the importance of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but i n 
the P r i n c i p l e s of Sociology he accepted t h a t such i n s t i t u t i o n s 
had r e l a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s may be simple or compound. I n the 
e a r l y s t a g e s of the s o c i a l mass, when t h e r e i s l i t t l e or ho 
a s s o c i a t i o n among i t s component p a r t s , t h e r e i s nothing l i k e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . As the s o c i a l mass advances, some form of o r g a n i z a t i o n 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d , and marked by a head. When the r u l i n g agency has 
been formed, the tendency i s to s e p a r a t e the r e g u l a t i v e from the 
o p e r a t i v e p a r t s . As h e t e r o g e n e i t y d i s p l a c e s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , not 
only developing p a r t s of c o - o r d i n a t i n g agencies show u n l i k e n e s s , 
but the agencies co-ordinated do the same. They have producing, 
d i s t r i b u t i n g and r e s t r a i n i n g a g e n c i e s . 
I n what way does a l i v i n g organism c o n t r a s t w i t h a s o c i a l 
organism ? The l i v i n g organism d i f f e r s from the s o c i a l i n t h i s 
manner - "The p a r t s of an animal form a concrete whole; but the 
p a r t s of a s o c i e t y form a whole t h a t i s d i s c r e t e . While.the l i v i n g 
u n i t s composing the one a r e bound together in: c l o s e c o n t a c t , the 
l i v i n g u n i t s composing the other are f r e e , not i n c o n t a c t , and more 
..16 
or l e s s w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d . Another d i f f e r e n c e s p r i n g s from the 
f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a mode of s o c i a l growth to which o r g a n i c 
growth a f f o r d s no p a r a l l e l - t h a t caused by the m i g r a t i o n of u n i t s 
17 
from one s o c i e t y to another." T h i s i s the r e s u l t of the 
concreteness of an i n d i v i d u a l organism and the d i s c r e t e n e s s of a 
s o c i a l organism. U n i t s forming the b o d y - p o l i t i c are not f i x e d i n 
t h e i r h a b i t a t s , they move about q u i t e u n l i k e those forming the 
i n d i v i d u a l organism. "But as members of the body p o l i t i c , though 
having s t a t i o n a r y h a b i t a t i o n s and working p l a c e s , are themselves 
locomotive, i t r e s u l t s t h a t the process of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s a f f e c t e d 
18 
p a r t l y i n t h i s way and p a r t l y by t h e i r own agency." 
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There i s a l s o a d i f f e r e n c e between the way i n which motion i s given 
to the c i r c u l a t i n g c u r r e n t s i n the two organisms. The body p o l i t i c 
l a c k s p h y s i c a l cohesion, and the r e q u i r e d metamorphosis of u n i t s , 
consequently, "....cannot have i t s c u r r e n t s of commodities thus 
moved; though remotely produced by other f o r c e s , t h e i r motion has 
to be proximately produced by f o r c e s w i t h the c u r r e n t s 
..19 
themselves. 
Where p a r t s of an organism a r e l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , every 
p a r t can w i t h comparative ease, f r e e l y perform any other p a r t ' s 
f u n c t i o n , but where they c o n t r a s t w i t h each other to a g r e a t e x t e n t , 
such freedom i s l i m i t e d . I f an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s so c o n s t r u c t e d t h a t 
i t s p a r t s can c a r r y on mutually-dependent a c t i o n s , then, as the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s m a l l i n s i z e , the p a r t s must be comparatively 
independent of one another and hence g r e a t e r freedom. On the other 
hand, i f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s g r e a t , every p a r t becomes dependent 
on the r e s t l e a d i n g to a l i m i t a t i o n of freedom. 
S o c i e t i e s can be grouped i n t o two - primary and secondary. 
I n the primary group, s o c i e t i e s a re arranged according to t h e i r 
degrees of composition - simple, compound, doubly compound, t r e b l y 
compound. I n secondary grouping, s o c i e t i e s a re mainly m i l i t a n t and 
i n d u s t r i a l . M i l i t a n c y c h a r a c t e r i s e s defence w h i l e i n d u s t r i a l 
f e a t u r e s production f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the s o c i e t y . 
I n m i l i t a n t s o c i e t i e s , the freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s i s 
very l i m i t e d . T h i s form of s o c i e t y can be best d e s c r i b e d as "... 
one i n which the army i s the n a t i o n m o b i l i z e d , w h i l e the n a t i o n i s 
the q u i e s c e n t army and which, t h e r e f o r e , a c q u i r e s a s t r u c t u r e 
20 
common to army and n a t i o n . " E v e r y aspect of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s 
c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . A c t i v i t i e s a r e c a r r i e d on according to 
p r e s c r i b e d laws. B e s i d e s a c t i v i t i e s , l i f e i s s u b j e c t e d to kindred 
d i s c i p l i n e . The theory of government concerning the r e l a t i o n 
between the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e , takes t h i s form. - " T h i s 
s t r u c t u r e which adapts a s o c i e t y f o r combined a c t i o n a g a i n s t .other 
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s o c i e t i e s , i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the b e l i e f t h a t i t s members e x i s t 
f o r the b e n e f i t of the whole and not the whole f o r the b e n e f i t of 
i t s members. As i n an army the l i b e r t y of the s o l d i e r i s denied 
and only h i s duty as a member of the mass i n s i s t e d on; ....the laws 
recognised no p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s , but p a t r i o t i c ones only; so i n 
the m i l i t a n t type throughout, the c l a i m s of the u n i t are nothing 
and the c l a i m s of the aggregate e v e r y t h i n g . Absolute s u b j e c t i o n to 
21 
a u t h o r i t y i s the supreme v i r t u e and r e s i s t a n c e to i t a crime." 
The i n d i v i d u a l i s a mere puppet of the s t a t e . He has no freedom 
except t h a t allowed him by the s t a t e . These a p a r t , he i s f o r c e d 
i n t o a c t i v i t y . His freedom of c h o i c e i s very much l i m i t e d . The 
co-operation by which l i f e of the m i l i t a n t s o c i e t y i s maintained, 
22 
i s compulsory co-operation. Every i n d i v i d u a l ' s w i l l i n e i t h e r 
p r i v a t e or p u b l i c t r a n s a c t i o n i s o v e r r u l e d by t h a t of the s t a t e . 
Spencer's Utopian i d e a l of p e r f e c t i b i l i t y i s observed i n 
i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . They present a d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e "from the 
p r i m i t i v e predatory c o n d i t i o n s under which the master maintains 
s l a v e s to work f o r him, t h e r e i s a ' t r a n s i t i o n through stages of 
i n c r e a s i n g freedom to a c o n d i t i o n l i k e our own, i n which a l l who 
work and employ, buy and s e l l a r e e n t i r e l y independent; and i n 
which t h e r e i s an unchecked power of forming a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t r u l e 
23 
themselves on democratic p r i n c i p l e s . " Quite u n l i k e i n the m i l i t a n t 
s o c i e t y , where coherence l i m i t e d freedom, here, coherence and 
freedom develop s i d e by s i d e . Many o b j e c t s a r e achieved by f r e e 
a c t i o n s of an i n d i v i d u a l or a combination of i n d i v i d u a l s governed 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l y . I t becomes a tendency to t h i s type of o r g a n i z a t i o n 
t h a t f o r every proposed end, the proposed means i s an 
agglomeration of people r u l e d by an e l e c t e d committee headed by an 
e l e c t e d chairman. 
Every stage i n the process of e v o l u t i o n i s followed by 
g r e a t e r i n d i v i d u a l freedom. The theory of proper r e l a t i o n between 
the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e takes a d i f f e r e n t form i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . The w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l i s supreme and the 
s t a t e e x i s t s merely to c a r r y out h i s w i l l . "Thus subordinated i n 
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a u t h o r i t y , the r e g u l a t i n g power i s a l s o r e s t r i c t e d i n range. 
I n s t e a d of having an a u t h o r i t y extending over a c t i o n s of a l l k i n d s , 
24 
i t i s shut out from l a r g e c l a s s e s of a c t i o n s . " S i m i l a r to Locke, 
Spencer pointed out t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s had the r i g h t to r e s i s t 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e government, and a l s o to r e s i s t a r e s p o n s i b l e one 
when i t exceeds i t s l i m i t s . "There a r i s e s a tendency i n m i n o r i t i e s 
to disobey even the l e g i s l a t u r e deputed by the m a j o r i t y , when i t • 
i n t e r f e r e s i n c e r t a i n ways; and t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n s to laws they 
condemn as i n e q u i t a b l e , from time to time cause a b o l i t i o n of 
..25 
them. A c t i v i t i e s - s o c i a l , economic or otherwise - a r e c a r r i e d 
26 
on under v o l u n t a r y co-operation. The p o s i t i o n of women compared 
w i t h what i t was i n a m i l i t a n t s o c i e t y . They enjoy g r e a t e r freedom 
and r e c e i v e b e t t e r treatment from men. 
I t i s r e a l l y d i f f i c u l t to accept Spencer's view t h a t 
i n c r e a s e d v o l u n t a r y co-operation, and every stage i n the process of 
e v o l u t i o n i s followed by g r e a t e r i n d i v i d u a l freedom. I n c r e a s e d 
v o l u n t a r y co-operation w i l l , i n f a c t , i n v i t e more s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
e i t h e r between master and man, or between master and master, and 
hence a g r e a t e x t e n s i o n of s t a t e powers. Government w i l l have to 
keep pace w i t h i n d u s t r i a l growth, and w i l l have to s o l v e many 
problems a r i s i n g by v a r i o u s l e g i s l a t i v e a c t s . Every stage i n the 
p r o c e s s of e v o l u t i o n makes one more of a s o c i a l being than what he 
was. He comes more i n c o n t a c t w i t h people and as e v o l u t i o n a r y 
p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e a g r e a t e r co-operation among v a r i o u s u n i t s 
comprising the s o c i e t y , such c o n t a c t a l s o i m p l i e s a g r e a t e r 
s u r r e n d e r of i n d i v i d u a l freedom f o r the b e n e f i t of a l l . 
Why should i n c r e a s e d v o l u n t a r y co-operation i n v i t e more 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e ? Robinson Crusoe f o r example had no need f o r a 
s t a t e because he was alone and h i s a c t i o n or behaviour d i d not 
i n t e r a c t w i t h anyone e l s e ' s . N e i t h e r was h i s economic world 
governed on the p r i n c i p l e of v o l u n t a r y - c o - o p e r a t i o n . I n such a 
s o c i e t y , t h e r e was no need f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . But a government 
becomes e s s e n t i a l i n a s o c i e t y bigger than t h a t i n which Robinson 
Crusoe l i v e d i n because such s o c i e t y c o n t a i n s many i n d i v i d u a l s . 
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I t s i n t e r f e r e n c e (the government's) i s n e c e s s a r y i n order to 
ensure t h a t no i n d i v i d u a l encroaches on the r i g h t s of h i s 
neighbour. I n the economic f i e l d , we are t o l d t h a t the demand f o r 
27 
goods, i s g r e a t e r than the supply. Consequently, t h e r e i s a 
tendency f o r people to compete f o r the s c a r c e goods. Though 
according to the p r i n c i p l e of voluntary co-operation, the r e l a t i o n 
28 
between man and men i s e s t a b l i s h e d by c o n t r a c t , the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of some people evading the terms of the c o n t r a c t i n order to g a i n 
a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n i n which to compete f o r the s c a r c e goods cannot 
be r u l e d out. A c c o r d i n g l y , s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s n e c e s s a r y to 
ensure t h a t every person keeps the terms of h i s c o n t r a c t . I n 
a d d i t i o n , when the c u r r e n t economic a f f a i r s of most c o u n t r i e s 
e x p e r i e n c i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s m i s considered, one does not observe 
29 
l e s s government i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
I n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , freedom-economic, pe r s o n a l -
i n c r e a s e s during peace, and d i m i n i s h e s during war. An example i s 
provided by the s i t u a t i o n i n B r i t a i n . during the p r e v i o u s 
p e a c e f u l period, when i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y was extended by a b o l i s h i n g 
r e l i g i o u s d i s a b i l i t i e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g f r e e t r a d e , removing 
impediments from the p r e s s e t c . , s i n c e the r e v e r s i o n began the 
p a r t y which a f f e c t e d these changes has v i e d w i t h the opposite p a r t y 
i n m u l t i p l y i n g s t a t e - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which d i m i n i s h i n d i v i d u a l 
l i b e r t y . How f a r the p r i n c i p l e s of f r e e government have been 
di s r e g a r d e d , and how d i r e c t l y t h i s change i s sequent upon the 
f e e l i n g which m i l i t a n t a c t i o n f o s t e r s , i s c o n c l u s i v e l y shown by the 
30 
Suez Canal b u s i n e s s . " 
D e spite h i s r e v i v a l of the o r g a n i c concept of the s t a t e 
d uring t h i s p e r i o d , Spencer c o n t r i b u t e d a l o t to the h i s t o r y of 
p o l i t i c a l thought i n an attempt to develop the e v o l u t i o n a r y process 
of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . While some n a t u r a l r i g h t p h i l o s o p h e r s h e l d 
to the view, or p o s t u l a t e d the development of c i v i l s o c i e t y from 
the s t a t e of nature, he was convinced t h a t s o c i e t y was a t the 
o u t s e t m i l i t a n t and l a t e r changed to i n d u s t r i a l . 
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I n 1882, Spencer v i s i t e d America. Immediately a f t e r h i s 
r e t u r n to England, he s t a r t e d upon a crusade a g a i n s t the p o l i t i c a l 
movement which was then tending towards an i n c r e a s e i n S t a t e 
f u n c t i o n and a c t i v i t i e s as opposed to the i n d i v i d u a l , . I n 1884, he 
wrote four a r t i c l e s on the s u b j e c t which were p u b l i s h e d i n the 
"Contemporary Review". L a t e r , they were bound together and i s s u e d 
under the t i t l e of The Man versus The S t a t e . The book can be b e t t e r 
d e s c r i b e d as an impress of n a t u r a l r i g h t s . I n emphasizing the 
d o c t r i n e of n a t u r a l r i g h t s , he mentioned the s c i e n c e of l i f e not 
only i n support of the d o c t r i n e , but a l s o as i t s source* 
Spencer s t a r t e d the book w i t h a trenchant a t t a c k on the 
L i b e r a l s , and i n f a c t on the grounds of t h e i r c o e r c i v e l e g i s l a t i v e 
a c t s , he d e s c r i b e d them as " T o r i e s of a new type". I n order to 
j u s t i f y t h i s view, he had to show the d i f f e r e n c e between the 
i n t r i n s i c natures of Toryism and L i b e r a l i s m . On t h i s s c o r e , he took 
up the i d e a s about compulsory and vol u n t a r y co-operation l e f t i n 
the P r i n c i p l e s of Sociology. Toryism was i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the regime 
of s t a t u s which marked compulsory co-operation and L i b e r a l i s m was 
considered as the regime of c o n t r a c t which c h a r a c t e r i z e d v o l u n t a r y 
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c o - operation. How d i d t h e i r v a r i o u s t r a i t s r e l a t e to t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s ? 
On one hand, the T o r i e s upheld the monarchy as of D i v i n e 
o r i g i n . On the other, the Whigs not only began by r e s i s t i n g the 
monarchy ( C h a r l e s I I ) and h i s c a b a l , i n the l a t t e r ' s attempts to 
r e - e s t a b l i s h unchecked monarchial power, but a l s o regarded the 
monarchy, as a c i v i l i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l t by the n a t i o n f o r the 
b e n e f i t of a l l i t s c i t i z e n s . These c o n t r a s t i n g views about the 
monarchy i n v o l v e d the two b e l i e f s , f i r s t l y t h a t the s u b j e c t i o n of 
the c i t i z e n to r u l e r was u n c o n d i t i o n a l , and secondly t h a t i t 
was c o n d i t i o n a l . I n s h o r t , w h i l e Toryism d i r e c t e d i t s e f f o r t s to 
i n c r e a s i n g the power of the r u l e r , L i b e r a l i s m was determined to 
reduce i t . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e i r aims, was shown by t h e i r e a r l y 
a c t i v i t i e s . For example, the Whigs passed, among many other a c t s , 
aimed a t i n c r e a s i n g i n d i v i d u a l freedom, the Habeas Corpus Act which 
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ensured a f a i r t r i a l of the c i t i z e n before he was punished by the 
S t a t e . T h e i r e f f o r t s were, i n f a c t , concentrated on weakening the 
p r i n c i p l e of Compulsory Co-operation throughout s o c i a l l i f e and on 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g the p r i n c i p l e of Voluntary Co-operation. 
Having done these i n the p a s t , the L i b e r a l s of the present 
(about 1884) have changed, and have to an i n c r e a s i n g e x t ent adopted 
the p o l i c y of d i c t a t i n g the a c t i o n s of c i t i z e n s , and as a r e s u l t , 
d i m i n i s h i n g the sphere of t h e i r f r e e a c t i o n . How i s . t h i s change i n 
a t t i t u d e to be e x p l a i n e d ? L i b e r a l p o l i c y had been a b o l i s h i n g those 
g r i e v a n c e s which people s u f f e r e d most, because they were regarded 
"....as hindrances to happiness. And s i n c e , i n the minds of most, a 
r e c t i f i e d e v i l i s e q u i v a l e n t to an achieved good, these measures 
came to be thought of as so many p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t s ; and the w e l f a r e 
of the many came to be conceived a l i k e by L i b e r a l statesmen and 
L i b e r a l v o t e r s as the aim of L i b e r a l i s m . Hence the confusion. The 
g a i n i n g of a popular good, being the e x t e r n a l conspicuous t r a i t 
common to L i b e r a l measures i n e a r l i e r days ^then i n each case gained 
by a r e l a x a t i o n of r e s t r a i n t s / , i t has happened t h a t popular good 
has come to be sought by L i b e r a l s , not as an end to be i n d i r e c t l y 
gained by r e l a x a t i o n s of r e s t r a i n t s , but as the end to be d i r e c t l y 
gained. And s e e k i n g to g a i n i t d i r e c t l y , they have used methods 
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i n t r i n s i c a l l y opposed to those o r i g i n a l l y used." A g e n e r a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s p e r i o d shows 
t h a t "every one of these i n v o l v e s f u r t h e r c o e r c i o n - r e s t r i c t s s t i l l 
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more the freedom of the c i t i z e n . " 
As the regime of S t a t u s was marked by c o e r c i v e r u l e w i t h 
the e f f e c t of d i m i n i s h i n g i n d i v i d u a l freedom, and the regime of 
C o n t r a c t i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by spontaneous f r e e a c t i o n of every 
c i t i z e n , the analogy which Spencer was drawing between Toryism and 
the regime of S t a t u s on one hand, and L i b e r a l i s m and Contract on 
the other, was to show t h a t so long as L i b e r a l i s m a p p l i e d c o e r c i v e 
measures i n i t s government, i t had f a i l e d i n i t s m i s s i o n and had as 
such, changed i t s t r u e L i b e r a l i s m f o r Toryism. 
I s a p a r t i c u l a r form of government a s e c u r i t y f o r 
i n d i v i d u a l freedom ? I t i s not because "....the l i b e r t y which a 
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c i t i z e n enjoys i s t o be measured, not by the nature of the 
governmental machinery he l i v e s under, whether r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or 
other, but by the r e l a t i v e p a u c i t y of the r e s t r a i n t s i t imposes 
on him; and t h a t , whether t h i s machinery i s , or i s not, one t h a t 
he has shared i n making, i t s a c t i o n s are not of the k i n d proper to 
L i b e r a l i s m i f they i n c r e a s e such r e s t r a i n t s beyond those which are 
n e e d f u l f o r p r e v e n t i n g him from d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y a g g r e s s i n g 
on h i s f e l l o w s - n e e d f u l , t h a t i s , f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the l i b e r t i e s of 
h i s f e l l o w s a g a i n s t h i s i n v a s i o n s of them: r e s t r a i n t s which a r e , 
t h e r e f o r e , to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d as n e g a t i v e l y c o e r c i v e , not p o s i t i v e l y 
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c o e r c i v e . Quite u n l i k e Bentham, James M i l l , and to an extent 
John S t u a r t M i l l , Spencer was not convinced t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
government was a s u f f i c i e n t guarantee f o r i n d i v i d u a l freedom, even 
i f i t allowed a person the l i b e r t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the -. 
development of laws by which he was governed. What about the 
w e l f a r e s t a t e ? - does i t encourage spontaneous a c t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l s or expose people to r e g u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e of government ? 
Spencer h e l d the view t h a t w e l f a r e s t a t e animated 
i n t e r f e r e n c e by government. Apart from t h i s , i t i s not a remedy f o r 
S o c i a l e v i l s . I n Malthusian terms, Spencer a s s e r t e d t h a t people were 
aware t h a t misery or p a i n was a g e n e r a l r e s u l t of misconduct; they 
go together and should not be s e p a r a t e d . Y e t , some argued t h a t 
s o c i a l e v i l was removable, and i t was the duty of some one to remove 
i t . They f o r g e t t h a t "to s e p a r a t e p a i n from i l l - d o i n g i s to f i g h t 
a g a i n s t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i n g s , and w i l l be followed by f a r more 
p a i n . " Saving men from the n a t u r a l p e n a l t i e s of d i s s o l u t e l i v i n g , 
e v e n t u a l l y n e c e s s i t a t e s the i n f l i c t i o n of a r t i f i c i a l p e n a l t i e s i n 
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s o l i t a r y c e l l s , on tread-wheels and by the l a s h . " A c c o r d i n g l y , , 
the s t a t e was looked upon as the c o r r e c t agent to remove the e v i l . ' 
The consequences of which was t h a t poor laws passed to a l l e v i a t e the 
s u f f e r i n g s of the poor,- i n s t e a d of f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r m i s s i o n , 
produced an a p p a l l i n g amount of d e m o r a l i z a t i o n . Besides t h i s , the 
state, was a l s o considered as the s a v i o u r of the poor. 
The tendency i s t h a t a l e g i s l a t o r w i l l always look out 
f o r means of improving the c o n d i t i o n of the people. I n s e a r c h i n g 
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f o r t h i s means, he gathers " p o l i t i c a l momentum". When l e g i s l a t i o n 
i s s e t working, " . . . . i n s t e a d of d i m i n i s h i n g or remaining constant, 
i t i n c r e a s e s . The theory on which he d a i l y proceeds i s t h a t the 
change caused by h i s measure w i l l stop where he intends i t to 
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stop. The gen e r a l tendency r e s u l t s i n r e g u l a r l e g i s l a t i v e 
enactments. L e g i s l a t o r s pass a c t s f o r c e r t a i n purposes without 
due c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r e f f e c t s on freedom. For example, 
" L e g i s l a t o r s who i n 1833 voted £20,000 a year to a i d i n b u i l d i n g 
school-houses, never supposed t h a t the s t e p they then took would 
l e a d to f o r c e d c o n s t r i b u t i o n s , l o c a l and g e n e r a l , now amounting to 
£6,000,000. They d i d not in t e n d to e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e t h a t A 
should be made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r educating B's o f f s p r i n g ; they d i d 
not dream of a compulsion which would depri v e poor widows of the 
help of t h e i r e l d e r c h i l d r e n ; and s t i l l l e s s d i d they dream t h a t 
t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s , by r e q u i r i n g impoverished parents to apply to 
Boards of Guardians t o pay the fees which School Boards would not 
remit , would i n i t i a t e a h a b i t of applying t o Boards of Guardians 
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and so cause p a u p e r i z a t i o n . " The S t a t e having done one t h i n g , w i l l 
always ask i t s e l f , why can i t not do the other ? For example, the 
s t a t e having enacted a law f o r " . . . . i n s p e c t i n g lodging houses to 
l i m i t the number of occupants and enforce s a n i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s , i t 
goes on to i n s p e c t i n g a l l houses below a c e r t a i n r e n t i n which 
t h e r e a r e members of more than one f a m i l y , and are now p a s s i n g to a 
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kindred i n s p e c t i o n of a l l s m a l l houses." By so doing, the s t a t e 
tends to pass more l e g i s l a t i o n h o s t i l e to l i b e r t y . 
Not only precedent n e c e s s i t a t e s the spread of l e g i s l a t i v e 
a c t i o n , but a l s o the urge to f i g h t or supplement i n e f f e c t i v e a c t s 
of parliament and to deal w i t h e v i l s a r i s i n g from them. F o r q u i t e 
long i n the p a s t , laws have been passed to check intemperance, much 
improvement has not been n o t i c e d , now those i n e f f e c t i v e laws a r e 
being supplemented by r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s a l e of a l c h o h o l i c 
l i q u o r s , and to deal w i t h the e v i l s of drunkeness, laws a r e passed 
to prevent the s a l e a l t o g e t h e r l o c a l l y . The e x t e n s i o n of such 
p o l i c y by the s t a t e g i v e s the impr e s s i o n t h a t i t should s t e p i n 
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wherever anything i s f a u l t y i n the s o c i e t y . "Every e x t e n s i o n of the 
r e g u l a t i v e p o l i c y i n v o l v e s an a d d i t i o n to the r e g u l a t i v e agents -
a f u r t h e r growth of o f f i c i a l i s m and an i n c r e a s i n g power of the 
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o r g a n i s a t i o n formed of o f f i c i a l s . " 
As t h e i r number i n c r e a s e s , i t becomes harder f o r the 
c i t i z e n s to r e s i s t them. The power of r e s i s t a n c e of the r e g u l a t e d 
p a r t decreases i n a geo m e t r i c a l r a t i o as the r e g u l a t i n g p a r t 
i n c r e a s e s . What i s meant by the power of the r e g u l a t e d p a r t 
d e c r e a s i n g i n geometrical r a t i o ? I t i m p l i e s t h a t the weight of 
s m a l l body of o f f i c i a l s i s g r e a t e r than t h a t of an i n d i v i d u a l . I t 
i s c l e a r t h a t "a comparatively s m a l l body of o f f i c i a l s , coherent, 
having common i n t e r e s t , and a c t i n g under c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , has an 
immense advantage over an incoherent p u b l i c which has no s e t t l e d 
p o l i c y , and can be brought to a c t u n i t e d l y only under s t r o n g 
40 
pr o v o c a t i o n . " The sentences of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n passed on the 
Tolpuddle Martyrs i n 1834 f o r t a k i n g a p u b l i c oath of l o y a l t y to 
t h e i r t r a d e union provides a good example of t h i s view. The 
s t r e n g t h of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s was strong e r than those of the martyrs 
and t h a t was why r e s i s t a n c e was i m p o s s i b l e . 
B e s i d e s the decrease i n geometrical r a t i o of the power of 
r e s i s t a n c e of the r e g u l a t e d power, the p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s of many 
i n the r e g u l a t e d p a r t i t s e l f , makes the change of r a t i o s t i l l more 
r a p i d . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of comp e t i t i v e examination f o r the C i v i l 
S e r v i c e i s a good i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s view. When i t became a r u l e 
f o r people to take an examination before employment, parents wanted 
t h e i r sons educated i n such a way as to pass the examination. I t s 
good pros p e c t s made people who had obj e c t e d , accept i t w i t h some 
t o l e r a n c e because i t o f f e r e d the b e s t jobs f o r t h e i r dependents. 
"Any one who remembers the numbers of u p p e r - c l a s s and m i d d l e - c l a s s 
f a m i l i e s anxious to p l a c e t h e i r c h i l d r e n , w i l l see t h a t no s m a l l 
encouragement to the spread of l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l i s now coming 
from those who, but f o r the pe r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s thus a r i s i n g , would 
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be h o s t i l e to i t . " Those on the lower grades of the s o c i a l 
l a d d e r tend to support such s t a t e schemes because of the a s s i s t a n c e 
the s t a t e agency w i l l g i v e them. Any p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e promised or 
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given by the s t a t e , n o u rishes the hope t h a t i t w i l l g i v e more and 
hence the support those people on the lower s o c i a l s c a l e g i v e to 
such schemes. I n f l u e n c e s of these nature tend to i n c r e a s e corporate 
a c t i o n and to decrease i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . 
T h i s i n c r e a s e of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s tends towards e n s l a v i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l s . The s t a t e i s con t i n u o u s l y narrowing the f i e l d of 
i n d i v i d u a l f r e e a c t i o n by constant l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s . Measures 
used i n c l u d e , f o r example, housing l e g i s l a t i o n supported by the 
i n d u s t r i a l d w e l l i n g s a c t ; land n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and state-ownership 
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of the r a i l w a y s . From these, Spencer observed t h a t " e v i d e n t l y 
then, the changes made, the changes i n progress, and the changes 
urged w i l l c a r r y us not only towards state-ownership of land, and 
d w e l l i n g s and means of communication, a l l to be adm i n i s t e r e d and 
worked by s t a t e agents; but towards s t a t e u s u r p a t i o n of a l l 
i n d u s t r i e s : the p r i v a t e forms of which disadvantaged more and more 
i n competition w i t h the s t a t e , which can arrange e v e r y t h i n g f o r i t s 
own convenience, w i l l more and more d i e away; j u s t as many 
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v o l u n t a r y s c h o o l s , i n presence of Board s c h o o l s . The u l t i m a t e 
p i c t u r e , i f unchecked, w i l l p o r t r a y a s t a t e of a f f a i r s where every 
a c t i v i t y i n the s o c i e t y i s c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . T h i s c o n d i t i o n i s 
a k i n to s t a t e s o c i a l i s m . S o c i a l i s m i s not d e s i r a b l e because i t 
i n v o l v e s s l a v e r y , and as such l i m i t s the freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s . 
Spencer foresaw the e v i l s of c e n t r a l i z e d s o c i a l democracy 
and the g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l thought during t h a t p e r i o d was 
a g a i n s t s o c i a l i s m . Adam Smith a s s e r t e d t h a t c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y was 
incompetent to decide on a proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s . He 
d e s c r i b e d the mistake which C o l b e r t - the famous m i n i s t e r of L o u i s XIV 
- made i n h i s ( C o l b e r t ' s ) attempt to d i r e c t the i n d u s t r y of France 
i n support of h i s declamatory views a g a i n s t s o c i a l i s m . I n h i s words, 
" t h a t m i n i s t e r had u n f o r t u n a t e l y embraced a l l the p r e j u d i c e s of the 
m e r c a n t i l e system, i n i t s nature and essence a system of r e s t r a i n t 
and r e g u l a t i o n , and such as could s c a r c e f a i l to be agreeable to a 
la b o u r i o u s and plodding man of b u s i n e s s , who had been accustomed to 
r e g u l a t e the d i f f e r e n t departments of p u b l i c o f f i c e s , and to 
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e s t a b l i s h the n e c e s s a r y checks and c o n t r o l s f o r c o n f i n i n g each to 
i t s proper sphere. The i n d u s t r y and commerce of a great country he 
endeavoured to r e g u l a t e upon the same model as the departments of a 
p u b l i c o f f i c e ; and i n s t e a d of a l l o w i n g every man to pursue h i s own 
i n t e r e s t h i s own way, upon the l i b e r a l p l a n of e q u a l i t y , l i b e r t y 
and j u s t i c e , he bestowed upon c e r t a i n branches of i n d u s t r y , 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r i v i l e g e s , w h i l e he l a i d o t h e r s under an 
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e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e s t r a i n t s . " Such a m i n i s t e r , Adam Smith pointed out 
as assuming, "....an a u t h o r i t y which could s a f e l y be t r u s t e d not 
only to no s i n g l e person, but to no c o u n c i l or s e n a t e whatever, and 
which would no where be so dangerous as i n the hands of a man who 
had f o l l y and presumption enough to fancy h i m s e l f f i t to e x e r c i s e 
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i t . " I n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo and Nassau 
S e n i o r a l l opposed t h i s system of c e n t r a l i s e d s o c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
Summing up, Spencer i n s i s t e d t h a t the m i s e r i e s people 
s u f f e r e d under the present s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n could not be remedied 
by a r t i f i c i a l a i d s . Exposing i n d i v i d u a l s to the a s s i s t a n c e of the 
w e l f a r e s t a t e e n t a i l e d s u b s t i t u t i n g one k i n d of e v i l f o r another. 
People tended to surrender t h e i r l i b e r t y i n p r o p o r t i o n to the k i n d 
of m a t e r i a l w e l f a r e they r e c e i v e d from the s t a t e . Any form of 
co-operation planned to provide w e l f a r e would e n t a i l some 
r e g u l a t i o n and f u r t h e r i n v o l v e submission to the r e g u l a t i n g body. 
For the r e g u l a t i o n to be e f f i c i e n t , i t should be s t r i c t , and such 
a device might explode i n t o a c o n d i t i o n where the r e l a t i o n between 
the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e was s i m i l a r to one between s l a v e and 
master. 
Does a democratic set-up not e x i s t , where the r u l i n g body 
i s e l e c t e d by i n d i v i d u a l s ? I f i t does, i s i t not a guarantee 
a g a i n s t s l a v e r y ? Being thus e l e c t e d , one may argue t h a t the 
c o n t r o l of the r u l i n g body w i l l not exceed what i s needful f o r the 
i n d i v i d u a l s . N e vertheless t h i s s l a v e - l i k e c o n t r o l w i l l s t i l l 
e x i s t . F i r s t l y , as every i n d i v i d u a l has a share i n e l e c t i n g the 
r e g u l a t i n g body, i t shows th a t every i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be a s l a v e to 
the s o c i e t y as a whole. Such a r e l a t i o n e x i s t e d i n m i l i t a n t 
s o c i e t i e s , and under "quasi-popular forms of government." " I n 
a n c i e n t Greece the accepted p r i n c i p l e was t h a t the c i t i z e n 
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belonged n e i t h e r to h i m s e l f nor to h i s f a m i l y , but belonged to h i s 
c i t y - the c i t y being w i t h the Greek e q u i v a l e n t to the community. 
And t h i s d o c t r i n e , proper to a s t a t e of constant w a r f a r e , i s a 
d o c t r i n e which s o c i a l i s m unawares r e - i n t r o d u c e s i n t o a s t a t e 
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intended to be p u r e l y i n d u s t r i a l . The s e r v i c e s of every 
i n d i v i d u a l belonged to a l l , and the labourer was rewarded not 
according to h i s labour but according as the s t a t e thought f i t . 
T h i s d e v i c e was not a guarantee but tantamount to s l a v e r y . 
Moreover, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n designed w i l l not work the 
way i t i s planned, s i n c e i t i s to be based on the nature of 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n the s o c i e t y . The d e f e c t s of human beings w i l l not 
f a i l to show themselves. "The love of power, the s e l f i s h n e s s , the 
i n j u s t i c e , the u n t r u t h f u l n e s s which o f t e n i n comparatively s h o r t 
time, b r i n g p r i v a t e o r g a n i s a t i o n s to d i s a s t e r , w i l l i n e v i t a b l y , 
where t h e i r e f f e c t s accumulate from generation to generation, work 
e v i l s f a r g r e a t e r and l e s s remediable; s i n c e , v a s t and complex and 
possessed of a l l the r e s o u r c e s , the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
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once developed and c o n s o l i d a t e d , must become i r r e s t i b l e . 
A g a i n s t these i d e a s , which c l a i m t h a t s o c i a l i s m l i m i t e d 
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i n d i v i d u a l freedom, Hyndman argued t h a t i t d i d not e n s l a v e the 
i n d i v i d u a l as Spencer a s s e r t e d but y i e l d e d " f u l l and never ending 
freedom". Taking i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s 
coupled w i t h s o c i a l e f f e c t s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , he did not 
agree f i r s t l y w i t h Spencer's i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i d e a s about l e a v i n g 
t h i n g s to the f r e e p l a y of "supply and demand" i n the market and 
secondly h i s notions of " S u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t " . Hyndman s t r e s s e d 
t h a t c a p i t a l i s t s ' e x p l o i t a t i o n of the masses would continue so long 
as producers were given the l i b e r t y to c o n t r o l e i t h e r c o l l e c t i v e l y 
or i n d i v i d u a l l y the means of production; so long as the mass 
of l a b o u r e r s were obliged to s e l l t h e i r labour to another c l a s s i n 
order merely to s u b s i s t ; so long as s o c i a l and economic a f f a i r s 
were l e f t e n t i r e l y to be c o n t r o l l e d by the i r o n law of competition. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , he urged a g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e i n s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n 
order to p r o t e c t the l i b e r t y of the masses. 
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Contrary to Spencer's views, h i s t h e s i s a f f i r m e d t h a t the 
misery and i d l e n e s s that the poor s u f f e r e d , were no f a u l t of t h e i r 
own but a consequence of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and economic d e p r e s s i o n . 
I t was a phenomenon not only l i m i t e d to B r i t a i n but which could be 
observed i n other i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s . He d i d not see 
anything wrong i n the r e g u l a r l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h s o c i a l 
a f f a i r s which Spencer f e l t was h o s t i l e to l i b e r t y . Such i n t e r f e r e n c e , 
he emphasized, was w e l l intended f o r the g e n e r a l good of the 
community. I t was planned "to check the f r i g h t f u l tyranny of a 
p r o f i t making c l a s s . " , and not " d i s a s t r o u s " to freedom as Spencer 
conceived. He pointed out f u r t h e r , t h a t the "corporate a c t i o n " 
Spencer ought to f e a r was not t h a t of the s t a t e but t h a t a r i s i n g 
from l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s l i k e the r a i l w a y s , gas and water companies 
which were o f t e n o u t s i d e popular c o n t r o l . A l l i n a l l , he p e r c e i v e d 
t h a t s t a t e c o n t r o l and employment - when the s t a t e i t s e l f was an 
organized democracy and c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s ceased - need not imply 
s l a v e r y but l i b e r t y . 
Having d i s c u s s e d Hyndman's r e p l y to Spencer's c r i t i c i s m 
of s o c i a l i s m and i t s e f f e c t s , I w i l l go on to review Spencer's ideas 
about the u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y of parliament. Most supporters of 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the c i t i z e n to a r u l e r , a r e s t i l l 
i n f l u e n c e d by the o l d s u p e r s t i t i o u s b e l i e f s h e l d when the r i g h t s of 
a r u l e r were considered to o r i g i n a t e from God. "The great p o l i t i c a l 
s u p e r s t i t i o n of the p a s t was the d i v i n e r i g h t of k i n g s . The g r e a t 
s u p e r s t i t i o n of the present i s the d i v i n e r i g h t of p a rliaments 
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i . e . of m a j o r i t i e s . " Some people w h i l e f o r s a k i n g the o l d theory 
r e l a t i n g to the source of s t a t e - a u t h o r i t y , s t i l l b e l i e v e i n t h a t 
u n l i m i t e d extent of s t a t e - a u t h o r i t y which p r o p e r l y followed the o l d 
theory, but does not r i g h t l y accompany the new one. U n r e s t r i c t e d 
power over s u b j e c t s a l l o t e d to the r u l e r , when he was h e l d to be 
God-sent, i s now a s c r i b e d to the r u l e r when he i s no longer 
regarded as God-sent. I n Spencer's views, t h i s view about the 
u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y of parliament considered under modern i d e a s , i s 
b a s e l e s s . S i m i l a r to Locke, Spencer opposed the a b s o l u t e power of 
the s o v e r e i g n . 
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Examining the notion of s o v e r e i g n t y as maintained by those 
who d i d not support the s u p e r n a t u r a l o r i g i n of s o v e r e i g n t y , Spencer 
f e l t , r e q u i r e d a review of Hobbes's argument. Hobbes p o s t u l a t e d 
t h a t - during the time men l i v e without a common power to keep them 
a l l i n awe, they are i n t h a t c o n d i t i o n which i s c a l l e d war of 
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every man a g a i n s t every man - For Spencer, t h i s p l e a was 
untrue because there were some sm a l l u n c i v i l i s e d s o c i e t i e s i n 
which without any r u l e r , maintain peace and harmony b e t t e r than 
they were kept i n s o c i e t i e s where such a power e x i s t e d . However, 
a c c e p t i n g t h i s view f o r purposes of argument together w i t h Hobbes's 
i d e a of the pact by which people surrendered t h e i r p r i m i t i v e 
freedom of a c t i o n , surrendered themselves to the w i l l of the r u l i n g 
power on one hand, and on the other consenting a l s o to the view 
t h a t such a pact once made was e t e r n a l l y binding, he proceeded to 
c o n s i d e r the c o n c l u s i o n reached by Hobbes. 
Hobbes judged t h a t - f o r where no covenant hath preceded, 
t h e r e hath no r i g h t been t r a n s f e r r e d , and everyman has r i g h t to 
e v e r y t h i n g ; and consequently, no a c t i o n can be u n j u s t . But when a 
covenant i s made, then to break i t i s u n j u s t : and the d e f i n i t i o n 
of i n j u s t i c e , i s no other than the not performance of covenant.... 
T h e r e f o r e before the names of j u s t and u n j u s t can have p l a c e , t h e r e 
must be come c o e r c i v e power, to compel men e q u a l l y to 
performances of t h e i r covenants, by the t e r r o r of some punishment, 
g r e a t e r than the b e n e f i t they expect by the breach of t h e i r 
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covenant . From Hobbes s p o s t u l a t e , he observed two s i g n i f i c a n t 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . "One i s t h a t s t a t e - a u t h o r i t y as thus d e r i v e d , i s a 
means to an end, and has no v a l i d i t y save as s u b s e r v i n g t h a t end: 
i f the end i s not subserved, the a u t h o r i t y , by the hypothesis, does 
not e x i s t . The other i s t h a t the end f o r which the a u t h o r i t y e x i s t s , 
as thus s p e c i f i e d , i s the enforcement of j u s t i c e - the maintenance 
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of e q u i t a b l e r e l a t i o n s . " I t could then be deduced t h a t the s t a t e 
had no warrant to coerce i t s c i t i z e n s b esides t h a t which was 
r e q u i r e d f o r preventing d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t a g gressions and f o r 
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p r o t e c t i n g a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l enemies. 
There i s another general notion h e l d by many people. 
T h i s notion d e c l a r e d t h a t "the d i v i n e r i g h t of parliament means 
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the d i v i n e r i g h t of m a j o r i t i e s . The assumption here as Spencer 
conceived i s that the m a j o r i t y has an u n l i m i t e d power. He went on 
to r e f u t e t h i s i d e a . Reducing the s o c i e t y to an i n c o r p o r a t e d body 
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f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n purposes, he saw from i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t 
members of such a body bent t h e i r w i l l to the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y 
i n a l l matters r e l a t e d to the f u l f i l m e n t of the o b j e c t s f o r which 
they were incorporated; but i n no o t h e r s . T h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n 
demonstrates t h a t the power of the i n c o r p o r a t e d body and hence the 
s t a t e i s l i m i t e d . Supposing t h i s view i s o b j e c t e d to, on the b a s i s 
t h a t as t h e r e i s no such deed by which the members of a s o c i e t y are 
bound, hence th e r e i s no s p e c i f i c a t i o n of purposes f o r which the 
body i s formed, hence no l i m i t s e x i s t , i t only f o l l o w s t h a t the 
u n l i m i t e d power of the government i s j u s t i f i e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the 
d o c t r i n e of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t as expressed by Hobbes was b a s e l e s s 
because i f t h e r e had been such a c o n t r a c t , i t would not be binding 
e t e r n a l l y . 
The question i s , what makes the m i n o r i t y y i e l d to the 
wishes of the m a j o r i t y b e s i d e s the l a t t e r ' s s u p e r i o r f o r c e ? 
" we have to f i n d , not a p h y s i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , but a moral 
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j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r the supposed absolute power of the m a j o r i t y . 
There must n e c e s s a r i l y be a fundamental agreement of some kind, from 
which the powers and o b l i g a t i o n s of the m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y can 
be d e r i v e d . But on what qu e s t i o n s do they fundamentally agree ? I n 
h i s views, they co-operate i n order to r e s i s t a g g r e s s i o n or 
i n v a s i o n , i . e . i n a sense, to provide p r o t e c t i o n f o r people and 
t h e i r property. Besides co-operation f o r p r o t e c t i o n , they would a l s o 
u n i t e f o r the proper use of the t e r r i t o r y they l i v e d i n . Whatever 
the system of land ownership, whether owned on the o l d p r i m i t i v e 
communal p a t t e r n , or i n p r i v a t e ownership, the d e c i s i o n s of the 
m a j o r i t y p r e v a i l . 
Spencer's argument about n a t u r a l r i g h t s c a r r i e d him i n t o 
the d o c t r i n e of a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . I n S o c i a l S t a t i c s he regarded the 
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s t a t e as a j o i n t - s t o c k concern, which every c i t i z e n had the r i g h t 
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to ignore, i f the c i t i z e n d e s i r e d . T h i s view i n d i r e c t l y i n t r o d u c e s 
the idea t h a t t h e r e i s an agreement t a c i t l y entered i n t o between 
the s t a t e and i t s members. S i m i l a r l y , i n Man v e r s u s the S t a t e , 
c o n t r a r y to Bentham's view, he r e s o r t e d to moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
the i n s t i t u t i o n of s o v e r e i g n t y and i t s l i m i t a t i o n . While Bentham 
af f i r m e d t h a t people obey the s o v e r e i g n power because what they 
would g a i n by obeying was g r e a t e r than what they would s u f f e r by 
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disobeying, Spencer i n s i s t e d t h a t the mxnority obeyed the m a j o r i t y 
not because of p h y s i c a l s t r e n g t h of the m a j o r i t y but because i t was 
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i n accordance w i t h m o r a l i t y . Hobbes and Locke argued t h a t i t was 
i n the i n t e r e s t of the people to obey c i v i l laws and honour t h e i r 
p a c t as f a i l u r e to do so would oppose the end f o r which the pact 
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was made. Besides m o r a l i t y , t h e r e must be an agreement between the 
m a j o r i t y and the m i n o r i t y . P r a c t i c a l l y , they a l l w i l l agree to 
co-operate i n defending t h e i r t e r r i t o r y a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n 
and i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r persons and property a g a i n s t i n t e r n a l 
v i o l e n c e and f r a u d . To t h i s e x t e n t , then, the submission of the 
m i n o r i t y i s v a l i d and l e g i t i m a t e ; beyond t h i s p o i n t such 
submission i s u n j u s t and i l l e g i t i m a t e . 
Spencer was prepared to accept t h a t the w i l l of parliament 
d i d i n f a c t r e p r e s e n t the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y , although because of 
the l i m i t e d nature of the f r a n c h i s e when he wrote, t h i s was very f a r 
from being the c a s e . He was more concerned to argue t h a t , no matter 
how l a r g e the m a j o r i t y i n whose name parliament speaks, t h e r e were 
s t i l l l i m i t s to i t s a u t h o r i t y . 
Having thus s e t l i m i t s ( t o h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n ) "to show 
the proper sphere of government", he went on to r e v i v e what he 
c a l l e d "a dormant c o n t r o v e r s y " - t h a t concerning n a t u r a l r i g h t s . 
While a whOle school of l e g i s t s i n the Continent h e l d to the b e l i e f 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have n a t u r a l r i g h t s , some E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r s h e l d 
a c o n t r a r y view. P r o f e s s o r Jevons, i n h i s work - The S t a t e i n 
R e l a t i o n to Labour, a s s e r t e d t h a t - the f i r s t s t e p must be to r i d 
our minds of the i d e a t h a t t h e r e are any such t h i n g s i n s o c i a l 
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matters as a b s r a c t r i g h t s -. S i m i l a r l y , Mr.Mathew Arnold, i n an 
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a r t i c l e , a v e r red t h a t - An author has no n a t u r a l r i g h t to a 
property i n h i s production. But then n e i t h e r has he a n a t u r a l r i g h t 
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to anything whatever which he may produce or a c q u i r e -. Bentham 
af f i r m e d " . . . . t h a t government f u l f i l s i t s o f f i c e /hy c r e a t i n g r i g h t s 
which i t confers upon i n d i v i d u a l s ; r i g h t s of p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y , 
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r i g h t s of p r o t e c t i o n f o r honour, r i g h t s of p r o e r t y ; e t C j / 
Spencer argued t h a t Bentham's p r o p o s i t i o n s were d i f f i c u l t 
to s u s t a i n on the f o l l o w i n g grounds. F i r s t l y , they were d i f f i c u l t 
to s u s t a i n because of t h e i r f a n t a s t i c n ature. "The s o v e r e i g n people 
j o i n t l y appoint r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and so c r e a t e d a government; the 
government thus c r e a t e d , c r e a t e s r i g h t s ; and then, having c r e a t e d 
r i g h t s , i t c o n f e r s them on the s e p a r a t e members of the s o v e r e i g n 
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people by which i t was i t s e l f c r e a t e d . Secondly, Bentham 
a s s e r t e d t h a t government f u l f i l l e d i t s o f f i c e by c r e a t i n g r i g h t s . 
Spencer pointed out t h a t two meanings were deducible from the word 
c r e a t i n g . E i t h e r i t meant the production of something out of 
nothing, or i t i m p l i e d g i v i n g form and s t r u c t u r e to something which 
a l r e a d y e x i s t e d . The f i r s t meaning was unacceptable because i t was 
beyond the power of the government to c r e a t e something out of 
nothing. On the other h'and, i f the government shaped something 
p r e - e x i s t i n g according to the second meaning, what was t h a t something 
which i t shaped ? I t was s t i l l d i f f i c u l t to determine. 
Assuming th a t Bentham meant that a group of i n d i v i d u a l s , 
who s e v e r a l l y wish to s a t i s f y t h e i r d e s i r e s , and have as an 
aggregate, p o s s e s s i o n of a l l the sources of s a t i s f a c t i o n , as w e l l 
as power over a l l i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s , appoint a government, which 
d e c l a r e s the ways i n which, and the c o n d i t i o n s under which, 
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i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s may be c a r r i e d on and the s a t i s f a c t i o n s obtained." 
I t i m p l i e s t h a t each man e x i s t s i n dual c a p a c i t y . I n h i s p r i v a t e 
c a p a c i t y , he i s s u b j e c t to the s t a t e , i . e . he i s one of those who 
r e c e i v e r i g h t s from the s t a t e , and i n h i s p u b l i c c a p a c i t y , he i s one 
of the s o v e r e i g n people who appoint t h e . s t a t e , i . e . he 
p a r t i c i p a t e s through the government which he i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
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other people appoint, i n g i v i n g r i g h t s . F o r i l l u s t r a t i o n purposes, 
" L e t the community c o n s i s t of a m i l l i o n men, who, by the h y p o t h e s i s , 
a r e not only j o i n t p o s s e s s o r s of the i n h a b i t e d region, but j o i n t 
p o s s e s s o r s of a l l l i b e r t i e s of a c t i o n and a p p r o p r i a t i o n : the only 
r i g h t r e c o g n i s e d being t h a t of the aggregate to e v e r y t h i n g . What 
f o l l o w s ? ....As the government, i n Bentham's view, i s but an 
agent; the r i g h t s i t c o n f e r s are the right's given to i t i n t r u s t 
by the s o v e r e i g n people. I f so, such r i g h t s must be possessed en 
b l o c by the s o v e r e i g n people before the government, i n f u l f i l m e n t 
of i t s t r u s t , c o n f e r s them on i n d i v i d u a l s ; and i f so, each 
i n d i v i d u a l has a m i l l i o n t h p o r t i o n of these r i g h t s i n h i s p u b l i c 
c a p a c i t y , w h i l e he has no r i g h t s i n h i s p r i v a t e c a p a c i t y . These 
he gets only when a l l the r e s t of the m i l l i o n j o i n to endow him 
w i t h them; w h i l e he j o i n s to endow w i t h them every other member of 
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the m i l l i o n I " 
Spencer argued t h a t Bentham's view could only be d i s m i s s e d 
as absurd w h i l e i t was i n s i s t e d t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s had n a t u r a l r i g h t s . 
There were v a r i o u s s o c i a l phenomena which could be c i t e d to support 
t h i s view. A n t h r o p o l i g i c a l s t u d i e s show t h a t before government 
e x i s t e d , people's conduct was r e g u l a t e d by custom, "....and when 
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government a r i s e s , i t s power i s l i m i t e d by them ^customs./" These 
customs not only l i m i t e d the power of r u l e r s but were s a i d a l s o to 
r e s p e c t r i g h t s - but only i n p r i v a t e property. "Now, among the 
customs which we thus f i n d to be pre-governmental, and which 
subordinate governmental power when i t i s e s t a b l i s h e d , a r e those 
which r e c o g n i s e c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s - r i g h t s to a c t i n c e r t a i n 
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ways and possess c e r t a i n t h i n g s . Comparative s o c i o l o g y d i s c l o s e s 
as w e l l , t h a t "along w i t h s o c i a l progress i t becomes i n an i n c r e a s i n g 
degree the b u s i n e s s of the s t a t e , not only to g i v e formal s a n c t i o n * ..68 to men s r i g h t s , but a l s o t o defend them a g a i n s t a g g r e s s o r s . 
These a p a r t , comparative government i n d i c a t e s u n i f o r m i t y i n the 
r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d by d i f f e r e n t governments. 
H i s t o r y shows t h a t "....along w i t h i n c r e a s e of i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , and i m p l i e d s u b s t i t u t i o n of the regime of c o n t r a c t f o r 
the regime of s t a t u s , and growth of a s s o c i a t e d sentiments, t h e r e 
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went .... a decrease of meddling w i t h people's doings. L e g i s l a t i o n 
g r a d u a l l y ceased to r e g u l a t e the cropping of f i e l d s , or d i c t a t e the 
r a t i o of c a t t l e to acreage, or s p e c i f y modes of manufacture and 
m a t e r i a l s to be used, or f i x wages and p r i c e s , or i n t e r f e r e w i t h 
d r e s s e s and games /except where t h e r e was gambling7, or put 
bounties and p e n a l t i e s on imports or exports,, or p r e s c r i b e men's 
b e l i e f s , r e l i g i o u s or p o l i t i c a l , or prevent them from combining as 
they p l e a s e d , or t r a v e l - l i n g where they l i k e d . That i s to say, 
throughout a l a r g e range of conduct, the r i g h t of the c i t i z e n to 
u n c o n t r o l l e d a c t i o n has been made good a g a i n s t the p r e t e n s i o n s of 
the s t a t e to c o n t r o l him. While the r u l i n g agency has i n c r e a s i n g l y 
helped him t o exclude i n t r u d e r s from t h a t p r i v a t e sphere i n which 
he pursues the o b j e c t of l i f e , i t has i t s e l f r e t r e a t e d from t h a t 
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sphere; or, i n other words - decreased i t s i n t r u s i o n s . Common 
law r e c o g n i s e s the law of nature as the source of a l l laws. With 
a l l t hese f a c t s a t hand, i t could be concluded t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s -
had n a t u r a l r i g h t s . 
He moved on to r e i n f o r c e the d o c t r i n e of l i b e r t y 
b i o l o g i c a l l y . Having t r i e d t h i s q u e s t i o n i n the "court of p o l i t i c s " 
i t i s d e s i r a b l e to t r y i t as w e l l i n the "court of s c i e n c e - the 
s c i e n c e of l i f e " before complete a c q u i t t a l . "Animal l i f e i n v o l v e s 
waste; waste must be met by r e p a i r ; r e p a i r i m p l i e s n u t r i t i o n . Again, 
n u t r i t i o n pre-supposes obtainment of food; food cannot be got 
without powers ofprehension, and, u s u a l l y of locomotion: and t h a t 
these powers may achieve t h e i r ends, t h e r e must be freedom to move 
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about. Again, i f i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t l i f e b r i n g s more 
p l e a s u r e than p a i n , i . e . i f i t i s worth l i v i n g , then the a c t i o n s by 
which l i f e i s maintained a r e j u s t i f i e d . A c c o r d ingly, freedom i s 
r e q u i r e d f o r those a c t i o n s . "Those who hold t h a t l i f e i s v a l u a b l e , 
hold, by i m p l i c a t i o n s , t h a t men ought not to be prevented from 
c a r r y i n g on l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s . I n other words, i t i s s a i d 
to be / r i g h ^ 7 t h a t they should c a r r y them on, then, by permutation, 
we get the a s s e r t i o n t h a t they "have a r i g h t " to c a r r y them on. 
C l e a r l y the conception of / n a t u r a l r i g h t s ^ o r i g i n a t e s i n r e c o g n i t i o n 
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of the t r u t h t h a t l i f e i s j u s t i f i a b l e , t h e r e must be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r the performance of a c t s e s s e n t i a l to i t s p r e s e r v a t i o n ; and 
t h e r e f o r e , a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r those l i b e r t i e s and c l a i m s which 
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make such a c t s p o s s i b l e . " 
What obtains i n the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l , a p p l i e s to t h a t 
of the s o c i e t y . The main prompter which makes people l i v e i n 
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groups i s advantages to be d e r i v e d from co-operation. By i t s 
medium people can always get what they l a c k . The p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s 
working w e l l , depends on the f u l f i l m e n t of c o n t r a c t s t a c i t or o v e r t . 
T h i s form of co-operation e x i s t s i n any form of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
I t i s then d e s i r a b l e to l e a v e them f r e e but enforce t h e i r 
f u l f i l m e n t . Enforcement of c o n t r a c t s entered upon i m p l i e s enforcement 
of r i g h t s , as a breach of i t can be regarded as an i n d i r e c t 
a g g r e s s i o n . F o r example, supposing a man goes to a shop to buy a 
packet of t e a . He i s given the t e a and i n s t e a d of paying f o r i t , he 
walks away w i t h i t (maybe unnoticed by the shopkeeper). D e f i n i t e l y , 
such a person has broken the c o n t r a c t entered w i t h the shopkeeper. 
The s e l l e r on the other hand, i s i n j u r e d because he i s deprived of 
something which he p o s s e s s e s , without r e c e i v i n g the e q u i v a l e n t 
bargained f o r . " I t r e s u l t s then t h a t to recognize and enforce the 
r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s i s a t the same time to recognize and enforce 
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the c o n d i t i o n s to a normal s o c i a l l i f e . " 
Spencer pointed out l i k e M i l l , t h a t s o c i e t y was a growth 
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and not "an a r t e f a c t " . He was convinced t h a t the conception of the 
s o c i e t y as a manufacture was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s i n s of l e g i s l a t o r s , 
because i t s e t them manufacturing, and i n most c a s e s w i t h bad 
r e s u l t s . J u s t as Adam Smith maintained t h a t the r e l a t i o n between 
c a p i t a l and production could not be improved by a r t i f i c i a l means, 
Spencer s t r o n g l y urged the v i t a l connexion between i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . The p o i n t which he was s t r i v i n g to make here i s 
t h a t no l e g i s l a t i o n can do any more w i t h i n s t i t u t i o n s than n a t i o n a l 
c h a r a c t e r a l l o w s . Whatever i n s t i t u t i o n s a re e s t a b l i s h e d , n a t u r a l 
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r i g h t s have t h e i r precedence over them. 
A l l i n a l l , Spencer had i n f a c t , p a i n t e d the t r u e p i c t u r e 
of v a r i o u s inroads the s t a t e was making i n t o people's freedom 
dur i n g the p e r i o d he was w r i t i n g . He held the same view l i k e 
o ther p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s of t h i s age about the t y r a n n i c a l power 
of the m a j o r i t y which i f l e f t unchecked would d e l i m i t the sphere 
of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . To crown a l l h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s towards the 
h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l thought, he had expressed v i v i d l y i n Locke's 
terms, the supremacy of n a t u r a l r i g h t s over a l l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
and t e r s e l y opposed the u t i l i t a r i a n i d e a s about the sovereign 
power being a b s o l u t e . 
I n h i s e s s a y on - From L i b e r t y to Bondage - Spencer 
d i s c u s s e d the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . F i r s t l y , he considered the 
h i s t o r i a l . changes people had undergone i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r 
freedom i n s o c i a l a f f a i r s , and observed t h a t the more things improve 
the louder were exclamations about t h e i r badness. Secondly, he 
a s s e r t e d t h a t democracy was not a s u f f i c i e n t guarantee f o r i n d i v i d u a l 
freedom because the power of the m a j o r i t y could i n c r e a s e and become 
t y r a n n i c a l and t h i r d l y , opposed the i d e a of s o c i a l i s m on the grounds 
t h a t i t l i m i t e d i n d i v i d u a l freedom. 
Spencer a f f i r m e d t h a t the degree of freedom, an i n d i v i d u a l 
enjoyed depended on the amount of c o e r c i o n he was s u b j e c t e d t o . 
"When he i s under the impersonal c o e r c i o n of nature, we say t h a t he 
i s f r e e ; and when he i s under the personal c o e r c i o n of someone above 
him, we c a l l him, a c c o r d i n g to the degree of h i s dependence, a 
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s l a v e , a s e r f , or a v a s s a l . People work together i n a s o c i e t y 
under e i t h e r of these two forms of c o n t r o l . I n some c a s e s , these 
forms of c o n t r o l are mixed, w h i l e i n o t h e r s they are separated. On 
t h i s b a s i s , he deduced t h a t s o c i a l l i f e must be c a r r i e d on on the 
b a s i s of e i t h e r v o l u n t a r y or compulsory co-operation, or what 
S i r Henry Maine d e s c r i b e d as the Systems of C o n t r a c t or of S t a t u s 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
What are the f e a t u r e s of these systems ? I n the system of 
v o l u n t a r y co-operation, "....the i n d i v i d u a l i s l e f t to do the best 
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he can by h i s spontaneous e f f o r t s and get s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e 
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according to h i s e f f i c i e n c y I n every modern s o c i e t y , 
i n d u s t r y i s c a r r i e d on by v o l u n t a r y co-operation. I n s t e a d of 
f o r c i n g people to work f o r a l i v i n g , a c o n t r a c t i s entered upon both 
by employers and employees. T h i s n e c e s s i t a t e s working together by 
consent. There i s no one to f o r c e terms of to f o r c e acceptance of 
those terms. Though people work according to c o n t r a c t j t h i s system 
i s not devoid of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . Employers and employees are 
s t i l l arranged according to t h e i r grades. 
As regards the system of compulsory co-operation, every 
i n d i v i d u a l has h i s appointed p l a c e ; h i s share of food, c l o t h i n g , 
s h e l t e r and works under c o e r c i v e r u l e s . I t i s marked by a b s o l u t e 
obedience of an i n f e r i o r grade to a s u p e r i o r one. The i n d i v i d u a l 
has no freedom except t h a t given by an a u t h o r i t y . S o c i a l 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s not l a c k i n g , but i t i s q u i t e u n l i k e the s o c i a l 
g r a d a t i o n i n the system of voluntary co-operation. T h i s form of 
co-operation was i n the p a s t p r e v a l e n t i n v a r i o u s s o c i e t i e s , due to 
i n c e s s a n t wars they had to wage. I n order to f i g h t such wars 
s u c c e s s f u l l y , the s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t i e s was m i l i t a n t . 
Compulsory co-operation r e l a x e d as s o c i e t i e s advanced and 
was r e p l a c e d by a system of voluntary co-operation. The s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e produced by war and appropriate to i t changed s l o w l y to 
s u i t t h a t produced by i n d u s t r i a l l i f e . When the number of people 
engaged i n o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e a c t i v i t i e s decreased, those 
employed f o r production and d i s t r i b u t i o n i n c r e a s e d . The l a t t e r 
s e t t l e d mainly i n towns where the i n f l u e n c e of the m i l i t a n t c l a s s was 
l e s s and c a r r i e d on i n d u s t r i a l production under v o l u n t a r y 
co-operation. Coercion l o s t most of i t s importance and was g r a d u a l l y 
r e p l a c e d by exchange and f r e e c o n t r a c t . These f e a t u r e s spread 
throughout the community, and money became the medium of exchange. 
D i v i s i o n s of rank became l e s s r i g i d and c l a s s power diminished. 
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No one measure of c o n t r o l i s permanently engrafted to 
the s o c i e t y . I t i s s u b j e c t to change and very o f t e n a l t e r n a t e s 
between systems of vo l u n t a r y and compulsory co-operation. T h i s 
d e s i r e to change i s not only common w i t h s o c i e t i e s but w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l s as w e l l . At the o u t s e t , s o c i e t y i s c o n t r o l l e d by the 
regime of s t a t u s . Having emancipated i t s e l f from the hard 
d i s c i p l i n e of such a regime, i t s e t t l e s under the regime of c o n t r a c t . 
But not f o r e v e r : "as f a s t as vo l u n t a r y co-operation i s abandoned 
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compulsory co-operation must be s u b s t i t u t e d . " Labour must 
always have a type of o r g a n i z a t i o n . E i t h e r i t i s given the freedom 
to work uncoerced, or i t s freedom of a c t i o n i s r e g u l a t e d by 
a u t h o r i t y . 
Contrary to h i s e a r l i e r views, Spencer conceived t h a t 
" r e g u l a t i v e apparatus" was an important f e a t u r e of a l l advancing 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h i s was important to hold v a r i o u s p a r t s of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n together, and i n order to do i t s work e f f e c t i v e l y , i t 
must be e x t e n s i v e , e l a b o r a t e and powerful. I n a democracy, i t i s 
r e q u i r e d f o r c a r r y i n g on n a t i o n a l defence, m a i n t a i n i n g p u b l i c order 
and p e r s o n a l s a f e t y , but i n s o c i a l i s m , b e s i d e s the above f u n c t i o n s , 
i t c o n t r o l s a l l f a c t o r s of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . Under the 
former i n s t i t u t i o n , w i t h i t s f r e e c o n t r a c t s , production and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a r e l e f t to - "demand and supply, and the d e s i r e of 
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each man to g a i n a l i v i n g by supplying the needs of h i s f e l l o w s . 
I f t h i s system were to be " . . . . r e p l a c e d by a regime of 
79 
i n d u s t r i a l obedience, enforced by p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s , " i t would 
i n v o l v e a v a s t machinery of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and c o n t r o l to the 
extent of l i m i t i n g i n d i v i d u a l freedom of a c t i o n . 
From experience of s m a l l s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , he observed 
t h a t the e x e c u t i v e power could be t y r a n n i c a l as i t i n c r e a s e d i n 
power. T h i s was a common day to day experience i n s o c i e t y . "The 
t r u t h t h a t the r e g u l a t i v e s t r u c t u r e always tends to i n c r e a s e i n 
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power, i s i l l u s t r a t e d by every e s t a b l i s h e d body of men. The 
o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s showed how o f f i c i a l s of such 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , d i r e c t e d t h e i r a f f a i r s w i t h but l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e , 
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even when most members of the s o c i e t y disapproved. J o i n t - s t o c k 
companies p a r t i c u l a r l y the management of r a i l w a y companies 
provide a good example. "The p l a n s of a board of d i r e c t o r s are 
u s u a l l y a u t h o r i z e d w i t h l i t t l e or no d i s c u s s i o n ; and i f t h e r e i s 
any c o n s i d e r a b l e o p p o s i t i o n , t h i s i s f o r t h w i t h crushed by an 
overwhelming number of p r o x i e s sent by those who always support the 
e x i s t i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Only when the misconduct i s extreme does 
the r e s i s t a n c e of s h a r e h o l d e r s s u f f i c e to d i s p l a c e the r u l i n g 
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body. Trade union o r g a n i z a t i o n i s another example. I n t h i s , too, 
the " r e g u l a t i v e apparatus" i s very powerful. Members who d i s a g r e e 
w i t h the p o l i c y of the union o f f i c i a l s , u l t i m a t e l y y i e l d to the 
a u t h o r i t i e s they have s e t up. They y i e l d because seceding from the 
union w i l l mean making enemies of t h e i r f e l l o w workers and o f t e n 
l o s i n g t h e i r employment. T h i s view p o i n t s out the e v i l s 
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a t t e n d i n g James M i l l ' s i d e a - namely t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s could b e s t 
s e c u r e the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e q u a n t i t y of the produce of t h e i r 
labour by combining and d e l e g a t i n g to a s m a l l number the power 
n e c e s s a r y f o r p r o t e c t i n g them. 
T h i s o f f i c i a l tyranny i s not only l i m i t e d to s o c i a l and 
economic o r g a n i z a t i o n s but can be observed as w e l l i n p o l i t i c a l 
ones. The L i b e r a l p a r t y had r e l i n q u i s h e d "....the o r i g i n a l 
conception of a l e a d e r as a mouthpiece f o r a known and accepted 
p o l i c y , t h i n k s i t s e l f bound to accept a p o l i c y which i t s l e a d e r 
s p r i n g s upon i t without consent or warning - a p a r t y so u t t e r l y 
without the f e e l i n g and i d e a i m p l i e d by l i b e r a l i s m , as not to 
r e s e n t t h i s t rampling on the r i g h t of p r i v a t e judgement which 
c o n s t i t u t e s the root of l i b e r a l i s m - a p a r t y which 
Though t h i s s m a l l number was f o r James M i l l , a government, I am 
t r e a t i n g trade unionism or j o i n t s t o c k companies as a m i c r o - s o c i e t y 
and the s m a l l body of people c o n t r o l l i n g e i t h e r as a m i c r o - s t a t e . 
A ccordingly, the e v i l s observed i n these m i c r o - s o c i e t i e s can be 
experienced i n m a c r o - s o c i e t i e s . 
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v i l i f i e s as renegade l i b e r a l s , those of i t s members who 
'83 
r e f u s e to surrender t h e i r independence." " I f then, t h i s 
supremacy of the r e g u l a t o r s i s seen i n bodies of q u i t e modern 
o r i g i n , formed of men who have, i n many of the cases i n s t a n c e d , 
unhindered powers of a s s e r t i n g t h e i r independence, what w i l l the 
supremacy of the r e g u l a t o r s become i n l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d bodies, i n 
bodies which have grown v a s t and h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d and i n bodies 
which i n s t e a d of c o n t r o l l i n g only a s m a l l p a r t of the u n i t ' s l i f e , 
..84 
c o n t r o l the whole of h i s l i f e ? T y r a n n i c a l o f f i c i a l i s m develops 
because people a r e not endowed w i t h those sentiments needed to 
prevent i t s growth. 
D i r e c t proofs of tyranny are a l s o f u r n i s h e d by those who 
pledge themselves to s o c i a l i s t i c i d e a s , and who undertook to f i g h t 
the cause of the o p e r a t i v e c l a s s e s . They show p a s s i v e i n t e r e s t s 
i n the a f f a i r s of the c l a s s e s . These p a s s i v e i n t e r e s t s take- the 
form of imposing r e g u l a t i o n s which l i m i t the numbers of the l a t t e r 
being admitted i n a t r a d e . Such r e g u l a t i o n s do not show' any s i g n 
of a l t r u i s m which marked s o c i a l i s m . I n s t e a d of p r a c t i s i n g a c t u a l 
s o c i a l i s m , they are c a r r i e d away by the p u r s u i t of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . 
With p a s s i v e d i s r e g a r d of other people's c l a i m went a c t i v e 
encroachment on them. F o r example, i n t r a d e union o r g a n i z a t i o n , . 
where members i n order " t h a t they may conquer i n the s t r u g g l e they 
s u r r e n d e r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t i e s and i n d i v i d u a l judgements, and 
show no resentment however d i c t a t o r i a l may be the r u l e e x e r c i s e d 
..85 
over them. I f t h i s tendency towards s o c i a l i s m were l e f t , unchecked, 
the i n d i v i d u a l stood a good chance of being s u b j e c t e d to the 
vigorous r u l e of o f f i c i a l o l i g a r c h y . S o c i e t y might tend to 
r e t r o g r e s s i n s t e a d of p r o g r e s s i n g w i t h such a l e a n i n g towards 
s o c i a l i s m . 
Spencer d i d not t h i n k . t h a t c e r t a i n p a r a p o l i t i c a l systems 
such as trade unionism, j o i n t - s t o c k companies which people c r e a t e d 
p a r t l y to p r o t e c t t h e i r r i g h t s and p a r t l y to improve themselves 
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w i t h , were a b l e to cure the s o c i a l e v i l s they ( t h e people) 
s u f f e r e d i n the process of adapting themselves from an a n t e - s o c i a l 
to an i d e a l s t a t e . 
Can there be an immediate cure f o r s o c i a l e v i l s ? " I t i s 
p o s s i b l e to remove causes, which i n t e n s i t y the e v i l s ; i t i s 
p o s s i b l e to change the e v i l s from one form i n t o another; and i t i s 
p o s s i b l e , and very common, to exacerbate the e v i l s by the e f f o r t s 
made to prevent them; but anything l i k e immediate cure i s 
86 
i m p o s s i b l e . " Mankind l i v e s i n a c i v i l i z e d s t a t e where h i s 
r e g u l a r needs are s a t i s f i e d by continuous labour. The nature 
r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s s t a t e i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t needed f o r the 
a n t e - s o c i a l s t a t e . Consequently long continued pains a r e i n e v i t a b l e 
i n changing from one s o c i a l s t a t e to another. What mankind 
a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e s f o r a w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i a l a c t i o n i s the 
sentiment of j u s t i c e . T h i s sentiment " . . . . i n s i s t s on p e r s o n a l 
freedom and i s s o l i c i t o u s f o r the l i k e freedom of o t h e r s ; and t h e r e 
a t p r e s e n t e x i s t s but a very inadequate amount of t h i s 
87 
sentiment." Consequently, t h e r e i s the need f o r s u b j e c t i n g 
mankind to a s o c i a l law which makes them a l t r u i s t i c . T h i s s o c i a l 
p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s every i n d i v i d u a l to c a r r y on h i s a c t i v i t i e s w i t h 
due regard to s i m i l a r c l a i m s of o t h e r s to c a r r y on t h e i r s , and which 
r e q u i r e s every i n d i v i d u a l to s u f f e r any e v i l a r i s i n g e i t h e r from 
h i s s o c i a l a c t i v i t y or i n a c t i v i t y . 
Vide p ,'/139* above. Here he argued t h a t even the s t a t e as a P 
p o l i t i c a l system could not cure s o c i a l e v i l s by l e g i s l a t i o n . 
The s t a t e he a f f i r m e d was a n t a g o n i s t i c to L i b e r t y . 
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CONCLUSION. 
T h i s t h e s i s s t a r t e d w i t h an a n a l y s i s of v a r i o u s t r a d i t i o n a l 
i d e a s about freedom and the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n of the people which 
could have formed the background to the w r i t i n g s of John S t u a r t M i l l 
and Herbert Spencer. T h i s was followed by an a n a l y s i s of t h e i r main 
works showing t h e i r i d e a s of l i b e r t y . I n t h i s concluding chapter, a 
d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be made f i r s t l y about: what M i l l and Spencer 
conceived to be t h r e a t s to i n d i v i d u a l s 1 freedom which urged them to 
develop p r i n c i p l e s which would j u s t i f y any a r t i f i c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e 
w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s ' l i b e r t y . I f the s t a t e and s o c i e t y were t h r e a t s to 
freedom, d i d other t h i n k e r s of the same e r a p e r c e i v e those bodies as 
t h r e a t s a l s o ? I f they d i d not, how much d i d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l e a n i n g s 
i n f l u e n c e t h e i r views ? Secondly, what c r i t i c i s m s could be lodged 
a g a i n s t M i l l and Spencer ? What did other c r i t i c s say ? T h i r d l y , 
a d m i t t e d l y t h e i r views a r e of h i s t o r i c a l importance, but what are 
t h e i r r e l e v a n c e to contemporary B r i t a i n ? F o u r t h l y , what are the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between law ( s t a t e ) and l i b e r t y on one hand, and 
freedom and s o c i e t y on the other ? Could they be r e c o n c i l e d ? 
F i n a l l y , e i t h e r M i l l and Spencer were advocating freedom, or, 
having surveyed the c o n d i t i o n of the working c l a s s e s , were pl e a d i n g 
i n the name of l i b e r t y t h a t these c l a s s e s ought to be recognised as 
groups of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h some equal p e r s o n a l r i g h t s - such as 
r i g h t s to self-independence, freedom - by the p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s e s . 
T h r e a t s to Freedom. M i l l and Spencer observed from the manner 
government f u n c t i o n s were growing on one hand, and on the other, 
the i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c opinion and f e e l i n g were having on the masses, 
t h a t the sphere of f r e e a c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l was narrowing 
w h i l s t t h a t of the s t a t e was i n c r e a s i n g . T.H.Green, w r i t i n g during 
the l a t e r p a r t of the 19th century saw t h i s phenomenon w i t h a 
d i f f e r e n c e . He p e r c e i v e d t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s under which people 
l i v e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y the working c l a s s , d i d not allow a f r e e e x e r c i s e 
of t h e i r f a c u l t i e s because of l e s s p r o t e c t i o n given them by laws. 
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Consequently, w h i l s t M i l l and Spencer agreed t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
freedom would s u f f e r i f s t a t e f u n c t i o n and a c t i v i t i e s i n c r e a s e d 
unchecked, Green argued t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom would be 
l i m i t e d i f the s t a t e d i d not i n t e r f e r e to maintain an environment 
without which a f r e e e x e r c i s e of h i s f a c u l t i e s was i m p o s s i b l e . 
Though Spencer thought n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e on the p a r t of the s t a t e 
n e c e s s a r y and i n v a r i a b l e , M i l l could allow some growth of s t a t e 
f u n c t i o n s . While M i l l p e r c e i v e d two t h r e a t s to i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , 
Spencer on the other hand, recognised one, 
M i l l d i s c e r n e d two t h r e a t s o r i g i n a t i n g from the s o c i e t y 
and the s t a t e r e s p e c t i v e l y . " t h e r e a r e , i n our own day, gross 
u s u r p a t i o n s upon the l i b e r t y of p r i v a t e l i f e a c t u a l l y p r a c t i c e d , 
and s t i l l g r e a t e r ones threatened w i t h some e x p e c t a t i o n of s u c c e s s , 
and opinions propounded which a s s e r t an u n l i m i t e d r i g h t i n the 
p u b l i c not only to p r o h i b i t by law every one which i t t h i n k s wrong, 
but, i n order to get at what i t t h i n k s wrong, to p r o h i b i t a number 
of t h i n g s which i t admits to be innocent."* Spencer beheld the 
s t a t e as the only massive t h r e a t a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l freedom. Hence, 
he maintained t h a t "every e x t e n s i o n of the r e g u l a t i v e p o l i c y 
i n v o l v e s an a d d i t i o n to the r e g u l a t i v e agents - a f u r t h e r growth 
of o f f i c i a l i s m and an i n c r e a s i n g power of the o r g a n i z a t i o n formed 
2 
of o f f i c i a l s . " I t must not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t most t h i n k e r s thought 
a t t h i s time t h a t the g r e a t e r the q u a n t i t y of power allowed an 
i n d i v i d u a l or a group of i n d i v i d u a l s i n power, the g r e a t e r would be 
the chances of t h e i r abusing i t . Such a growth of o f f i c i a l d o m , and 
i n c r e a s e d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n may tend to s u b j e c t the i n d i v i d u a l to the 
r i g o r o u s r u l e of o f f i c i a l o l i g a r c h y . Hence, Spencer t r i e d to 
3 
d e v i s e a p r i n c i p l e which would form a law of r i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n the s o c i e t y and i t was the duty of the s t a t e to ensure t h a t i t 
was honoured, though i t would be remarked t h a t Spencer a t a l a t e r 
s t age of h i s l i f e came to see some danger i n v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
M i l l r e a s s e r t e d the c l a i m s of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y 
a g a i n s t the new l e v i a t h a n of e x c e s s i v e government a u t h o r i t y and of 
the p r o s p e c t i v e tyranny of mass o p i n i o n demanding conformity and 
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u n i f o r m i t y i n an i n d u s t r i a l i s e d s o c i e t y . He argued t h a t i f these 
c l a i m s were to be preserved, t h e r e should be a l i m i t t o the 
l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e of c o l l e c t i v e opinion w i t h i n d i v i d u a l 
independence. To mark o f f t h a t l i m i t l e d to the endeavour to 
d i v i d e a person's a c t i o n i n t o two - s e l f and other - regarding 
a c t i o n s . His views suggest t h a t the l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e of 
c o l l e c t i v e opinion or government ought to be l i m i t e d to ot h e r -
5 
r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s of an i n d i v i d u a l . 
I n c o n t r a s t to M i l l and Spencer,:Green d i d not p e r c e i v e 
government nor s o c i e t y , as a t h r e a t to i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom, 
though he d i d not observe as M i l l d i d t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of 
government could be d i f f e r e n t from those of the s o c i e t y . He regarded 
c i v i l laws "as the d e l i b e r a t e v o i c e of s o c i e t y " and i t was 
e s s e n t i a l that they should be e x e r c i s e d to ensure every person h i s 
freedom of making the best of h i m s e l f . But why was such i n t e r f e r e n c e 
n e c e s s a r y ? Green pointed out t h a t people had not reached a stage 
where t h e i r w e l f a r e should be l e f t to "the spontaneous a c t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l s " . " U n t i l such a c o n d i t i o n of s o c i e t y i s reached, i t i s 
the b u s i n e s s of the s t a t e to take the best s e c u r i t y i t can f o r the 
young c i t i z e n s 1 growing up i n such h e a l t h and wi t h so much knowledge 
..6 
as i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r r e a l freedom. 
How could the v a r i o u s r e a c t i o n s on the p a r t of these 
t h i n k e r s to these t h r e a t s be ex p l a i n e d ? They could be i n t e r p r e t e d 
i n the l i g h t of these f a c t o r s : f i r s t l y , the t r e n d of s o c i a l a f f a i r s 
when they were w r i t i n g , and secondly, t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r conception 
o f l i b e r t y and how each t r i e d to d e r i v e i t . M i l l and Spencer 
began t h e i r championship of freedom before the middle of the 19th 
century when the l i b e r t y of the mass to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the r e g u l a r 
process of government was very much l i m i t e d . Green on the other 
hand wrote during the l a t e r p a r t of the 19th century, when 
r e g u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h a t c l a s s i n l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s e s had 
been enhanced. He was convinced t h a t i n a t t a i n i n g such a freedom, 
any r e s t r a i n t an i n d i v i d u a l imposed on h i m s e l f was no r e s t r a i n t 
as such because he w i l l e d i t . The freedom a person had, d i d not 
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take the shape of one which a master a l l o t e d h i s s e r v a n t or s l a v e 
but one i n which the former and the l a t t e r gave themselves as 
equ a l s . 
Hence, Green pointed out tha t "the danger of l e g i s l a t i o n , 
e i t h e r i n the i n t e r e s t of a p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s or f o r the promotion 
of p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s o p i n i o n s , we may f a i r l y assume to be 
over. The popular j e a l o u s y of law, once j u s t i f i a b l e enough, i s 
7 
t h e r e f o r e out of date. The c i t i z e n s of England now make i t s law." 
Both M i l l and Spencer def i n e d l i b e r t y as t h a t process 
by which a man pursued h i s own good i n h i s own way so long as h i s 
a c t i o n s d i d not attempt to de p r i v e o t h e r s of the same p r i v i l e g e . 
T h i s was t h e i r conception of freedom, and they a l s o regarded i t as an 
8 
end i n i t s e l f . Green gave a p e c u l i a r and d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n , and 
d i d not accept t h e i r meaning of freedom as an end i n i t s e l f but as 
a means. L i b e r t y as an end, ought to be d i r e c t e d towards the 
l i b e r a t i o n of the powers of a l l men e q u a l l y f o r the c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
a common good. A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of M i l l ' s and Spencer's conception of 
freedom suggests t h a t s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s not encouraged. The s t a t e 
can only e x i s t as an umpire to ensure t h a t no body's a c t i o n causes 
harm to o t h e r s . Green's i d e a of l i b e r t y on the other hand supports 
government i n t e r f e r e n c e i n order to make c e r t a i n t h a t every person 
has the freedom to c o n t r i b u t e to the common good. 
M i l l on one hand was prepared to show th a t a person's 
freedom d i d not belong to him as an a b s t r a c t r i g h t but was d e r i v e d 
9 
from u t i l i t y , and as such was w i l l i n g to encourage some growth of 
s t a t e f u n c t i o n s provided those f u n c t i o n s were d i r e c t e d towards the 
permanent i n t e r e s t s of mankind as p r o g r e s s i v e beings. On the other 
hand, Spencer argued t h a t a person's l i b e r t y belonged to him as a 
n a t u r a l r i g h t , and consequently, no s t a t e could j u s t i f i a b l y 
i n t e r f e r e with i t . * ^ Green h e l d q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t view. He gave the 
impre s s i o n t h a t a person owed h i s freedom as a r i g h t to the s o c i e t y . 
I f l i b e r t y were d e r i v e d from the s o c i e t y , c i v i l laws (and hence the 
s t a t e which i s "a d e l i b e r a t e v o i c e of s o c i e t y " ) could j u s t i f i a b l y 
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i n t e r f e r e or i n c r e a s e t h e i r f u n c t i o n s . 
M i l l and Spencer v e r s u s Green. 
T.H.Green i s g e n e r a l l y heralded as marking a d i s t i n c t i v e 
break w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a of l i b e r t y . Does he r e a l l y provide 
a new i d e a about freedom ? How does he compare and c o n t r a s t w i t h 
M i l l and Spencer ? 
T.H.Green considered freedom as "a p o s i t i v e power or 
c a p a c i t y of doing or en j o y i n g something worth doing or enjoying, 
and t h a t something t h a t we do enjoy w i t h others."''"''' Freedom i s a 
p o s i t i v e t h i n g and does not merely imply an absence of r e s t r a i n t . 
Hence, he could argue t h a t a savage could not be counted as being 
f r e e because he was not s u b j e c t e d to any r e s t r a i n t imposed by 
s o c i e t y but t h a t of nat u r e . Accordingly, r e s t r a i n t imposed by 
s o c i e t y formed an e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e towards the r e a l i z a t i o n of 
freedom, and t o submit to these r e s t r a i n t s became the f i r s t s t e p 
i n t r u e freedom because i t was the f i r s t s t e p towards the f u l l 
e x e r c i s e of the f a c u l t i e s w i t h which man was endowed. 
Applying t h i s i d e a of l i b e r t y to the notio n of c o n t r a c t , 
he observed t h a t freedom of c o n t r a c t , l i b e r t y , i n a l l the forms of 
doing what a person w i l l w i t h a person's own,was v a l u a b l e only as a 
means to an end. That end was what he considered as freedom i n the 
p o s i t i v e sense. Put i n other words, he regarded i t as the 
l i b e r a t i o n of the powers of a l l men e q u a l l y f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n to a 
12 
"common good". He i n s i s t e d t h a t no person, i n whatever s o c i a l 
or economic f u n c t i o n the person was engaged, had a r i g h t to 
contravene t h i s end. The person would not be tempted to go a g a i n s t 
t h i s end, i f he r e a l i s e d t h a t the means of pursuing h i s i n t e r e s t 
were guaranteed him by the s o c i e t y . T h i s guarantee, he a s s e r t e d , 
was b u i l t on the idea of common i n t e r e s t . "Everyone has an i n t e r e s t 
i n s e c u r i n g to everyone e l s e the f r e e use and enjoyment and 
d i s p o s a l of h i s p o s s e s s i o n s , so long as t h a t freedom on the p a r t 
of one does not i n t e r f e r e w i t h a l i k e freedom on the p a r t of o t h e r s , 
because such freedom c o n t r i b u t e s to t h a t equal development of the 
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..13 f a c u l t i e s of a l l which i s the h i g h e s t good of a l l . 
Green's views would tend to i n d i c a t e t h a t any a r t i f i c i a l 
h indrance to a person's a b i l i t y to c o n t r i b u t e to the common good' 
would form a gen e r a l s a n c t i o n f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . But t h i s was J 
14 
the case as R i c h t e r observed. I t was not what Green meant. He d i d 
not i n f a c t maintain a steady p r i n c i p l e but tended to waver between 
e a r l y 19th century t r a d i t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m and c o l l e c t i v i s m so 
long as e i t h e r l e d to the development of c h a r a c t e r . N e i t h e r d i d he 
seem to e s t a b l i s h any p r i n c i p l e f o r marking o f f j u s t i f i a b l e l i m i t s 
of s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
15 
Weinstein, and R i c h t e r have both shown how much Green 
f a i l e d i n g i v i n g freedom a cogent d e f i n i t i o n . Holding these 
c r i t i c i s m s v a l i d , how f a r d i d Green's views compare or c o n t r a s t 
w i t h those h e l d by M i l l and Spencer ? Spencer f o r example a l l o t t e d 
a s u p e r v i s o r y post to the s t a t e and would encourage i t to 
ad m i n i s t e r j u s t i c e when a person i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the equal freedom 
of h i s neighbour. Freedom to him was e s s e n t i a l f o r the e x e r c i s e 
of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s f a c u l t i e s , i n s h o r t the development of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . I t was observed t h a t Green a s s e r t e d t h a t l i b e r t y 
ought to be given people f o r the development of t h e i r f a c u l t i e s 
which enabled them c o n t r i b u t e g e n e r a l l y towards the common good. 
He argued t h a t i t was the duty of government to ma i n t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s without which a f r e e e x e r c i s e of the human f a c u l t i e s 
was i m p o s s i b l e . A view s i m i l a r t o what Spencer i n s i s t e d should be 
the duty of the s t a t e , though w h i l e Green would go f u r t h e r to 
encourage s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e by l e g i s l a t i o n , Spencer would not. 
One wonders whether both men were not preaching the same 
d o c t r i n e from d i f f e r e n t t e x t s . I f i t were the duty of the s t a t e 
to ensure t h a t every person pursues h i s i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n h i s 
sphere of a c t i o n , as Spencer -stated;' was i t not m a i n t a i n i n g 
a c o n d i t i o n which would enable the i n d i v i d u a l to e x e r c i s e h i s 
f a c u l t i e s ? I f i t d i d , was i t not the same duty Green a l l o c a t e d 
to the s t a t e ? One might say t h a t Spencer was more i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the improvement of the i n d i v i d u a l and Green was keener on 
- 165 -
ena b l i n g the person to c o n t r i b u t e towards the common good. But on 
the other hand, c l o s e examination shows t h a t they a l l come to the 
same t h i n g . Spencer had e a r l i e r t o l d us t h a t s o c i e t y was a 
16 
f i c t i t i o u s body t h a t what counted was the mass of people 
composing i t . I f t h i s were the case, when an i n d i v i d u a l improved 
h i m s e l f , or made a new d i s c o v e r y , would such d i s c o v e r y not s e r v e 
the purpose of a l l ? 
I t i s to an extent doubtful whether Green a c t u a l l y 
departed from the i n d i v i d u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m . L i k e 
Bentham and Spencer, he admitted t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l formed an 
important u n i t of the s o c i e t y , and the l a t t e r depended on him f o r 
the g e n e r a l good. Any impediment the i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r e d i n h i b i t e d 
h i s powers of c o n t r i b u t i n g to the common good. S o c i e t y then, 
s u f f e r s a l o s s . S o c i e t y i s made up of d i f f e r e n t important u n i t s , 
and the gen e r a l good of the s o c i e t y depends on the s e u n i t s . When 
Green a f f i r m e d t h a t i t was the duty of the s t a t e to maintain 
c o n d i t i o n s f a v o u r a b l e to the f r e e e x e r c i s e of a person's f a c u l t i e s 
i n order to enable him to c o n t r i b u t e to the common good, was he 
not r e p e a t i n g the d o c t r i n e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y which e a r l y l i b e r a l i s m 
preached, though earmarking i t w i t h the noti o n of common good. 
17 
As i t was pointed out before, Green a s s e r t e d t h a t a 
person owed h i s r i g h t to freedom to s o c i e t y . Implying t h a t an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom depends on s o c i a l and l e g a l r i g h t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s . A view which was shared by Bentham but which M i l l d i d 
not e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e . For M i l l , a person's l i b e r t y i s d e r i v e d 
18 
from u t i l i t y . Hence, Green i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e r t y s t r e s s e d 
or d e s c r i b e d freedom as "....a power which each e x e r c i s e s through 
the help or s e c u r i t y given him by h i s fellow-men, and which he 
..19 
i n t u r n h e l p s to s e c u r e f o r them. As regards freedom of 
c o n t r a c t , both M i l l and Green tended to encourage s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
because t h e r e were c e r t a i n c o n t r a c t s which f o r the i n t e r e s t of 
p u b l i c good should not be executed. 
Behind the id e a of e a r l y l i b e r a l i s m l a y the d e s i r e to 
d i m i n i s h c o e r c i o n , probably because of the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the 
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g r e a t e s t amount of freedom c o i n c i d e s w i t h absence of l e g i s l a t i o n . 
M i l l observed t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i b e r t y was being s u b j e c t e d to 
two forms of c o e r c i o n - one l e g a l , i . e . a r i s i n g from the s t a t e , 
and the other n o n - l e g a l , i . e . a r i s i n g from the s o c i e t y . He admitted 
t h a t r e s t r a i n t s were bad but not to a degree which would 
n e c e s s i t a t e t h e i r n u l l i f i c a t i o n . Consequently he t r i e d , w h i l e 
a l l o w i n g a measure of c o e r c i o n , to develop a p r i n c i p l e which would 
determine the scope of i n d i v i d u a l freedom. Green t r i e d to meet t h i s 
i s s u e w i t h h i s theory of " p o s i t i v e freedom" probably on the 
assumption t h a t s i n c e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y depends on s o c i a l and 
l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n , i t was the duty of a government to 
se c u r e every person h i s a p p r opriate sphere of f r e e a c t i o n . Spencer 
i n l i n e w i t h e a r l y l i b e r a l thought, regarded the s t a t e as a s e r i o u s 
threat"=<tb^ the freedom, and would not encourage any e x t e n s i v e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e by the s t a t e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . Convinced t h a t 
freedom was a n a t u r a l r i g h t , he argued t h a t the s t a t e - an a r t i f i c i a l 
body - would be doing wrong i f i t i n t e r f e r e d w i t h i t . A l l the 
s t a t e should do, was to make c e r t a i n t h a t no person exceeded h i s 
n a t u r a l l i m i t s . 
M i l l and Green appeared to t a c k l e r e a l i t y b e t t e r than 
Spencer d i d . Obviously, t h e r e was much i n e q u a l i t y i n s o c i e t y i n the 
19th century. Without s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e as M i l l and Green showed, 
most people would f i n d t h a t t h e i r l i b e r t y to pursue t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r own way, or make the most of themselves, was 
u s e l e s s . A f a t h e r , f o r example, would be behaving f o o l i s h l y i f he 
bought a c a r f o r h i s son and gave him the freedom to d r i v e the c a r 
anytime he wished to do so without ensuring t h a t the son could 
d r i v e . Spencer, i n f l u e n c e d by h i s i d e a s of " s u r v i v a l of the 
f i t t e s t " , and h i s p a r t i c u l a r concept of n a t u r a l law d i d not seem to 
r e a l i z e t h i s f a c t . 
C r i t i c i s m ; - The p o l i t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r which M i l l i s ever 
remembered a r e - d e l i m i t i n g the i n t e r f e r e n c e of government w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom, and a s s e r t i n g the need to ma i n t a i n a high 
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degree of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . But a c l o s e examination of M i l l ' s s e t 
of d o c t r i n e s on education tends to oppose h i s p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y . 
I t does i n f a c t suggest t h a t he was not l i b e r a t i n g but advocating 
domination of the mass or "the mediocre" by the e l i t e . The 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y which he was preaching was one which should be 
allowed a f r e e scope w i t h i n the l i m i t s f i x e d by a r a t i o n a l s o c i a l 
consensus of higher or e l e v a t e d minds. 
M i l l made c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s on i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
but appeared to make them u n a t t r a c t i v e by encouraging s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e . U n a t t r a c t i v e i n the sense t h a t s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
l i m i t e d the freedom he advocated, and tended to f r u s t r a t e the 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y he fought f o r . " . . . . s o c i e t y , ..../he said7 has now 
f a i r l y got the b e t t e r of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and the danger which 
t h r e a t e n s human nature i s not the ex c e s s , but the d e f i c i e n c y , of 
per s o n a l impulses and p r e f e r e n c e s . Things a r e v a s t l y changed s i n c e 
the p a s s i o n s of those who were strong by s t a t i o n or by p e r s o n a l 
endowment were i n a s t a t e of h a b i t u a l r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t laws and 
ordinances, and r e q u i r e d to be r i g o r o u s l y chained up to enable the 
persons w i t h i n t h e i r r e ach to enjoy any p a r t i c l e of s e c u r i t y . 
...ZHe d i d / not mean th a t they choose what i s customary i n 
pre f e r e n c e to what s u i t s t h e i r own i n c l i n a t i o n . I t does not occur 
to them to have any i n c l i n a t i o n , except f o r what i s customary. 
Thus the mind i t s e l f i s bowed to the yoke: even i n what people do 
f o r p l e a s u r e , conformity i s the f i r s t t h i n g thought of; they l i k e 
i n crowds, they e x e r c i s e c h o i c e only among t h i n g s commonly done: 
p e c u l i a r i t y of t a s t e , e c c e n t r i c i t y of conduct, a r e shunned e q u a l l y 
w i t h crimes: u n t i l by d i n t of not f o l l o w i n g t h e i r own nature they 
have no nature to follow; t h e i r human c a p a c i t i e s a r e withered and 
s t a r v e d ; they become i n c a p a b l e of any s t r o n g wishes or n a t i v e 
p l e a s u r e s , and a r e g e n e r a l l y without e i t h e r o pinions or f e e l i n g s 
..20 
of home growth or p r o p e r l y t h e i r own. 
"To g i v e any f a i r p l a y to the nature of each, i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l t h a t d i f f e r e n t persons should be allowed to l e a d 
d i f f e r e n t l i v e s . I n pro p o r t i o n as t h i s l a t i t u d e has been e x e r c i s e d 
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i n any age, has t h a t age been noteworthy to p o s t e r i t y . Even 
despotism does not produce i t s worst e f f e c t s , so long as 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y e x i s t s under i t ; and whatever crushes i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
21 
i s despotism by whatever name i t may be c a l l e d . . " 
22 
M i l l condemned custom as has been pointed out before, 
because i t l i m i t e d i n d i v i d u a l ' s freedom of c h o i c e , " . . . . i t i s the 
p r i v i l e g e and proper c o n d i t i o n of a human being, a r r i v e d a t the 
ma t u r i t y of h i s f a c u l t i e s , to use and i n t e r p r e t e experience i n h i s 
23 
own way," but customs prevented t h i s . I n d i v i d u a l s gained no 
experience i n choosing what was best f o r them because t h e i r attempt 
was i n h i b i t e d by custom. On t h i s b a s i s , he warned t h a t "human 
nature i s not a machine to be b u i l t a f t e r a model, and s e t to do 
e x a c t l y the work p r e s c r i b e d f o r i t , but a t r e e , which r e q u i r e s to 
grow and develop i t s e l f on a l l s i d e s , according to the tendency of 
24 
the inward f o r c e s which make i t a l i v i n g t h i n g . " 
These were not only h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about i n d i v i d u a l i t y , 
He gathered a l s o from the ideas of Von Humboldt t h a t the two 
r e q u i s i t e s to i n d i v i d u a l i t y of power and development were freedom 
and v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s . I n order to p r e s e r v e these r e q u i s i t e s , 
he urged t h a t " . . . . f r e e scope should be given to v a r i e t i e s of 
c h a r a c t e r , s h o r t of i n j u r y to o t h e r s ; and t h a t the worth of 
d i f f e r e n t modes of l i f e should be proved p r a c t i c a l l y , when any one 
t h i n k s f i t to t r y them. I t i s d e s i r a b l e , i n s h o r t , t h a t i n t h i n g s 
which do not p r i m a r i l y concern o t h e r s , i n d i v i d u a l i t y should a s s e r t 
i t s e l f . Where, not the person's own c h a r a c t e r , but the t r a d i t i o n s or 
customs of other people a r e the r u l e of conduct, t h e r e i s wanting 
one of the p r i n c i p l e i n g r e d i e n t s of human happiness, and q u i t e the 
..25 
c h i e f i n g r e d i e n t of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . 
Having made these a s s e r t i o n s , he proceeded to b l u r them 
by encouraging s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e or r a t h e r s u b j e c t i n g the 
i n d i v i d u a l to the domination of the e l i t e . He would d e l i m i t s t a t e 
f u n c t i o n s p a r t l y because i n d i v i d u a l s were the be s t judges of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s and p a r t l y as governments assumed g r e a t e r f u n c t i o n s , 
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t h e i r powers tended to i n c r e a s e . But i n matters of education, he 
would encourage s t a t e . i n t e r f e r e n c e because education being one of 
"...those things which are c h i e f l y u s e f u l astending to r a i s e the 
c h a r a c t e r of human beings. The u n c u l t i v a t e d cannot be competent 
judges of c u l t i v a t i o n . Those who most need to be made w i s e r and 
b e t t e r , u s u a l l y d e s i r e i t l e a s t , and, i f they d e s i r e d i t , would 
.,26 
be i n c a p a b l e of f i n d i n g the way to i t by t h e i r own l i g h t s . 
I n s h o r t , " i n the matter of education, the i n t e r v e n t i o n of government 
i s j u s t i f i a b l e , because the case i s not one i n which the i n t e r e s t 
and judgement of the consumer are a s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y f o r the 
27 
goodness of the commodity." 
R e a l i z i n g t h a t "the primary and p e r e n n i a l sources of a l l 
28 
s o c i a l e v i l , a r e ignorance and want of c u l t u r e , " he warned t h a t 
they could not be e l i m i n a t e d from the s o c i e t y "by the b e s t 
c o n t r i v e d system of p o l i t i c a l checks, n e c e s s a r y as such checks are 
28 
/designed/ f o r other purposes." I n s t e a d , they could be 
exterminated by "....the u n r e m i t t i n g e x e r t i o n s of the more 
i n s t r u c t e d and c u l t i v a t e d , whether i n the p o s i t i o n of the government 
or i n a p r i v a t e s t a t i o n , t o awaken i n t h e i r minds a consciousness of 
28 
t h i s want, and to f a c i l i t a t e to them the means of sup p l y i n g i t . " 
Convinced t h a t a c i v i l i z e d government ought to i n c l u d e 
the most educated i n the s o c i e t y , M i l l was l e d to a l l o c a t e the 
f u n c t i o n of education to them. Being the b e s t , these e l i t e s ought 
" . . . . t h e r e f o r e be capable of o f f e r i n g b e t t e r education and b e t t e r 
i n s t r u c t i o n to the people, than the g r e a t e r number of them would 
29 
spontaneously demand." The i n d i v i d u a l i t y , he was preaching 
appears to be clamped down to the consensus of opinion formed by 
the e l e v a t e d minds i n the s o c i e t y . 
T h i s view i s f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t e d by another of M i l l ' s 
views. I n t r y i n g to t e l l us what he meant by d i f f e r e n c e of q u a l i t y 
i n p l e a s u r e s , or what makes one p l e a s u r e g r e a t e r i n amount than 
another, M i l l a f f i r m e d t h a t i t was the p r e f e r e n c e of a person who 
had the knowledge of the two p l e a s u r e s which r e a l l y counted, and 
not what any i n d i v i d u a l f r e e l y thought of them. "Of two p l e a s u r e s , 
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i f t h e r e be one to which a l l or.almost a l l who have experience of 
both g i v e a decided p r e f e r e n c e , i r r e s p e c t i v e of any f e e l i n g of 
moral o b l i g a t i o n to p r e f e r i t , t h a t i s the more d e s i r a b l e p l e a s u r e . 
I f one of the two i s , by those who are competently acquainted w i t h 
both, p l a c e d so f a r above the other t h a t they p r e f e r i t , even 
though knowing i t to be attended w i t h a g r e a t e r amount of 
d i s c o n t e n t , and would not r e s i g n i t f o r any q u a n t i t y of the other 
p l e a s u r e which t h e i r nature i s capable of, we a r e j u s t i f i e d i n 
a s c r i b i n g to the p r e f e r r e d enjoyment a s u p e r i o r i t y i n q u a l i t y , so 
f a r outweighing q u a n t i t y as to render i t , i n comparison, of s m a l l 
30 
account." Judging from the c o n d i t i o n of the mass i n the 19th 
century, i t i s d i s p u t a b l e whether M i l l was r e a l l y advocating 
freedom f o r them to pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s or p l e a s u r e i n 
t h e i r own way or to fo l l o w the d e c i s i o n s of these e l e v a t e d minds 
because they appear the only group which can a f f o r d to experience 
d i f f e r e n t types of p l e a s u r e . 
I t i s i n f a c t d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o n c i l e M i l l ' s s e t of 
d o c t r i n e s on education and h i s p r i n c i p l e s of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Perhaps 
the i n d i v i d u a l i t y which he was preaching was on]y meant f o r those 
e l i t e s , and not f o r the mass. As he pointed out: " i t does seem, 
however, t h a t when the opinions of masses of merely average men are 
every where become or becoming the dominant power, the 
counterpoise and c o r r e c t i v e to t h a t tendency would be the more and 
more pronounced i n d i v i d u a l i t y of those who stand on the higher 
eminences of thought. I t i s i n these circumstances most e s p e c i a l l y , 
t h a t e x c e p t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s , i n s t e a d of being d e t e r r e d , should 
..31 
be encouraged i n a c t i n g d i f f e r e n t l y from the mass. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , 
h i s endeavour might be to b u i l d a s o c i e t y based on enlightened 1'* 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t and not on d i v e r s i f i e d m e d i o c r i t y . 
Though t h i s c r i t i c i s m has been passed on M i l l , i t a l s o 
e x p l a i n s the d i f f i c u l t y i n which most t h i n k e r s i n c l u d i n g M i l l 
h i m s e l f found themselves. They a l l admitted t h a t l i b e r t y was good 
and ought to be an end i n i t s e l f . The problem most of them had to 
s o l v e was how - f i r s t l y , t o maximize the scope of i n d i v i d u a l 
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freedom and secondly to make i t a v a l u a b l e end. Hobbes and Locke 
32 
argued t h a t people had by nature equal r i g h t s to freedom. B e s i d e s 
having these r i g h t s , Hobbes pointed out t h a t they were a l s o s e l f -
s e e k i n g by n a t u r e . Without the e x i s t e n c e of a s t a t e to c o n t r o l 
them, t h e r e was a tendency f o r some i n d i v i d u a l s to encroach on the 
33 
r i g h t s of t h e i r neighbours. I n order to ensure t h a t every person 
sought h i s own i n t e r e s t s i n h i s sphere of l i b e r t y , i t was n e c e s s a r y 
to c r e a t e a s t a t e . Bentham accepted the n e c e s s i t y of a s t a t e though 
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he d i d not agree t h a t people had n a t u r a l r i g h t s to freedom. I n 
other words, i t can be s t a t e d t h a t Hobbes, Locke, Bentham h e l d 
t h a t the s o l u t i o n to the d i f f i c u l t y was provided by c r e a t i n g a 
. government on one hand, and by i n d i v i d u a l s on the other, obeying 
the laws of the s t a t e . 
M i l l p e r c e i v e d t h a t the answer to the d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d 
something more than mere c r e a t i o n of a s t a t e . His reason was t h a t 
the s t a t e could be t y r a n n i c a l to i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . I n f a c t , he 
observed a l s o , t h a t not only the s t a t e but s o c i e t y could be 
t y r a n n i c a l . From h i s p a r t i c u l a r o b s e r v a t i o n , he saw t h a t " i n 
the stage of progress i n t o which the more c i v i l i s e d p o r t i o n s of 
the s p e c i e s have now entered, i t /the i d e a of freedom7 p r e s e n t s 
i t s e l f under new c o n d i t i o n s , and r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t and more 
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fundamental treatment. A c c o r d i n g l y , he endeavoured to 
supplement the s o l u t i o n o f f e r e d by h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s by developing 
h i s s e l f and o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g p r i n c i p l e . The i n d i v i d u a l , the s t a t e 
and s o c i e t y have t h e i r own spheres of a c t i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r a t h e r d e f i n e d . The l a t t e r ( t h e s t a t e and s o c i e t y ) 
now has been informed when to j u s t i f i a b l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h the scope 
of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . I n s h o r t , the sphere of i n d i v i d u a l freedom 
has been maximized ( t h a t i s i n r e l a t i o n to the p r i n c i p l e ) . I n 
M i l l i a n sense, t h i s sphere r e l a t e s to a l l t h a t concerns the 
i n d i v i d u a l . I t must be added t h a t he was very c a u t i o u s about t h i s ; 
hence he did not encourage c o e r c i o n or any l e g a l s a n c t i o n i n those 
t h i n g s which a f f e c t a person alone. What the s o c i e t y ought to do i s 
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to a d v i s e and persuade the person. 
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How can t h i s scope be made v a l u a b l e - How can t h i s 
long-sought f o r o b j e c t (freedom) be put i n proper use ? C l e a r l y , 
t h i s o b j e c t can be made l e s s v a l u a b l e i f misused. The deduction 
made from M i l l ' s views, namely, s u b j e c t i n g the masses to the 
consensus of opinion of the e l e v a t e d minds, suggests t h a t he might 
have conceived i t as the b e s t way of r e n d e r i n g the sphere v a l u a b l e . 
T h i s view i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the f a c t that M i l l was w r i t i n g 
d u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d - an e r a of p r o g r e s s . T h i s p e r i o d 
according to him was marked by these two f e a t u r e s . F i r s t l y , i t was 
a p e r i o d when t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s were dying away. Secondly, men 
r e q u i r e d new b e l i e f s and i d e a s to r e p l a c e o l d ones w i t h . I n h i s 
words: " . . . . t h i s i s a f e a t u r e belonging to periods of t r a n s i t i o n , 
when o l d notions and f e e l i n g s have been u n s e t t l e d , and no new 
d o c t r i n e s have y e t succeeded to t h e i r ascendancy. At such times 
people of any mental a c t i v i t y , having given up t h e i r o l d b e l i e f s , 
and not f e e l i n g q u i t e s u r e t h a t those they s t i l l r e t a i n can stand 
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unmodified, l i s t e n e a g e r l y to new o p i n i o n s . " I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t 
the masses who have had t h e i r minds darkened by custom and 
t r a d i t i o n w i l l have any new i d e a s or b e l i e f s to propagate i n 
s o c i e t y . The most they w i l l have to o f f e r a r e the o l d b e l i e f s 
and i d e a s entrenched by custom. I t i s c l e a r then t h a t i n order to 
l e a r n new i d e a s and b e l i e f s , these masses r e q u i r e the guidance of 
the few e n l i g h t e n e d i n d i v i d u a l s . With such an a s s i s t a n c e a v a i l a b l e , 
they ( t h e masses) w i l l be able to make t h e i r scope of l i b e r t y 
v a l u a b l e . 
Due to the growth of s o c i a l e q u a l i t y and of government by 
p u b l i c opinion a t t h i s p e r i o d , he observed t h a t those whose 
opinions were heard of as the s t a t e , were the " C o l l e c t i v e 
m e d i o c r i t y " . Government by such people could only produce a 
mediocre s t a t e and i n order to r a i s e the s t a t e above m e d i o c r i t y , i t 
was e s s e n t i a l to e n t r u s t the s t a t e to one or few t a l e n t e d and 
educated people. 
T h i s was how he put i t . : "At present i n d i v i d u a l s are l o s t 
i n the crowd. I n p o l i t i c s i t i s almost a t r i v i a l i t y to say t h a t 
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p u b l i c opinion now r u l e s the world. The only power d e s e r v i n g the 
name i s t h a t of masses, and of governments w h i l e they make 
themselves the organ of the tendencies and i n s t i n c t s of masses .... 
Those whose opinions go by the name of p u b l i c opinion a r e not 
always the same s o r t of p u b l i c But they a r e always a mass, 
t h a t i s to say, c o l l e c t i v e m e d i o c r i t y . And what i s a s t i l l g r e a t e r 
n o v e l t y , the mass do not now take t h e i r opinions from d i g n i t a r i e s 
i n s t a t e , from o s t e n s i b l e l e a d e r s , or from books. T h e i r 
t h i n k i n g i s done f o r them by men much l i k e themselves, a d d r e s s i n g 
them or speaking i n t h e i r name, on the spur of the moment,through 
the newspapers But t h a t does not hin d e r the government of 
m e d i o c r i t y from being mediocre government. No government by a 
democracy or a numerous a r i s t o c r a c y , e i t h e r i n i t s p o l i t i c a l a c t s 
or i n the opinions, q u a l i t i e s , and tone of mind which i t f o s t e r s , 
e v e r d i d n r could r i s e above me d i o c r i t y , except i n so f a r as the 
s o v e r e i g n Many have l e t themselves be guided by the counsels 
and i n f l u e n c e of a more h i g h l y g i f t e d and i n s t r u c t e d One or Few. 
The i n i t i a t i o n of a l l w i s e or noble t h i n g s comes and must come from 
i n d i v i d u a l s ; g e n e r a l l y a t f i r s t from some one i n d i v i d u a l . The 
honour and g l o r y of the average man i s t h a t he i s capable of 
f o l l o w i n g t h a t i n i t i a t i v e ; t h a t he can respond i n t e r n a l l y t o w i s e 
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and noble t h i n g s , and be l e d to them w i t h h i s eyes open." 
The same i d e a M i l l was r e p e a t i n g on h i s t h e s i s on -
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The E x t e n s i o n Of The S u f f r a g e . Here, though, he accepted the 
enfranchisement of the masses as a d e s i r a b l e f e a t u r e of democracy, 
he d i d not only advocate l i m i t i n g t h i s l i b e r t y by c e r t a i n 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r v o t i n g but a l s o argued t h a t i t was 
d e s i r a b l e to e n t r u s t matters of government to people w i t h 
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s u p e r i o r i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
n 
I t i s not o n l y ^ M i l l t h a t one observes t h i s c o n f l i c t 
between i n d i v i d u a l i t y and another s e t of d o c t r i n e . I t can a l s o be 
seen i n Spencer. Tension tends to appear between s o c i e t y as an 
organism and Spencer's i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c views. Drawing h i s analogy 
between a s o c i a l and an animal organism t h i s was what Spencer 
had to say of s o c i e t y as an organism. "When we say t h a t growth i s 
- 174 « 
common to s o c i a l aggregates and o r g a n i c aggregates, we do not thus 
e n t i r e l y exclude community w i t h o r g a n i c aggregates:.... N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
compared w i t h t h i n g s we c a l l inanimate, l i v i n g bodies and s o c i e t i e s 
so conspicuously e x h i b i t augmentation of mass, t h a t we may f a i r l y 
r egard t h i s as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of them both. Many organisms grow 
throughout t h e i r l i v e s ; and the r e s t grow throughout c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p a r t s of t h e i r l i v e s . S o c i a l growth u s u a l l y continues e i t h e r up to 
times when the s o c i e t i e s d i v i d e , or up to times when they a r e 
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overwhelmed." 
He a s s e r t e d t h a t the p r i n c i p l e which should govern the 
r i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p between people i n the s o c i e t y was - "Every man 
has freedom to do a l l t h a t he w i l l s , provided he i n f r i n g e s not the 
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equal freedom of any other man." Holding t h i s view as the 
cornerstone of h i s p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , he opposed the i d e a of 
n a t i o n a l system of education, p o o r i r e l i e f because they i n v o l v e d 
t a k i n g money from a person f o r the b e n e f i t of another and hence 
i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of the former. I n h i s words - " i n as much as 
the t a k i n g away by government, of more of a man's property than i s 
needful f o r m a i n t a i n i n g h i s r i g h t s , i s an infringement of h i s 
r i g h t s , and t h e r e f o r e a r e v e r s a l of the government's f u n c t i o n 
towards him, and i n as much as the t a k i n g away of h i s property to 
educate h i s own or other people's c h i l d r e n i s not needful f o r the 
m a i n t a i n i n g of h i s r i g h t s , the t a k i n g away of h i s property f o r such . .,43 a purpose i s wrong. 
I n h i s analogy between an animal and a s o c i a l organism, 
he showed t h a t the l a t t e r depended f o r i t s l i f e on mutual-dependence 
of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s . How could t h i s mutual dependence be v a l i d 
i f i t were wrong f o r the s t a t e to take away p a r t of a u n i t ' s 
property to a s s i s t another ? I f A and B were mutually dependent, 
and r e q u i r e d each other's co-operation, would A l e a v e B to 
degenerate i n t o a c o n d i t i o n i n which he would be of no e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e to A because C ( a s t a t e o f f i c i a l ) had i n t e r f e r e d to make 
the a s s i s t a n c e s y s t e m a t i c and w e l l organized ? Would i t not pay A 
t o a s s i s t B out of h i s i n f e r i o r s i t u a t i o n i n order to ensure t h a t 
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t h e i r inter-dependence was u s e f u l ? Did Spencer condemn such an 
a l t r u i s t i c a c t because an a u t h o r i t y had i n t e r f e r e d f o r the b e n e f i t 
of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s ? What would he say i f such mutual 
a s s i s t a n c e were l e f t to the spontaneous v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n of the 
p a r t s of the organism ? He had a f f i r m e d t h a t mutually-dependent 
p a r t s c o n s t i t u t e d the l i f e of the whole, and the l i f e of t h i s Whole 
was produced by the u n i t s . Holding t h i s view, i t was wrong f o r him 
to argue t h a t the whole would be more e f f i c i e n t l y maintained by 
l e a v i n g i t s l i f e to be c a t e r e d f o r by the v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n of i t s 
p a r t s r a t h e r than by e n s u r i n g t h a t every u n i t played i t s r o l e . 
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I n h i s autobiography , he remarked i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d -
Honesty i s the b e s t p o l i c y - t h a t the l i f e and h e a l t h of a s o c i e t y 
were the l i f e and h e a l t h of one c r e a t u r e . The same v i t a l i t y e x i s t e d 
throughout the whole mass. One p a r t could not s u f f e r without the 
r e s t being u l t i m a t e l y i n j u r e d . These views c o n t r a d i c t e d h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e . R e a l i z i n g t h a t a p a r t of the s o c i e t y 
could not s u f f e r without the r e s t being u l t i m a t e l y i n j u r e d , t h e r e 
was no point i n opposing the s t a t e i n i t s i n t e r f e r e n c e to provide a 
n a t i o n a l system of education, p o o r - r e l i e f or r a t h e r d e l i m i t i n g s t a t e 
f u n c t i o n s on the b a s i s of t h a t p r i n c i p l e . 
Again, he t o l d us t h a t a person had the r i g h t to ignore 
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the s t a t e . Could a u n i t or a c e l l ignore the whole mass by way of 
not performing i t s f u n c t i o n ? I f i t d i d would the body f u n c t i o n 
p r o p e r l y ? C o n s i d e r i n g the l a s t q u e s t i o n i n the l i g h t of h i s 
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j o i n t - s t o c k theory, i t i s doubtful i f the body would f u n c t i o n , 
when an important c e l l or c e l l s r e f u s e d to j o i n the body. These are 
a l l t e n s i o n s , which Spencer's o r g a n i c theory produce when r e l a t e d to 
h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i d e a s . 
Spencer turned to admit t h a t "co-operation being i n e i t h e r 
c a s e / I . e . s o c i a l and animal organism/ i m p o s s i b l e without 
a p p l i a n c e s by which the co-operating p a r t s s h a l l have t h e i r a c t i o n s 
a d j u s t e d , i t i n e v i t a b l y happens t h a t i n the body p o l i t i c , as i n the 
l i v i n g body, t h e r e a r i s e s a r e g u l a t i n g system, and w i t h i n i t s e l f 
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t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e s as the s e t s of organs e v o l v e . " Here, he i s 
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s t r e s s i n g the importance of a r e g u l a t i n g apparatus f o r ensuring an 
e f f e c t i v e co-operation among v a r i o u s p a r t s of the body p o l i t i c . 
A l l i n a l l , Spencer at times made statements which tend to render 
h i s argument about i n d i v i d u a l i s m empty. 
On c o n s i d e r i n g h i s i d e a s about s t a t e and s o c i e t y , i t 
appears t h a t he was not c o n s i s t e n t i n h i s concepts of r i g h t s . The 
notion of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t shows i t s e l f at d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of h i s 
w r i t i n g s . For example, he a f f i r m e d t h a t the s t a t e could be regarded 
as a j o i n t - s t o c k concern to which people had the r i g h t to j o i n or 
not and the d i r e c t o r s of the concern had no other r u l e s to abide by 
than those s e t down by i t s members. Next, he a s s e r t e d t h a t an 
i n d i v i d u a l had a r i g h t to ignore the s t a t e . 
I n h i s words: " I f every man has freedom to do a l l t h a t he 
w i l l s , provided he i n f r i n g e s not the equal freedom of any other man, 
then he i s f r e e to drop connection w i t h the s t a t e - to r e l i n q u i s h 
i t s p r o t e c t i o n , and to r e f u s e paying towards i t s support. I t i s 
s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t i n so behaving he i n no way trenches upon the 
l i b e r t y of o t h e r s ; f o r h i s p o s i t i o n i s a p a s s i v e one; and w h i l s t 
p a s s i v e he cannot become an aggressor. I t i s e q u a l l y s e l f - e v i d e n t 
t h a t he cannot be compelled to continue one of a p o l i t i c a l c o r p o r a t i o r 
without a breach of the moral law, s e e i n g t h a t c i t i z e n s h i p i n v o l v e s 
payment of t a x e s , and the t a k i n g away of a man's property a g a i n s t 
h i s w i l l , i s an infringement of h i s r i g h t s . Government being simply 
an agent employed i n common by a number of i n d i v i d u a l s to s e c u r e 
to them c e r t a i n advantages, the very nature of the connection 
i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s f o r each to say whether he w i l l employ such an 
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agent or not. I f s o c i e t y as he tended to show were a c o n t r a c t , 
i t followed t h a t r i g h t s were i n h e r e n t i n the i n d i v i d u a l and were 
abs o l u t e and i n a l i e n a b l e . But these views appear to c o n t r a d i c t • t h e 
n o t i o n of r i g h t s when s o c i e t y i s regarded as an organism. 
Spencer had shown t h a t s o c i e t y was comparable to an animal 
organism. Apart from t h i s , he a f f i r m e d t h a t the e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which these organisms d e p i c t was mutual dependence 
of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s and the l i f e of the whole being produced 
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by i t s p a r t s . I t i s deducible from t h i s view, t h a t r i g h t s here are 
r e l a t i v e and d e r i v a b l e from the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e . 
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Again, he a s s e r t e d t h a t land belonged to the s o c i e t y , and 
the mere mixing of a person's labour w i t h p a r t of i t , d i d not make 
the person the owner of the p a r t as Locke maintained. The mere 
mixing of labour can g i v e the person a b e t t e r r i g h t to the property 
than any other person and not a s o l e r i g h t u n l e s s he can prove 
t h a t by c o n t r i b u t i n g such a labour, "....he has made h i s r i g h t t o . . 
.../the p r o p e r t y / g r e a t e r than the p r e - e x i s t i n g r i g h t s of a l l other 
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men put t o g e t h e r . " 
S a t i s f i e d t h a t he had made a case, Spencer turned to s e t 
down a p r i n c i p l e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the law of equal freedom which 
j u s t i f i e d an i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m i n g a r i g h t over a property. T h i s 
p r i n c i p l e demanded " . . . . t h a t , without any i n f r a c t i o n of the law of 
equal freedom, an i n d i v i d u a l may l e a s e from s o c i e t y a given s u r f a c e 
of s o i l , by agreeing to pay i n r e t u r n a s t a t e d amount of. the produce 
he o b t a i n s from t h a t s o i l . . . . , i n doing t h i s , he does no more t h a t 
what every other man i s e q u a l l y f r e e w i t h h i m s e l f to do - t h a t each 
has the same power w i t h h i m s e l f to become the tenant and t h a t the 
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r e n t he pays accrues a l i k e to a l l . " 
Having h i r e d a t r a c t of land under s p e c i f i e d terms from 
the s o c i e t y , the i n d i v i d u a l , a f t e r paying h i s r e n t , had a r i g h t to 
c l a i m what the l a n d y i e l d s as h i s property. T h i s , he claimed was 
j u s t i f i e d by the law of equal freedom, and had a c l a i m to the 
produce of the land as a r i g h t , "....because he obtained the 
consent of the s o c i e t y before expending h i s labour, and having 
f u l f i l l e d the c o n d i t i o n which s o c i e t y imposed i n g i v i n g t h a t consent 
- the payment of r e n t - s o c i e t y , to f u l f i l i t s p a r t of the 
agreement, must acknowledge h i s t i t l e to t h a t s u r p l u s which remains 
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a f t e r the r e n t has been p a i d . I n t h i s c a s e , r i g h t s a re not 
a b s o l u t e but tend to be d e r i v e d from the s o c i e t y . A l l i n a l l , t h e r e 
i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . At times, Spencer claimed t h a t r i g h t s were 
abs o l u t e and a t other times t h a t they were r e l a t i v e . 
I n f l u e n c e d by h i s o r g a n i c theory, Spencer considered 
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s o c i e t y a n a t u r a l phenomenon w i t h n a t u r a l laws a s s i g n e d to r e g u l a t e 
most a s p e c t s of l i f e . The duty of government was a c c o r d i n g l y 
minimal: i t extended only to the s e c u r i n g of a f r e e f i e l d f o r the 
op e r a t i o n of n a t u r a l laws. Being thus engrossed by t h i s i d e a , he 
appeared to underrate the impact of economic and s o c i a l s t a t u s of 
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the i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s advocacy f o r equal freedom. He f e l t t h a t 
any i n e q u a l i t y people s u f f e r e d s o c i a l l y or economically was t h e i r 
own f a u l t and should not be a l l e v i a t e d by the s t a t e . He w i l l be 
prepared to argue according to h i s p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e of equal 
freedom t h a t i t i s d e s i r a b l e to give any c h i l d the l i b e r t y to go 
to a p u b l i c school - whether he i s the son of a doctor, or a 
p r o f e s s o r or an u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r - independent of the f a c t t h a t 
the son of the l a b o u r e r w i l l or w i l l not f i t i n s o c i a l l y , 
a c a d e m i c a l l y i n the school; i r r e s p e c t i v e of the f a c t t h a t the 
l a b o u r e r ' s son can or can not a f f o r d to pay the f e e s of a p u b l i c 
s c h o o l . Where the l a b o u r e r ' s son can f i t i n but can not a f f o r d to 
pay the f e e s , h i s s i t u a t i o n i s made d i f f i c u l t because the law of 
equal freedom w i l l not permit the s t a t e to pay h i s f e e s f o r him. 
The q u e s t i o n Spencer d i d not stop to c o n s i d e r was - why 
g i v e people equal freedom, i f the means of making th a t l i b e r t y 
v a l u a b l e was not a v a i l a b l e to every person ? I f i t were not 
a v a i l a b l e , how could i t be remedied ? M i l l on the c o n t r a r y p e r c e i v e d 
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t h i s problem and i n most o c c a s i o n s , t r i e d to suggest a s o l u t i o n 
to i t . 
He pointed out f o r example, t h a t the system of n a t u r a l 
laws which h i s predecessors thought p r a c t i c a b l e i n the economic 
sphere, was only a p p l i c a b l e i n production and not i n d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the w e a l t h of the s o c i e t y . Hence, he opposed e n t a i l s and other 
economic i n s t i t u t i o n s which f o s t e r e d the w e l f a r e of the upper c l a s s 
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a t the expense of the lowe^v. As M i l l pointed out :- The laws 
and c o n d i t i o n s of the production of w e a l t h partake of the 
c h a r a c t e r of p h y s i c a l t r u t h s . There i s nothing o p t i o n a l or 
a r b i t r a r y i n them. What ever mankind produce, must be produced i n 
the modes, and under the c o n d i t i o n s , imposed by the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
e x t e r n a l things,, and by the i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s of t h e i r own b o d i l y 
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and mental s t r u c t u r e I t i s not so w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
we a l t h . That i s a matter of human i n s t i t u t i o n s o l e l y . The t h i n g s 
once t h e r e , mankind, i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y , can do w i t h them 
as they l i k e The d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth, t h e r e f o r e , depends 
on the laws and customs of s o c i e t y . The r u l e r s by which i t i s 
determined a r e what the opinions and f e e l i n g s of the r u l i n g p o r t i o n 
of the community make them, and are very d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t ages 
c o u n t r i e s ; and might be s t i l l more d i f f e r e n t , i f mankind so 
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chose. 
Taking the s o c i a l and economic handicap c o n f r o n t i n g people 
s i m i l a r to the labourer s son f / kurged t h a t the s t a t e should provide 
them w i t h such an education " e i t h e r g r a t u i t o u s l y or a t a t r i f l i n g 
expense." 
One wonders how v a l u a b l e Spencer's notion of freedom i s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when a p p l i e d to the s i t u a t i o n i n 19th century B r i t a i n . 
C l e a r l y .:.' there was a marked i n e q u a l i t y i n the s o c i a l and economic 
s t a t u s of i n d i v i d u a l s . The s i t u a t i o n was such t h a t i t might be 
d i f f i c u l t to a t t a c h value to the i d e a of equal freedom as p o s t u l a t e d 
by Spencer without any l e v e l l i n g p r o p o s i t i o n i n the s o c i a l and 
economic sphere. 
What do other c r i t i c s say about M i l l and Spencer ? Barker 
pointed out t h a t according to Spencer, the development of s o c i e t y 
c ould be conceived as the r e s u l t of a tendency to i n d i v i d u a t e and 
become a t h i n g . Then he accused Spencer of f a i l i n g to e x p l a i n 
"....how the s t a t e can tend to become a t h i n g , and how an i n d i v i d u a l 
supposed to be u t t e r l y and e n t i r e l y opposed to i t , can tend to 
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become a t h i n g w i t h i n , a t one and the same time. I w i l l suggest 
an e x p l a n a t i o n of Spencer's views. 
He considered s o c i e t y as a c o l l e c t i v e name f o r a number of 
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i n d i v i d u a l s . I n such circumstances the e x i s t e n c e of s o c i e t y was 
only nominal. What a c t u a l l y counted were the i n d i v i d u a l s forming i t . 
The i d e a of s o c i e t y was r e c o g n i s e d because of the permanent 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which e x i s t e d among the v a r i o u s u n i t s forming the whole 
I t was t h i s permanence of r e l a t i o n s h i p which c o n s t i t u t e d the' 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the whole as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s 
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of i t s p a r t s . The general problem which most p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s of 
Spencer's e r a and before him were t r y i n g to s o l v e , was how to 
s e c u r e an i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t s between the r u l e r s and the r u l e d . I f 
a s i m i l a r i t y of i n t e r e s t s could be secured, the s t a t e would no 
longer look d i s t i n c t i v e from the mass or the i n d i v i d u a l i t was 
r u l i n g . When t h i s i d e n t i t y i s secured, both the r u l e r s and r u l e d 
w i l l no longer have opposing i n t e r e s t s but w i l l tend to become one, 
and to use Spencer's term, would tend to become a thing." 
Anschutz accused M i l l of d i s a g r e e i n g w i t h Bentham on two 
grounds. He a f f i r m e d t h a t Bentham b e l i e v e d i n l e t t i n g people alone 
to pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r own way, because he (Bentham) 
h e l d t h a t they were then most l i k e l y to promote the g e n e r a l 
i n t e r e s t " . Secondly, Bentham admitted t h a t the power of the s t a t e 
was i n d e f i n i t e except where i t was l i m i t e d by the law. A c c o r d i n g l y , 
he accused M i l l of a double disagreement w i t h Bentham. On one hand, 
M i l l a s s e r t e d the p r o p r i e t y of some s o r t s of governmental 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r e s t s of the s u b j e c t . Bentham would have 
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whole-heartedly opposed t h i s . The point Anschutz i s making i s 
q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the c o r r e c t s i t u a t i o n . M i l l ' s views as f a r as 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s concerned i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Bentham's. 
Bentham's l a i s s e z - n o u s - f a i r e p r i n c i p l e does not mean a t o t a l 
r e j e c t i o n of s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . The government i s allowed to 
i n t e r f e r e i n s o c i a l w e l f a r e provided i t i s j u s t i f i e d by the 
p r i n c i p l e of expediency. T h i s n o t i o n i s what M i l l a p p l i e d i n most 
w e l f a r e matters though h i s v e r s i o n of the d o c t r i n e of u t i l i t y 
i m p l i e d more than Bentham propagated. 
Anschutz s a i d t h a t M i l l departed even f u r t h e r from 
orthodoxy, a s s e r t e d the a b s o l u t e impropriety of other s o r t s of 
i n t e r f e r e n c e , and i n f a c t , spoke i n p r e c i s e l y the way t h a t Bentham 
condemned as an abuse of language. To an e x t e n t , t h i s i s t r u e , but 
i t must be pointed out t h a t M i l l was a f r a i d of the tyranny of the 
m a j o r i t y and as such would not grant a b s o l u t e power to the s t a t e . 
From h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of events f o l l o w i n g the p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n , 
he was convinced t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l was not only l o s i n g importance 
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59 but a l s o was g e t t i n g l o s t i n the crowd. Masses became more 
important than the i n d i v i d u a l and so he assumed the duty of a 
Messiah c a l l e d upon to save the i n d i v i d u a l . Bentham h i m s e l f showed 
the same f e e l i n g i n h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l code. He argued t h a t 
unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of power was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e v i l because 
the g r e a t e r the power an i n d i v i d u a l or a group of people had, the 
g r e a t e r the tendency to abuse i t . Consequently, i t i s an u n f a i r 
statement to say t h a t M i l l d i s a g r e e d w i t h Bentham on these grounds. 
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Ourkheim d i s a g r e e d w i t h Spencer s i d e a s about the 
i n d i v i d u a l and h i s freedom both i n the m i l i t a n t and i n d u s t r i a l 
types of s o c i e t y . The kind of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y e x i s t i n g i n these 
types of s o c i e t i e s , Durkheim d e s c r i b e d as mechanical and o r g a n i c . 
Spencer had maintained t h a t c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and m i l i t a r i s m as 
experienced i n a m i l i t a n t type of s o c i e t y submerged the i n d i v i d u a l 
who only regained h i s freedom through i n d u s t r i a l i s m ^ Durkheim 
h e l d an opposite view and suggested t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l was most 
absorbed i n s o c i e t y when m i l i t a r i s m and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n were 
absent. He a s s e r t e d t h a t i t was i n the most p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t y , 
where d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n h a r d l y e x i s t e d , t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l was so 
completely a p a r t of h i s group t h a t he had no s e p a r a t e i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
C e n t r a l i z a t i o n was n e c e s s a r y i f i n d i v i d u a l i t y were to emerge. 
Spencer observed on one hand, th a t a m i l i t a n t type of 
s o c i e t y was marked by s t a t u s , w h i l e c o n t r a c t was the f e a t u r e of the 
i n d u s t r i a l type. On the other hand, s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y and 
c o h esiveness of the s o c i a l group was maintained by f o r c e or c o e r c i v e 
measures i n the former and i n the l a t t e r by c o n t r a c t . The 
i n d i v i d u a l had to depend on h i s labour f o r a l i v i n g . His s u c c e s s 
or f a i l u r e hung on h i s e f f i c i e n c y . I n other words, as Adam Smith 
i n s i s t e d , t h a t s o c i a l harmony could be n a t u r a l l y a t t a i n e d i f people 
were l e f t to f r e e l y exchange the f r u i t s of t h e i r labour. The same 
view, Durkheim i n t e r p r e t e d to mean t h a t s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y and 
c o h esiveness of the s o c i a l group i n o r g a n i c s o c i e t y remained through 
the p r o c e s s of the d i v i s i o n of l abour. T h i s process made the u n i t s 
of s o c i e t y f u n c t i o n a l l y dependent on each other and t h i s was 
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a s s o c i a t e d w i t h new s o c i a l t i e s i n the o r g a n i c s o c i e t y which 
r e p l a c e d those i n the mechanical. 
Spencer p o s t u l a t e d f i r s t l y , t h a t s o c i a l harmony and 
cohesiveness of the s o c i a l group was maintained by c o n t r a c t . 
Secondly, as a f f a i r s of the s o c i e t y were s e t t l e d by c o n t r a c t , t h a t 
the f u n c t i o n s of the s t a t e became n e g a t i v e . Durkheim was very 
s c e p t i c a l about t h i s . He argued t h a t i f i t were i n t e r e s t only which 
r e l a t e d men, the s t a b i l i t y of s o c i e t i e s would be very d o u b t f u l . 
His reason was t h a t i n t e r e s t s were temporary t h i n g s and could not 
l a s t very long. I t could only g i v e r i s e to " t r a n s c i e n t r e l a t i o n s 
and p a s s i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s " . " I t can c r e a t e only an e x t e r n a l l i n k 
between them / i n d i v i d u a l s ? . I n the f a c t of exchange, the v a r i o u s 
agents remain o u t s i d e of each other, and when the b u s i n e s s has been 
completed, each one r e t i r e s and i s l e f t e n t i r e l y on h i s own. 
Consciences are only s u p e r f i c i a l l y i n c o n t a c t ; they n e i t h e r 
p e n e t r a t e each other, nor do they adhere. I f we look f u r t h e r i n t o 
the matter, we s h a l l see t h a t t h i s t o t a l harmony of i n t e r e s t s 
c o n c e a l s a l a t e n t or d e f e r r e d c o n f l i c t . For where i n t e r e s t i s the 
only r u l i n g f o r c e each i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s h i m s e l f i n a s t a t e of war 
w i t h every other s i n c e nothing comes to m o l l i f y the egos, and any 
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t r u c e i n t h i s e t e r n a l antagonism would not be of long d u r a t i o n . 
The view t h a t i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y s t a t e f u n c t i o n s are 
n e g a t i v e to the advantage of the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s freedom, 
Durkheim completely r e j e c t e d . C i t i n g i n s t a n c e s to support t h i s view 
as Spencer d i d , was not enough. H i s t o r y shows t h a t s t a t e 
f u n c t i o n s do not d i m i n i s h but tend to i n c r e a s e and to become more 
and more complex. E s t a b l i s h i n g laws does not r e s u l t i n making the 
sphere of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t y s m a l l e r . Durkheim a f f i r m e d t h a t where 
t h e r e was more r e g u l a t i o n i n l i f e , t h e r e was more l i f e i n g e n e r a l . 
There was no s i g n t h a t s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e has been r e l a x i n g . I f 
r e p r e s s i v e law which was p r e v a l e n t i n a mechanical type of s o c i e t y 
was l o s i n g ground, i n the i n d u s t r i a l type of s o c i e t y , r e s t i t u t i v e 
law, which d i d not e x i s t a t a l l before, kept growing. I f s o c i e t y 
d i d not any longer impose c e r t a i n uniform p r a c t i c e s upon people, i t 
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now took g r e a t e r c a r e to d e f i n e and r e g u l a t e the r e l a t i o n e x i s t i n g 
between d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s . 
When we t u r n to the sphere of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law - a law 
which Durkheim d e s c r i b e d as "... the t o t a l i t y of r u l e s which 
determine, f i r s t , the f u n c t i o n s of the c e n t r a l organ and t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s ; then, the f u n c t i o n s of the organs which a r e 
immediately subordinate to the f i r s t , t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
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f i r s t and with the d i f f u s e f u n c t i o n s of s o c i e t y - th e r e i s no 
s i g n of any decrease i n i t s enactment. H i s t o r y shows r a t h e r t h a t i t 
tends to be more developed as s o c i e t i e s approach a more e l e v a t e d 
type. The e a r l y h i s t o r y of s o c i e t i e s i s , the more rudimentary i s 
t h i s type of law. On t h i s b a s i s , he remarked t h a t "the i d e a l s t a t e 
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of Spencer i s r e a l l y the p r i m i t i v e form of the s t a t e . 
As s o c i e t i e s advance, s t a t e d u t i e s i n c r e a s e and become 
more v a r i e d . Various s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s grow, w i t h a s p e c i f i c 
r o l e to p l a y . L a t e r , these f u n c t i o n s which were d i f f u s e become 
concentrated i n the hands of the s t a t e . T h i s can be seen c l e a r l y 
i n v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l programmes - f o r example, n a t i o n a l system of 
education, h e a l t h , i n s u r a n c e and b e n e f i t . " I t i s thus c o n t r a r y 
to a l l method to regard the pr e s e n t dimensions of the governmental 
organ as a symptom of s o c i a l i l l n e s s , due to a concourse of 
a c c i d e n t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . E v e r y t h i n g f o r c e s us to see i n i t a 
normal phenomenon, which holds even of the s t r u c t u r e of higher 
s o c i e t i e s , s i n c e i t progresses i n a p e r f e c t l y continuous way, as 
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s o c i e t i e s tend to approach t h i s type. 
H i s t o r y and r e c e n t experience show t h a t government 
f u n c t i o n s are not d e c r e a s i n g . Rather they tend to i n c r e a s e as s o c i e t y 
develops, and i n t e r f e r e i n most s o c i a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s . To 
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t h i s e x t e n t , Durkheim s c r i t i c i s m i s a c c e p t a b l e . As Rumney pointed 
out, s i n c e Spencer died, t h e r e has been a growth of economic 
i m p e r i a l i s m , or c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e d as a combination of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s m and m i l i t a r i s m . Secondly, t h e r e has been an i n c r e a s e 
of the s o c i a l i z e d s t a t e where i n government and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
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take a p a r t i n the r e g u l a t i o n of i n d u s t r y . The s t r u g g l e f o r markets 
and the growth of c a p i t a l i s m tend to make every s o c i e t y a h i g h l y 
organized i n d u s t r i a l u n i t which a t the same time bears marks of 
m i l i t a n c y . 
How f a r Durkheim and Spencer are both wrong or c o r r e c t i n 
t h e i r views can be f u r t h e r demonstrated by c o n s i d e r i n g the Nuer of 
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Sudan which r e p r e s e n t s a modern example of people l i v i n g i n the 
s t a t e of nature and then Great B r i t a i n or the United S t a t e s of 
America or other advanced c o u n t r i e s which can be regarded as 
e x p e r i e n c i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s m . I use the s t a t e of nature here because 
t h e r e i s some s i m i l a r i t y between th a t s t a t e as shown by Hobbes and 
Locke w i t h Spencer's a n t e - s o c i a l s t a t e i n h i s e t h i c a l theory. The 
s i m i l a r i t y i s drawn from the nature of man w h i l e i n t h a t s t a t e . 
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Hobbes t o l d us t h a t i t was a s t a t e of war and both h i m s e l f and 
Locke a f f i r m e d t h a t i t was marked by i n s e c u r i t y and f e a r , 
I n s e c u r i t y and f e a r are l o g i c a l deductions anybody w i l l expect i n 
any s o c i e t y where peace i s n o n - e x i s t e n t . 
S i m i l a r l y , i n Spencer's treatment of the e v o l u t i o n a r y 
process of s o c i e t y , he s t r e s s e d i n h i s e t h i c s , t h a t the nature of 
man i n the a n t e - s o c i a l s t a t e was one which tended to invade other 
people's r i g h t s . T h i s s i g n i f i e s a s t a t e of war. He emphasized t h a t 
man was not adapted to the s o c i a l s t a t e because "....he yet 
p a r t i a l l y r e t a i n s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t adapted him f o r an 
antecedent s t a t e . The r e s p e c t s i n which he i s not f i t t e d to s o c i e t y 
are the r e s p e c t s i n which he i s f i t t e d f o r h i s o r i g i n a l predatory 
l i f e . His p r i m i t i v e circumstances r e q u i r e d t h a t he should 
s a c r i f i c e the w e l f a r e of other beings to h i s own; h i s p r e s e n t 
e 
circumstances r e q u i r e t h a t he should not do so; and i n as f a r as 
h i s o l d a t t r i b u t e s t i l l c l i n g s to him, i n so f a r as he i s u n f i t 
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f o r the s o c i a l s t a t e . 
The Nuer of Sudan forms a c l o s e modern example of people 
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l i v i n g i n t h i s s t a t e . Lucy Mair t o l d us t h a t as regards a 
r e c o g n i s e d form of government, they have l i t t l e or none of i t as 
any other human s o c i e t y . What they have i s a c e r t a i n s o c i a l 
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convention which demands f o r example t h a t c e r t a i n a c t i o n s are 
o f f e n c e s . As t h e r e i s no government, i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e are no 
c i v i l laws. I t only i m p l i e s t h a t people's freedom i s not r e s t r i c t e d 
by any c i v i l a u t h o r i t y . I t may be r e g u l a t e d by custom or convention 
but as t h e r e i s no c i v i l or l e g a l s a n c t i o n attached, i t i s 
d i s p u t a b l e how much a person's freedom i s coerced u n l e s s i t can be 
proved t h a t c i v i l or l e g a l s a n c t i o n s have the same impact as those 
a p p l i e d to custom or convention. One wonders i n f a c t whether the 
i d e a l s t a t e Spencer d e s c r i b e d as being marked by l i t t l e or no 
government i s not t h i s type of s o c i e t y , as Durkheim suggested. 
The s o c i a l s t a t e which r e p l a c e s the "antecedent s t a t e " i n 
Spencer's e t h i c a l theory, or the i n d u s t r i a l which succeeds the 
m i l i t a n t type i n h i s s o c i o l o g y i s s i m i l a r to most advanced 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r i t a i n or the United S t a t e s of America. 
One observes the trend of a f f a i r s i n these s o c i e t i e s , t h a t 
government f u n c t i o n s are i n c r e a s i n g and not d e c r e a s i n g as Spencer 
thought. C i v i l laws appear to be growing s t e a d i l y a t a r a p i d r a t e , 
and i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom seems to be determined by these laws. 
Though they are i n f r a c t i o n s of l i b e r t y , they are e s s e n t i a l to avoid 
chaos. Spencer's contention has not been s u b s t a n t i a t e d by h i s t o r i c a l 
f a c t s , u n l e s s one can be permitted to say i n h i s favour t h a t the 
c o n d i t i o n of mankind i n these s o c i e t i e s i s not p e r f e c t enough to 
warrant l e s s government. 
On the other hand, i f Spencer were c o n s i d e r i n g h i s 
M i l i t a n t type and i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y from the economic point of 
view, the f a c t t h a t a s o c i e t y i s i n d u s t r i a l i z e d does not mean l e s s 
government i f i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom i s to be p r e s e r v e d . Admittedly, 
i n a f e u d a l s o c i e t y , t h e s e r f s were dependent on t h e i r l o r d s f o r t h e i r 
e x i s t e n c e . T h i s gave these l o r d s a l a r g e sway over them to the extent 
of having t h e i r l i b e r t y r e g u l a t e d . 18th and 19th century B r i t a i n 
tended to p o r t r a y the same p i c t u r e . With i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n the f a t e 
of the working c l a s s would have been the same, were i t not f o r 
r e g u l a r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e . The c a p t a i n s of i n d u s t r y were s t i l l 
ready to e x p l o i t t h e i r l a b o u r e r s or e x e r c i s e the same c o e r c i v e r u l e 
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as the fe u d a l l o r d s d i d . 
But s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e , p r o t e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s ' freedom, 
made i t p o s s i b l e to c r e a t e an atmosphere c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 
p r i n c i p l e of "voluntary co-operation" i n which purchase and s a l e 
became the law f o r a l l k i n d s of s e r v i c e s as w e l l as f o r a l l kinds 
of goods. Again, h i s t o r y or the trend of economic a f f a i r s i n any 
country e x p e r i e n c i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s m has not shown t h a t 
i n d u s t r i a l i s m i m p l i e s l e s s government or a l l o c a t i n g negative 
f u n c t i o n s to the s t a t e . Having reviewed v a r i o u s c r i t i c i s m s , i t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to examine whether M i l l and Spencer's views are of any 
r e l e v a n c e to contemporary B r i t a i n or are j u s t of h i s t o r i c a l 
importance. 
Relevance of t h e i r views to contemporary B r i t a i n . 
The b a s i c need of e s t a b l i s h i n g a government, we are t o l d , 
was f o r s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n - the d e s i r e to p r e s e r v e l i f e . Should 
the s t a t e on t h a t b a s i s i n t e r f e r e w i t h the s a l e of drugs and 
poisons ? Spencer would argue t h a t the s t a t e should not i n t e r f e r e 
w i t h the s a l e of drugs and poisons. I n h i s views, ;any i n d i v i d u a l 
c o u l d buy drugs from whoever he l i k e d . I n f a c t , he maintained 
t h a t "men's r i g h t s are i n f r i n g e d by these as much as by a l l 
o t h e r t r a d e i n t e r f e r e n c e s . The i n v a l i d i s a t l i b e r t y to buy 
medicine and ad v i c e from whomsoever he p l e a s e s ; on no p r e t e x t 
whatever can a b a r r i e r be s e t up between them without the law of 
equal freedom being broken, and l e a s t of a l l may the government, 
whose o f f i c e i t i s to uphold t h a t law, become a t r a n s g r e s s o r of 
i t . " 6 8 
M i l l would i n s i s t t h a t the s t a t e should c o n t r o l the s a l e 
of drugs and poisons because " i t i s one of the undisputed f u n c t i o n s 
of government to take p r e c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t crime before i t has 
..69 
been committed.... The aim of the c o n t r o l i s not to prevent 
people from o b t a i n i n g them but to make i t easy to d e t e c t any 
improper use of i t which i s d e t r i m e n t a l to l i f e . He observed t h a t 
drugs and poisons were used not only f o r u s e f u l purposes but f o r 
bad ones, and was q u i t e prepared to stop i t s i l l e g a l u s e s . The only 
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d i f f i c u l t y which he apprehended was t h a t freedom could not be 
granted to people f o r buying drugs f o r u s e f u l purposes without 
t h e i r abusing i t . T h i s i s an accepted f a c t and r e g u l a r i n s t a n c e s 
of such abuses are common nowadays. He conceived t h a t the s t a t e was 
j u s t i f i e d i n r e s t r i c t i n g the s a l e of drugs but was a f r a i d t h a t i t 
70 
could not s u c c e s s f u l l y impose r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e i r bad us e s . 
71 
Sidgwick d e s c r i b e d t h i s type of i n t e r f e r e n c e as p a t e r n a l 
and argued t h a t not a l l p a t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n should be r e j e c t e d 
without c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s form of s t a t e c o n t r o l can be opposed on 
the grounds t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e the best guardians of t h e i r own 
w e l f a r e . But, when i t i s remembered t h a t such a maxim i s not a 
u n i v e r s a l t r u t h , - n o r p r a c t i c a b l e i n a l l a s p e c t s of human l i f e , the 
s t a t e w i l l be given a chance to i n t e r v e n e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of those who have not the s u f f i c i e n t knowledge to be the 
guardians of t h e i r own w e l f a r e . Moreover, when i t i s proved by 
experience t h a t people are l a r g e l y l i a b l e to r u i n themselves by 
having f r e e a c c e s s t o drugs and poisons, i t w i l l be unreasonable to 
allow these p r a c t i c e s t o go on without i n t e r f e r e n c e , merely on 
account of the e s t a b l i s h e d g e n e r a l notion of l a i s s e r - f a i r e . I t can 
be observed t h a t when the government i n t e r v e n e s , i t aims a t 
p r o t e c t i n g i t s s u b j e c t s from e v i l s i n c u r r e d through ignorance, and 
t h i s course of a c t i o n i s a l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n of the s t a t e which 
both the Na t u r a l r i g h t and U t i l i t a r i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s a l l o t to the 
s t a t e . 
According to the laws of l i f e , freedom i s d e s i r a b l e t o a 
person to c a r r y on l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s view has been 
j u s t i f i e d by the court of p o l i t i c s and of s c i e n c e . An i n d i v i d u a l 
r e q u i r e s h i s freedom to l i v e but not to k i l l h i m s e l f . When the 
government c o n t r o l s the s a l e of drugs and poisons, t h e r e i s no 
i n t e n t i o n of reducing freedom but of prev e n t i n g i t s abuse, though 
the s t a t e may not succeed i n curbing t o t a l abuse. Accordingly, 
from whatever point of view i t i s considered, t h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e i s 
l a w f u l p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t tends towards s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . 
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Spencer can be excused to an extent on the grounds t h a t 
d e s p i t e a l l attempts on the p a r t of the s t a t e to c o n t r o l the s a l e 
of drugs, t h e r e are s t i l l i n s t a n c e s of t h e i r abuse. Though 
admittedly, t h e i r abuse would have been g r e a t e r were t h e r e no 
government c o n t r o l . T h i s c o i n c i d e s w i t h Spencer's views t h a t s o c i a l 
e v i l s cannot be e n t i r e l y cured or prevented by the s t a t e . Furthermore, 
h i s views can be allowed when i t i s considered t h a t he was w r i t i n g 
f o r h i s p e r i o d . At t h a t time, the s t a t e of knowledge was not 
advanced as i t i s now. I n the 19th century, the supply of drugs was 
l i m i t e d , but i n our own age, not only the range, but a l s o the 
q u a n t i t y imported and s y n t h e s i z e d are so g r e a t t h a t i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y t h a t the freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s to buy drugs should be 
l i m i t e d . As much s t a t e a c t i o n i n t h i s case must be p o s i t i v e , and i s 
w e l l j u s t i f i e d to be, as M i l l and Sidgwick maintained. 
Housing has f o r some time been a problem f o r a good p a r t 
of the p o p u l a t i o n i n the country. The s t a t e s t e p s i n not only to 
p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t of tenants a g a i n s t the e x p l o i t a t i o n of 
l a n d l o r d s but a l s o to b u i l d houses and s u b s i d i z e r e n t s . R e n t - f i x i n g 
i s a s o c i a l a c t which i n v o l v e s the tenant and l a n d l o r d ; b e s i d e s t h i s , 
the supply and demand f o r houses a f f e c t r e n t s . I f t h i s i s the c a s e , 
i s the s t a t e j u s t i f i e d e i t h e r to c o n t r o l r e n t s or to improve 
housing c o n d i t i o n s ? Spencer would i n s i s t t h a t n e i t h e r improving 
housing c o n d i t i o n s nor c o n t r o l l i n g r e n t s should be i n c l u d e d among 
s t a t e d u t i e s . I n s t e a d of a l l o t t i n g e i t h e r to the government, he 
would advocate t h r u s t i n g them upon the n a t u r a l f o r c e s i n the market. 
The supply and demand f o r houses i n h i s views w i l l e s t a b l i s h an 
e q u i l i b r i u m p r i c e which w i l l appeal both to the tenant and l a n d l o r d . 
I n f a c t , he had r e p e a t e d l y accused the s t a t e of making u n s u c c e s s f u l 
attempts to improve housing c o n d i t i o n s . These ve n t u r e s , i n s t e a d of 
improving, tended to worsen the s i t u a t i o n . I n support, he a f f i r m e d 
t h a t "the New B u i l d i n g Act was to have giv e n the people of London 
b e t t e r homes, whereas, as we l a t e l y saw, i t has made worse the 
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homes t h a t most wanted improving." 
On the other hand, according to M i l l , t r a d e i s a s o c i a l 
a c t . Any person who undertakes to s e l l any forms of commodity to the 
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p u b l i c , does what a f f e c t s the i n t e r e s t of other people, and as such 
h i s conduct should j u s t i f i a b l y be r e g u l a t e d by the s t a t e . Purchase 
and h i r i n g of houses a re v i r t u a l l y commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s and 
a c c o r d i n g l y , can be c o n t r o l l e d by the government, p a r t i c u l a r l y as 
two opposing i n t e r e s t s - l a n d l o r d and tenants - are concerned. On 
t h i s b a s i s , M i l l would support s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h housing 
problems, though Spencer would oppose i t . 
M i l l ' s contemporary - N.Senior - ve r y much used h i s views 
to j u s t i f y s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n housing problems. S e n i o r maintained 
t h a t the government performed i t ' s duty when i t l e g i s l a t e d on 
housing. He argued t h a t " i n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t i s i n the power of a 
government c o n s i d e r a b l y to p a l l i a t e the e v i l s of d e f e c t i v e 
h a b i t a t i o n . I t cannot, of course, enact t h a t every f a m i l y s h a l l have 
f i v e w e l l - b u i l t , w e l l - v e n t i l a t e d rooms, any more than i t can enact 
t h a t every f a m i l y s h a l l l i v e on r o a s t beef, but i t can p r o h i b i t 
the e r e c t i o n of houses without drainage, or i n c o u r t s , or back to 
back. I t can r e q u i r e s t r e e t s to be paved, i t can r e g u l a t e t h e i r 
width and the t h i c k n e s s of the w a l l s . I n s h o r t , i t can provide 
p r o s p e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t the e r e c t i o n of new s e a t s of d i s e a s e and 
v i c e No one denies the r i g h t i n the s t a t e to i n t e r f e r e to 
prevent a man from i n j u r i n g o t h e r s . I t e x e r c i s e s t h i s r i g h t when 
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i t f o r b i d s him to b u i l d a row of undrained c o t t a g e s . " 
I n matters a f f e c t i n g p u b l i c h e a l t h , i t i s evident t h a t i f 
every f a m i l y , or group of f a m i l i e s , were l e f t to provide i t s own 
h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , not a l l could a f f o r d them because the c o s t of 
mai n t a i n i n g such s e r v i c e s i s r a t h e r too g r e a t . Besides the c o s t , 
they r e q u i r e some knowledge which many i n d i v i d u a l s l a c k . T h i r d l y , 
good h e a l t h i s seen both as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r the s u c c e s s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y and moreover, as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r 
the enjoyment and e x p l o i t a t i o n of s u c c e s s . F o u r t h l y , the standard 
of l i f e of the s o c i e t y i s not only the i n d i v i d u a l ' s concern but 
the s t a t e ' s . On these grounds, should h e a l t h s e r v i c e s be i n c l u d e d 
i n one of those e s s e n t i a l s of l i f e which people should provide f o r 
themselves, or should they be provided by the s t a t e ? 
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Spencer had opposed s a n i t a r y s u p e r v i s i o n by the s t a t e and 
h i s argument a g a i n s t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n was so unduly se v e r e t h a t 
i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t he would approve of s t a t e p r o v i s i o n of 
h e a l t h s e r v i c e s . As regards s a n i t a r y s u p e r v i s i o n , he p r e f e r r e d 
l e a v i n g i t to p r i v a t e companies i n s t e a d of the s t a t e as they would 
provide them at a lower c o s t than what people pay i n the form of 
t a x e s . His other reason f o r opposing S t a t e s u p e r v i s i o n was t h a t as 
regards e f f i c i e n c y , every p r i v a t e company would l i k e to maintain 
i t s r e p u t a t i o n , and as such i t would tend to l e a d to g r e a t e r 
e f f i c i e n c y compared w i t h s t a t e s e r v i c e s . He had shown constant 
d i s t r u s t i n l e g i s l a t i o n as a way of c u r b i n g s o c i a l e v i l s . He would 
not h e s i t a t e to support h i s view w i t h the a s s e r t i o n t h a t "the 
measures en j o i n e d by the V a c c i n a t i o n Act of 1840 were to have 
exterminated smallpox; y e t the R e g i s t r a r - G e n e r a l ' s r e p o r t shows 
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t h a t the deaths from smallpox have been i n c r e a s i n g . " 
I n f a c t , i f there were no compulsory s a n i t a r y i n s p e c t i o n , 
he would not mind people l i v i n g i n i n s a n i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s . He would 
allow a man's ignorance or stubbornness to stand i n the way of 
h i s p r o t e c t i o n , and would endeavour to argue t h a t what people s u f f e r 
was the p e n a l t y nature has imposed on them f o r being ignorant. "Of 
the s u f f e r i n g consequent upon u n r e s t r a i n e d empiricism, i t may s a f e l y 
be s a i d t h a t they are not so great as i s represented; and t h a t i n 
as f a r as they do e x i s t ; they are amongst the p e n a l t i e s which 
nature has attached to ignorance or i m b e c i l i t y , and which cannot be 
d i s a s s o c i a t e d from i t without u l t i m a t e l y e n t a i l i n g much g r e a t e r 
s u f f e r i n g s . ^He would f u r t h e r sh<ys7 t h a t even could the hoped 
f o r advantages be f u l l y r e a l i s e d /from n a t i o n a l h e a l t h servicesJ7 
they would be purchased at too great a c o s t s e e i n g t h a t they could 
be obtained only by an e q u i v a l e n t r e t a r d a t i o n i n some s t i l l more 
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important department of s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . " 
I n c o n t r a s t to t h i s view, Adam Smith would i n s i s t i n a 
s i m i l a r v e i n to S e n i o r t h a t p u b l i c h e a l t h , "....would deserve 
the most s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n of government, i n the same manner as i t 
would deserve i t s most s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n to prevent a l e p r o s y or any 
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other loathsome and o f f e n s i v e d i s e a s e , though n e i t h e r mortal nor 
dangerous, from spreading i t s e l f among them; though perhaps, no 
other p u b l i c good might r e s u l t from such a t t e n t i o n b e s i d e s the 
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p r e v e n t i o n of so g r e a t a p u b l i c e v i l . S i m i l a r l y , M i l l would 
approve of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n matters a f f e c t i n g p u b l i c h e a l t h . 
"Education, t h e r e f o r e , i s one of those things which i t 
i s a d m i s s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t a government should provide f o r 
the people. The case i s one to which the reasons of the non-
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i n t e r f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e do not n e c e s s a r i l y or u n i v e r s a l l y extend." 
T h i s was how M i l l summed up h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e 
i n education. I n h i s views, the s t a t e of knowledge at the p e r i o d 
when he was w r i t i n g was not s u f f i c i e n t to q u a l i f y people as judges 
of knowledge. Consequently, he d i d not very much favour t r u s t i n g the 
choice of education e n t i r e l y to people. 
Spencer h e l d q u i t e a c o n t r a r y view. He a s s e r t e d t h a t t h i s 
a l l e g e d incompetency on the p a r t of the people has been the reason 
as s i g n e d f o r a l l s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e s . These interferences,, according 
to him, were i n c r e a s i n g and would continue u n t i l " . . . . i n the d e s i r e 
to have a l l p r o c e s s e s s of production duly i n s p e c t e d , we approach a 
c o n d i t i o n somewhat l i k e t h a t of the S l a v e S t a t e s , i n which, as 
they say ^one-half of the community i s occupied i n s e e i n g t h a t the 
other does i t s duty7. And f o r each a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e the p l e a 
may be, as i t always has been, t h a t /the i n t e r e s t and judgement 
of the consumer a r e not s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y f o r the goodness of the 
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community. "J I n h i s view, education should be l e f t to the c h o i c e 
of the consumer. 
He f u r t h e r opposed n a t i o n a l education on the grounds t h a t 
i t was wrong f o r the s t a t e to take away a person's property i n 
order to provide education f o r other people's c h i l d r e n . Such an a c t 
on the p a r t of the s t a t e i m p l i e d i n f r i n g i n g the law of equal 
freedom. " I n as much as the t a k i n g away, by government, of more of a 
man's property than i s needful f o r m a i n t a i n i n g h i s r i g h t s , and 
t h e r e f o r e a r e v e r s a l of the government's f u n c t i o n towards him, and 
i n as much as the t a k i n g away of h i s property to educate h i s own or 
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other people's c h i l d r e n i s not needful f o r the m a i n t a i n i n g of h i s 
r i g h t s , the t a k i n g away of h i s property f o r such a purpose i s 
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wrong. 
He had a l r e a d y argued t h a t the s t a t e , and the f a m i l y have 
t h e i r d u t i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . Admittedly, i t i s the duty of the 
f a m i l y to provide education f o r i t s own c h i l d r e n . According to him, 
t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between f a m i l y and s o c i a l e t h i c s , and i f the 
s t a t e attempted p a t e r n a l government by p r o v i d i n g a system of 
n a t i o n a l education, i t would be i n t r o d u c i n g f a m i l y e t h i c s i n t o a 
domain to which they d i d not belong, and i n which they could do 
untold harm. He accused l e g i s l a t o r s of f o s t e r i n g t h i s i n t r u s i o n of 
f a m i l y e t h i c s i n t o the e t h i c s of the s t a t e , and of regarding i t as 
an e f f i c i e n t means of s o c i a l b e n e f i t i n s t e a d of something wrong. 
"The i n t r u s i o n of f a m i l y e t h i c s i n t o the e t h i c s of the s t a t e , 
i n s t e a d of being as s o c i a l l y i n j u r i o u s , i s more and more demanded 
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as the only e f f i c i e n t means to s o c i a l b e n e f i t . 
Green s t r e s s e d t h a t i t was a moral duty f o r a person to 
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educate h i s c h i l d r e n . T h i s duty could not be compared w i t h those 
d u t i e s l i k e t h a t of paying debts, of which the n e g l e c t d i r e c t l y 
i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the r i g h t s of some other person. Accordingly, i t 
was a duty w i t h which p o s i t i v e law and hence the s t a t e should have 
nothing to do. On the other hand, the n e g l e c t of i t on the p a r t of 
parents tended to prevent the growth of the c a p a c i t y f o r 
b e n e f i c i a l l y e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t s on the p a r t of the c h i l d r e n whose 
education was l o s t s i g h t of, and i t was on t h i s b a s i s , not as a 
p u r e l y moral duty on the p a r t of a parent, but as the p r e v e n t i o n of 
a hindrance to the c a p a c i t y f o r r i g h t s on the p a r t of the c h i l d r e n , 
t h a t education should be provided by the s t a t e . 
S i m i l a r l y , Sidgwick j u s t i f i e d s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n . 
e d u c a t i o n a l matters i n these words. " I t i s evident t h a t , so f a r as 
p u b l i c funds spent on education tend to make la b o u r e r s more 
e f f i c i e n t , though the l a b o u r e r s w i l l be thereby enabled to earn more 
wages, the employers of labour and the consumers of i t s products 
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w i l l , g e n e r a l l y speaking, share i n the g a i n r e s u l t i n g from the 
i n c r e a s e d e f f i c i e n c y ; so t h a t we may regard such expenditure as 
p r i m a r i l y designed to b e n e f i t the community as a whole by improving 
i t s production, though much of i t has a l s o an important tendency 
to m i t i g a t e the i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e a l t h . I t may 
perhaps be o b j e c t e d t h a t i f t h i s expenditure were r e a l l y p r o f i t a b l e 
to the community, i t would be remunerative to i n d i v i d u a l s to 
undertake i t , and i t might t h e r e f o r e be l e f t to p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . 
But t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w ; s i n c e the l a b o u r e r s i n 
q u e s t i o n or t h e i r parents may be unable to provide the r e q u i s i t e 
means, w h i l e the d i f f i c u l t y of making e f f e c t u a l c o n t r a c t s w i t h the 
l a b o u r e r s or t h e i r p a r e n t s , and the t r o u b l e and expense of 
e n f o r c i n g such c o n t r a c t s , may s u f f i c e to render the p r o v i s i o n of 
such means as u n d e s i r a b l e s p e c u l a t i o n f o r other p r i v a t e 
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i n d i v i d u a l s . " 
T h i s a p a r t , he observed t h a t s t a t e p r o v i s i o n f o r education 
was h e l d to be i n the i n t e r e s t of the s o c i e t y a t l a r g e and t h a t 
p u b l i c funds should be employed i n the moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
improvement of i t s members g e n e r a l l y . I n f a c t , he d e s c r i b e d t h i s 
type of i n t e r f e r e n c e i n v o l v i n g education, and p u b l i c h e a l t h , as 
s o c i a l i s t i c . 
According to Spencer's o r g a n i c theory, the s o c i e t y i s 
c o n s i d e r e d as an organism whose e f f i c i e n t f u n c t i o n i n g depends to 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent on the degree of co-operation among i t s 
p a r t s . The f i t n e s s of t h i s s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , i n a measure, 
depends on the f u l f i l m e n t of some f u n c t i o n i n which the u n i t takes 
p a r t , and the happiness of each u n i t depends a l s o on the normal 
a c t i o n of every organ i n the s o c i a l body. 
T h i s should not be confused w i t h the n o t i o n of s o c i a l i s m . Sidgwick 
employed i t t h e r e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t from p a t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n 
and to show t h a t the aim of the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s not the w e l f a r e of 
a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l but the w h o l e e s o c i e t y . 
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A f t e r s e t t i n g out these i d e a s , he t u r n s to oppose s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n w e l f a r e m a t t e r s . I t i s r e a l l y unreasonable because, 
i"£ the s o c i a l organism as a u n i t should s e c u r e the co-operation, 
happiness, and e f f i c i e n c y of i t s p a r t s , those p a r t s should be 
h e a l t h y , r e c e i v e good education and l i v e i n good houses. When the 
s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s to provide these t h i n g s , no r e d u c t i o n of freedom 
i s i n v o l v e d , and i f i t i s , i t w i l l not be as s e r i o u s as i t w i l l be 
i f they are l e f t unprovided f o r . Spencer must have been c a r r i e d 
away by the law of adaptation and the d o c t r i n e of s u r v i v a l of the 
f i t t e s t to an u l t i m a t e d e f e a t of the laws of l i f e which he 
propagated. These laws demand t h a t people should be given the 
freedom to c a r r y on l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s . The s t a t e , by 
p r o v i d i n g these amenities, a s s i s t s the people to achieve t h e i r end, 
and make t h e i r l i b e r t y more v a l u a b l e . 
People's freedom i s determined according to the extent to 
which they a r e i n t e r f e r e d w i t h by other people or to the measure to 
which t h e i r wishes are f r u s t r a t e d by other people. Hence, a person 
l a c k s p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y only i f he i s prevented from a t t a i n i n g h i s 
goals by other i n d i v i d u a l s . I f i t i s i n the economic or s o c i a l 
f i e l d , he i s s a i d to s u f f e r economic or s o c i a l s l a v e r y r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
For l i b e r t y to be meaningful, i t must be v a l u a b l e . No i n d i v i d u a l 
w i l l c l a i m t h a t h i s a c c e s s to medical treatment i n a case where f e e s 
ar e p a i d , i s v a l u a b l e i f he cannot pay f o r the c o s t of the treatment. 
There i s no d i f f e r e n c e between l e t t i n g a poor man who s c r a p e s a 
l i v i n g go to the h o s p i t a l f o r treatment when he i s s i c k , s u b j e c t to 
h i s a b i l i t y to pay f o r the treatment, and imposing a ban t h a t people 
who e a r n l e s s than f i v e pounds a week should not go to h o s p i t a l s 
f o r treatment. They a l l mean the same t h i n g i n the sense t h a t a 
person's freedom i s l i m i t e d because of h i s low income. I n the one, 
h i s freedom i s v a l u e l e s s s i n c e he cannot a f f o r d to pay f o r the 
treatment, and i n the other, h i s l i b e r t y i s l i m i t e d because of h i s 
low wages. 
There are c e r t a i n b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e which a person 
r e q u i r e s f o r the f r e e e x e r c i s e of h i s f a c u l t i e s . I t i s important 
t h a t every peson has these, i f h i s freedom i s to be v a l u a b l e . The 
most important of these n e c e s s i t i e s a r e good l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , 
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h e a l t h and adequate education. The c o s t of producing or p r o v i d i n g 
them i s i n most c a s e s too high f o r an i n d i v i d u a l to a c q u i r e , or 
the demand may be g r e a t e r than the supply w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t i f 
the i n d i v i d u a l i s l e f t to provide h i m s e l f w i t h these n e c e s s i t i e s 
u n a s s i s t e d , he thus f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent to 
e x e r c i s e h i s f a c u l t i e s , though he has the freedom to provide h i m s e l f 
w i t h them. The concept of l i b e r t y i s not v i o l a t e d by the s t a t e when 
i t provides most of these n e c e s s i t i e s a t the g e n e r a l expense of the 
s o c i e t y and allows every i n d i v i d u a l equal freedom to use them. 
Acc o r d i n g l y , i f the spontaneous development of p e r s o n a l i t y or 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y a re the main purpose of demanding i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , 
t h i s i s b e t t e r achieved by the s t a t e p r o v i d i n g those n e c e s s i t i e s 
whose c o s t i s r a t h e r too high f o r the i n d i v i d u a l or group of people 
to provide f o r themselves. T h i s i s not d e p r i v i n g people of t h e i r 
freedom, but making i t more v a l u a b l e to them. 
From t h i s premise, i t could be argued t h a t M i l l had s e t 
out i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r the development of p e r s o n a l i t y . 
On the other hand, Spencer had c a r r i e d h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c view to 
extremes, thus making the i d e a of freedom w o r t h l e s s . I f according 
to h i s views, freedom i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r s o c i a l and 
i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , i s i t more or l e s s v a l u a b l e when many people l i v e 
and work under poor c o n d i t i o n s of h e a l t h , housing and education ? 
L i b e r t y , under t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s v a l u e l e s s and l e a d s to s o c i a l 
r e t a r d a t i o n i n s t e a d of p r o g r e s s . 
I t i s c l e a r on these grounds t h a t i n contemporary B r i t a i n , 
M i l l ' s views are more r e l e v a n t t h a t Spencer's. Spencer on the other 
hand, g r e a t l y exaggerated h i s case and s e r i o u s l y under-estimated 
the a b i l i t y of the s t a t e to p l a y a c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t i n s o c i a l 
change. N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t s o c i a l systems w i l l not 
be r a d i c a l l y changed by mere l e g i s l a t i o n remains to the p o i n t . I f 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e were d e s i r a b l e f o r the s o c i a l w e l f a r e of 
i n d i v i d u a l s , how f a r can freedom be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h law ? 
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Law and L i b e r t y : - I t i s e s s e n t i a l to i n d i c a t e what k i n d of law, 
r e f e r e n c e i s made to i n t h i s connection, because not every law i s 
i n i m i c a l to freedom. F o r example, Common Law, q u i t e u n l i k e s t a t u t e 
law, i s not t r a d i t i o n a l l y regarded as forming an o b s t a c l e to 
n a t u r a l freedom. I t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted as a guardian of l i b e r t y . 
I t i s un w r i t t e n and does not d e r i v e i t s a u t h o r i t y from any express 
d e c l a r a t i o n of the w i l l of the l e g i s l a t u r e or government. I t 
depends f o r i t s a u t h o r i t y upon the r e c o g n i t i o n given by the c o u r t s 
to p r i n c i p l e s , customs and r u l e s of conduct p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g 
among the people. L i b e r t y i n i t s conventional use, i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n sidered as a human r i g h t , and a c c o r d i n g l y , i n s t e a d 
of forming an impediment, to i t , common law f o s t e r s i t . On the 
other hand, s t a t u t e law i s an e d i c t of the l e g i s l a t u r e , an a c t of 
parliament, an instrument by which the s t a t e governs. T h i s i s the 
law people regard as an i n f r a c t i o n of t h e i r l i b e r t y . As the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a t e and t h i s law i s r a t h e r s u b t l e , any 
r e f e r e n c e to the law i n t h i s s e c t i o n , p e r t a i n s mainly to the s t a t e 
and v i c e v e r s a . 
Though t h i s law i s an e v i l , i t i s a n e c e s s a r y e v i l and 
e s s e n t i a l f o r the enhancement of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . I f people's 
freedom were an end, how could i t c o - e x i s t w i t h law ? Obviously, law 
cannot be done away w i t h as i t i s ne c e s s a r y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n 
of l i b e r t y . 
Both M i l l and Spencer conceived the s t a t e and p u b l i c 
o pinion a s p o t e r i t i a l t h r e a t s to i n d i v i d u a l freedom. The individual, 
as they saw the matter, was being so submerged i n the s o c i e t y t h a t 
he tended to l o s e h i s sphere of f r e e a c t i o n . I t was t h e i r d e s i r e to 
pr e s e r v e elbow room f o r i n d i v i d u a l f r e e a c t i v i t y , which should be 
immune from the p r e v a i l i n g tyranny of the s t a t e , p u b l i c opinion 
and f e e l i n g ; i n . a d d i t i o n i n s t e a d of i n c r e a s i n g s t a t e f u n c t i o n s 
to d e l i m i t them. Spencer w i t h h i s u s u a l a t t i t u d e of marked 
abhorence of the s t a t e was prepared to a s s i g n n e g a t i v e d u t i e s to i t . 
S t a t e or no s t a t e d i d not bother him much. A l l he wanted to see 
maintained was a system of n a t u r a l l i b e r t y . 
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M i i l r e a l i z e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government was not i n 
i t s e l f a guarantee to i n d i v i d u a l freedom. Government by m a j o r i t y 
could be as t y r a n n i c a l as t h a t by an i n d i v i d u a l or as t h a t by a 
few people. He t h e r e f o r e endeavoured to s e c u r e a sphere of f r e e 
a c t i o n s a c r e d to the i n d i v i d u a l . Within t h a t sphere the s t a t e has 
no r i g h t to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the person's a c t i o n as i t only a f f e c t s 
him. But w i t h other a c t i o n s which he d e s c r i b e d as ot h e r - r e g a r d i n g , 
the s t a t e c ould r i g h t l y i n t e r f e r e i f the person's a c t i o n would 
cause i n j u r y or harm to o t h e r s . Though i n h i s attempt to demarcate 
one sphere of a c t i o n from another, many inroads were allowed the 
s t a t e i n t o a person's space of a c t i o n . Here, law can be r e c o n c i l e d 
w i t h freedom i f the person concerned t r i e s to r e f r a i n from 
engaging h i m s e l f i n those a c t i o n s which cause i n j u r y to o t h e r s . I f 
i t i s i n a ca s e where laws a r e enacted to p r o t e c t people, an 
i n d i v i d u a l would have h i s freedom unimpaired, i f he obeyed the 
laws. 
Spencer considered the s t a t e as a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to 
freedom. He was one of the e c c e n t r i c s who would hot i d e n t i f y 
l i b e r t y w i t h any p o l i t i c a l a p p l i a n c e e s t a b l i s h e d to maintain 
freedom. He b e l i e v e d i m p l i c i t l y i n a n a t u r a l system of l i b e r t y . 
Probably he was convinced t h a t as th e r e were n a t u r a l laws guiding 
people, i t would be sup e r f l u o u s developing c i v i l laws to c o n t r o l 
them. Ac c o r d i n g l y , he would only, a l l o t the f u n c t i o n of a d m i n i s t e r i n g 
j u s t i c e to the s t a t e . To him, "freedom i n i t s a b s o l u t e form i s the 
absence of a l l e x t e r n a l checks to whatever a c t i o n s the w i l l prompts, 
and freedom i n i t s s o c i a l l y - r e s t r i c t e d form i s the absence of any 
other e x t e r n a l checks than those a r i s i n g from the presence of other 
men who have c l a i m s to do what t h e i r w i l l s prompt. The mutual 
checks hence r e s u l t i n g a r e the only checks which freedom i n the 
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t r u e sense of the word, p e r m i t s . " So long as the i n d i v i d u a l i s 
r a t i o n a l and does not i n f r i n g e the equal sphere of f r e e a c t i o n of 
other people, the s t a t e does not tamper w i t h him. 
Hobbes and then Locke t r i e d t o s o l v e the problem by means 
of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . T h i s c o n t r a c t made the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e 
dependent on the i n d i v i d u a l s . I t s power was not ab s o l u t e , and 
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could not do whatever i t l i k e s a phenomenon which Spencer t r i e d 
t o . e x p l a i n w i t h h i s j o i n t - s t o c k theory. As long as the i n d i v i d u a l 
i s guaranteed s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y , he i s o b liged to obey the c i v i l 
l a ws. When the s t a t e f a i l s i n i t s duty about a s s u r i n g the i n d i v i d u a l 
of h i s s e c u r i t y , he i s not o b liged to obey. I t i s c l e a r then t h a t 
so long as the s t a t e does not f a i l i n i t s duty, i n d i v i d u a l freedom 
can be r e c o n c i l e d with law by obedience on the p a r t of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
Bentham a l s o attempted to provide a s o l u t i o n by arguing 
t h a t freedom and o b l i g a t i o n are i n t e r - r e l a t e d . L i b e r t y i s a c r e a t i o n 
of the s t a t e and i s followed by subsequent o b l i g a t i o n . L i b e r t y and 
law could be r e c o n c i l e d a c c o r d i n g to Bentham's views i f the 
i n d i v i d u a l could obey. A person i s guaranteed h i s freedom by the 
s t a t e , and the person on h i s s i d e i s o b l i g e d to obey the s t a t e . A l l 
i n a l l , i t has been shown t h a t law, hence the s t a t e , i s not i n i m i c a l 
to freedom. I f i t i s an e v i l , i t i s a n e c e s s a r y e v i l . To r e c o n c i l e 
both, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l obeys the c i v i l laws of 
the s o c i e t y . 
I f c i v i l laws and hence the s t a t e were e s s e n t i a l to l i b e r t y , 
what about s o c i e t y - should l i b e r t y be guarded a g a i n s t i t s 
i n t e r f e r e n c e ? Before examining l i b e r t y and s o c i e t y , i t i s n e c e s s a r y 
t o d i s c u s s a t r a i t of Spencer's which showed a marked hatred f o r 
government. He was not only ready to d e l i m i t i t s f u n c t i o n s but a l s o 
to oppose p o s i t i v e remedial s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n a g a i n s t s o c i a l e v i l s 
of h i s time. How could t h i s a t t i t u d e be e x p l a i n e d ? 
P r o f e s s o r Barnes t r i e d to a t t r i b u t e t h i s r e a c t i o n a r y 
a t t i t u d e to the development of the e v o l u t i o n a r y h y p o t h e s i s , which 
provided a new " n a t u r a l i s m " . I t was g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the 
h i g h l y organized forms of animal l i f e emerged from lower types i n an 
automatic and independent manner. Spencer, convinced t h a t t h e r e was 
a d i r e c t s i m i l a r i t y between o r g a n i c and s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n , could 
contend t h a t s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n was a p e r f e c t l y spontaneous process 
which a r t i f i c i a l human i n t e r f e r e n c e could i n no way quicken but 
might f a t a l l y impede or d i r e c t . 
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Admittedly, P r o f e s s o r Barnes's e s t i m a t e of the impact of 
the i d e a of " n a t u r a l i s m " and n a t u r a l s c i e n t i f i c laws on him i s 
j u s t i f i a b l e . His r e l i a n c e on these laws i s shown i n h i s 
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autobiography, - where he a s s e r t e d t h a t the laws of s o c i e t y were 
of such a type t h a t n a t u r a l e v i l s would r e c t i f y themselves by 
v i r t u e of a " s e l f - a d j u s t i n g p r i n c i p l e " . I n h i s words: "Then comes 
the c o r o l l a r y t h a t those people are absurd who suppose t h a t "every 
t h i n g w i l l go wrong u n l e s s they are c o n t i n u a l l y i n t e r f e r i n g ..... 
they ought to know t h a t the laws of s o c i e t y a r e of such a c h a r a c t e r 
t h a t n a t u r a l e v i l s w i l l r e c t i f y themselves "by v i r t u e of a 
" s e l f - a d j u s t i n g p r i n c i p l e " . There f o l l o w s the i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t i s 
n e e d f u l only to maintain order - t h a t the f u n c t i o n of government 
i s "simply to defend the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of man - to p r o t e c t person 
and property - to prevent the aggressions of the powerful upon the 
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weak - i n a word, to a d m i n i s t e r j u s t i c e . But t h e r e i s another 
p o i n t which needs c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s i s the element of h i s 
p e r s o n a l e x p erience. I t i s q u i t e d i f f i c u l t to say which of the two -
p e r s o n a l experience and the impact of " n a t u r a l i s m " - had a s t r o n g e r 
hold of him i n h i s advocacy f o r a n a t u r a l system of l i b e r t y . 
Spencer remarked i n h i s autobiography t h a t he came from 
a d i s s e n t i n g f a m i l y and was r e a r e d i n t h a t atmosphere. His f a t h e r , 
he n o t i c e d , showed s i g n s of d i s r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y . He a f f i r m e d 
as w e l l t h a t the same moral t r a i t e x i s t e d i n him. T h i s was the 
f i r s t problem h i s u n c l e had to b a t t l e w i t h when he was a t Hinton. 
An important p o i n t the u n c l e wrote about i n h i s l e t t e r to Spencer's 
f a t h e r . "The grand d e f i c i e n c y i n Herbert's n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s i n 
the p r i n c i p l e of f e a r . And i t i s only so f a r as h i s r e s i d e n c e w i t h 
me has s u p p l i e d t h a t p r i n c i p l e i n a degree unusual to him, t h a t 
a f t e r a few s t r u g g l e s he e n t i r e l y surrendered h i m s e l f to obey me 
w i t h a promptness and a l a c r i t y t h a t would have given you p l e a s u r e 
to w i t n e s s , and the more obedient I have observed him the more I 
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have r e f r a i n e d from e x e r c i s i n g a u t h o r i t y . " 
With such a d e f i c i e n c y , except f o r the b r i e f p e r i o d he 
was at Hinton, he was allowed to grow i n an atmosphere of 
u n r e s t r a i n e d freedom. From h i s p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , he must have 
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always i d e n t i f i e d freedom w i t h a l e s s degree or absence of 
a u t h o r i t y . I n the s o c i e t y , the only l e g i t i m a t e and accepted 
a u t h o r i t y i s the s t a t e . As he had a d i s r e g a r d f o r a u t h o r i t y , would 
i t hot be the same f e e l i n g he was p r o j e c t i n g to the s t a t e ? Hence, 
he was q u i t e prepared to i d e n t i f y freedom w i t h l e s s government. He 
had experienced l i f e both i n an atmosphere emptied of a r t i f i c i a l 
r e s t r a i n t w h i l e at home, and had been s u b j e c t to some s o c i a l 
d i s c i p l i n e w h i l e l i v i n g w i t h h i s u n c l e . He p r e f e r r e d the former 
and t h a t was why he ran away once from h i s u n c l e to r e t u r n home. 
Would t h i s experience or the e f f e c t of s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e not make 
him p r e f e r people to l i v e under a system of n a t u r a l l i b e r t y than 
under a r e s t r a i n e d one ? 
L i b e r t y and S o c i e t y : - At the o u t s e t , we must c l e a r our minds as to 
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what s o c i e t y means. As i t has been shown before, both M i l l and 
Spencer d e s c r i b e d i t as a f i c t i t i o u s body - a mere e n t i t y . " I t may 
be s a i d t h a t a s o c i e t y i s but a c o l l e c t i v e name f o r a number of 
i n d i v i d u a l s . C a r r y i n g the c o n t r o v e r s y between nominalism and 
n 
r e a l i s m i n t o another sphere, a n o m i n a l i s t might a f f i r m t h a t j u s t as 
t h e r e e x i s t only the members of a s p e c i e s , w h i l e the s p e c i e s 
c o n s i d e r e d apart from them has no e x i s t e n c e ; so the u n i t s of a 
s o c i e t y alone e x i s t , w h i l e the e x i s t e n c e of the s o c i e t y i s but 
v e r b a l . I n s t a n c i n g a l e c t u r e r ' s audience as an aggregate which by 
d i s a p p e a r i n g a t the c l o s e of the l e c t u r e , proves i t s e l f to be not 
a t h i n g but only a c e r t a i n arrangement of persons, he might argue 
t h a t the l i k e holds of the c i t i z e n s forming a n a t i o n Thus we 
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c o n s i s t e n t l y regard a s o c i e t y an an e n t i t y . . . . Thus, when 
r e f e r e n c e i s made to s o c i e t y i t i m p l i e s the i n d i v i d u a l s who compose 
i t . 
I t has been f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
the e x i s t e n c e of laws i s t h a t i t saves the i n d i v i d u a l from being 
i n t e r f e r e d w i t h by other i n d i v i d u a l s who are more powerful than 
h i m s e l f . I n so f a r , t h e r e f o r e , as' the s t a t e s u b s t i t u t e s ordered and 
reasonable i n t e r f e r e n c e f o r the a r b i t r a r y i n t e r f e r e n c e .'• 
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of i n d i v i d u a l s , i t i n c r e a s e s freedom. The workman r e c e i v e s more 
freedom under a trade union a c t which f o r b i d s c o n t r a c t i n g out 
than when he i s s u b j e c t to the w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l employed; 
he may have more r e a l l i b e r t y by the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g of a 
t r a d e union than i f he has to bargain f o r h i m s e l f . 
R e a l l i b e r t y i s p o s s i b l e not i n a s o c i e t y where we have no 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s ( a s Robinson Crusoe had) but where our 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h them are the e x p r e s s i o n of reason. But not every 
i n d i v i d u a l i s r a t i o n a l , and i t i s a g a i n s t these i r r a t i o n a l beings 
t h a t freedom needs p r o t e c t i n g . I t i s out of f e a r of these beings 
th a t most t h i n k e r s have been advocating the l i m i t a t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' n a t u r a l freedom i n order t h a t the scope l e f t them can 
be p r o p e r l y made use of. 
Hobbes f o r example, aff i r m e d t h a t "the f i n a l l cause, End 
or Designe of men (who n a t u r a l l y love l i b e r t y , and Dominion over 
o t h e r s ) i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h a t r e s t r a i n t upon themselves, 
. . . . i s the f o r e s i g h t of t h e i r own p r e s e r v a t i o n , and of a more 
contented l i v e thereby, t h a t i s to say, of g e t t i n g themselves out 
from t h a t m i s e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n of Warre, which i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
consequent to the n a t u r a l 1 P a s s i o n s of men, when there i s no 
v i s i b l e Power to keep them i n awe, and t y e them by f e a r e of 
punishment to the performance of t h e i r covenants, and o b s e r v a t i o n 
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of those lawes of nature " What these laws of nature a r e , I 
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have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . A person cannot f r e e l y pursue h i s own 
i n t e r e s t i n h i s own way when t h e r e i s no s e c u r i t y t h a t other people 
w i l l obey th e s e laws. Because of i n s e c u r i t y , i t has been n e c e s s a r y 
to e r e c t an a u t h o r i t y though" a t the r i s k of l i m i t i n g i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
freedom, w i t h power to keep o b s t a c l e s out of people's way. 
Accordingly, the r e l a t i o n between l i b e r t y and s o c i e t y i s such t h a t 
although a person i s p a r t of s o c i e t y , f o r h i s freedom to be 
v a l u a b l e , or to be saved from r e g u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e of i r r a t i o n a l 
people, the s o c i e t y needs c o n t r o l l i n g by an a u t h o r i t y . The 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h i s r e g u l a t i n g apparatus i n v o l v e s reducing the 
person's n a t u r a l freedom but on the balance he i s b e t t e r o f f having 
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i t c u r t a i l e d i n order to enjoy the scope l e f t him without any 
f u r t h e r o b s t r u c t i o n . 
M i l l p r o f e s s e d to have d i s c o v e r e d a p r i n c i p l e which should 
enable people to decide what i n t e r f e r e n c e impaired the s p i r i t of 
l i b e r t y . He admitted t h a t without the s t a t e and without c o n s i d e r a b l e 
s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e , freedom was impossible, but f o r the 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a person to e x i s t i n a s o c i e t y , i t was e s s e n t i a l 
to draw l i m i t s to which h i s freedom would be l e f t unimpaired e i t h e r 
by the s t a t e or s o c i e t y . Examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i e t y 
and an i n d i v i d u a l , he emphasized th a t "each w i l l r e c e i v e i t s proper 
s h a r e , i f each has t h a t which more p a r t i c u l a r l y concerns i t . To 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y should belong the p a r t of l i f e i n which i t i s c h i e f l y 
the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t i s i n t e r e s t e d ; to s o c i e t y , the p a r t which 
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c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t s s o c i e t y . The s o c i e t y should only concern 
i t s e l f w i t h those a c t i o n s of the i n d i v i d u a l which a f f e c t e d i t . The 
degree to which he supported t h i s view was shown i n h i s r e l u c t a n c e 
to encourage any l e g a l s a n c t i o n to those a c t i o n s which are 
s e l f - r e g a r d i n g and d i d not i n v o l v e any r i s k of l i f e . M a i n taining 
the "negative" n o t i o n of freedom, M i l l ' s j u s t conception of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between l i b e r t y and s o c i e t y was one i n which the 
l a t t e r a b s t a i n e d from i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the former, provided t h a t 
l i b e r t y d i d not produce a c t i o n s which a f f e c t e d i t s i n t e r e s t s . 
Spencer took a d i f f e r e n t view from M i l l . He e s t a b l i s h e d 
a p r i n c i p l e which would j u s t i f y i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a person's 
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freedom, but d i f f e r e d from M i l l i n t h a t (probably i n f l u e n c e d by 
h i s i d e a of " s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t " ) so long as an i n d i v i d u a l 
was a c t i n g w i t h i n h i s l i m i t s of f r e e a c t i o n ; the s o c i e t y ought not 
to i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s freedom whether or not t h a t l i b e r t y was 
producing a c t i o n s which a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t of the s o c i e t y . 
L i b e r t y or S t a t u s ? There i s y e t another point which needs 
mentioning before ending t h i s chapter. Taking the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n 
of the mass i n the 19th century, and v a r i o u s l i b e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n , 
c ould i t not be s a i d t h a t what M i l l , to an extent Spencer and other 
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l i b e r a l t h i n k e r s were s t r i v i n g f o r i n the name of freedom was, 
s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n or s t a t u s ? Does the l a c k of freedom or d e n i a l 
of i n d i v i d u a l s ' r i g h t s not amount to l a c k of r e c o g n i t i o n on the 
p a r t of the p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s e s t h a t the working c l a s s e s are e n t i t l e d 
to some r i g h t s ? Without much argument, i t i s c l e a r t h a t the 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact of such a treatment w i l l make the working 
c l a s s e s or t h e i r sympathizers f e e l t h a t they a r e being a l i e n a t e d 
from the s o c i e t y . I n other words, they w i l l f e e l t h a t they do not 
belong to the s o c i e t y . 
F o r a person to f e e l t h a t he i s an Englishman or a 
N i g e r i a n , he must be recognised by h i s group or the community t h a t 
he i s what he cl a i m s to be, and has the same r i g h t s or the same 
amount of l i b e r t y as any other person i n the same s o c i e t y . The 
hankering a f t e r h i s freedom by an i n d i v i d u a l can be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t being ignored or despised, or not being t r e a t e d as 
a being or person. His d e s i r e i s f o r a c o n d i t i o n i n which he can 
f e e l t h a t he i s a person, because he i s t r e a t e d as a r e s p o n s i b l e 
agent, whose w i l l i s taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n as any other person 
i n the community as being e n t i t l e d to t h i s or t h a t r i g h t , 
The d e f i n i t i o n of freedom o f f e r e d by M i l l and Spencer 
has been reviewed. The p r i n c i p l e s which the former endeavoured to 
e s t a b l i s h f o r j u s t i f y i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e l e a v e s a l o t of inroads f o r the 
s t a t e or any a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l . M i l l ' s 
e f f o r t f o r example to mark o f f the d i s t i n c t i o n between s e l f and 
o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s breaks down under examination. The s t a t e 
has s t i l l some grounds f o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the s e l f - r e g a r d i n g 
a c t i o n s , though h i s stand i s excusable i n the sense t h a t some one 
i n h i s c a p a c i t y d e a l i n g w i t h some s o c i a l s c i e n c e cannot demarcate 
a c t i o n s as r i g i d l y as a n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t . Again Spencer was 
p u t t i n g the c a s e about i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t s . How these l i m i t s can be 
drawn i n a s o c i e t y i s s t i l l d i f f i c u l t to determine. 
However, a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of M i l l ' s chapter i n The P r i n c i p l e s 
of P o l i t i c a l Economy on the probable f u t u r e of the l a b o u r i n g 
c l a s s e s tends to s u b s t a n t i a t e the view t h a t the demand f o r freedom 
i m p l i e s a c l a i m f o r s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n or s t a t u s . As regards t h e i r 
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w e l f a r e , two c o n f l i c t i n g t h e o r i e s have been propagated. The 
one i s c a l l e d the theory of dependence and p r o t e c t i o n and the 
other t h a t of self-dependence. 
According to the f i r s t theory, a l l t h a t concerns the 
working c l a s s e s should be r e g u l a t e d f o r them and not by them. "They 
should not be r e q u i r e d , or encouraged, to t h i n k f o r themselves, or 
g i v e to t h e i r own r e f l e c t i o n or f o r e c a s t an i n f l u e n t i a l v o i c e i n 
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the determination of t h e i r d e s t i n y . " M i l l observed from the way 
these c l a s s e s were t r e a t e d t h a t " a l l p r i v i l e g e d and powerful 
c l a s s e s , as such, have used t h e i r power i n the i n t e r e s t of t h e i r 
own s e l f i s h n e s s , and have indulged t h e i r s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e i n 
d e s p i s i n g , and not i n l o v i n g l y c a r i n g f o r those who were, i n t h e i r 
e s t i m a t i o n , degraded, by being under the n e c e s s i t y of working f o r 
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t h e i r b e n e f i t . I t i s t h i s l a c k of s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of these 
c l a s s e s by the p r i v i l e g e d c l a s s e s which r e q u i r e s remedying. The 
way of remedying or a l l e v i a t i n g i t i s by curbing the power of the 
wealthy c l a s s . M i l l d i d "not a f f i r m t h a t what has always been must 
always be, or t h a t human improvement has no tendency to c o r r e c t the 
i n t e n s e l y s e l f i s h f e e l i n g s engendered by power; but though the e v i l . 
may be l e s s e n e d , i t cannot be e r a d i c a t e d u n t i l the power i t s e l f 
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i s withdrawn. 
"As the i d e a i s e s s e n t i a l l y r e p u l s i v e of a s o c i e t y only 
h e l d together by the r e l a t i o n s and f e e l i n g s a r i s i n g out of 
pecuniary i n t e r e s t s , so t h e r e i s something n a t u r a l l y a t t r a c t i v e i n 
a form of s o c i e t y abounding i n s t r o n g p e r s o n a l attachments and 
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d i s i n t e r e s t e d s e l f - d e v o t i o n . How can t h i s f e e l i n g of p e r s o n a l 
attachment and d i s i n t e r e s t e d s e l f - d e v o t i o n be k i n d l e d ? A sense of 
belongingness to a s o c i e t y may not be the best way of a r o u s i n g i t , 
but comparably i t may be one of the best ways. I t i s when a 
N i g e r i a n i s recognised by h i s f e l l o w countrymen as belonging to 
them and t r e a t e d as having equal r i g h t s w i t h them, can he whole-
h e a r t e d l y devote h i s s e r v i c e s to h i s country. 
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The need f o r p r o t e c t i o n may be f e l t by i n d i v i d u a l s , 
when they a r e f r e q u e n t l y exposed to i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l danger 
and where th e r e i s no e s t a b l i s h e d means of o f f e r i n g i t . " the 
f e e l i n g s between p r o t e c t o r and pr o t e c t e d , whether between Kings and 
s u b j e c t s , r i c h and poor, or men and women, can no longer have t h i s 
b e a u t i f u l and endearing c h a r a c t e r where t h e r e a r e no longer any 
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s e r i o u s dangers from which to p r o t e c t . " Even where dangers e x i s t , 
the i n d i v i d u a l has "the laws to p r o t e c t them". These go to show 
t h a t the i d e a of p r o t e c t i o n or dependence i s o b s o l e t e . I t i s time 
people a r e recognized as i n d i v i d u a l s and given the r i g h t of 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
M i l l added a g r e a t e r l i g h t to t h i s d e s i r e of s e l f -
dependence amd r e c o g n i t i o n by a f f i r m i n g t h a t " i t i s on a f a r other 
b a s i s t h a t the w e l l - b e i n g and w e l l - d o i n g of the la b o u r i n g people 
must hen c e f o r t h r e s t . The poor have come out of l e a d i n g - s t r i n g s , 
and cannot any longer be governed or t r e a t e d l i k e c h i l d r e n . To t h e i r 
own q u a l i t i e s must now be commended the ca r e of t h e i r d e s t i n y 
The theory of dependence attempts to dispense w i t h the n e c e s s i t y of 
these q u a l i t i e s i n the dependent c l a s s e s . But now, when even i n 
p o s i t i o n they are becoming l e s s and l e s s dependent and t h e i r minds 
l e s s and l e s s a c q u i e s c e n t i n the degree of dependence which 
remains, the v i r t u e s of independence are those which they stand i n 
need of. What ever a d v i c e , e x h o r t a t i o n , or guidance i s h e l d out to 
the l a b o u r i n g c l a s s e s , must henceforth be tendered to them as 
„98 
e q u a l s , and accepted by them w i t h t h e i r eyes open. 
The d e s i r e of the working c l a s s e s f o r self-government and 
having t h e i r w i l l r e s p e c t e d can make i t " . . . . q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t 
they may demand, i n many c a s e s , the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e i r a f f a i r s , and the r e g u l a t i o n by law of v a r i o u s 
t h i n g s which concern them, o f t e n under very mistaken i d e a s of 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t . S t i l l , i t i s t h e i r own w i l l , t h e i r own id e a s and 
suggestions, to which they w i l l demand t h a t e f f e c t should be given, 
99 
and not r u l e s l a i d down f o r them by other people." These views 
tend to suggest t h a t the demand f o r l i b e r t y i s another way of 
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a s s e r t i n g t h a t these working c l a s s e s r e q u i r e s o c i a l 
r e c o g n i t i o n as human beings with some r i g h t s . 
T h i s p l e a f o r s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n or s t a t u s which 
was being made i n the name of l i b e r t y was brought out by 
M i l l i n these words - he pointed out t h a t "very 
d i f f e r e n t i s the s t a t e of the human f a c u l t i e s where a 
human being f e e l s h i m s e l f under no other e x t e r n a l 
r e s t r a i n t than the n e c e s s i t i e s of nature, or mandates of 
s o c i e t y which he has h i s share i n imposing, . . . . i t 
i s a great a d d i t i o n a l stimulus to any one's s e l f - h e l p 
and s e l f - r e l i a n c e when he s t a r t s from even ground, and 
has not to f e e l t h a t h i s success depends on the 
impression he can make upon the sentiments and d i s p o s i -
t i o n s of a body of whom he i s not one. I t i s a great 
discouragement to an i n d i v i d u a l , and a s t i l l g r e a t e r one 
to a c l a s s , to be l e f t out of the c o n s t i t u t i o n ; to be 
reduced to plead from outside the door to the a r b i t e r s 
of t h e i r d e s t i n y , not taken i n t o c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h i n . 
The maximum of the i n v i g o r a t i n g e f f e c t of freedom upon 
the c h a r a c t e r i s only obtained when the person acted on 
e i t h e r i s , or i s looking forward to becoming, a c i t i z e n 
as f u l l y p r i v i l e g e d as any other". 
I n d e a l i n g with p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l 
l i b e r t y , both M i l l and Spencer strove f o r s i m i l a r ends. 
T h i s end can best be conceived as the p r e s e r v a t i o n of 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m . The i n d i v i d u a l i s considered v i t a l i n 
the s o c i e t y and i f he were to p l a y h i s p a r t e f f e c t i v e l y 
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i n the move towards progress h i s freedom of a c t i o n must 
not be i n f r i n g e d upon. T h i s freedom of a c t i o n should 
not be an u n l i m i t e d one. I f every person i n the 
s o c i e t y should c l a i m the same freedom, i t means that 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y should have i t s proper sphere of a c t i o n . 
I n order to ensure that the i n d i v i d u a l a c t s w i t h i n h i s 
own f i e l d of a c t i o n , government i n s t i t u t i o n i s deemed 
necessary and i t s duty should be merely that of s a f e -
guarding i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . 
What a c t u a l l y separated them i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e was 
the approach. While M i l l wavered between i n d i v i d u a l i s m 
and c o l l e c t i v i s m , Spencer kept to extreme i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 
To him, the best means of p r e s e r v i n g i n d i v i d u a l i s m was 
by l e a v i n g a person's f i e l d of a c t i o n f r e e from s t a t e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e or any other e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y . M i l l , on 
the other hand, argued that i t could be done not by 
abandoning s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e completely but by 
r e s e r v i n g a l a r g e a r e a of a c t i o n f o r the i n d i v i d u a l 
which n e i t h e r the s t a t e nor any other e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y 
should be allowed to t r e s p a s s upon. The s t a t e could 
only i n t e r f e r e when i t s a c t i o n was j u s t i f i e d by the 
p r i n c i p l e of expediency. 
But as i t i s the end which j u s t i f i e s the means, 
the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e approaches can be 
over-looked w h i l e s t r e s s i s l a i d on the end, and to a' 
l a r g e extent both men had endeavoured to safeguard a 
l a r g e sphere of f r e e a c t i o n f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . 
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